Non-democratic regimes are forms of government which are controlled by only a small group of individuals, who “exercise power over the state without being constitutionally responsible to the public.”[1] According R. Tannenbaum and W. Schmidt, such regimes result in “autocratic leaders [ruling] by issuing threats and punishments and evoking fear”[2], while Freedom House suggest there is widespread state control over “key political institutions, [and over] information on certain political subjects and key sectors of the media”[3], as well as a lack of viable opposition or competition for office. Today, we still see the existence of such authoritarian systems in practice, though mainly concentrated to certain regions of the world as shown in Figure 1.
Thus the question arises: why do some non-democratic regimes survive longer than others?
In this essay I am to discuss the possible reasons why some regimes outlive others, and the factors which could affect their success.
To begin, I examine the economic factors which undoubtedly have a huge influence on the survival of non-democratic regimes.
In many non-democratic countries today, an abundance of wealth held by the ruling elites compared with poverty among the masses helps dictatorships resist democratisation. Often, the ruling elites spend large portions of the funds available to them on suppressing resistance, for example, “China reportedly employs two million censors to police the internet (Bennett and Naim 2015)”[4], while in Peru under Fujimori, “the regime paid more than $36 million a year to the main television channels to skew their coverage, and reportedly offered one channel a $19 million bribe (McMillan and Zoido 2004, pp.82-5)”[4]. This has an opportunity cost; spending on investment and development of industries is foregone, often leaving the citizens of a non-democratic regime stuck in the early stages of Walter Rostow’s 5 Stages of Growth Theory, as shown in Figure 2, which can leave countries primary- or secondary-sector dependent and under-developed. As John Harriss describes, such “economic development [is] conducive to democratisation, partly because [it] strengthens the ‘moderate’ middle class”[5]: a social group of people who are better educated and financially-placed to resist being ‘bought-off’ by a dictator. Emerging middle classes therefore diminish the extent to which non-democratic leaders can bribe their winning coalition with private goods, as the prospect of doing so becomes increasingly expensive as the size and wealth of the middle classes grow as a result of development, while the loyalty norm weakens too.
We may also see a rise in post-materialist values as the population becomes wealthier, since “after a period of sharply rising economic and physical security, one would expect to find substantial differences [in] value priorities, […] for example, post-materialists […] are markedly more tolerant of homosexuality”[6]. This could erode the extent to which the population would be morally willing to accept such bribes, regardless of magnitude. Subsequently, economic development might lead to the demise of such a regime.
An additional economic explanation could be the ‘resource curse’, which suggests that countries “with abundant reserves of non-renewable mineral resources, such as Nigerian oil [and] DRC gold […] produce less diversified and less competitive economies, more income inequality [and] heightened danger of state capture and rent-seeking by ruling elites”[25]. This is because the revenue streams in these countries are so concentrated to the elites and ruling classes, providing only menial low-paid labour to politically-insignificant lower classes. Moreover, since they are primary-product-export dependent, manufacturing industries develop overseas where economies of scales are subsequently built; diminishing the ability of local entrepreneurs to set up competing businesses and increase their wealth. The likelihood of a democratic transition is therefore low, since “democracy is expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality”[26]; something which is not in the interest of the elite ruling classes.
Moreover, economic crises can have a large role to play in mobilising a population against the elites and causing the fall of a non-democratic government. Although the elites do have “the monopoly over large scale violence, […] states in crisis can […] slide […] into even more instability”[7], particularly if a popular revolution is supported by a large proportion of the population, or, as in the case of Syria, the “improving […] economic conditions of the large Syrian refugee communities in neighbouring countries [provide] economic alternatives to joining armed groups”[8]; decreasing the state’s military stronghold over its population.
It is certain, however, that the likelihood of the collapse of a non-democratic regime as a result of an economic shock depends on its depth and severity, and the degree to which there is the resulting loss in welfare incentivising the population to mobilise. Furthermore, if the state is able to reallocate resources effectively despite an economic crisis, they may be able to withstand opposition to power; for example, by “[cutting] back outlays on subsidies, enabling it to concentrate more resources on the police, domestic security, and the state’s cultural and media propaganda machinery”[9] (page 165), as was undertaken in Egypt under Mubarak. While wealth and development are undoubtedly significant in causing a shift towards democratic governance, “authoritarian regimes around the world [have shown] that they can reap the benefits of economic development while evading any pressure to relax their political control. [An example is China’s economy, which] has grown explosively over the last 25 years, [even though] its politics have remained essentially stagnant.”[10] Evidence of this undermines the thesis that economic factors are the most significant.
A second possible explanation for some non-democratic regimes outliving others is the importance of cultural and religious factors.
As argued by Almond and Verba, there is a certain “‘civic culture’ [which] is necessary for the establishment of democracy, and […] this sort of culture is not easy transferable to non-Western cultures”[15]. The widespread acceptance of state authority and obedience towards civic duties defines the nature of Western culture: for example, the “obeying [of] the laws of the country, paying the taxes levied by the government [or] serving in a jury or as a witness in court”[16]. Almond and Verba argue the Western “mix of parochial passivity and modern participant activism”[17] is only compatible with certain cultures, and could be a factor fixing countries in non-democratic regimes. Some of the most likely explanations for this are likely to be historical religious influences, particularly the influence of Protestantism in the early 17th century in Western Europe. Steve Bruce argues that “Protestantism has contributed to modern democracy [by] pioneering a particularly effective combination of individualism and community spirit”[18], and the differing cultures of historically Islamic cultures are perhaps strengthening the likelihood of non-democratic regimes’ survivals today.
As explained in the view of Sayyid Qutb, “Islam is irreconcilable with the main assumptions of democratic government, and therefore Islam and democracy are incompatible”[11]. This view is supported by Huntington, writing that “the nature of Islamic culture [is] inhospitable [to] democracy”[12], since “democracy clashes with the Islamic notion of the sovereignty of God [and means] taking power from the hands of its usurpers and restoring it to God alone”[11]. In this regard, we can see how Islamic countries may be less likely to democratise and thus be more rigidly stuck in an authoritarian regime; holding beliefs which perhaps do not align as well with democratic governments. It could be argued, for example, that Sharia Law can foster the unequal treatment of women, while it has made space for “a violent Islamic radical movement: Boko Haram, [which] proffers religious authoritarianism as an alternative to democracy”[13].
The extent to which this is true is, of course, debatable, particularly since “Sharia movements draw popular support, especially from lower and middle class Muslims, [since the movements support] social, economic and political reforms meant to provide economic and physical security and accountability”[13]. M. Steven Fish builds on this point, arguing that the “unusual degree of subordination of women in Muslim societies”[19] is not actually caused by an oppressive nature of the religion itself; rather, the position of women has been determined by the historically “kin-based political power [in the] North African countries”[19] . Moreover, according to Freedom House, Indonesia, “the most populous Muslim country in the world, receives very high scores for both civil rights and political rights”[14]; a certain demonstration of the compatibility of Islam with democracy in a contemporary real-world scenario. It may therefore not be as great a contributing factor in the survival of non-democratic regimes as one might have expected.
A third possible explanation for the lengthy survival of a non-democratic regime could be a small winning coalition.
Defined as “the sub-set of the selectorate whose support is necessary for the leader to remain in power”[20], the winning coalition, as shown above in Figure 3, is very important in determining whether a non-democratic regime can survive; the larger it becomes as a proportion of the selectorate, the greater the likelihood of the next most popular regime being able to take power. The size itself is mainly influenced by the type of authoritarian regime, and is particularly small in the case of monarchies, which, in the case of hereditary monarchies, only require the approval of a branch of the ruling family in order to survive. As explained by Bueno de Mesquita et al., “in autocratic systems, the winning coalition is often a small group of powerful individuals. [Thus] when a challenger emerges to the sitting leader and proposes an alternative allocation of resources, [the leader thwarts the challenge since he or she] retains a winning coalition”[21]; the size of which is in an inverse relationship with the likelihood of successful challenge, since fewer people must be ‘bought-off’. In fact, “the Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005) theorises that it is the size difference between the selectorate and the winning coalition […] that is most important”[22] in influencing the survival of non-democratic regimes.
This theory has, however, received much criticism. Largely, the extent to which it is true, that having a small winning coalition is the most significant factor affecting the survival of non-democratic regimes, is dependent on how stable the regime appears to be, since “high political instability should reduce the effect of corruption, because actors have less incentive to bribe a government when it is unlikely to survive”[23], meaning the loyalty of the ruler’s winning coalition may become less effective. Thus, in reality, if a challenge to power did arise, the ruler may not be able to rely on his winning coalition if they were, in fact, more confident in the challenger overthrowing the incumbent, as in this circumstance it is highly likely that they would switch allegiances. Furthermore, Clark and Stone argue that Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s analysis “suffers from omitted variable analysis [which] can make the results appear stronger than they are. Once this error is corrected, the results are no longer interesting.”[24] This empirically undermines the foundations of the theory which Bueno de Mesquita et al. try to argue.
To conclude, I would, however, argue that the economic factors are the most influential in determining why some non-democratic regimes survive longer than others. While there is one major anomaly, China, which accounts for “4 out of 5 people in the world that live in an autocracy”[27]
02.02.2019