Literary Review
The United States Environmental Protection Agency defines a brownfield as, “a property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant,” (USEPA, 2012). These sites often occur in previously industrialized areas where harmful substances were being handled and utilized during the land’s previous use, during the construction process, or demolition process. Due to the legal processes, costs, and political barriers one needs to take into consideration when attempting to redevelop these
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lots, developers can shy away from the challenge leaving lots vacant. Brownfield clean up and development essentially allows a community to recycle land. Considering the fact that many brownfield sites are located within already highly developed communities, and that the EPA estimates that greater than four hundred thousand brownfields exist across the United States, redevelopment of these lots can do a great deal in the area of infill development (USEPA 2012). The issue that haunts those who make an effort to develop these sites has to do primarily with the cleanup process and the stipulations therein.
Converting brownfields to usable land presents a number of barriers. Among these barriers is the economic feasibility of the project which can greatly depend on the monetary benefit from development. Economic barriers often have to do with a project team’s ability to secure grants and take advantage of other government incentives, and getting the backing of private interests (Andrew, 1996). There is a legal aspect of cleaning the site, which has to do with the projected land use and the liability that can be pressed upon the parties responsible (Slutzkey and Frey, 2010). The social and political aspect has bearings on the swiftness of completion and on various points of approval that a site would need in order to move along in the process of redevelopment. This warrants that the person at the head of the project has a high degree of centrality or many connections at the local, state, and federal levels (Alexander, 2012). Each of these factors has a large role to play within the process of developing underutilized and contaminated sites. Simply focusing one’s efforts on one of these aspects will not likely grant success. Setting a project in motion can be made or broken on getting the necessary pieces in place with social and political leaders as well as leadership from the community benefitting. It can also depend on a favorable determination of the actual cost of assessment and clean up and its relationship to the potential profits, be it in terms of property values and neighborhood fulfillment or the developer’s potential earnings. Furthermore, knowing the liability issues beforehand and the taking advantage of programs in place for taking on liability can help support a brownfield redevelopment effort.
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Property Value Case Studies
Fulton County, Georgia
In addition to its service as an effective option for infill development helping to mitigate sprawl, brownfields can also revitalize communities. Investing in existing communities through brownfield redevelopment can improve quality of life, pride in one’s community, as well as higher property values. A study done by Keith R. Ihlanfeldt and Laura O. Taylor in Fulton County, Georgia, which contains the city of Atlanta, demonstrated a price-distance gradient from hazardous waste sites (Ihlanfeldt and Taylor, 2005). The study found that there was a significant difference in land value between properties nearby a site before being listed as a hazardous site and after being listed. The study was done for office, residential (including apartments), vacant land, retail, and industrial prices. Office spaces depreciated the most with a 36% increase in price from 0.5 miles to 2 miles from the site. With residential properties, the results show a significant difference in the property value of the post discovery and pre-delisting (Ihlanfeldt and Taylor 2005). This study makes apparent the perception of nearby contaminated land. Brownfields can bring down the property value of a neighborhood significantly and therefore disenfranchise those who hold residence near these sites. Because of the stigma these sites carry with them and the lowered land values that are a result, there is an opportunity presented. For communities feeling the effect of brownfield sites, development can regain the lost land value through redevelopment.
Milwaukee/Minneapolis
Christopher De Sousa and Changshan Wu performed a study in Minneapolis and Milwaukee, which went one step further by cataloging the effect of property values after publicly funded brownfield development had taken place. In a study of over one hundred brownfield projects in both cities, there was a net increase in property values of 11.4% in property value of land near by the brownfield redevelopment in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and a 2.7% increase in value of those properties in Minneapolis, Minnesota. For Minneapolis, commercial and park projects yielded the greatest benefit. Commercial projects caused a net increase of 4.4% in land value while park projects caused a 4.6% increase in land value. Furthermore, a survey was done of the stakeholders, which tabulated their opinions on the impact of the redevelopments. When asked about the
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impact on residential property that undeveloped properties had, 61% of stakeholders believed that this was largely due to blight and perception of contamination. They also claimed that undeveloped brownfields were a sign of poor quality of life in the neighborhood. Another survey question that stood out was that 74% of stakeholders believed that the redevelopments had a positive impact on the value of the surrounding property (De Sousa and Wu 2009). Brownfields, in addition to the stigma of being a contaminated site and the perception that they may have adverse health effects on the community adjacent, can also be an eyesore. People are not as willing to buy property near undeveloped brownfields because of the story it tells. Undeveloped brownfields close to existing communities leads to the perception that the community is either not safe or disenfranchised.
Lincoln, Wisconsin
In another study done in Lincoln, Wisconsin, a neighborhood of eight hundred and ninety houses were examined due to their proximity to two brownfields, which were a product of work by the Outokumpu manufacturing company and the Frost manufacturing company, and a public park (Kaufman and Cloutier 2006). The study also measured the gradient of property values as one moves closer or further away from these sites. The study particularly had to do with the impact of converting brownfield land with public green space and its effect on the community property values. The study determined if the two brownfields were eliminated from the neighborhood the effect on average property value per home would be a net increase of between $1.19 million and $4.31 million (Kaufman and Cloutier 2006). The study also projected that with the reclamation of those brownfields as green space, Lincoln would see a net increase in property value of between $2.4 million and $7.01 million (Kaufman and Cloutier 2006). This would mean an approximate increase of three to seven thousand dollars per home. In the same way that a neighbor who does not keep up with their home’s aesthetic quality can affect the property values of the homes within view, so too can a brownfield have the same impact on a larger scale. Redevelopment can lift this stigma, bring back an aesthetic quality to the neighborhood, which will in turn yield a higher quality of life perception, and bring nearby property values up.
The three studies demonstrate that there is a real economic incentive for developing within already existing communities on brownfield sites. Each study leads to
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the same conclusion that brownfields can have a negati
ve effect on property value and that redevelopment can have a significant positive impact on the housing values. Redevelopment can have a positive impact in many different forms, whether it includes new residential complexes or housing tracts, public green space, new office or workspace development, or other types of recreation purposed development. For a community with the issue of a brownfield, redevelopment can mean more that simply economic opportunity in the form of land values but a revitalization of that existing community. Redevelopment can promote cleaner and safer neighborhoods as well as job opportunities (Kass, Bridgen, and Lee 1998). Many of these locations sit in the heart of cities, which gives them access to a large population base meaning the areas would be of great value if not contaminated. This presents the opportunity for the purchase of valuable land at low prices although there is the added cost of assessment and clean up (Kass, Bridgen, and Lee 1998).
Brownfields in the inner city create economic opportunity for both developers and the constituents of community with the added benefit, as previously discussed, of mitigating urban sprawl. Most major metropolitan areas have an issue with the rate at which the fringes of the metro area are being developed. The market favors areas on the fringe due to the lowered land costs and people’s desire to live in communities perceived as “safe” and with large housing floor plans as well as abundant in open space and views. If existing communities are reinvested in, the result can be greater competition between inner-city areas and suburban tract housing on the fringes of the metro area.
Community Involvement and Networking
Although brownfields can be a suitable alternative to development as usual, it can be more difficult than development as usual. During the redevelopment of a brownfield, those involved in the project can hit a number of pitfalls. One of these pitfalls involves the social and political aspect of brownfield redevelopment. Due to high amounts of legal issues and government involvement in the documentation and repurposing of these sites, a fair amount of networking is involved. Rob Alexander (2012) investigated Public- Private Partnerships (PPPs) and their role in brownfield developments coming to fruition. Alexander performed a study of a number of these relationships as they dealt with brownfield redevelopments. The study came to a conclusion that called for a high degree
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of centrality and density when it came to brownfield projects (Alexander, 2012). Essentially, when one person is leading the charge for the redevelopment who also has access to others who have a stake in the project, a higher degree of success is expected (Alexander, 2012). Environmental officials were shown to have the greatest degree of centrality (Alexander, 2012). People who were leading the projects who also had a high level of centrality also saw the greatest amount of success in their projects (Alexander 2012). Alexander’s study calls for an active role by one individual in order for the greatest chance at success. It also suggests that those involved have open lines of communication, which can allow for greater flow of ideas with respect to compromises and problem solving (Alexander, 2012). Alexander’s study was purposed with understanding the strength of Public Private Partnerships in order with brownfield remediation as the identifier of successful relationships. High centrality relationships, in this study, were most desirable in order to achieve favorable results.
Further emphasizing the importance of public organizations teaming up with the private sector, I.L. Whitman, Thomas Bisaquino, the president of the National Association of Industrial and Office Properties (NAIOP), asserted that major commercial developers are seeing brownfields as equally competitive with other land options (Whitman, 2006). Specifically, twenty of the fifty major U.S. real-estate markets show true competition between fringe development and brownfield redevelopment (Whitman, 2006). This is due to the lack of viable land in densely populated areas and the demand for space within these urban centers by the younger generation as well as the baby boomers that are rediscovering urban life as preferable as they find their nests empty (Whitman, 2006).
Whitman also notes that what keeps many in the private sector from investing in development of brownfields has to do with liability (2006). Many developers are advised by their legal staffs not to get involved with a brownfield site due to the risk of being pulled into the chain of liability. Susan Boyle, who sits on the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, is an example of a person engaging in effective relationships with those in the private sector. She negotiates Prospective Purchaser Agreements for the state, which is a binding agreement between the Department of Environmental Quality and the purchaser that limits the liability of the purchaser for the property’s environmental cleanup (Oregon DEQ 2011). Susan Boyle also counsels developers in
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liability protection and reduction. She notes that when developers become more familiar and more sophisticated in matters of liability, their confidence increases in venturing into brownfield redevelopment (Whitman, 2006). If private developers begin to see brownfields as a viable option, these damaged lands can be recycled more rapidly. Boyle’s efforts are a prime example of the public and private sectors working well in concert in order to see each other’s goals achieved.
The literature also suggests a high degree of involvement from the community directly impacted by the brownfield’s existence and redevelopment. In a ten-item list of suggestions for brownfield revitalization, a journal published by Reimagine (2001) championed the importance of community involvement during the redevelopment process. The first recommendations had to do with community involvement and community assistance (Race Poverty and the Environment, 2001). The first point of community involvement calls for the constant input by those stakeholders at every step from beginning to end. The second point of community assistance has to do with education (Race Poverty and the Environment 2001). Public brownfield programs are called to inform the stakeholders on policies and site decision in order to ensure the community’s ability to contribute to the brownfield effort and steer it in a direction that will increase the quality of life for those within the community (Race Poverty and the Environment 2001). In addition, six out of the ten recommendations involve an active community role. The fifth recommendation explains the importance of maintaining the identity of the community (Race Poverty and the Environment, 2001). The sixth recommendation calls for government funding for non-profit community-based organizations to enact brownfield redevelopment (Race Poverty and the Environment, 2001). The seventh recommendation is to establish funding sources for those community programs (Race Poverty and the Environment 2001). This would mean preferences toward projects that benefit the public and are community run. Lastly, the ninth recommendation involves assessing the initial needs of the community and providing the necessary tools for stakeholders to define for themselves what their needs are (Race Poverty and the Environment 2001). The “Recommendation for Responsive Brownfields Revitalization” piece holds the community’s involvement at the forefront of a successful brownfield redevelopment project, and on a larger scale, views smaller communities as the catalysts and drivers for these projects. The local community can define whether or
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not a project is successful. Having a high level of community involvement ensures that the development will increase the quality of life within the area, stay true to the identity of the community, and be utilized. Thinking about development from the bottom up
rather than the top down can be a useful strategy because of the fact that those who are affected by a nearby contaminated land area are likely to persevere within the process in order to get the project through due to the fact that development results in increased quality of life as well as property value (Ihlanfeldt and Taylor, 2005).
Converting Brownfields to public green space can have financial incentives as well, according to the studies previously discussed concerning property value and the potential increase in the tax base of that community, which can increase funding for a metro area’s other needs. In order to successfully increase the tax base as well as achieve an increase in property value that a community desires, the community itself must be involved in the decision making process. The idea is that the people who carry out their everyday lives in the area are better equipped to make good decisions concerning what type of development can produce the best outcome for the neighborhood. Stakeholders are more likely than a government official or a developer to know what type of development is needed, whether that is a new school, green space, community center or commercial development (Felten, 2006). Meeting the needs of the community makes the greatest difference in making improvements and thereby enhancing the financial situation of that community.
In 1995, NEJAC (National Environmental Justice Advisory Council) held meetings open to the public in which the most important recommendation was to increase community participation and “community vision” in the brownfield redevelopment process. NEJAC also addressed societal issues with community involvement concerning surging energy and hope into the community in order to increase involvement in meetings having to do with the fate of brownfield sites. The efforts from NEJAC were specifically aimed at young adults in the community suggesting job training as a part of brownfield programs knowing that they would eventually be the leaders of their communities (Felten, 2006). Essentially, the aim of the NEJAC framework was to install a hope for a future for the community and then get them involved in the brownfield redevelopment process in order to gain the most favorable results. The ELI (Environmental Land Institute) created a report in 1998 cataloging the state of programs
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at the time; in 2005 the EPA updated the information, which showed an increase in the amount of public involvement in brownfield remediation. Today, all states have public participation requirements. These improvements include various mechanisms that require public involvement at certain points in the process, as well as required meetings and amounts of input by the community impacted. A study by Jennifer Felten catalogued the changes underwent by the four communities of North Lawdale in Chicago, Hawthorne near Los Angeles, Belcourt in North Dakota, Stamford in Connecticut, New Bedford in Massachusetts, and Miami. Each of these communities share a history of poverty and therefore low quality of life. In the case of Hawthorne, development did not contain any amount of input by the community (Felten, 2006). The lack of input resulted in a high amount of retail and business park development, which created jobs for those within the community in the retail sector, however, the considerable amount of development for the business park was not in line with the community’s interests. More jobs for local citizens could have been created if the community had been more involved, due to the fact that they are more aware of the typical education and career status within Hawthorne (Felten, 2006). Miami and New Bedford have similar stories to Hawthorne as far as lacking either resources or will power to involve the community in the decision making process (Felten, 2006). All three experience less community empowerment and financial gain than the citizens of the Stamford, North Lawndale, and Belcourt, communities which were each decreed successful by the hand of stakeholder input (Felten, 2006).
Portland, a community where urban development is held in high regard, has a brownfields program that makes an attempt to take into account the community’s ideas and needs. Geri Washington (2001) wrote about the state of brownfield redevelopment in Portland, placing a focus on the presence of contaminated land in areas of low income and high amounts of minorities. The North to Northeast area of Portland had been neglected in the respect of brownfield remediation (Washington 2001). Washington explains that this area of Portland is home to many African American residents and therefore when community members talk about redeveloping the brownfields in their proximity, the fear of displacement is enters the conversation naturally as well (2001). The fear that exists in within this particular community is a result of past development that had displaced residents in the past. In Portland, property for residence due to the Urban Growth Boundary is somewhat scarce and finding affordable land is another
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challenge in itself. With the understanding that brownfields often take up long-term residence in poorer neighborhoods, which also means a greater number of brownfields in minority dominated areas, Washington discusses a bottom to top approach,
“In N/NE Portland we talk about brownfields revitalization as opposed to redevelopment. Revitalization is a bottom-up process that starts with a community based vision. We want to see projects that are not necessarily profitable, but provide the community with needed services. We’d like to see community centers, healthcare facilities, greenspace, and entrepreneurial opportunities for community small businesses” (Washington, 2001).
The desire is for not just redevelopment in order to get rid of the contaminated land in these areas but to reuse these properties in a way that benefits those in the surrounding area. The residents of this area should not have to settle for redevelopment of any kind. Redevelopment should turn a large negative into an equally substantial positive (Washington, 2001). Washington goes on to discuss that the N/NE Portland community activists had placed pressure on the city to remedy the neglect it received in the brownfields department (2001). This resulted in a grant that gave them the opportunity to select three brownfields for revitalization (Washington, 2001). In this case, the community’s efforts sparked movement and therefore affect the landscape of N/NE Portland. A committee was assembled among stakeholders in order to identify areas within the low-income community that would most benefit from revitalization, which would come in the form of one of the criteria Washington discussed (2001). This article demonstrates that members of the community can create movement in the realm of brownfields. If enough members of a particular community are in support of an action, it poses a threat politically. Voting members of a community caused a shift in paradigm in Portland.
In 1969, the Office of Economic Opportunity financed an extensive study that involved interviewing community leaders and activists in one hundred poor neighborhoods. This was done in order to measure the scope of the poverty program on poor neighborhoods. This study created a large amount of data, which Curt Lamb among others repurposed in order to generate an evaluation of the political power in low-income areas (Bartley, 1976). After careful examination of the data, Lamb concluded that communities with more militant approaches and strong community organizations were
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more successful in “achieving institutional change” than were communities that were less aggressive and unorganized (Bartley, 1976). Those with inadequate resources can find success in protest and placing political pressure on those in power. The author of the review, Numan V. Bartley, brings up the fact that, at least at the time, there existed an undercurrent of radicalism in poorer communities. “Maximum fe
asible participation” is preferable in neighborhood with considerably less resources (Bartley, 1976). The study was performed at the dusk of the civil rights movement, which captures the country in a moment where reasonable solutions to public issues were subject to greater complication due to race. Less militant approaches to community activism can have the same affect now as a greater amount of effort may have had fifty years ago (Bartley, 1976). In the event of less profitable brownfield revitalization projects, reasonably toned political pressure from community activists still needs to be applied in order to create movement.
Superfund and Government Incentive
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was first proposed in June of 1979 by the Carter administration as a response to the public health risk caused by the irresponsible disposal of waste by some oil and chemical companies. The legislation required government notification in the event of a spillage of or known presence of hazardous waste at any site in the United States. This also allows the government to take immediate action including containing the situation at these spill and waste disposal sites. In 1980, Congress passed the bill called CERCLA. This law imposed a tax on petroleum and chemical industries as well as expanded federal authority to respond to releases and potential releases of hazardous substances. Most of the funds for CERCLA came from a $0.03 per barrel tax on petroleum, a $0.50 per pound tax on materials used to manufacture petroleum products that were frequently being found at hazardous waste sites, as well as a $1.00 per pound tax on other products also frequently found at hazardous waste sites (USEPA). The oil and chemical companies felt the majority of the effects of the initial legislation. $1.6 billion dollars collected in five years was placed in a trust purposed for funding the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Furthermore, the act placed prohibitions and requirements on hazardous waste sites, as well as liability for those responsible for the waste (USEPA). The government was enabled to remediate the sites at the expense of the party or parties deemed responsible
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for the contamination. It also provided funding for clean up when no party could be identified as responsible. By the federal authority, there are two types of response actions including short-term and long-term remediation. Long-term remediation refers to the cleanup of sites that are not of immediate danger to those in the surrounding settlement. This action permanently reduces the danger associated with hazardous chemicals at a given site and is associated only with sites on the NPL (National Priorities List) (USEPA). CERCLA was amended in 1986 in order to increase consideration of state requirements, encourage greater involvement by local communities in the process of cleaning up, and increase the fund to $8.5 billion (USEPA).
CERCLA, which is also known by the name “Superfund” was intended to help subsidize the process of brownfield development in order to increase the amount of remediation nationwide. Some, however, feel that Superfund is in desperate need of reform. David Slutzky and A.J. Frey both authored “Brownfields Uncertainty: A Proposal to Reform Superfund,” which criticizes superfund on its hindrance of certain brownfield remediation projects due to the fact that they are not registered as NPL sites (2010). Even though these sites are not listed by the EPA, they may still contain contaminates that could hold developers legally liable for cleanup and redevelopment. Because of this, many sites hang “in a sort of regulatory limbo” (Slutzkey and Frey, 2010). The sites remain vacant because developers are uncertain of whether or not they will be subject to expensive regulatory and third party liabilities (Slutzky and Frey 2010). Even though CERCLA seeks out to identify those responsible for the contamination in the first place, a developer who buys contaminated land after the fact can still be held liable. Furthermore, no mechanisms currently exist through the EPA that can guarantee the property owner that no further liabilities associated with the land or the cleanup exist (Slutzky and Frey 2010). It is due to this stipulation the authors suggest that Superfund is getting in its own way.
An article by Lucia Ann Silecchia in The Harvard Environmental Law Review, presents an opinion about the passing of the legislation (1996). She suggests that a by- partisan group without much debate hastily put the bill together (Silecchia, 1996). The legislation provides that the government can order clean ups with a certain amount of urgency and some worried that this could put some landowners and business in tight spots financially if subject to this enforcement. Congress reformed CERCLA with
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SARA, which in addition to increasing the fund, added legislation, which limited the, “timing of pre-enforcement judicial review of ordered cleanups” (Silecchia, 1996). The amendment limited dilatory litigation concerning matters of responsibility and therefore allowed for speedier cleanups. The government can exert a large amount of power when it comes to the issue of brownfields being it an environmental issue as well as in some cases a health issue. The government’s involvement can surely allow for fast remediation and redevelopment, although the quickness comes at the expense of those parties identified as responsible.
The impact that Superfund can have on certain brownfield projects has led some states to lead their own reform to Superfund in order to encourage the infill development that brownfields play a large role in. Because of impediments in real-estate transactions, the Midwestern region has headed the charge in this area. The Lewis College of Urban affairs at Cleveland State University assessed the situation with the barriers associated with brownfield remediation and came up with five factors that were critical to encouraging voluntary cleanup of brownfield properties. The list included flexible cleanup standards depending on future use, finality in the cleanup process meaning an end to liability for the site in question, an “innocent landowner” option which allows for cleanup costs to be taken on by former owners of the site, liability protection for lenders in order to remove stigma and increase financing for remediation and development, and financial support for additional cost towards actual development (Andrew, 1996). The five factors each increase the likelihood that a potential developer will choose a brownfield site by catering to the thought process of the developer, which includes the financing of the remediation and its relationship to the potential profit after development is complete and the legal issues that come with the cleanup and development. According to Andrew, the need for the cleanup to be “final” is the most important, because without the finality of cleanup the other factors of little impact (1996).
Ohio is one of the Midwestern states that reformed its brownfields program with a new approach to cleanup standards and site investigations. It requires the developer to work with a state-certified consultant to conduct the cleanup in a way that meets the standards set by the state (Andrew, 1996). When the process is complete, the consultant issues a “No Further Action” letter, which protects the developer from any legal action by the state for any possible left over contamination (Andrew, 1996). The letter addresses
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the second factor in the Lewis College of Urban Affairs study which finalizes the cleanup upon completion. Other states in the Midwest chose different approaches in order to protect developers. For instance, Michigan only holds property owners liable if they are directly responsible for the release or threat of release of harmful wastes (Andrew, 1996). Illinois allows the purchaser to do a Phase I site assessment for contaminants (Andrew, 19
96). If contaminants are found, the owner can enter into a release, which calls for a remediation plan and with proper execution will deflect liability from the owner (Andrew, 1996).
Financial programs are also put to work in the Midwestern states, which can offset the cost of remediation. These programs put public funding toward incentives such as low interest loans, guaranteed loans, tax incentives, industrial development bonds, and direct grants (Andrew, 1996). Each of the incentives is a given metro area’s investment in the already developed inner city areas. The efforts all go toward increasing competition between infill development and outer fringe development. Remediation also goes toward increasing property values, revitalizing communities, and increases the tax base for the communities affected. Decreasing the restrictions associated with brownfield cleanup and development and placing financial incentives can inflict great change in the decision- making of the developer.
In the United States, successful brownfield redevelopment can depend on financial, legal, and social factors. The financial factors include the project team’s ability to secure funding for the project through various government programs. Legal factors that need to be addressed in order to keep the project in going primarily have to do with Superfund. States have different histories and policies with regard to Superfund and having people who understand these policies at the county, state, and federal level can greatly improve a site’s chances. Superfund can present barriers to initiating projects but can also secure funding effectively. Furthermore, according to Rob Alexander a central figurehead with a wide range of connections and heavy influence with those connections can play a key role in development. Each of these factors, according to the research can make or break a project. Tucson’s economy and social makeup can differ from those in the Midwest and East Coast regions. Defining what can create a successful project in these regions may not necessarily translate perfectly to the desert southwest, however, there is no doubt that a project in Tucson will face legal, financial, and social difficulties
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just as a project in the Midwest would. In order to define what has made certain projects successful and others unsuccessful in Tucson, one would need to identify those sites and also identify each one’s weaknesses and strengths. Certain facets within the basic process of remediation, in Tucson specifically, may be more difficult to get a grip of than others. This would involve case studies of past brownfield projects both ones that are considered successful and those considered unsuccessful.
Specifically, this study focuses on three different brownfields within the city of Tucson. These areas include the Old Fort Lowell Remediation project, the El Paso and Southwestern Greenway Connection project, which passes through brownfields in the city of South Tucson, and the Tucson International Airport site. Each of these sites is well documented in the way of community organization and outreach, funding options, and networks of participants. Each of these projects was large in scale. The Old Fort Lowell- Adkins property covers an area of 5.5 acres and the contamination covers approximately 2 acres of the site. The site sits within a 70-acre land restoration project that is the Fort Lowell Restoration. The Greenway connection through South Tucson is a bike path projected to cover 6 miles with one mile of the path crossing through South Tucson and its contaminated land plots. The Tucson International Airport site contained one hundred thousand tons of contaminated soils as well as a contaminated water table underground, which has been used as a potable water source.