Descartes utilised his meditations to attempt to defeat the revived scepticism of the renaissance and to reinstate epistemological certainty by finding a philosophical Archimedes point – from which a criterion of truth could be deduced. Through this, Descartes utilised methodological doubt employing the sceptic method (mainly associated with Pyrrhonian scepticism) about theoretical scientific episteme to establish certainty. Descartes, ultimately failed to defeat the sceptic by means of continued errors within his reason, principally in his attempt to move beyond the confines of the cogito.
Initially, Descartes first meditation mirrored the method of the sceptic to undermine the content of what is presumed to be known. Descartes employed the sceptic method through his famous three waves of doubt, in which he doubted the account of the senses, as well as memory, implemented the famous dream argument and ultimately solidified the arguments by means of the malignant demon. To illustrate the former the idea of perceiving the size of an object from differing distances leads to the allusion that a building, for example, can grow in size. The ‘dream argument’ attempts to undermine the validity of experience by arguing for the idea that I am equally as likely to be in a dream as I am to be awake. These two initial arguments clearly attempt to undermine the value of the meditators current knowledge, the argument though, falters when considering the distinction between ‘any’ knowledge holding the potentiality to be false and ‘all’ knowledge being false. Consequently, Descartes introduces the malignant Demon whose sole purpose is to trick the meditator into maintaining false knowledge. Descartes summarises this line of reason through the conclusion “there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies”. Within the initial meditation Descartes clearly is following the distinct method of the sceptic failing to assert any certainty over his previously held beliefs on account of the three waves of doubt. Descartes extends the sceptical method to the mind and therefore the internal content of the meditator himself.
Secondly, Descartes moves forward from the doubting of the mind in hope of asserting a philosophical Archimedes point, to escape the ‘Problem of the Wheel of Knowledge’. The meditator utilises the idea of thoughts in an attempt to escape the bounds of sceptical doubt and to assert “one unshakeable truth”. In an attempt to undermine the current sceptical position Descartes follows the reason surrounding the idea of thoughts existing. Descartes employs the notion of conceptual truths, whereby a ‘mind’ and ‘thought’ are conceptually true, in that one equally entails the other as much as the term ‘hill’ entails ‘valley’. Resultantly, Descartes moves toward the notion of an ‘I’ as stated one “cannot conceive of thought without a thinking thing” and so it follows that a “thing” is a direct product. This revelation is summarised by means of the cogito (cogito ergo sum) which can be found in Descartes Discourse on the Method. The cogito potentially can be understood as an inference;
P1 If thoughts exist, then a mind which contains them exist (conceptual truth).
P2 thoughts exist at present (‘I’ am having thoughts now).
C1 A mind exists (‘I’ exist).
Clearly, in this Descartes has fully asserted a philosophical Archimedean point in which one is aware of the ‘I’ and thus massively undermines the sceptic position yielding all that the mind entails. This being, the mental capacity of an ‘I’ according to Descartes’ idea of ‘self-transparency’ and one which provides an opportunity to deduce a rule of truth. Descartes presents the mind body distinction in which the mind as transparent is better known than the body or external bodies. Furthermore, Descartes highlights the manner in which the meditator was able to draw the conclusion of the cogito, in that the meditator clearly and distinctly perceived the conclusion of the cogito. Clear pertains to something present and open for deliberation, whilst distinct is something separate and precise from all other perceptions. Thus, Descartes has established absolute certainty in the mind of the meditator that as a mind he himself exists and equally discerned a criterion of truth from this one indubitable intuition.
Ultimately, Descartes presented two arguments for the existence of God in order to lead to certainty about ‘intuitions’ in memory, previous intuitions and for awareness of external bodies. Descartes trademark argument, the ‘causal argument’, establishes the existence of God by means of the meditator having a clear and distinct idea of God. The causal argument is as follows:
P1. I have an idea of God
P2. Whatever exists has an adequate cause
P3. The idea of a perfect being cannot be caused by an imperfect being
P4. The infinite can only cause the infinite
C1. God exists
Descartes presents the fact that through possessing an idea of God, comprehending all the premises, the meditator is resultantly left with the indubitable conclusion that God exists. Consequently, there is no option by means of the premises, but to accept that God implanted the idea of himself upon the meditators mind as only he can cause himself. This argument, therefore, aims to categorise God’s existence. The aim is to prevent God from being classified as artificial (fictitious) and to implement the idea of God as innate. The idea of God is the effect which resultantly leads the meditator to the cause. This point allows for Descartes to undermine the sceptic position and assert (when in line with the ontological argument) that the rest of knowledge is obtainable to the meditator as it is fully affirmed by a non-deceiving being– fully defeating the sceptic.
The final facet of Descartes’ attempt to defeat the sceptic comes in the form of the ontological argument which operates in similar internalist manner as the causal argument. The ontological argument utilised by Descartes followed a typical structure like that of Anselm. The argument can be seen as follows:
P1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature or essence of a thing can be truly affirmed to that thing
P2. A supremely perfect being has all perfections
P3. Existence is a perfection
P4. I clearly and distinctly perceive that existence belongs to the nature of a supremely perfect being
C1 a supremely perfect being exists
Descartes here utilises once again the new criterion of truth to affirm the existence of God or a “supremely perfect being”, following from the idea that clear and distinct perception leads to truth. In this case, the clear and distinct perception of the nature or essence of a supremely perfect being leads to the conclusion that existence is a predicate of a supremely perfect being on account of existence being a perfection. This argument clearly therefore maintains similar objections as those levelled against Anselm.
Initially, however, it is important to assert that Descartes’ method leading to the discovery of the cogito is flawed. The immediate point in undermining the validity of the cogito does not come by means of the assertion itself, but the manner in which Descartes proceeds to maintain conceptual truth when supposedly having disregarded all previous beliefs. The consequent idea of an ‘I’ is arguably flawed, in the sense that one can equally assert, without conceptual truths, that successive thoughts do not pertain to a subject. To present George Lichtenburg, thoughts themselves exist, thinking is going on and yet this does not necessarily follow that Descartes is able to posit an ‘I’. This becomes even more substantial a point when combined with the fact that Descartes is not in a position as of yet to assert conceptual truths due to a criterion of truth having not yet been discovered. Although, arguably Lichtenburg’s argument is better suited to an ‘I’ which entails all facets of the meditator – memory, emotion and so on. The point still holds that Descartes is not at this point in a position to assert a “thinking thing” or “persisting subject” on account of successive thoughts. Clearly here, the foundations upon which the Descartesian argument stands are not firm, the objection itself characterised by Lichtenburg is though, harsh, but adequate given the nature of Descartes line of reason when seen without conceptual truths.
Despite this, if one were to continue forward with the investigation on Descartes success in defeating the sceptic further structural issues would be encountered. This namely falls around the causal and ontological arguments for God’s existence. There are several arguments against both the causal and ontological argument such as the implicit premise of causal adequacy with the illustration of the blueprint of a super computer being in the mind of a person, the Cartesian circle or the Kantian existence is not a predicate. The focus in this piece, however, will be surrounding the first premise. initially Hobbes’ argument surrounding the impossibility of premise 1 will be the focus in which the aim will be to expose the flaw in the idea of God. For Hobbes’ nominalist view the distinction between idea and image was Descartes failing, in the sense of possessing the definition of God, does not represent the full concept of the being and it solely is an individual reference one which fails to define the concept’s nature. This clearly contrasts heavily with Descartes and undermines the way in which Descartes argues for the idea of God, the idea in this instance is unobtainable and represents an image of God but not the actual nature. Though, one may reject Hobbes objection on the basis that definitions themselves reflect the true nature of the concept. This comes especially when considering the idea of triangle actually holding its true nature as say the definition indicates that the internal angles add up to 180 degrees would not be known. It is clearly a more favourable epistemological stance, but this line of objection would still lead to queries on the content of the concept/idea.
The issue as to what the nature of the ‘supremely perfect’ being is, which in both arguments is known clearly and distinctly still remains, thus the first premise of each argument still seems problematic. In this, both arguments can be scrutinised on the basis that the being of supreme perfections, as stated by Pascal is the “God of the philosopher” and is therefore not necessarily in line with the Abrahamic religions. This is clear when considering the following manner in which the perfections have been asserted. They are the fullest extrapolation of differing qualities – infinity and perfect existence. Resultantly, Descartes supremely perfect being could equally in one sense be a supremely perfect evil being as much as it could be a supremely perfect good being. This is shown by the fact that they both are capable of being perfections. This argument would further undermine Descartes success in defeating the sceptic, as it is a requirement, as highlighted in the Cartesian Circle for the supremely perfect being to affirm clear and distinct truths, as he is not a deceiver. This conclusion is resultantly absurd when placed in line with this objection. Descartes reply to the Cartesian Circle, the memory argument, is equally as redundant when considering that this ‘being’ is required to affirm memories and collective intuitions to prevent repetition. Clearly in this, despite the premises possibly validating the conclusion of a supremely perfect being’s existence, when siding against Hobbes, still does not necessarily conclude upon the Abrahamic notion of God being good. Therefore, the God in question is more than likely to be a deceiver and thus can be equally be the malignant demon of the three waves of doubt as much as it could be the Abrahamic God of the Bible.
In conclusion, when considering Descartes attempt in defeating the sceptic, one is confronted with an apt theory which holds distinct structural issues. The problematic use of conceptual truths is implemented without a criterion of truth, the cogito is asserted in a non-sceptical manner and the idea of God is either debatable or potentially unobtainable.
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