President Truman’s fateful decision to use nuclear warfare againist the Empire of Japan is often considered one of the most controversial decisions in American history. One camp of thought approves of the bombing due to the amount of Americans that were presumably spared accordingly. On the contrary, there are also discissions as to whether the attack in August 1945 was necessary to end the war. Not surprisingly, there are also many historians that now theorize the bombing was aimed to frighten their soon-to-be rival Soviet Union. These criticisms and analyses question the necessity of atomic weapons in the pacific war, and consequently raise concerns surrounding the ethics of Truman’s decision.
The goal of this paper is not to decide where the use of the bomb falls on the ethical spectrum or discuss every controversy surrounding its use. Rather, this paper will serve as an exploration of how influential the bomb was in Japan’s decision to surrender. It’s important to understand both the Japanese and American perspective when determing if the bomb truly ended the war.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1945, the Japanese were victim to countless attacks by American B-29s; their major cities were severly damanged and naval blockades resulted in food scarcity. Japanese casualities were rapidly approaching three million with no end to deaths in sight. Defeat was certain.
As August 1945 began, Japan’s military victories were rare and leaders were generally hoping for stalemates. Much earlier, Emperor Hirohito ordered his armies to raise the cost of America’s island campaigns, and in doing so, encouraged Japanese soldiers to avoid dishonoring themselves through surrender by meeting an honorable death. Even though the dedication to fighting continued and his people’s morale was holding up, at this point, Hiro knew a final battle for the homeland was not a reasonable prospect. However, from the American perspective, “the suffering of Japanese and civilians and the absence of an Atomic bomb were not enough, in the spring of 1945, to shake the cabinet’s resolve to fight on, if the alternative was unconditional surrender” (Rotter 180). To the Americans the Japanese were prepared to fight on, as seen in former PFc E. B. Sledge’s account in his memoir:
“What we had experience in fighting the Japs on Peleliu and Okinawa caused us to formulate some very definite opinion that the invasion…would be a ghastly bloodletting…It would shock the American public and the world. [Every Japanese] soldier, civilian, woman, and child would fight to the death with whatever weapons they had, rifle, grenade, or bamboo spear” (Fussell 212).
To the Americans, the Japanese determination to fight on is evident; however in reality, Japan knew their fate. Whereas the Japanese were seeking an end to the fighting, the Americans assumed the Japanese military still wanted to pursue adhere to their ‘pre-invasion patriotic song,’ ‘One Hundred Millions for the Emperor,’ says Sledge, “meant just that” (Fussell 212).
In July of 1945, President Truman and other international leaders issued the Potsdam Declaration, a detailed terms of surrender for the Empire of the Japan. This ultimatum stated that, if Japan did not surrender, it would face “prompt and utter destruction.” This surrender must include, with no negotiations, “The “unrestricted occupation of Japanese territory, total authority in the governing of Japan, dismantlement of Japan’s military and military industrial complex, a restructuring of Japanese society, and an Allied-run war crimes trials” (Miscamble 80). To the dismay of the American-led alliance, Japan’s PM Suzuki Kantaro publicly dismissed the Potsdam terms in late July. Although Hirohito and other key members of the cabinet sought Soviet help to bring the war to an end, they were not prepared during June and July to accept the Allied demands for unconditional surrender. Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō’s response, “with regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will” (Rotter 184). This rejection of the Potsdam Declaration is an additional example of Japanese government’s decision to order civilians to fight on.
Americans worried that the limited number and poor quality of roads in any invasion plan would slow its progress (Rotter 185). Not only that, but after being witness to – and hearing stories of – Japanese Kamakaze missions on Allied soldiers, American’s fighting feared Japanese suicide attacks. This fear, as Paul Fussell explains, “is having to come to grips, face to face, with an enemy who designs your death” (Fussell 211). Although many of these assumptions may have been irrational, the fear in the American mindset perhaps fogged any rational thinking. From the US perspective, the likelihood of American casualities in any ground invasion increased as days without peace continued (Miscamble 82).
Based on his knowledge of the aforementioned dedication of the Japanese to the Emperor’s war in the Pacific, Truman sought to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This desire to avoid a ground campaign against Japan was in an attempt to decrease both Japanese and American military and civilian casualities. To him, this was the lesser of two evils. It’s interesting to contrast this rationale with the Japanese government fear of their inevitble downfall, a fear that manifests itself in a tough demonstration of civilian dedication. Perhaps if communication were better, history would be different.
It’s hard to determine if the bomb truly ended the war. Although it’s clear that Japanese were nearly interested in peace negotiations, without great communication between the two countries, this perhaps mutual desire for peace was impossible. With that, American intelligence needed to rely on emotional accounts of wartime participants. To the Americans, Joseph Alsop best explains it, “The true, climactic, and successful effort of the Japanese peace advocates … did not begin in deadly earnest until after the second bomb had destroyed Nagasaki. The Nagasaki bomb was thus the trigger to all the developments that led to peace” (Fussell 215).