The international system seems to be changing due to the effects made by globalization. However, it is just history repeating itself. One of the factors repeated over time is sanctions. Sanctions have been part of the international system for a long time although in different forms. For example, British trade was sanctioned by the Napoleon System. A more specific example to Africa was in South Africa. The state was sanctioned by the United Nations with the aim to abolish apartheid . In both cases the sanctions were economic.
Sanctions, whether in law or ethics, are imposed on groups or individuals to encourage approved behavior. The sanctions can either be positive or negative. However, the term has over the years been used in the negative sense especially in international relations (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2015). The sanctions commonly used are political, economic or social.
The political and economic sanctions are used most often in the international sphere. The economic sanctions involve trade embargoes on states while political sanctions involve alienation of certain people from traveling to other countries than their own. Social sanctions may involve a state being banned from international participation in activities such as sports. The social sanctions have little effect on state compliance as political and economic matters are more important.
Previous work on sanctions have been done by Florea and Chirtoaca (2013) and Kanishchenko and Mamalyga (2015). Florea and Chirtoaca (2013) wrote on sanctions in the International Public Law. Their work draws from agreement such as the 1969 Vienna Convention. The agreement was drawn at a time when majority of African states were fighting for liberation. Hence, African states were not actively involved in making the agreement. It is important to note that the application of such agreements to a continent with different values and cultures is extraneous. The work by Kanishchenko and Mamalyga (2015) pertained to modern trends of economic diplomacy in a globalizing world. Once again majority of the work points to the Northern Hemisphere states and the regional influences of sanctions. As much as a state is sanctioned by the international community, the terms of the sanctions are difficult to adhere to by the regional states around the sanctioned state.
This chapter will investigate the impact of sanctions on South Sudan. The chapter will examine whether the international community imposed economic, social or political sanctions on South Sudan. Moreover, the chapter will investigate whether the sanctions have managed to change the behavior of the entities or individuals sanctioned. The sanction period will pertain to the 2013 civil conflict that still wages on.
2.2 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS
The United Nations Security Council met to decide on the fate of the 18 month long unending conflict in South Sudan. The meeting resulted in drafting of resolution 2206 (2015). The resolution imposed certain measures in order to put an end to the conflict. The measures were in the form of sanctions (UNSC, 2015).
The sanctions were travel bans and asset freezing. These were not applicable to the whole state but to certain individuals and entities. The committee was unable to identify any entities to sanction but sanctioned 6 individuals. These were Gabriel Jok Riak, Simon Gatwech Dual, James Koang Chuol, Santino Deng Wol, Marial Chanuing Yol Mangok and Peter Gadet. These individuals were identified from either side of the conflict. The list was however subject to change once the committee found any individual or entity to be accelerating the conflict or preventing the peace process (UNSC, 2015).
The travel ban was to be implemented by member states where the states were to prevent entry into or transit through their territories. The travel bans were to be imposed on the individuals named above. The states were however to enable entry of their own citizens as the ban is only applicable to the named individuals. The ban was as per paragraph 11 of the resolution (UNSC, 2015).
Asset freezing on the other hand, was to be implemented by member states where all assets pertaining to the named individuals, all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which were on member states territories were to be immediately frozen. The states were to also consider assets owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by individuals/entities on behalf or at their direction. These assets were to be frozen as well (UNSC, 2015).
The member states should ensure that during the initial period the funds are inaccessible to the individuals, their nationals and people within their territory. These guidelines were provided in paragraph 13 of the resolution. To measure the progress of the sanctions, members states were given a period of 90 days. The period was to enable implementation of the resolution (UNSC, 2015).
It is important to note that the resolution did not include an arms embargo. This would suggest that the individuals cannot access their assets but can still be able to access arms using other means such as selling of the oil from the oil rich regions. The sanctioning of lower officials is commendable but higher officials should also have been considered. The sanctions should have also included the president and former vice-president as their actions are of immediate effect to the conflict. The president and vice-president continue to travel within the region and making the need for peace less urgent than it actually is.
In this case, the UN would be considered a toothless dog as the conflict continues to wage on despite the sanctions. Moreover, the decision was made millions of miles away and the direct mediators of the conflict were not involved. IGAD should have been involved in the decision making because they understood the conflict better. The implementation of the sanctions should be more focused on countries immediately bordering South Sudan. These include Kenya, Uganda, DRC, C.A.R, Sudan and Ethiopian. However, some of the countries such as DRC and C.A.R are not stable and may not be able to help resolve the conflict.
As a result, the sanction has had little impact on the conflict. The sanctions may have affected the named individuals but there are many more individuals, entities and third parties at play which may have been considered as part of the sanction. Thus, the panel of experts on South Sudan should have carried out more research.
2.3 EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS ON SOUTH SUDAN
On 10 July 2014, the European Union Council met to make a decision on the conflict in South Sudan. The council arrived at Council Decision 2014/449/CFSP concerning restive measures in view of the situation in South Sudan. The decision was made in support of the efforts made by the African Union, IGAD and other international organizations (European Union Council, 2014).
The measures were to be imposed on individuals obstructing the political process or violating the agreements. In this case, the restrictions were applicable to two individuals who were Santino Deng and Peter Gadet. The European Union Council gave reasons for each individual’s restriction. Santino Deng was said to have violated the 23 January Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This was done by recapturing of Bentiu in May 2014. Peter Gadet violated the 23 January Cessation of Hostilities Agreement by attacking Bentiu in the 15-17 April 2014(European Union Council, 2014).
The state was sanctioned as much as the individuals. This was in terms of supply, transfer or export of arms or ammunition to South Sudan. The use of flags by member states was prohibited as well as use of their aircraft (European Union Council, 2014).
The European Union’s effort for an arms embargo is more commendable compared to that of the UNSC. However, this again was a decision made millions of miles away. Moreover, Europe is not the only region which can supply arms to the country in conflict. Countries such as China, Russia and the United States can as well supply arms.
This chapter was meant to determine the impacts of sanctions on South Sudan, whether political, economic or social. The sanction period pertained to the 2013 civil conflict. Moreover, the chapter was also to determine whether the sanctions have managed to deter the behavior of the individuals or entities sanctions. The findings of the chapter were that the sanctions have had an impact on South Sudan, however, the sanctioned individuals have not changed their behavior.
Gabriel Jok Riak, Simon Gatwech Dual, James Koang Chuol, Santino Deng Wol, Marial Chanuing Yol Mangok and Peter Gadet were the sanctioned individuals by both the UNSC and EU. The sanctions imposed were both political and economic. The political sanction was a travel ban while the economic sanction was freezing of assets. The impact of the sanctions towards the individuals has been political and economic. However, the overall goal to bring peace to South Sudan has failed.
Despite the efforts of the UNSC and EU council, the sanctions seem to be causing more harm than good. Monitoring has not markedly improved, and many of the practices and procedures of sanctions committees are to some extent seriously flawed. The Security Council remains in control and permanent members seem disinclined to modify past practices. They prefer not to be burdened with rules and they do not want to be billed for collateral damage. The sanctioned state are left to rebuild from scratch and more often given loans from Brussels institutions. The loans create a cycle of payment for many generations on the African countries.
Sanctions do hold great promise despite the current inability to prevent or stop conflict. Under certain conditions and measures, sanctions may be able to work. For example, states neighboring the conflicted country to actually come up with the sanctions compared to states and institutions which are nowhere near the region.
ï¿½ï¿½CHAPTER 3: COMMODIFICATION
War has been part of human history. The war or conflict has been over many differing issues. The first world war was triggered by the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. World War Two was caused by Adolf Hilter’s goal to kill all Jews. At the end of all conflicts and wars, peace was negotiated. Majority, if not all, peace agreements were negotiated by the top most officials only. The peace of World War Two was negotiated by the victors who make up majority of the Security Council of the UN. Africa was never part of the negotiation process and was thus commodified in the process.
The first instance of commodification for South Sudan was after the colonial period where Sudan became independent in 1956. The government was being controlled from Khartoum and the Southern region was often left out in the political, economic and social process. This led to subsequent conflicts with the two decade war between the government and SPLM/A being the most significant. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement came at a much needed time with Kenya leading the mediation process through former President Mwai Kibaki.
After the death of the then Vice-president John Garang, the CPA was deemed to no longer sustain the agreement between the two regions. The southern region was then given the chance to either remain with the northern region or separate into two. The separation of the two regions was believed to bring an end to the conflict but an internal conflict was brewing within the southern region itself which eventually led to a civil conflict in December 2013.
Previous work on commodification has been done by Bush (2004). His work suggests that many diplomatic solutions are dependent on agreement between or among the leaders involved in the conflict. Majority, if not all, agreements are per the standards of the leaders and are mostly meant to protect themselves. The war prone society is rarely consider and the discontent by the people results in the reoccurring of conflicts as in the case of South Sudan.
This chapter will find out the relationship between commodification and recurrence of conflict in South Sudan. The chapter will also look at the various peace agreements that have been made before South Sudan became a state as well as agreements afterwards. The agreements that will be examined pertain to peace. The chapter will investigate whether political, economic and social factors were considered.
3.2 THE ADDIS ABABA ACCORD
The British left a well divided country as was the case in Eastern Africa but nation-states were of little consideration at the time.The first military rule by General Abood was not well welcomed and accepted by the Sudanese people. It eventually led to a rebellious uprising in 1964. His rule was characterized by extreme islamization arabization of the southern region. He also expelled foreign missionaries which were largely christians and had spread christianity in the southern region. As a result of the rebellion governance, identity and acceptance of other ethnic groups were the core issues of discussion. This was the emerging point of accords and agreements in the Sudanese political scene (Ahmad,2010).
The rebellion was known as the ‘October Revolution’ but called Anya-Nya war according to the southerners. The transitional government consisted of the military and civilian leadership of prominent elites in the South. These included Agrrey Jaden and William Deng.Exerting considerable effort, the transitional government managed to attract a wide spectrum of politicians representing major political parties from both the North and south to join a round table conference to deliberate Sudan’s most pressing issues of the day. Since it was not able to reach a final conclusion, the conference was suspended and its work was delegated to a 12 man committee composed of representatives of the various political parties (Ahmad,2010).
The committee came up with possible recommendations to solve the country’s issue. Some of the recommendations were decentralization of government, preservation and development of languages and culture.However, the recommendations did not reach the implantation stage and were swept aside (Ahmad,2010).
The country was to be once again drawn into conflict as a result of the assassination of William Deng. This took place in May 1968 during a tour of the South. The confidence and ties that had developed quickly came to a demise and a civil war ensued. At this juncture, the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was formed. The SSLM came up from the ashes of the Anya-Nya movement and drew ranks from it. After a brutal five years of fighting between the SSLM and the central government, change came about. This was as a result of a military takeover at the centre. The new regime announced the June 1969 Declaration which recognized the multiple differences between the North and the South. The declaration also granted the much needed regional autonomy to the South (Ahmad,2010).
A dialogue between the SSLM and the central government was resumed in which the World Council of Churches and Emperor Haile Selassie played a pivotal role in bringing the two parties to the table. The negotiations culminated in the Addis Ababa Accord of February 1972 which paved the way for stopping the war (Ahmad,2010).
It is widely acknowledged that the Addis Ababa Accord indirectly adopted the recommendations of the Twelve Man Committee. The Accord recognized the root problems and attempted to provide serious solutions, thereby initiating autonomous regional rule which provided the southern people enough space for self’determination and guaranteed all rights included in the June 1969 declaration (Ahmad,2010).
This being the first official and significant agreement between the North and the South suggests that commodification was of much greater importance compared to complete involvement of the southern region. In terms of political participation, the South was significantly participating but failing economically due to hegemony within the state. Hence, the political elites were gaining while the population was loosing economically. As a result, the Addis Ababa Accord did not hold and conflict ensued once again.
3.3 THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also referred to as the Naivasha Agreement, is the most crucial milestone in the political development of Sudan and South Sudan.The country had been in almost three decade war. Due to the collapse of the Addis Ababa Accord, reaching the agreement was very difficult. The process of dialogue took more than 5 years just to reach a consensus. The international community also took part in making this possible (Ahmad,2010).
The serious beginning of this dialogue was initiated through the IGAD Declaration of 1994, an approach endorsed by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the Eritrean President Asaias Afewerki, both of whom were experts on Sudanese affairs due to their long stays in Sudan while leading the struggle to remove Mengistu Haile Mariam from power in Ethiopia. IGAD was also assisted by troika which was a combination of Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States and later on Italy.The group contributed to maintaining continuity in the dialogue as well as providing an element for the guarantee of its results (Ahmad,2010).
From the Abuja talks and so forth was the birth of the Machos Protocol of 2002. This set the pace for other protocols which would ensue later on.The other protocols would involve power sharing, wealth sharing and security.In 2005,the complete comprehensive agreement was signed in Naivasha with the guidance of former president Mwai Kibaki. The hopes and future of Sudan was pegged on that agreement compared to those before it (Ahmad,2010).
John Garang de Mabior became the vice president but his time was soon to come to an end in June 2005.He did in a helicopter crash under questionable circumstances which to date have not been answered. He left the CPA as a tool for the peaceful co-existence among the Sudanese but it did not hold as the southern region wanted to become a country of its own, South Sudan.
The data above suggests that the whole CPA was pegged on the leadership and guidance of John Garang. Without him, the agreement was not able to hold. It further suggests the commodification nature of the agreement where the elites were involved and the agreement did not trickle down to the citizens.
3.4 2014 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENTS
In December 2013, South Sudan was engulfed by a civil war which evoked the response of IGAD. IGAD has held a number of meetings for the two warring sides to agree but it seems that the two sides can never agree. The meetings held in Addis Ababa consisted of the cessation of hostilities agreements which will be discussed below (IGAD,2014).
The first cessation of hostilities was agreed upon on 23 January 2014 in Addis Ababa.The agreement was signed by Nhial Deng Nhial and Taban Deng Gai representing the government and the opposition respectively. The agreement was witnessed by Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and General Mohamed Ahmed M. El Dabi (IGAD,2014).
The agreement recognized that the transitional constitution of South Sudan requires peace building through dialogue. The loss of life on 15 December was recognized and various factors led the violence to ensue. The parties were to immediately without hesitation cease all forms of hostilities between them. All forces and armed groups under their control were to as well observe the agreement. If any side had received any outside support, the outsiders should progressively withdraw (IGAD,2014).
The parties were to also cease all forms of hostile propaganda. The use of media and other propaganda campaigns was prohibited. Ethnic propaganda was specially prohibited by the agreement. Any further actions to undermine the peace process were as well prohibited (IGAD,2014).
The protection of civilians was an essential part of the agreement. Both sides were to refrain from causing harm to the civilian population. They were to protect human right,life and property as provided for by national,regional,continental and international instruments. The rights of the girl child were to be protected through prevention of rape,sexual abuse and torture. Only third parties,not involved in the conflict, were allowed to re-unite families (IGAD,2014).
Due to the immediate need for humanitarian assistance, both sides were to allow free and secure flow of humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict. Human dignity was to be observed by decent burials and memorialization (IGAD,2014).
The agreement was to enter into force 24 hour after signature by the Parties and the progressed monitored by a Monitoring and Verification Team. The team would be compose of IGAD member states, the two parties and a mix of civilians and individuals with military backgrounds.The Agreement had such good promise of peace but it did not take long for it to be invoked. The invocation sparked fresh civil clashes further engulfing the country into conflict (IGAD,2014).
On 9 May 2014 President Slava Kiir Mayardit and chairman of SPLM/A( In Opposition) signed another agreement to put an end to hostilities between the two sides. The guarantor of the agreement was the Chairman of IGAD Assembly and the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Dessalegn. The agreement was witnessed by Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, General Lazoro K. Sumbeiywo and General Mohammed Ahmed El-Dabi
This second agreement was to reinforce the efforts of the previous agreement.The two sides recognized that a military solution was not suitable to solve the conflict but political dialogue was rather more saturable. The two parties were to again cease hostilities within twenty-four hours and agree to deploy the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism. Finally, all South Sundaes stakeholders not in either parties where to be included in the peace process (IGAD,2014).
Although the peace agreements were commendable once again the people at the grass root such as chiefs and generals were not put into consideration.Even though the people present were to represent their views, some of their concerns may have not been represented and hence the invocation of the cease fire by the generals who had been sanctioned by the UN.This further suggests the commodified nature of peace agreement made at top levels.
This chapter was meant to find out the relationship between commodification and recurrence of conflict in South Sudan. The chapter was to also look at the various peace agreements that have been made before South Sudan became a state as well as agreements afterwards. The agreements that were examined pertain to peace. The chapter would investigate whether political, economic and social factors were considered.
The findings were that commodification and the recurrence of conflict due have a relationship. The relationship was the various peace agreements made fulfilling only political factors rather than economic and social factors as well. The peace agreements included the Addis Ababa Accord, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements. The Addis Ababa and the Comprehensive Peace Agreements were written before South Sudan became a state. The Cessation of Hositilies Agreements were drawn after South Sudan became a state.
The Addis Ababa Accord attempted to incorporate the needs of the society but was deterred by failure in the economic sector and conflict ensued once again. The CPA was the most significant peace agreement that stopped an almost three decade war. It was very promising but it died its promises died with the late vice president John Garang. The state was soon split into two giving birth to South Sudan. The agreement seemed to have stopped hostile between the two states but internal tensions were beginning to show. Ultimately a civil conflict took place in 2013 which gave birth to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements. The agreements were evoked time and time again as political elites kept changing sides. This suggested that the agreements were dependent on the politicians rather than the people.
Leaders are a representation of the people and are meant to air their views. However in the instances of peace agreements, these views may be overlooked. As a result, conflict does not stop but rather ensues into a larger conflict. The commodification nature of the Addis Ababa Accord, the CPA and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements suggests this to be true.
CHAPTER 4:MEDIATION OF THE SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT
IGAD has played a huge role in the peace processes in the Eastern Africa region. This is especially true to the peace process of Sudan and South Sudan. The CPA was paramount and no chances were taken to achieving peace. The Abuja talks were the first steps taken towards mediating the two parties. The serious beginning of this dialogue was initiated through the IGAD Declaration of 1994. In the subsequent years the CPA was drawn. The agreement was signed by the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A.
Since IGAD was familiar with the conflict in the region, it was the first regional body to mediate the 2013 conflict in South Sudan. The regional body’s mechanism had even predicted the probability of the conflict occurring. The regional mechanism was the Intergovernmental Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. The mechanism had warned of an imminent conflict but failed to prevent it.
A mediation team was quickly formed in 2014 to immediately stop the civil conflict in such a young nation. Putting the above into consideration, this chapter will examine whether the mediation efforts have actually helped in resolving the conflict. Moreover, the chapter will view the history of IGAD in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. The history preview is meant to understand the previous mediation process.The chapter will also examine the intervention role played by Uganda.
4.2 IGAD’s HISTORY IN SOUTH SUDAN
IGAD was instrumental in mediating the conflict between the North and south of Sudan in the 1990s. The conclusive efforts led to the signing of the CPA in Kenya.The efforts of IGAD were officially engaged in 1993. A Standing Committee on Peace was established by IGAD. The committee was to mediate the negotiation to end Sudan’s civil war (Young,2007).
The efforts led to the establishment of A Declaration of Principles. The document contained the basis for negotiation.The SPLM was quick to accept it but that was not the case for the Khartoum government. However, in 1998 the document was accepted by the Khartoum government. Although it was important for the Khartoum government to accept the document, the peace process had been dwindling. In an effort to save the process, IGAD once again came in. In 1999 the Standing Committee established a secretariat, Secretariat for the IGAD Peace Process on the Sudan. The mandate of the secretariat was to ensure and sustain the mediation process. This phase of mediation was led by Special Envoy Ambassador Daniel Mboya (Young, 2007).
Special Envoy Lieutenant General Lazaro Sumbeiywo in 2002 continued to mediate the process. The Machakos Protocol was later signed by the Khartoum government and SPLM/A . This took place on 20 July, 2002.The document was another guideline for the conduct of negotiation. The process led up to the CPA which was signed in 2005 (Young, 2007).
Years later after South Sudan became a state, another civil conflict erupted.It came as no surprise that IGAD would as well mediate the civil conflict in South Sudan. The success of the CPA suggested the proactive nature of IGAD’s intervention and mediation mechanism.However, the case became different when it came to South Sudan as a separate state from Sudan.
IGAD’s mediation team included Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, General Lazoro K. Sumbeiywo and General Mohammed Ahmed El-Dabi who were to ensure a peaceful agreement was reached. The IGAD head of states and prime ministers were involved at one point or another but it was the mediation team which was essentially charged with the responsibility (IGAD,2012).
As stated in the previous chapter various agreements had been put in place. These included the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements of January and May 2014. The agreements did not hold as conflict kept reoccurring and continues to do so.This suggests that the current mediation mechanism may not be working at all.
4.3 IGAD’s EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM
In December 2011 South Sudan became the newest member of IGAD making it the 8th member. The others members are Ethopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Eriteria. As part of it functions IGAD has the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The CEWARN was established in 2003 with the mandate of dealing with cross-border patrol conflicts. The mechanism has three clusters of operations. These are the Karamoja, Somali and Dikhil. The Karamajo cluster covers the cross border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia. The Somali cluster covers cross borders of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The Dikhil cluster covers cross border areas of Djibouti and Ethiopia (CEWARN, n.d).
IGAD recognized South Sudan’s struggle to attain peace and wanted to maintain the peace in the state. It also recognized the importance of economic and political stability for the region at large. As a result, IGAD established CEWARN in the state. CEWARN was established in Eastern Equatoria in 2009. The mandate of CEWARN was to detect conflict along South Sudan’s border with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The effort was essential to maintain peace in all of South Sudan including the border regions (Taye,2012).
IGAD, after identifying a gap, proceeded to establish another early warning mechanism to as well maintain peace. On 5 May 2012, the CEWARN established another unit. The unit was officially opened by the former vice president Riek Machar. The unit was the National Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU).The unit was located in Juba and composed of non-governmental as well as governmental institutions with peace as their mandate. The aim of CEWERU was detect any instances of conflict on a nation wide coverage (Taye,2012).
In the period between 2012 and 2019, the unit was to focus on key areas for early conflict detection. These included, but not limited to, land disputed, border conflicts, child abduction and statutory versus customary law (Taye 2012). In less than two years, the unit started to detect some early warning signs of possible national conflict. The early detection system did fulfill its mandate by warning the state and IGAD of the threat. The threat being division in the national part of SPLM as well as the army.
Despite the warning, the conflict erupted in December 2013. Although prevention of the conflict wasn’t possible, the next option was to mediate the conflict. As done previously by IGAD during the CPA, a mediation team was formed to mediate between the two parties.
4.4 INTERNAL OBSTACLES FOR THE MEDIATION PROCESS
The United Nations Charter recognizes regional bodies to mediate conflicts within the region. IGAD as a regional body has been mediating the South Sudan conflict. The process began mediating the conflict in South Sudan since December 2013. The team included Uganda.The mediator as a third party should be neutral in the process. This has not been the case with Uganda. Uganda has been actively involved in the conflict by the order of President Museveni. Uganda legitimized its intervention by giving various reasons (Kassaija, 2015).
Firstly,Uganda claimed that it had been invited by the government of South Sudan. It was not any government but the legitimate government. The purpose was to protect the infrastructure and enable safe evacuation of foreigners.Secondly, Ugandan citizens needed to be evacuated. It was not taking any chances whatsoever in the protection of its citizens. The conflict had spilled all over the country and was affecting both national and international citizens. The Ugandan troops ensured the safe passage of Ugandans, South Sudanese and other foreigners (Kassaija, 2014).Thirdly, Uganda claimed that the UNSC asked it to intervene. President Museveni had bee phoned by the UNSC. This claim was supported by Fred Opolot and Ofwono Opondo,Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and Government spokesman respectively.Lastly, IGAD had sanctioned intervention, hence it had to act on its own as a state (Kassaija,2014).
Kassaija (2014) points to the ties between South Sudan and Uganda back to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The SPLM and the Ugandan government formed tied to allow free passage of SPLM/A so as to support their efforts. Due to this action, Sudan and Uganda broke off diplomatic ties in 1995. The breaking of ties was also due to accusations by Uganda of Sudan’s government support of LRA. Hence, the ties between the two states were present even before.Uganda’s intervention in the region may have helped to maintain peace in Juba but has not done so for the entire state. The intervention of Uganda has not aided the peace process whatsoever
This chapter was meant to examine whether the mediation efforts have actually helped in resolving the conflict. Moreover, the chapter was to view the history of IGAD in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. The history preview was meant to understand the previous mediation process and the current mediation process. The chapter was to also examine the intervention role played by Uganda.
IGAD has been the permanent factor in the Sudan and South Sudan conflict. It was there during the Abuja talks, Machakos Protocol and the CPA. These agreements had been successful. The case has been different in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements. It employed various mechanism such as CEWARN and CEWERU to ensure conflict does not recur in the region. However, the systems detected the conflict but was unable to prevent it.
Despite the various efforts of IGAD to resolve the conflict though mediation, it is evident that that mechanism alone does not work. Direct involvement of Uganda in the conflict does not help the mediation efforts either. The IGAD states should be consistent and have the same goals. Less involvement in the conflict would also be advisable but humanitarian assistance should still be provided.
...(download the rest of the essay above)