Introduction: Emily
On the night of April 20, 2010, a bubble of methane gas escaped from the well of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. This bubble shot up the pipe towards the surface causing an explosion and fire at the rig. During the explosion and rescue efforts to follow, 11 people were killed and 115 rig workers were rescued. After burning for more than a day, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig sank. The rig was located 42 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. After the fires were contained along the wreckage, on April 26 BP began to add dispersants to the oil. The dispersants are used like a strong soap which causes the oil to break down and begin to mix with the water easily speeding up the natural biodegradation. BP and the government tired on multiple attempts to stop the flow of oil. On May 7, a four stories tall “containment dome” was lowered over the well by BP. The dome was placed to run a new pipe to the surface to collect to oil however, the opening became clogged with ice, gas, and water causing the plan to be abandoned. On May 26, BP began to shoot heavy mud, golf balls, and rubber into the well opening to try to clog it which also did not work. After a variety of attempts, BP and the government had several partial successes with capping the well. By capping, a lid was placed on the top of a well and a pipe is run to the surface to collect leaking oil. On July 15, 2010, the well was successfully capped. The pipe leaked oil and gas for a total of 87 days releasing and estimated total of 3.19 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The solution was successful because engineers designed the cap to stop the flow of oil without building up an excessive amount of pressure under the seafloor that would burst out of a different opening. The well was cemented shut on August 3 and declared dead by the federal government September 21.
Due to the severity of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and sinking, an ethical dilemma was posed. Based off the ASCE Code of Ethics, there are eight fundamental canons that should be considered as a model of professional conduct.
The potential culpable parties responsible for the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill are BP and Transocean. BP oil company was the company that was providing the funds for the oil extraction and was the company that was going to obtain the oil to sell. BP was leasing the Deepwater Horizon rig from Transocean, the offshore oil drilling company that owned and operated the rig. The Deepwater Horizon was oil project was several weeks behind and millions of dollars over budget so the executives at BP put pressure on Transocean to speed up the drilling process in order to increase BP’s revenue.
List of Events
7 months before the explosion the Deepwater Horizon rig crew drilled the deepest oil well in history ( could have lead to overconfidence and pride)
Getting the oil was taking too long
BP ordered a faster pace
Faster pace caused the bottom of the well to split open
That well was abandoned and they had to drill a new route (this cost BP more than 2 weeks and millions of dollars more)
More pressure was placed on the Deepwater Horizon crew from BP
Canon 6?
There was an accident on the rig that was not reported ( 4 weeks before the explosion the blowout preventer broke, rig’s most vital piece of safety equipment was damaged and weeks before that one pod that controls the BOP lost function so the BOP was just operated using a remote control) Supervision said it was no big deal
The annular is used to seal the well for pressure tests so without it pressure tests are not reliable
Canon 3?
Canon 1?
On the day of the explosion the process was almost complete and the Transocean rig owner said that they were going to finishing doing one thing and a BP manager disagreed
Transocean wanted a subcontractor to place three concrete plugs, like corks, in the column to keep the pressure down below contained
The BP manager wanted to begin remove the “mud” before the last plug was
BP won the argument and the mud was taken out (if the mud had been left in there probably wouldn’t have been a blowout)
Canon 5?
Canon 2?
The night of the explosion the Deepwater Horizon received a award from BP to congratulate them for having 7 years without an injury
Once the explosion happened (“The BOP was suppose the protect us and keep us from the blowout but obviously had failed”)
As the drilling fluid was removed, downward pressure was relieved, the bottom plug failed, the blowout preventer didn’t work ,and 11 men were killed
BP was found willfully negligent and hit with $108million in fines, the highest workplace safety fine in US history
BP’s chief executive says that” This is Transocean’s accident”
Through all the red flags, they pressed ahead. It was, after all, the Deepwater Horizon, the world’s record holder. Celebrated as among the safest in the fleet
Prosecuting: Tim and Katie
Ethical Dillema
In the two weeks leading up to the explosion, multiple decisions were made in the day to day operation of the oil rig and drilling process. An ethical dilemma would not be apparent by looking at these decisions individually. After grouping the decisions together, there was a trend developed which putting profits and speed above the health and safety of the public.
Cement Failure
The main purpose of cement is to plug the well.. Once the initial drilling process was complete, and the target depth was met, Transocean planned to temporarily abandon the well. Another rig would withdraw the oil and gas at a later date.
Centralizers
Once the well was ready for concrete, centralizers needed to be installed on the production casing. The purpose of the centralizers was to keep the production casing off the edge of the well bore and increase the effectiveness of the concrete seal. Maintaining spacing between the production casing and the well bore allows the concrete to follow the path of least resistance. Without the proper amount of centralizers, there is a risk the concrete will not follow the path of least resistance, and channeling could occur. Halliburton ran a model to determine the number of centralizers needed for the production casing.
BP only had 6 centralizers on the oil rig and needed to order 15 more to meet the recommendation of 21. BP placed the order for the additional centralizers but failed to review the product details. Upon delivery, BP discovered the centralizers required a slip on collar, which was not included in the shipment. BP did not like this model of centralizer as they felt it could get caught up in the well bore. At this time, BP could have placed an order for the slip on collars, but decided that using the 6 centralizers on the rig was sufficient. BP did not notify Halliburton of this change, and the Transocean crew was unaware that 21 centralizers were recommended. After it was decided to use 6 centralizers, one BP engineer wrote “But who cares, it’s done, end of story, we will probably be fine and we’ll get a good cement job”.
The number of centralizers may not have been a sole contributor to the disaster, and there was no guarantee that 21 centralizers would have prevented channeling. That being said, only using 6 centralizers increased the risk of channeling.
Cement testing
February 2010, Haliburton conducted tests on concrete similar to the mix used for the Macondo Well. The process used involved a nitrogen foam. These tests demonstrated instability with the cement procedure, and this data was not presented to BP officials.
1c. On site cement analysis also displayed instability, but this report did not make it to BP.
BP placed an order with Schlumberger for cement evaluation services for $128,000 which included a cement bond log, isolation scanner, inclinometer survey, and variable density log. Schlumberger flew out to the rig on April 19th , and was sent home on the morning of April 20th because BP believed the cement job went well enough to bypass the cement tests. These tests would have taken approximately 8 hours to complete.
Cement Failure Conclusion
BP failed to follow Halliburton recommendations of 21 centralizers, BP failed to review the product details of the order of the 15 centralizers, BP failed to follow their own recommended technical guidance for the number of barrels of cement installed above the hydrocarbon zone, Halliburton failed to inform BP regarding the instability of nitrogen foamed cement, and BP failed to allow Schlumberger perform tests on the cement after it was installed. All of these decisions significantly contributed to the disaster.
Design Change Failure
Design changes occur in virtually every project, and are expected. In the last 9 days leading up the the blowout, the abandonment procedure was changed at least 4 times. John Guide BP Wells Team leader make a comment to his supervisor “we’re flying by the seat of our pants….huge level of paranoia from engineering leadership is driving chaos….The operation is not going to succeed if we continue in the manner”
Procedure Failures
There were multiple occasions in which the crew either did not follow their own procedures, or there were not procedures in place to help the crew react to an abnormal operating condition.
One of the final steps of temporarily abandoning the well was a negative test. The crew performed two negative pressure tests which resulted in pressures above 1400 psi while the pressure should have maintained a pressure of 0 psi. The crew interpreted the 1400 psi as “the bladder effect” and failed to recognize that something was wrong in the well. BP and transocean did not have a procedure in place to to interpret a failed negative pressure test to help the crew identify what could have been wrong.
Immediately after the blowout, the crew had the option of diverting the influx of mud, oil and gas through the mud/gas separator or sending it overboard. Transocean’s Well Control Handbook advises that flow be diverted overboard
Defendant: Kyle and Gage
Mediator on Ethical Violations:
Mediator opinion on Resolution of the violation:
Conclusion:
References:
https://ocean.si.edu/conservation/gulf-oil-spill/gulf-mexico-oil-spill-interactive
https://www.asce.org/code-of-ethics/