Over the years, major intra-state conflicts have occurred around the world which incited international concerns and sparked several controversies. At present, one of the most notable conflicts within national borders is the conflict in Sudan. Early in 2003, several armed groups launched and initiated a rebellion in Darfur claiming the region had suffered decades of political marginalization and economic neglect from successive national government. In turn, the government responded with force, and the fighting quickly escalated.
Until 2011, Sudan was a single country. On the same year, following decades of civil war, the southern section seceded which became the world’s newest nation: South Sudan. Despite the ensuing independence, conflict continues to roil both countries brought about by various political identities and ethnically based armed units which resulted in economic turmoil and loss of hundreds of lives. (Oxfam, 2018).
Background
Based on the present scenario, the actual mechanisms for the political management of South Sudan greatly collapsed primarily as a result of shutting down their national oil production six (6) months after independence as well as political competition within the ruling party-elites. In addition, South Sudan’s poor institutionalized societies was even aggravated by a lack of professionalized army. Instead, a collection of militia arose, each of which was organized on the basis of personal loyalty to its commander (Noel, 2016).
In an attempt to resolve the aforesaid conflict, President Salva Kiir resorted to a rule known as the “Big Tent” policy. By its nature, the policy aims to create a stable Sudanese state with a self-sustaining economy and a stable all-inclusive government, in which all different ethnic groups, different tribes and various religious groups, agree upon that form of governance and are equal stakeholders with equal opportunities in the political, economic and social fields—a state in which they are able to co-exist with harmony and development; hence, the implementation of the policy would result in a political dispensation in which all regions and people are able to co-exist and interact with communal harmony, economic development and social prosperity.
In essence, under the said policy, all the former militias – armed, trained, supported and directed by Khartoum against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) were forgiven and integrated into the new government and army of South Sudan.
In 2006, the “Big Tent” policy reached its pinnacle during the Juba declaration in which militia leader, Paulino Matip Nhial, was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the national army. Necessarily, the “Big Tent” policy was conducted in such a manner as to safeguard the smooth and successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and timely conduct of the referendum: the informed and concrete determination to ensure successful secession from Khartoum and to realize political stability and social prosperity in the infant Republic of South Sudan (Wël, 2018).
Analysis
At the onset, it cannot be denied that the “Big Tent” policy by President Kiir succeeded in integrating all the militia groups into the army and government of South Sudan. Despite its short period of success, however, the policy did not work for the following reasons:
First, one cogent reason why the policy did not work is the fact that the policy harbours the practice of allowing the use of state funds to acquire loyalties by licensing corruption which in reality, necessitates large income. Inevitably, while the public expenditure of South Sudan subsequent to its independence significantly increased, however, the public expenditure was incurred neither as a means of investing in infrastructure nor for public good but rather, to primarily fund the elites as well as the military.
Second, the “Big Tent” policy inadvertently resulted in major inflation of the numbers and ranks of the national army. As a result of this sudden change, grim cases of incentivizing violent rebellion ensued between militia groups who aims to outdo each other in pursuit of power notwithstanding the likelihood of carnage and destruction. In turn, other rebels were encouraged to reap the same fruits by feasting on more resources and titles in total disregard existing rules and policies.
Finally, it can be surmised that the unitization of the national army could have prompted Riek Machar to create a military force in pursuit of power following his spiteful fallout with President Kiir in 2013. Furthermore, Riek Machar manifested before several states Neur control more than seventy percent (70%) of the army; hence, this claim alone bolstered the latter’s pursuit of military means in acquiring power in South Sudan.
Based on the foregoing enumerated reasons, it is imperative that other alternatives be implored to forestall the rising conflict in Sudan. The necessity of resorting to other alternatives, aside from the idea of a unified military force, can be grounded upon the fact that Sudan had always been the subject of battle between formidable forces. Therefore, since these military forces have different views based on their own religious principles as well as political perspectives, a policy which seeks to establish a unified military force is futile.
Policy Options
Given the fact that military powers dictate the political system of Sudan in general, the following policy options can be adopted in pursuit of effectively addressing the conflict in Sudan without resorting to the use of arms and force, to wit:
a. International states to exert financial pressure policy tools on regime elites, enablers and facilitators.
The exertion of financial pressure policy tools against the regime elites, their enablers and facilitators would allow several international stake holders to regain leverage over Sudanese policy decision-makers in furtherance of reviving efforts at comprehensive peace. In order to achieve this alternative, the U.S. government, for instance, should revoke the Obama executive order and replace it with enhanced policies directed to countenance the effects of money laundering. Only then will international stake holders be able to facilitate a revitalized peace process that is both comprehensive and inclusive.
b. Intensify the Bilateral Economic Relations.
In the past, several international stake holders have played a key role in helping negotiate the CPA between Sudan and South Sudan. This in effect, had laid the groundwork for South Sudan’s eventual independence referendum and secession in 2011. Verily, in order to bolster established bilateral economic relations with various international stake holders, the Sudanese government should monitor its progress as regards countering terrorist groups, ending the threat of multiple resistance army, putting to end its own offensive internal military operations as well as improving humanitarian access.
c. Establish a Civic Protection Force in furtherance of a National Dialogue Process.
Another possible alternative in solving the conflict in Sudan is the establishment of regional protection forces through the initiative of international stake holders. The said regional protection forces shall consist of troops from various neighboring countries and shall be mandated to protect civilians against the immediate and imminent threat from warring parties. In realizing this alternative, the said regional protection force may opt to take control of the capital city and to remove all other armed group in the area. Thereafter, the capital city may be utilized as a protected space for political and civic dialogue where all South Sudanese civil and political forces can be represented in a non-violent manner—a process of national political dialogue and nation building.
Recommendation
In general a collective number of Muslims, Christians and adherents of indigenous African beliefs have been the constituents of Sudan. Further, a careful scrutiny of the religious structure of the diversified nationalities in Sudan would reveal that Islam and Arabism, among others, are widely practiced. Inevitably, the country’s 30 million people are deemed as one of the most ethnically, linguistically and geographically diverse populations on the continent (Kebbede, 1997).
In this connection, it is a well-settled unspoken rule, borne from religious norms and practices, that religious leaders exercise some degree of influence over their respective constituents which greatly affect the latter’s conduct in forming opinions about salient political issues. Consequently, over the past years, our society have widely recognized the significant role of religious leaders in fostering peace and their power to incite conflict in their capacity either as preventers or instigators. For this reason, I recommend that an immediate call on all religious leaders be made for the latter to adopt steps in addressing and/or minimizing the effects of the present conflict.
In this context, it is of no doubt that religious leaders can act particularly to temper heightened conflicts. While religion is deemed as broad, complex and all-encompassing, influencing the minds of the religious constituents to act in accordance with a given standard of conduct may prove beneficial in reducing the risk of getting into far more complex conflicts brought about by a multifarious array of individual and unfounded actions. In the same light, given the fact that religion is considered as a source of shared identity and solidarity, the same can be utilized by religious leaders in convincing their constituents to refrain from engaging in any form of behavior which others may regard as unacceptable or unlawful (Mustafayev, 2014).
As to the manner of implementation, although religious leaders tend to influence their religious constituents in one way or another, it should be emphasized that one’s exercise of free will and volition is something that cannot be ultimately transgressed and usurped by another. Therefore, all religious constituents have the bounden duty to fully understand the bearing of religion during the prevalence of conflict and violence for only then will religion be fully recognized as part of the solution.
Conclusion
In sum, it is worthy to emphasize that Sudan had strived under tumultuous circumstances prior to its emergence as a sovereign political entity. Like most of the African states, Sudan’s emergence as a political unit is rooted from a long historical happenstance and the fact that it came to existence is not solely attributed to its own internal dynamics and the predisposition of its constituents but rather, it is a product of an ever-changing political system under the continued influence of political elites who wield unyielding military powers.
On the contrary, it should likewise be noted that the northern Arab elites who have ruled Sudan for nearly four decades have carelessly failed to pursue an inclusive national strategy which fosters equality for all citizens in the political, economic and socio-cultural sphere. Therefore, in order to sufficiently address the unending conflict in Sudan, it is essential to resort to means that somehow aims to harmonize all the cultural, ethnic, economic, political and religious principles of its constituents. Only then will the conflict in Sudan be effectively addressed.
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