Essay: Sensemaking Implementation in higher education (two case studies)

A growing body of literature suggests that the states are taking a more active role in the governing and expectations of institutions of higher education.  Decision-making powers that were once in the protected areas of academia are being addressed by policy makers outside of higher education.  In this changing policy environment, reports from the U.S. Department of Education and Complete College America established an agenda for policy research based on nationwide trends, which have impacted higher education.
In June 2016, state leaders in Missouri enacted the Missouri 15-to-Finish Initiative.  Like most newly adopted policies, there has been limited research in higher education into how educational leaders make sense of policy (Chase, 2016; Young & Lewis, 2015).  According to Chase (2016), the sensemaking of implementing new policy initiatives in higher education has not been explored like it has in the K-12 sector.  Goldrick-Rab and Shaw (2007) argued that it is rare to find the word implementation in the title of higher education research articles, which shows a lack of research on policy implementation in general and less specifically on how educational leaders make sense of policy.  In addition, Young and Lewis (2015) noted that when it comes to implementing new policy “there is a broad agreement that implementation is a decidedly complex endeavor, more complex than the policies, programs, procedures, techniques or technologies that are the subject of implementation efforts” (p. 4).  This research seeks to bridge this gap by emphasizing which sensemaking factors influence how a new policy initiative is interpreted and implemented within the higher education setting.
This study concentrates on the sensemaking of the implementation of the Missouri 15-to-Finish Initiative at two varied public institutions of higher education in Missouri.  It draws on policy analysis, policy implementation, and sensemaking theory.  The primary purpose of this study is to examine the sensemaking process of how the leadership at two varied institutions in Missouri are implementing the new policy Initiative.
The research questions relate to the sensemaking of policy implementers responsible for implementing the 15-to-Finish Initiative.  The following questions will be addressed in this study:
1. What sensemaking do leaders engage in when implementing an ambiguous policy mandate?
2. How do colleges and universities make sense of the 15-to-Finish Initiative ambiguous policy mandate for implementation and change?
3. What specific actions, if any, are they taking in regard to the three components of the 15-to-Finish Initiative (e.g., incentives, number of credits, banded tuition)?
4. How are leaders at the two-year and four year institutions of higher education making sense of the institutional approach to implementing the Missouri 15-to-Finish Initiative?
5. What are the triggers or barriers in implementing the 15-to-Finish Initiative?
This review has been divided into five sections.  First, a review of the literature on Complete College America and research on 15-to-Finish.  The next section reviews the literature on policy analysis.  The third section reviews the literature on policy implementation.  The fourth section includes the sensemaking theory.  Finally, the last section concludes with a summary.
Complete College America
Complete College America (CCA) is a national nonprofit organization established in 2009 to increase educational attainment in the United States, known as the completion agenda.  Also referred to as the “reform” movement since it encompasses a wide array of proposed changes to higher education, the Complete College Agenda is focused mainly on state policy leaders, governors, legislators, and boards of higher education (Walters, 2012).  Walters (2012) noted “States are the principal target of the completion agenda because it is at the state level that political pressure can be more effectively linked to drivers of institutional change” (p. 34).   On the other hand, governors and legislators approach institutions of higher education from the perspective of annual budgets.  According to Walters (2012), CCA is the standard bearer of the completion agenda, mainly because CCA represents a synthesis of the best thinking of the “reformers” and because CCA’s primary agenda was adopted by the U.S. Department of Education in 2011 (Walters, 2012).
Complete College America also works closely with the National Governors Association (NGA) to increase graduation rates and recommended a series of reforms to address the problem of low graduation rates. The NGA in their 2010 report, Complete to Compete, identified state policy and higher education data as “two significant challenges standing in the way of dramatically increasing college completion” (p. 3).  According to the NGA, states need to devise policies that promote completion and increase efficiency in higher education, and like the K-12 system, build performance metrics for higher education that accurately portray whether states are meeting the goal of increased attainment.  Furthermore, the NGA report noted three approaches critical to achieving meaningful progress: (a) increase degree attainment to meet the economy’s increasing demand for more educated workers; (b) improve higher education productivity due to fiscal challenges states face by restructuring remedial courses to reduce time-to-degree completion; and (c) expand training opportunities and remove barriers for older adults returning to higher education in order to obtain a higher skilled workforce (National Governors Association, 2015).
The Complete College America (CCA) 2011 reform report, Time Is The Enemy: The Surprising Truth About Why Today’s College Students Aren’t Gaduating . . . And What Needs To Change, was an urgent call to action and argued that the longer a student takes to complete their studies, the more likely it is that something will derail their plans (Complete College America, 2011).  Strategies CCA recommends to increase graduation rates include, streamlining remediation programs so that students earn college credits more quickly, and restructuring traditional college programs (e.g., block scheduling) so that students can plan their lives around a fixed schedule.  However, Walters (2012) noted that “it’s all about the money” (p. 34), and at the core of CCA’s strategy is performance funding because the premise is that “colleges and universities will not do the right thing unless they are paid to do so” (p. 34).  Walters (2012) describes this strategy as “pressure punitive funding” (p. 34) designed to force institutions of higher education to change or punish them if they do not.
According to Goudas and Boylan (2012), the National Governors Association and Complete College America are policy analysis organizations that publish a number of reports. In addition, foundations, such as the Lumina Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation, fund a variety of demonstration and research projects (Goudas & Boylan, 2012). The result has been a “plethora of literature and research marked by varying qualities of methodology and data analysis accompanied by sometimes conflicting and sometimes inconsistent conclusions” (p. 2).  Nevertheless, this literature has been used to produce numerous policy recommendations for states and institutions.  Moreover, these policy recommendations are of varying quality; some are based on reasonable interpretations of the available data, some represent a misunderstanding of the available data, and some simply ignore the available data (Goudas & Boylan, 2012).
According to Complete College America (CCA), policy should be “evidence based, pursued in an appropriate venue, developed transparently and crafted with implementation in mind,” and that “good policy provides flexibility for institutions but does not compromise on equity, quality, or accountability for result.”  Furthermore, CCA affirms their belief in smart policy to accelerate and sustain systemic reforms by (a) identifying the policy’s purpose, (b) listening and learning before acting, (c) selecting the venue with the greatest chance of success, (d) creating and circulating a draft policy, (e) broadly soliciting advice from experts and stakeholders, (f) providing exceptional support for policymaking processes, (g) ensuring robust communication throughout the policy process, (h) proactively launching the implementation and setting expectations, and (i) establishing a feedback loop to ensure results (Complete College America, n.d.c).
Despite a somewhat reasonable rationale, Complete College America’s approaches are not entirely evidence-based.  There is little research outside of Complete College America to support the merits of its agenda; available research is limited to Complete College America, its constituents, or alliance members.  Therefore, bias is called into question, and the CCA agenda is under-evaluated, under-theorized, and under-researched in general.
Policy Analysis
Policy analysis “requires you to think not only about the technical aspects of government action but also about its institutional aspects – that is, the institutions that implement policy” (Bardach & Patashnik, 2016, p. 165).  When policy is adopted, the organization is tasked to carry out the policy intent through implementation.  However, whether implementation goes well or poorly depends on whether the implementers want to facilitate or impede the policy at hand (Bardach & Patashnik, 2016).  The people implementing the policy may alter the policy makers’ original intent, thereby altering policy outcomes (Fowler, 2000; May & Winter, 2007; Trowler, 2001; Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977).  Research on policy implementation in education have found: “1) implementers shape implementation, 2) characteristics of policy and context influence implementation, 3) policies that do not account for the complexity of schools are unlikely to be implemented effectively, and 4) variation in implementation is the rule rather than the exception” (Young & Lewis, 2015, p. 14).
Policy Implementation
Policy implementation is one aspect of the classic stage model of policy development, which includes six areas: “definition, agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, implementation and evaluation” (Fowler, 2000, p. 5).  “It is what develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action” (O’Toole, 2000, p. 266). Implementing the 15-to-Finish Initiatives will be a challenge to institutions of higher education.  As Trowler (2001) noted, “policy making in higher education institutions is a messy, complex business, which does not happen according to a rational-purposive model with clearly defined goals pursued and achieved by coordinated groups of those affected by the change” (p. 14). The problem is that policy implementation can be ambiguous, so “the policy becomes laden with multiple agendas, attitudes, values and set of meaning” (Trowler, 2002, p. 12), and the desired outcomes may not look as the policy makers originally intended because the policy remains open to the interpretation of the implementers (Spillane, 2004).  In other words, because of the varied higher education institutions, those tasked with policy implementation have flexibility in multiple areas that may affect policy outcomes, and there may be different outcomes in different contexts.
Literature on policy implementation research has been categorized as occurring in three generations or stages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s), which Meredith Honig’s (2006b), New Directions in Education Policy Implementation, refers to as waves.  Each of these research waves builds on the lessons learned from the previous waves, and presents a renewed perspective on policy implementation research and practice.  During these waves of changes in policy implementation, demands grew more varied and complex.  “Past implementation research revealed that policy, people and places affected implementation, but contemporary implementation research aims to uncover their various dimensions and how and why interaction among these dimensions shape implementation in particular ways” (p. 14). “Policy implementation research followed suit by beginning to highlight that variations in policies, people, and places matter to how implementation unfolds” (p. 9).
The first wave of policy implementation research in the 1960s focused on what gets implemented.  Policy implementation was about compliance, generally top-down in orientation, and mandated to those at the lower levels of the organization.  This view of policy implementation highlighted the gap between policy makers and policy implementers, as well as policy and practice.  Researchers found the problems of policy implementation were due to “uncertain relationships between policies, decisions and implemented programs” (Paudel, 2009, p. 36).  Pressman and Wildavsky, in 1973, were the first to bring the issue of policy implementation to the forefront, and the first to address the gap between policy and practice when they showed that policy interpretation by its implementers could fall short of its anticipated outcomes (Honig, 2006b), because policy implementation is open to interpretation (Spillane, 2004).  This paved the way for a second wave of policy implementation research and literature.
The second wave of policy implementation in the 1970s focused on what gets implemented over time, and describing and analyzing the relationships between policy and practice (Honig, 2006b; Paudel, 2009).  Here, policy is described as evolving, as policy design reflected continuity and change (Honig, 2006b).  The concerns of this policy implementation wave concerns focused on explaining implementation successes and failures, and engaging in the “development of analytical frameworks” (Paudel, 2009, p. 39), which led to reinforcing top-down control relationships and closing the gap between policy makers’ intentions and implementers’ actions. In other words, policy implementers construct policy meaning into what they can recognize and use.  However, before policy can be implemented, it must be understood, and the meaning and sense that implementers make of policy is an ongoing cognitive process (Spillane, 1986).
In the 1980s, the third wave of policy implementation shifted and overturned former implementation research by focusing on growing concerns and what works.  Policy research and policy making in previous eras focused on individual programs.  During the third wave, the macro world of policymakers with the micro world of individual implementers was integrated (Honig, 2006b; McLauglin, 1987).  Growing implementation research focused on “moving away from trying to understand which policies get implemented to elaborating the various conditions that matter to enabling effective practice” (Honig, 2006b, p. 9).
As implementation research evolved, “two schools of thought developed as to the most effective method for studying and describing implementation: top-down and bottom-up” (Matland, 1995, p. 146).  According to Matland (1995), top-down theorists see policy designers as the central actors and measure success in terms of specific outcomes tied to the statute, while bottom-up theorists argue that policy is made at the local level and positive effects can be labeled a success.
Top-down perspective.  Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) argued there are three general sets of factors which determine the probability of successful implementation: (a) tractability of the problem, (b) ability of statute to structure implementation, and (c) nonstatutory variables affecting implementation. The top-down perspective is policy centered, represents the policy-makers’ views, and assumes that policy goals can be specified by policymakers and that implementation can be carried out successfully by setting up certain mechanisms easy to manipulate, (e.g., funding, budgets, planning and evaluation requirements; Honig, 2006b; Matland, 1995; Paudel, 2009).  However, there are several criticisms of the top-down perspective of implementation: (a) this perspective takes the statutory language as its starting point (Mazmamian & Sabatier, 1983), (b) top-downers see implementation as an administrative process (O’Toole, 2000), (c) top-downers put exclusive emphasis on statute framers as key actors (Matland, 1995), (d) top-downers neglect the reality of policy modification or distortion at the hands of implementers (Matland, 1995), and (e) the top-down perspective has no behavioral basis (James, Bowman, Goggin, & O’Toole, 1995).  Similarly, Berman (1978) argued that the top-down perspective can lead to discard and pro forma compliance and resistance.
Bottom-up perspective.  The bottom-up perspective focuses on individuals and their behavior.  These individuals are referred to as street-level bureaucrats and are considered to be central in the process (Lipsky, 1980; May & Winter, 2007; Paudel, 2009).  Michael Lipsky (1980) defined street-level bureaucrats as the frontline workers or policy implementers in government agencies such as educational institutions.  They are considered to have a better understanding of how to implement policy because of their direct contact with the public and their interactions with clients (Matland, 1995).
In Street Level Bureaucracy, Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy, claimed that street-level bureaucrats are the real policy makers because of their discretionary role.  However, implementation failure has been linked with this discretionary role because of the many actors involved.  According to Berman (1978), “Policy implementation takes place at two levels:  macro and micro.  At the macro implementation level, centrally located actors devise a government program; at the micro level, local organizations react to macro-level plans; develop and implement their own plans” (p. 42).
Essential differences between the macro- and micro-processes arise from their distinct institutional settings: macro-implementation setting is an entire policy sector, whereas micro-implementation setting is a local organization.  Educational institutions are loosely-coupled structures, which (a) have their own problems, perspectives, and purposes that reflect its particular structure and culture, and (b) more or less autonomous within the overall sector (Berman, 1978).  Further criticisms of the bottom-up perspective are that it does not provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of public policy, and it cannot successfully explain why coping strategies occur and why they vary (Matland, 1995; Paudel, 2009).
Combination of both perspectives.   Both top-down and bottom-up perspectives cover the implementation process.  However, a “limited number of attempts have been made to combine these two major perspectives and other perspectives on implementation” (Matland, 1995, p. 150), and neither perspective covers the implementation reality explained by the other.  Perhaps this is why Sabatier (1986) moved away from the top-down perspective he helped develop for the combined perspective.  In response, Matland (1995) presented the ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation as a combination of the two perspectives in order to explain the theories (See Figure 5).  His model suggests that “their relative value depends on the degree of ambiguity in goals and means of a policy and the degree of conflict” (Paudel, 2009, p. 43).
Using four policy implementation paradigms, Matland (1995) spells out how ambiguity and conflict affect policy implementation, which provides a more theoretically grounded approach to implementation: “low conflict-low ambiguity (administrative implementation), high conflict-low ambiguity (political implementation), high conflict-high ambiguity (symbolic implementation), and low conflict-high ambiguity (experimental implementation)” (p. 145).  A review of the four perspectives helps to identify the conditions under which policy recommendations will be effective.
The first perspective, low policy conflict-low policy ambiguity, low levels of ambiguity means it is clear which actors are to be active in implementation and which resources are required in the implementation process (Matland, 1995).  In this administrative implementation perspective, the central principle is outcomes determined by resources. Information flows from the top down, and implementation is ordered in a hierarchical manner.  The policy is spelled out explicitly at each level, and actors have a clear idea of their responsibilities and tasks.  Influences are internal and not external.  In contrast, the second perspective, high policy conflict-low policy ambiguity, low levels of ambiguity insure “that monitoring of compliance is relatively easy… [and]…attempts at subversion are relatively easy” (Matland, 199, p. 165).  The central principal in political implementation is that implementation outcomes are decided by power, influences are more external than internal, and coercive mechanisms will predominate.
The third perspective, high policy conflict-low policy ambiguity, outcomes depend on which actors are active and most involved, and this perspective is more open to environmental influences.  The central principle driving this experimental implementation perspective is that contextual conditions dominate the process.  In the decision-making terms, this type of implementation condition “closely parallels a “garbage can” process with streams of actors, problems, solutions, and choice opportunities combining to produce outcomes that are hard to predict” (Matland, 1995, p. 166).  Participants’ level of activity depends on a host of variables: their feelings, number of demands on their time, their proximity to the place where decisions are made, etc.
The last perspective, high policy conflict-high policy ambiguity, the policy course is “determined by the coalition of actors at the local level who control the available resources” (Matland, 1995, p. 186), and coalition strength determines the outcome. Therefore, the high level of ambiguity leads to excess of interpretations, and the high level of conflict is important because it structures the way resolutions are developed.
The high level of ambiguity results in outcomes that vary across sites, and the central principle is that local level coalitional strength determines the outcome (Matland, 1995). Policy is determined by actors who control resources at the local level.
Policy Implementation and Change at the Institutional Level
The first mode of operation for an institution implementing new policy usually requires change.  The amount of this change can be major or minor, depending on the current culture of the organization.  Fullan (2007), in his study, noted that many change attempts fail because no distinction is made between what causes the change and how to influence those causes.  Therefore, it is important to point out that policy and change goes hand-in-hand with policy implementation (Cerna, 2013), and that participant involvement in the decision making surrounding the implementation of new policies and reform is important to overall success (Fowler, 2000; Fullan & Miles, 1992).  Also, according to Fullan (2007), there are nine critical factors that affect the implementation of education policy, which vary from characteristics of change, local characteristics, and external characteristics Furthermore, Kotter (1994) noted that policy implementation required transformational change.  He stated that it is important for chief executive officers to stay involved in the transformational change process, otherwise efforts may fail.  The steps to transformation include (a) establishing a sense of urgency, (b) forming a powerful guiding coalition, (c) creating a vision, (d) communicating the vision, (e) empowering others to act on the vision, (f) planning for and creating short-term wins, (g) consolidating improvements and producing still more change, and (h) institutionalizing new approaches (Kotter, 1994).
Implementation staircase.  Reynolds and Saunders’s (1987) implementation staircase model “emphasizes how the location of individuals and groups in the hierarchy of the policy process can shape their interests and perceptions about the nature and relevance of particular policies” (Trowler, 2002, p. 3), and analyzes how a new policy develops through groups of people from concept to reality.  The model helps to explain reasons for implementation gaps, which is “the distance between original purposes and actual outcomes” (Trowler, 2002, p. 3).  Figure 7 outlines a version of the staircase specific to this study, the stages or steps, and the relevant group of people involved.
Theorists, such as Cohen and March (1974), have argued there is a loosely coupled relationship between policy Initiatives and intentions at the top of the implementation staircase and outcomes at the bottom. This can result in inefficiency in communication because top leadership may not be aware of what bottom workers are doing.  According to Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972), colleges and universities are likened to “organized anarchies” (p. 1) because they have the following characteristics: (a) problematic preferences – the organization “operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences” (p.1), (b) unclear technology – the organization “operates on the basis of simple trial-and-error procedures, the residue of learning from the accidents of past experiences, and pragmatic inventions of necessity” (p. 1), and (c) fluid participation – participants and involvement vary in time and effort.
Inclusive Implementation.  “Governments intervene in a myriad of ways at the local level, but rarely are these interventions coordinated effectively” (Francesca & Sylvain, 2010, p. 1).  It is time policy makers realize that “working independently is not enough to solve a particular problem or issue” (Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004, p. 364), and people must “actively work together to accomplish what they recognize as a problem or issue of mutual concern” (p. 364).  As noted by Keast, et al., (2004), decision makers need to find “new ways of collaborating that bring together the full array of stakeholders and offer more integrated and holistic responses” (p. 364), or the practice of openness (Preskill & Brookfield, 2009).  Openness is inclusive, and as Preskill and Brookfield (2009) stated, “Openness is the willingness to entertain a variety of alternative perspectives, be receptive to contributions from everyone regardless of previous attainment or current status, and create dialogic open spaces – multiple opportunities for diverse voices and opinions to be heard” (p. 21).
The groups depicted in Figure 7 often work separately, in silos, collaborating among themselves to make decisions that affect all stakeholders.  Nevertheless, decisions are made in which “policies are fragmented, services are duplicated, gaps missed, and agencies do not communicate with each other about what they are trying to achieve” (Reynolds & Saunders, 1987, p. 1).  Therefore, it is important during the implementation process to have full and inclusive participation of all stakeholder in the successful implementation of a new policy.  In addition, ambiguous policy mandates require new ways of working and thinking, beyond the traditional approaches that have been found to be inadequate and inappropriate.
The work of Cervero and Wilson (2006) focused on the “people work” (p. 6) of planning, in which “people gather at the planning tables to make decisions about the educational objectives and the social and political objectives of educational programs” (p. 6).  The planning table speaks to the issue of power, participation, and decision making across all areas.  Its importance relies on (a) who is (or is not) at the table, (b) what people bring to the table, and (c) putting issues on the table (Cervero & Wilson, 2006).  Those at the table bring their particular ways of seeing and understanding the conditions in which they work and how to get the work done.  For higher education, which espouses to be inclusive, the planning table would include students and stakeholders (See Figure 8).  Working together in this way – collaboration, conversation, and reacculturation (Bruffee, 1999) – presents an important process of change, willingness, courage, and skill.
Sensemaking, which includes strategic change and decision making, innovation and creativity, and organizational learning, is a central activity in organizations (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  Moreover, organizational sensemaking is a fundamentally social process where organization members interpret their environment in and through interactions with others, constructing accounts that allow them to comprehend the world and act collectively (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  Since Weick’s (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations, sensemaking research has exploded, but also has been fragmented.  Sensemaking has been referred to in a variety of ways in literature (e.g., sensemaking theory, sensemaking perspective, sensemaking paradigm, sensemaking process, or sensemaking framework) specifically when referring to the Weick’s (1995) seven properties of sensemaking. These properties of sensemaking interact and intertwine with each other as individuals make interpretations, and allow for the most progress when implementing transformational change (Kezar, 2013).
Sensemaking During Implementation
Educational policy implementation studies uncovered how individual, group, and cognitive processes contribute to implementers’ variable policy responses and the achievement of policy goals (Spillane, Reiser, & Reimer, 2002), and findings reflect that sensemaking is an unavoidable dimension of the implementation process (Honig, 2006b).  The key to policy implementation is “what happens when policies enter schools and administrators and teachers must make sense of and implement them as part of their daily practices” (Palmer & Rangel, 2010, p. 615).  In his study, Spillane (2004), argued that the discretion of lower-level policy actors (faculty, staff, and students) is critical to the policy implementation process, and the sensemaking involves the implementer’s sensitivity to cues within the environment of the organizational context.
Although there is much literature on sensemaking, there is a literature gap in understanding the link between how individuals turn policy into practice and then implement it in their environment (Coburn, 2001; Weick, 1995).  The research by Honig (2006b) provided studies that discussed implementation using various theoretical frameworks and perspectives.  Previous studies exploring how individuals interpret policy concentrated on the process and the institutional contexts (Chase, 2016).  Results point to factors that influence the sensemaking of policy, including prior knowledge, beliefs, experiences (Coburn, 2001), institutional culture (Coburn, 2001; Weick, 1995), and institutional leadership (Coburn, 2005; Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Spillane, Reiser, & Reimer, 2002).
Policy actors (leadership) are tasked with the responsibility of effectively integrating the existing institutional policies and practices with the new Initiative.  For the leadership, being able to effectively implement a new policy Initiative begins with the leadership assigning meaning to the policy.  Meaning and interpretation of policy occur individually and collectively in organizations through sensemaking.  Implementers rely upon a cognitive process known as sensemaking that allows them to comprehend situations in their environment in order to facilitate adaptive thoughts and actions (Weick, 1995).
“The concept of sensemaking has been widely used in the literature as an interpretive framework within which to study processes of organizational change” (Coleman, Checkland, Harrison, & Hiroeh, 2010, p. 290).  For example, Weick (1995) suggested that sensemaking is an important element in the process of implementation of new Initiatives in organizations.  In their study, Weber and Glynn (2006) addressed the relationship of sensemaking to institutional contexts.  They argued that in addition to providing a cognitive constraint on sensemaking, institutions act more directly to influence the process of sensemaking (Weber and Glynn, 2006). They noted that institutions (a) prime sensemaking, (b) edit sensemaking, and (c) trigger sensemaking (Coleman et al, 2010).  Therefore, as institutions initiate new policy, sensemaking is required to reconcile old assumptions and identities with new realities.
An emerging line of research has shown that implementers come to understand new policy ideas through the lens of pre-existing knowledge and practices, “often interpreting, adapting, or transforming policy messages as they put them in place in a process that is influenced by the social and structural conditions” (Coburn, 2005, p. 477) of the workplace, and “the nature of their connections to the policy” (p. 478).   Organizational leaders impact sensemaking during policy implementation by understanding the social nature of sensemaking. However, sensemaking focused on the role of leadership in this process has been rare.  Of particular relevance to this study is the work of Coburn (2005) whose study investigated how principals in two West Coast schools influenced teacher learning about and enactment of changing reading policy.  She argued that “principals influence teacher sensemaking by shaping access to policy ideas, participating in the social process of meaning making, and creating substantively different conditions for teacher learning” (p. 477).
Organizational Sensemaking and Change
The research shows sensemaking to play a central role in change (Balogun & Johnson, 2005, p. 2). Weick (1995), hypothesizing the link between sensemaking and change, argued that “organizations are social constructions that various individuals constantly create and re-create as they make meaning of their work lives” (Kezar, 2013, p. 762).  Therefore, it is difficult for people to process change unless it is meaningful, and they can connect to the change (Kezar, 2013).  However, Weick (1995) only hypothesized the link between sensemaking and change, it was Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) who made the connection between sensemaking and change through research.
Studies on change in higher education saw change as implementing tactics and providing incentives for people to change (Kezar, 2013).  Studies on sensemaking within the change process focus on top-down change efforts through the perspectives of top managers, but more recently there has been a focus on examining middle managers (Balogun & Johnson, 2005).  As employees look to their managers to help them make sense of the change Initiative, managers themselves struggle for understanding (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).  A study by Kezar and Eckel (2002), who focused on top-down organizational change, identified strategies to create sensemaking but did not study these strategies as they unfolded over time.  Eckel and Kezar (2003) applied a sensemaking framework to research transformational change at six American college and university campuses.  The study identified “key strategies that led to the adoption of new mental models, including ongoing conversations, processes to develop a set of concrete concepts, the use of cross departmental working groups, public presentations, faculty and staff development opportunities, and the involvement of outsiders” (p. 39).
Summary
New policies are adding pressure on institutions of higher education to increase student completion and on-time graduation rates, no matter the challenges each student brings.  The theory of sensemaking is used to understand the connection between how a new educational policy is interpreted and then transferred into practice.  Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) were among the first to connect sensemaking and change through empirical analysis and study. They defined it as “the process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (p. Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, 442).  Sensemaking allows researchers to recognize its presence in policy implementation, which in this study involves the sensemaking process of the leadership responsible for implementing the Missouri 15-to-Finish Initiative.  Organization leaders implement new policy Initiatives through a variety of methods to support the desired transformational change.  However, individuals implementing the policy may alter policymakers’ original intent to align with their interpretations, desired interests, and goals (Fowler, 2000; Trowler, 2001; Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977).  Balogun and Johnson (2004) explained that those charged with implementing organizational changes and persuading employees are often middle managers.  They “have the challenge of grasping a change they did not design and negotiating the details with others equally removed from the strategic decision making” (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, p. 543).