It would be very understandable for someone to think they understand a word when they actually don’t. This can stem from the person simply not actually understanding what the word means, or from double meanings of words in the English language. For example, take the proposition: I saw the person on the hill with the telescope. In one instance, it can be taken as somebody saw somebody else on a distant hill, and they saw that person with a telescope. However, it could also mean that somebody saw someone else on a distant hill, and that person on the hill had a telescope. But we can also dig deep into individual words. What does it mean for someone to be a person? If the proposition says that somebody saw another person on a hill, does that mean they actually saw another living human being on the hill? Or rather, could they think they understand that they saw what it means to be a person, but they actually saw a cardboard cut-out of a person? Put into simple terms, Person A believes they saw Person B on a distant hill. Person A thinks they know what the word “person” means; they come to understand that a person is another human being. They think they understand the word, but if Person B is actually only a cardboard cutout, then they are proven wrong right away. Furthermore, if this type of occurrence can happen with a simple word like “person”, who’s to say it couldn’t happen to more existential words like “exist” and “think”? After all, Person A probably thought that when they saw Person B on the hill, that Person B existed. But when Person B is revealed to be a cardboard cut-out, Person B no longer exists; rather, only a piece of cardboard exists.
What this implies is an obstacle to the refutation of skepticism. One of the basic arguments against skepticism is that we should believe those who seem believable. In other words, unless someone or something has given us a reason to not believe in them, then they should believed with reason. From this, it’s easier to form an argument against trusting absolutely anything. It leads to the conclusion that individuals should try and rely on experiences and instances that have proven most reliable, those that have lead to presumable truth, while at the same time avoiding those that have been unreliable in those instances. But how easy would it be for a reasonably believable person to mistake an actual living person with a cardboard cut-out of a person? In fact, one would even say that this mistake is on account of the senses deceiving the observer. They think they’re seeing a person, but they’re only seeing cardboard. The skeptic argues that nobody knows anything, while the refuter believes we can come to believe certain things given justifiable evidence and/or reasoning. Does Person A observing the cardboard not have justifiable reasoning in thinking they see a human being? Most likely they do, but that doesn’t matter. What matters is that they were, in fact, deceived by their senses and came to believe in something that actually wasn’t there. Person A mistaking the meaning of what the word “person” means, or even what the word “person” looks like visually serves as obstacle to the refutation of skepticism, as it was just proven that words and senses can still be deceived.
In conclusion, it can be understandable for a person to mistake the meanings of words, especially in the English language. In simpler terms, there is even mass confusion between the distinction of the words “there, their, and they’re”. However, on the other end of the spectrum, there can also be confusion as to what a word actually means, or what it is perceived to be. A person can mean a human being, but it could also theoretically pertain to a cardboard cutout. It all depends on the observers point of view. In this case, Person A observing a “person” on a hill is mistaken if that person actually turns out to be a piece of cardboard, rather than an actual living being. This serves as an obstacle to the refutation of skepticism. Skepticism is designed to keep the observer correct. Even if they don’t know anything for certain, they’re still not wrong (no knowledge is still correct while false knowledge is always incorrect). If the observer falls into the same trap that radical skepticism tries to protect them from, then the confusion of words is an easy contender to the refutation of skepticism.
B5.
Putnam claims that we are merely brains in a vat. This theory undermines the whole concept of humans being able to think, speak, or simply be. Putnam, though she proposes the idea, ultimately rejects it because it is self refuting. She proposes that because we can merely contemplate the idea that we could or could not be brains in a vat makes the whole premise as false. Being that if we actually were brains in a vat, we wouldn’t be able to debate the trueness or falseness of the idea, making such a premise false. What this implies is that the external world really can’t have skepticism. Putnam, in his argument against the brain in a vat theory, explains what it means for a statement to be false. She agues that the statement “I do not exist” is self refuting because it is thought by a person. Someone who didn’t actually exist could not have said that, so the person who did must exist for sure. This opens up the question as to what we can actually be skeptical of. Descartes for a while questioned his own existence, thinking his reality could have been illusion. This brain in a vat fallacy already refutes that premise; Descartes must have existed in a stable reality for him to have even questioned his existence, therefore making his existence concrete. If we take another premise, such as: “My car does not exist”, we can show similar results. Putnam’s self refutation idea can extend into this statement. If the person who owns the car exists, (and he does because he can already question the existence of an external object), then he can already validate the reality of other things. Can he get inside his car? Can he drive it? Can he logically come to the conclusion that his car is real and not a fallacy? His existence gives him the means to decide whether or not any of that is true. The whole brain in a vat being a self refutation of existence brings in the notion that we may not necessarily have to dig so deep into the questioning of an objects reality.
Putnam argues that the brain in a vat idea is self refuting because he argues that, if brains in a vat were to exist, then those brains in the vat would have the same qualitative thoughts as those not in a vat. However, there are no external objects in the vat, only the brain. Anything the brain in the vat visualizes must be a simulation of sorts. If external things don’t exist, there can be no connection between the vat and reality.
The problems with this argument varies. Some believe that we would not actual hard evidence to decide whether or not our brains are in a vat or not, therefore disregarding even coming up with hypothesis. Others argue that, even if Putnam’s argument is logically sound, it also disregards Cartesian and global skepticism. Dennett in 1991 argued that it would be physically impossible for a vetted brain to have the same biological/physiological comprehension as a non-vetted brain. Finally, many would maintain the notion that such possibilities do not actually amount to any real cases of doubt, and thus can be disregarded . This doesn’t necessarily make Putnam wrong, or disproven in her arguments. Putnam still offers, more or less, logically sound premises and solutions to the situation at hand. However, that doesn’t mean she won’t have doubters. Putnam does a good job in putting the skepticism that someone is actually only a brain in a vat to rest, but that doesn’t mean she won’t have people against her.
In conclusion, Putnam offers an idea about reality. After proposing the idea that everyone and everything could be the mere productions of simulation, with our brains hardwired to a super computer that projects our vision of reality, Putnam offers the notion that this is actually impossible, as our brains and brains in vat would have to have the same thoughts, and the self refuting thought of self-existence, would make this possibility impossible. Though she faces credible and valid opposition, Putnam does a good job of offering sound arguments for her notion.