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Essay: Exploring Armstrong’s Inner Sense Theory & Its Capacity to Acquire Self-Knowledge

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In his text, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, author D.M. Armstrong proposes and defends the “Inner Sense Theory,” an empiricist method of self-knowledge acquisition, wherein self-knowledge is acquired through an additional faculty of perception, the inner sense. Inner sense can be described as a sort of inward perception, or introspection, which allows us to both observe and apprise our mental states, which Armstrong would argue is critical to purposive mental activity. Armstrong argues that introspection is comparable to sense-perception, or outward perception, on a variety of accounts, some of which include both introspection and sense-perception’s propensity to error, as well as both introspection and sense-perception’s materialistic identity within the mind. The validity of the Inner Sense Theory as a method of self-knowledge acquisition rests in part upon the assumption that introspection is comparable to sense-perception, because it is this ‘inner sense’ that allows us to have access to our mental states. Therefore, critics of Inner Sense Theory frequently attempt to distance introspection from other sense faculties in an attempt to draw distinction between the two and therefore derail the Inner Sense Theory’s validity as a method of self-knowledge acquisition. Such criticisms include C.B. Martin’s argument and Sydney Shoemaker’s argument, which both draw skepticism towards introspection’s identity as a sense-perception. I will argue that Inner Sense Theory is a valid method of self-knowledge acquisition because introspection is indeed comparable to sense-perception in general.

In order to relate introspection to sense-perception, Armstrong identifies two characteristics of typical outward perception that are shared with introspection. First, Armstrong argues that “when we are aware of happenings in our own minds, there is nothing we are aware with” (Armstrong 325). It is important to distinguish here that what we are aware with is not what we are perceiving with, or in other words a sensory organ. When Armstrong refers to what we are aware with, he is referring to a sensory faculty that we have conscious control over, and that we could therefore manually turn off. Under normal, human circumstances, no such sensory faculty is under this conscious control, as we cannot, for example, consciously ‘turn off’ our senses such as sight or audition. Since introspection also lacks such conscious control, it is not unfounded to compare sense-perception to introspection. Secondly, Armstrong argues that our “introspective awareness is confined to our own minds” (Armstrong 235) or materialistic in nature, as opposed to the Cartesian dualist philosophy wherein the mind is separate from the body. This prescribes the notion of introspection with a variety of limitations that make it more similar to other sensory faculties. The materialistic confinement of introspection implies the mechanism in which introspection happens has a propensity to error, and is not subject to an infinite perceptual regress. These points are noteworthy when compared to sensory faculties that we are more familiar with; we know that our eyes fail us frequently (optical illusions, hallucinations, et cetera), and that the system of optical perception is confined with a region of the brain and not an entity that could exist without it. As both introspection and self-perception possess these attributes, it is not unlikely that introspection is a form of perception.  

The first criticism I will address is that of C.B. Martin, wherein he attempts to debase the comparison of introspection to sense-perception. Martin notes that when discussing perception in general, it is important to distinguish between ‘perception without belief’ and ‘perception without acquiring belief’. Perception without belief is the ability to perceive an event and know it is erroneous or illusory due to an abundance of contrary evidence. Perception without acquiring belief is the ability to perceive an event and know it will not be altered from this instance to the next. Martin would argue that outer perception satisfies both concepts; one can outwardly perceive without belief, and one can outwardly perceive without acquiring a belief. However, Martin would argue that introspection fails as a sense-perception against these criteria; one can introspect without acquiring a belief, but cannot introspect without belief. Martin argues that it is impossible to dismiss an introspective state as erroneous or illusory due to the intrinsic nature of introspection. This is because much of our ability to discount perceptual observations come from our ability to cross-reference our perceptions with the perceptions of others. This cross-reference is seen frequently in sense-perception, but it is very difficult in introspection. For example, one can perceive that the horizon is flat without believing the Earth is flat, while, according to Martin’s logic, the same person cannot perceive that they are angry while believing they are scared. Martin would argue that this lack of parallel between introspection and sense-perception is enough to distance introspection from sense faculties, and therefore draw skepticism to Inner Sense Theory as a method of acquiring self-knowledge.

Armstrong counters this claim with what I find to be a satisfactory argument. He suggests a hypothetical scenario in which an individual has the capacity to identify illusory introspections. In this situation, an individual could have the ability, by their own devices, to discount an erroneous introspection (a false emotion or behavior-altering mental state, perhaps) without requiring input from others to support their rejection of it. Armstrong retaliates to the challenging of this potentially unrealistic hypothetical scenario to suggest that ‘introspection without belief’ may not occur, but “it is only a contingent fact that it does not occur” (Armstrong 329). In other words, he suggests that introspective observation (and rejections thereof) is contingent upon belief only, while sense-perception is not exclusive to belief. Armstrong likely extrapolated this argument from his opinions towards first-personal asymmetry, in that introspection is contingent upon beliefs only because the examination of mental states is the only path that is available to it as a ‘sense’. Comparatively, the other sense-perceptions have other paths that can be observed and compared between persons.  Following this argument, there is no reason to dismiss the similarity between introspection and sense-perception, as the difference is not that in capacity of sensory ability but in access of information.

The second counterargument I will address is that suggested by Sydney Shoemaker. Shoemaker presents his counterargument in Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity as such; one can perceive another individual, and further, perceive whether that individual is perceiving. If introspection is a form of perception, one ought to be able to introspect a particular mental state, and further, introspect whether that mental state is within one’s awareness. Shoemaker disagrees with the latter statement, as he claims that it is “impossible that I should perceive that I was not perceiving the mental state, because I automatically must be perceiving it” (Armstrong 331). Shoemaker would argue that this is a fundamental difference between introspection and perception, because in all other sense faculties, it is possible to empirically ascertain whether a certain stimulus has been perceived. Due to the intrinsic nature of introspection, it is difficult to empirically settle whether an individual is perceiving something, whether it be a mental event or otherwise. Shoemaker claims that this difficulty is enough to distance introspection from sense-perception, and therefore enough to discount inner sense as a method of self-knowledge acquisition.

Armstrong responds to this criticism in the following way. One can perceive another’s mental state, albeit mediately. For example, sense-perceptions surrounding an individual (expression, tone of voice, redness of skin) could suggest that this individual is angered. Therefore, I am mediately perceiving their mental state of anger from a third person standpoint. If one can perceive another’s mental state, however, you can argue that one can mediately perceive another’s awareness of that mental state with enough scrutiny and observation. It is possible by these lights that one can perceive another’s mental state and perceive if they are aware or unaware of this state. This is, of course, all non-inferential, and cannot be know without uncertainty due to the asymmetry of introspective analysis. But Armstrong argues that if you apply the same logic to your own mind, the argument still holds. One can be aware that they are not perceiving a mental state, simply by realizing that part of one’s mind is not perceiving it. In other words, one can simultaneously be perceiving a mental state, and perceiving that they are not perceiving a mental state. This is due to the fact that introspection, like other forms of sense-perception, cannot perceive the innumerable features of an environmental stimulus (in the case of introspection, the environmental stimulus is the deliverance of mental states and features of mental states). Therefore, there are mental states that are introspected and other mental states that are not introspected, and this introspection (or lack thereof) is happening simultaneously.  Armstrong notes that these mental states that we are not introspectively aware of can be perceived introspectively. Therefore, one can perceive a mental state without being aware of that mental state, and Shoemaker’s argument therefore fails to derail Inner Sense Theory as a viable means of acquisition of self-knowledge.

Skepticism drawn towards Inner Sense Theory typically revolves around Armstrong’s claims surrounding the first-personal experience and perceptual asymmetry. Armstrong argues in A Materialist Theory of the Mind that perception, including introspection, has privacy that is purely empirical and only ours due to the physiological devices that allow us to sense them. “This privacy is purely empirical,” Armstrong notes, “and we can imagine having the same direct perceptual access to states of other people’s bodies that we now have to our own” (Armstrong 325). Both C.B Martin and Shoemaker’s criticisms were countered using hypothetical examples along those lines of reasoning. In the former case, third-personal access to other’s introspections can help verify our own, and in the latter case, third-personal access to other’s introspections can elucidate whether they, and therefore I, can perceive a state and perceive an awareness of that state. A substantial criticism is drawn here by proponents of rational accounts of self-knowledge acquisition; such third-personal access to the mental states of others is impossible, and therefore the validity of one’s claims about his mental states is permanently subject to scrutiny. Rationalists would argue that the validity of one’s mental states are immediately known (as Descartes said, “I think therefore I am”), and therefore no such direct perceptual access to the mental states of others is need to verify one’s said mental states. I would reject this rationalist model on the following account. A translucent, pristine access to the consciousness would require a superhuman, immaterial mind that is capable of perceiving any and all mental states given rise by a particular stimulus. Based on the propensity of introspection to error, and the amount of introspective states that would be required for accurate perception of all mental states, the likelihood that the rationalist theory of dualism does not hold, at least within the confines of self-knowledge acquisition. Therefore, it is logical to assume that empiricist models of self-knowledge hold, and Armstrong’s responses to the criticisms of the comparison of introspection to perception support Inner Sense Theory as a method of self-knowledge acquisition.

Inner Sense Theory rests upon the premise that introspection is a form of perception comparable to that of outward sense. D.M. Armstrong would argue that introspection is a form of sense-perception on the grounds we have no entity or mechanism of introspection in which we are consciously in control of, and that introspective awareness is materialistic in nature. C.B. Martin and Sydney Shoemaker attempt to derail Inner Sense Theory by distancing introspection from perception, but their criticisms are countered by Armstrong’s counterclaims, which explore the first-personal experience and perceptual asymmetry to derive hypotheticals to determine the likely nature of perception and introspection. The rationalist account of mental state perception is also challenged, leaving the empiricist account of mental state perception as the more likely method of self-knowledge acquisition. As it stands, Inner Sense Theory is a valid form of of empirically based self-knowledge acquisition due to the accurate comparison and multitude of parallels between introspection and other sense-perceptions.

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