This type of question is answerable by a “yes” – i.e., the concept of hegemony is still relevant – or a “no” – i.e., the concept of hegemony is not relevant anymore. But I will have to suspend my response to this question until I deal with it fully below. Three preliminary points will have to be highlighted first.
First of all, I would like to situate the question. Since this question is taken from the Summer 2016 examination paper in IR 450 – IPE, the question merits an answer within the realms of International Political Economy. Therefore, as I attempt to craft my response, it is not going to be in the field of religion, or culture, or social relations, but IPE.
The second preliminary point is the scope of my sources. There might be a great number of literature on the subject, but I will only be using as references for this paper, the required readings in Week 3: Systemic-level Approaches: Hegemony, International Regimes and Neorealism of this term’s IR 470 – IPE. These sources are cited in the list of references at the end of the paper and are quoted within the essay itself.
The third introductory point has something to do with the structure that I will be using in responding to the question. I will try to analyse the question first by breaking it down into smaller parts, identifying and weighing significant features from multiple points of view, in order to build a reasoned argument from my own perspective on the topic. I will conclude with my categorical response to the question.
After discussing the situation of the question, scope of the sources of this paper, and the structure of the response, I am now ready to proceed in answering the question, “Is the concept of hegemony still relevant?”
In my attempt to come up with an argued response this question, I would like to take three steps that correspond to the three important key words within the question itself [A] the “concept of hegemony”, [B] how the “concept of hegemony” was “relevant”, and [C] how the “concept of hegemony” is “still” relevant in studying International Political Economy. At this point, it is important to highlight that it is the “concept of hegemony” that is in contention here, not any particular hegemon in the past, present or future. It is the idea of hegemony, not the presence of a dominant power, that is being considered to be whether or not still relevant.
[A] We begin the discussion with the “concept of hegemony”. In “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” Stephen D. Krasner related the degree of openness of the movement of goods with maximizing the state’s interest in [1] aggregate national income, [2] economic growth, [3] political power and [4] social stability.
Within the article, Krasner defined a hegemonic system as the “one in which there is a single state [the hegemon] that is much larger and relatively more advanced than its trading partners.” (322) Krasner claims that within this system, the hegemon has the preference for an open international trade structure because this [1] does not only increase its national income due to trade gains but also [2] increases its growth rate when the hegemon’s economic power, e.g., economies of scale and technology, is increasing. Krasner asserts further that an open structure of international trade increases the hegemon’s [3] political power because its opportunity cost of closure to trade is much less compared to that of smaller states. The hegemon’s political power is also due to its large domestic market and relatively cheap exports which it can offer or withhold anytime to any of its partner-states. Finally, the hegemon’s [4] social instability as a consequence of trade openness is eased by the mobility of its factors of production, and its low-level of involvement in the international economy, relative to weaker states. Krasner concludes that trade openness is “most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency. Such a [hegemonic] state has the interest and the resources to create a structure, characterized by lower tariffs, rising trade proportions, and less regionalism.” (323)
[B] This brings us to the consideration of the implication of this “concept of hegemony” in understanding the global political economy. This part of the essay argues that the “concept of hegemony” was relevant to the study of IPE, because it was the foundation of one of systemic theories of IPE, the Hegemonic Stability Theory.
Robert O. Keohane, in his book, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, states the two central propositions of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (HST): [1] “order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power… and [2] the maintenance of order requires continued hegemony.” (31) Thus, supporters of HST claim that international cooperation necessitates the self-interested hegemon.
Nevertheless, Keohane discredits these two claims of HST. Keohane argues that [1] while hegemony can “help to create a pattern of order”, (49), it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of global cooperation. More importantly, Keohane maintains that [2] cooperation is not dependent on the existence of a hegemon after international institutions have been established. After Hegemony, as the title of Keohane’s book suggests, cooperation is also possible to be realized. Furthermore, Axelrod and Keohane argue that cooperation can be achieved even under anarchy – “a lack of common government in world politics.” (226) For Keohane, and Axelrod, international regimes, not the hegemon, are necessary for international stability.
It is not for me to take sides in this debate, at least in this essay, not only because there is a further development along these lines, i.e., discrediting the promise of international institutions, but also because this is not the point that I have to defend here. I only had to show how the “concept of hegemony” was used in the Hegemonic Stability Theory to argue that it was “relevant”. Moreover, the “concept of hegemony” is also “relevant” because the opposing international regimes theory was developed as a critique and a response to the “concept of hegemony”. Thus, the “concept of hegemony” is “still” relevant, even if it has already been discredited, because it has been a part of the narrative that is IPE.
[C] I have already discussed above how the “concept of hegemony” was “relevant” to the Hegemonic Stability Theory and that it is “still” relevant to the Theory of International Regimes, albeit in a negative way. But the plot “still” thickens.
John J. Mearsheimer, in his paper, “The False Promise of International Institutions” define “institutions” as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.” (8) However, Mearshimer claims that the three international relations theories that support institutions – Koehane’s liberal institutionalism among others – are all flawed. Each have problems in its causal logic; each finds little evidence in history. “What is the most impressive about institutions,” needless to say that this is a sarcastic comment from Mearsheimer, “is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behaviour” (47) and thus, “holds little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.” (7)
Mearsheimer concludes his article by pointing out that the only “undeniable advantage in the eyes of [American] supporters” of institutional theories is that “they are not realism.” (49) The four principal reasons against realism, Mearsheimer enumerates include: “[1] that realism is pessimistic – it depicts a world of stark and harsh competition… of no escaping from evil; [2] that it treats war as inevitable, and sometimes necessary; [3] in realist theory, all states seek the same goal: maximum relative power; and [4] a long [American] tradition of anti-realist rhetoric which continue to influence [Americans] today.” (48-49)
Given Mearsheimer’s line of reasoning, should we turn back, maybe not exactly to “the concept of hegemony” but to consider how states tend to maximize their goals and self-interests within the context of international regimes, as we cannot really treat them independently of each other? And maybe, also consider how sub-systemic state variables, i.e., ideas, interests, domestic institutions, affect foreign policies?
Unfortunately, or fortunately, these questions are again beyond the scope of this essay. For now, showing how the “concept of hegemony” weaves into this narrative of understanding IPE is already sufficient in arguing that it is “still” very much relevant until today.
To conclude, having been able to discuss in this formative essay the three key components of the question above, namely: the “concept of hegemony”, how this concept was “relevant”, and is “still” relevant in studying International Political Economy, I am now ready to give my categorical answer to the question “Is the concept of hegemony still relevant?” It is a resounding “yes”!
References:
Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,” in World Politics 38(1): 1985.
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Krasner, Stephen D. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade”, in World Politics 28(3): 1976.
Mearsheimer, John, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19(3): 1994/95.