But, how can one reconcile the evidence that conscious experiences such as “free choice” are causally effective with the principle that the physical world is causally closed? One method suggested by Max Velmans is to accept that for each individual there is one "mental life" but two ways of knowing it: the subjective experience (first-person knowledge) and an objective assessment (third-person knowledge). From a first-person perspective conscious experiences appear causally effective. From a third-person perspective, however, the same causal sequences can be explained in terms of neurobiology. Neither perspective is right or wrong, or exclusionary of the other. These perspectives are complementary. The differences between how things appear subjectively to the actor versus a third-person objective perspective has to do with differences in the observational arrangements (the means by which a subject and an external observer assess the subject's mental processes).
Suppose I listen to a piece of music of particular significance to me. I can describe a causal account of the event based upon my experience of it (the technical performance, artistic style, the sound of the violin, etc.). A behavioral neurologist can if so inclined make any number of observations (gross behavioral as well as scientific measurements—assuming access to sophisticated equipment) about the neurophysiologic events operating in my brain as I listen to the performance and provide a detailed physical account of this biologic symphony. The two experiences are real yet different based on their separate perspectives. From a scientifically reductionist perspective, the claim that conscious experiences are nothing more than brain states is a claim that my subjective (first-person) phenomena are nothing more than and equivalent to an objective set of phenomena (the coincident brain states viewed by an external observer). Formally this implies conscious experiences to be ontologically identical to brain states. However, correlation and causation do not establish ontological identity. Ontological identity is symmetric: if A is identical to B, then B is identical to A. Ontological identity also obeys Leibniz’s Law: if A is identical to B, all the properties of A are also properties of B, and vice versa. Correlation is also symmetrical but does not obey Leibniz’s Law: if A correlates with B, it does not follow that all the properties of A and B are the same. Conversely, causation is asymmetrical: if A causes B, it does not follow that B causes A. If a baseball is thrown through a pane of glass, it does not follow that the breaking glass causes the baseball to be thrown through the window. Furthermore, causation does not comply with Leibniz’s Law: flying baseballs and shattering glass have very different properties. Thus, under select conditions, brain states may be shown to cause or correlate with conscious experiences (deciding to throw a baseball through the window), but it does not follow that conscious experiences are nothing more than states or functions of the brain. As no information about consciousness the than its neural causes and correlates is available to neuro-scientific investigation of the brain, it is difficult to see how such neurobehavioral experimentation could settle the problem. The only description of conscious experiences requires first-person sources, and thus are ultimately not amenable to reductionist insights.
In classical dualism, consciousness is thought to be a nonmaterial substance different from the material world with an existence that is independent of the existence of the brain. Emergentism in the form of property dualism, however, retains the view that there are fundamental differences between consciousness and physical matter, but regards these attributes as different kinds of brain properties. That is, consciousness is not reducible to a set of brain functions, but its existence is nevertheless dependent on the a neural substrates (Searle, J. (1987) Minds and brains without programs, in C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield (eds) Mindwaves, Oxford: Blackwell). Consciousness therefore may be viewed as an emergent property of brain functioning (similar to liquidity being an emergent property of water molecules at room temperature)— essentially a higher order property of the brain, caused by a set of neural activities without being ontologically identical to it.
As with other philosophic questions (i.e., the historic belief in a geocentric universe, based on plana terra, as opposed to the scientifically manifest reality of our world), the debate over the existence of free will, and, by extension its implications for moral responsibility, provides an example in which our intuitions seemingly are in conflict with contemporary scientific understanding. To what degree then is the impression of our own self authorship analogous to one’s experience in Plato’s cave.
Kant provided an early avenue to resolve the tension between free will and determinism— distinguishing between phenomena (the sensible world— what we know through experience) and noumena (the intelligible world— what we can think but not know through experience). His analysis of moral concepts such as good will and duty led him to the conclusion that we are free as long as morality is not illusory. Thus moral responsibility becomes a defining requisite for free will. From a compatibilist view, all acts are causally determined, but a free act is one that can be described as determined by irreducibly mental causes, and in particular by the casualty of reason.
Unfortunately, a problem in framing the debate over metaphysical requisites for moral responsibility arises from lack of consensus as to what the terms “free will” and “morality” mean. Is there any convincing argument for an objective standard for what is moral?
Traditional rationalist models of moral decision-making based in free will suggest that judgements arise from deliberative reflection and the weighing of alternative possibilities. Increasingly, however, popular sentiment prefers the view that moral decisions reflect a composite of fast, brain-based responses to morally apposite situations that derive from unconscious cognitive processes affected by our genetic constitution and environmental history. This change in perspective about moral psychology has been driven by an emerging body of research that indicate individual judgements are formed too quickly to be realistically affected by deliberative reflection— and, are significantly influenced by situational, cultural and emotional content; often unjustifiable by objective standards.