Distinguished philosophers Peter Singer and Onora O’Neill, in each of their essays, present differing viewpoints regarding what duties we Americans have to those living in third- world countries who are less privileged than we may be, specifically those people affected by famine and poverty. In his essay, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer suggests that by donating to aid agencies, Americans can prevent suffering and death from famine, poverty, and a lack of basic health care without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. On the other hand, in her essay, “Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems,” O’Neill states that because people living in these treacherous conditions have limited autonomy, it is crucial that we may never treat humanity as a mere means, drawing on Kant’s Principle of Humanity. While each of these notions have merit, I firmly believe that Peter Singer presents the stronger argument of the two.
Peter Singer, in his argument in favor of giving aid, utilizes the strong version of the Singer Principle, which indicates that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do it. Now, many people may be unsure of what constitutes as something of moral importance. In order to explicate what he means by this, Singer offers an example known as The Shallow Pond. In this scenario, imagine you are walking to work per your usual route, in which you happen to pass by a pond. One morning, on your stroll, you notice a small child has fallen into the pond and appears as if he may be drowning. You are now faced with an important decision — you can either jump in and attempt to rescue the child, but in the process, destroy your brand new $200 Italian leather shoes and arrive to work late, or you can just continue walking and allow the child to drown without causing any collateral damage. Singer would argue that, in this situation, the moral thing to do, and what you ought to do, would be to jump into the pond and, at least, make an effort to save the drowning child. The child’s life has a significantly greater amount of moral importance than your shoes and being late to work, and therefore, by jumping into the pond, you would not be sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
In relation to the duties we have to the world’s poor, Singer first asserts that suffering and death from a lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. Then, taking the strong Singer Principle into consideration, he claims that by donating to aid agencies, many Americans can prevent suffering and death from the formerly mentioned without sacrificing anything nearly as important. This premise assumes that many Americans have the ability to give up as little as a few cents or dollars without compromising their own lifestyle. So, for this reason, many Americans ought to donate to aid agencies — it is our moral duty and obligation.
On the other hand, Onora O’Neill presents her argument in favor of giving aid using a much different line of reasoning. O’Neill makes use of Immanuel Kant’s Principle of Humanity, insisting that his principle gives us an obligation to provide aid to those in need. The Principle of Humanity yields two sets of duties that we must follow — the duty of justice and the duty of beneficence. The duty of justice claims that we must act that we never use humanity merely as a means, and the duty of beneficence requires we act that we use humanity as an end. O’Neill incorporates the duty of justice into her proposal, stating that we should not treat people in ways that reflect a maxim they could not rationally consent to. Due to the fact that those who live in disadvantageous situations that have been stricken by famine and poverty display a vulnerability and a limited autonomy, it is critical that we do not treat these people as a mere means by deceiving, coercing, or taking advantage of them ourselves, because they would not be able to rationally consent to these sorts of things, just as they are not able to rationally consent to their current states. It is also crucial that we do not participate in institutions that deceive, coerce, or take advantage of said people, because doing so would further diminish their autonomy. As if the duty of justice tells us how not to act, the duty of beneficence does the opposite — it tells us how to act. In O’Neill’s eyes, the duty of beneficence, that we use humanity as an end, suggests that we must act to support impoverished people, and in turn, improve their autonomy. One way to do this is to provide aid. Whether it be through material contributions, educating others about the needs of these people, or influencing trade policy, we can easily boost the affected people’s autonomy without too much burden.
While Singer and O’Neill’s arguments are both in favor of providing aid to the world’s poor, there are areas in which their viewpoints stand in opposition. For example, Singer approaches the issue with a more utilitarian point of view, and O’Neill leads with a Kantian perspective. Singer is more concerned with the consequences of an action, and particularly, if the consequences, providing aid in this case, maximize the amount of possible overall happiness, they can be seen as morally just, because lives derive value from happiness. O’Neill chooses to hone in on benefiting impoverished people’s autonomy by giving aid when needed, whereas Singer does not exactly focus on this aspect. The Kantian perspective, as a requirement of justice, urges us to respect every person’s autonomy, especially those whose autonomy is limited, because in this case, lives derive value from capacity for autonomy. Another slight way in which their arguments come into disagreement is the fact that the type of aid each scholar suggests we give differs. It appears as if Singer is more in favor of monetary donations, while O’Neill promotes not only monetary donations, but policy-changing, educational, and material aid, as well.
After examining each philosopher’s argument, I believe that Singer offers the stronger, more convincing proposition of the two regarding our personal duties and obligations to those in third-world countries afflicted by famine and poverty. Compared to O’Neill’s argument, I think Singer provides a simpler, more concrete thesis that is easier to understand how to act on. O’Neill’s statements seem to be quite broad, which may confuse people attempting to assist those in need, and eventually, lead to further limitation of those affected’s autonomy. Her argument advocates that we do not act in that we use humanity as a mere means, but because there is substantial grey area and are many, somewhat inconspicuous, ways in which this can occur, we may unknowingly do so, and therefore, contribute to the cycle of restricting one’s autonomy even more unintentionally. However, I feel that Singer gives a more conclusive set of statements that allow us to fully comprehend what we can, and should, do to those who fall at a disadvantage because his argument is based on smaller-scale sacrifices. Because of this, there is less confusion concerning our obligations, and I imagine that following his line of reason will lead to a greater contribution from those who are more well-off. When adhering to Singer’s basic argument and putting things into perspective, it seems quite manageable to sacrifice something as simple as a daily drink that costs $2.50 and instead, donating that money to provide bed nets to those suffering from malaria. For these reasons, I believe Singer’s argument is much more compelling than O’Neill’s and may be more effective at inspiring people to take and produce action — his logic is far easier to understand.
Although Singer offers a sound argument, in my opinion, there have been a few objections to it. Critics have claimed that the Singer Principle does not distinguish between the needs of people far away and those nearby, and that we have a greater obligation to help people in our own communities than we have to those who reside in an area very distant from us. Singer addresses this objection by stating that moral principles are impartial; distances between people is not morally relevant. He argues that we can very effectively provide aid to people very far away from us, which refutes the foundation of this objection. If Americans were to solely focus on helping those in their own communities, the people in third-world countries would never receive the aid they need, even when their suffering might be equivalent or even greater compared to those in our homeland. Since there are many agencies and outlets nearby in which we are able to contribute to to assist those nearby and at a greater distance from us, we ought to do so and take both parties into consideration.
Even though we may be surrounded by a variety of aid agencies that we are able to donate to, critics have expressed their uncertainty about how effective these organizations may be at actually providing aid. Singer refutes this claim by offering the fact that there is substantial evidence that money given to these organizations effectively provides aid to those in need, and sometimes, donors are able to actually see how their money has been used. Furthering his reply, Singer draws on The Shallow Pond example I had previously mentioned. If you were only slightly certain that you could actually save the drowning child from the pond, it does not remove your obligation to do so — uncertainty does not remove your duty to help others.
Peter Singer and Onora O’Neill each provide arguments about the duties we Americans have to those in third-world countries who are affected by famine and poverty. However, each scholar makes use of different ethical theories to construct their proposal. Overall, I believe that Singer offers a more plausible and persuadable rationalization to do so, and I feel as if his argument would be more successful in urging people to take action and act justly regarding the issue at hand.
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