In the study and practice of international affairs, the constructivist theory of relations specifically considers the influence of national identity, norms, and social interaction in the international community as a means to explain the decision-making process and actions of an individual nation. Rather than the common assumption that states and their respective leaders are motivated solely by self-help, “[constructivism] is interested in how actors define their national interests, threats to those national interests, and their interests’ relationship to one another.”1 By such principles, identities and roles formed by a nation’s collective interests play a crucial role particularly in respect to the nation’s interaction within the international community, and help in the establishment of international norms and the interaction between countries bound together in responsibility and accountability for greater collective security and other represented interests.
Though national identity, norms, and interaction ideally lead to international cooperation, constructivism also recognizes that these same factors play into a nation’s decision to use force in times of conflict. From the perspective of this theory, the use of force most often occurs as a result of a violation of international norms and standards, and additionally as the result of a collective identity, which might compel certain nations to use force in order to uphold stature in the international community. In the case of a state that acts in the disapproval of the international community, for example, major powers might respond with force as a means to impose social pressure against current and future norm violators, secure their own role of power in the international community, and promote new standards of cooperation in defense of international norms.
In respect to the 2011 U.S. decision to bomb Libya, constructivism explains the actions taken by the United States and Obama as a direct result of the Qaddafi-led violations of human rights, the U.S.’s commitment to the UNGA Responsibility to Protect, and the U.S. interactions with France, Britain, and other organizations in the international community in organizing a response to the humanitarian crisis.
On February 24, 2011, President Barack Obama addressed the nation regarding the rising conflict in Libya. In his speech, Obama decried the Qaddafi regime’s violent actions taken against its own citizens, stating, “…[The] Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence, to allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, and to respect the rights of its people.”2 He further declared that Libya “must be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities, and face the cost of continued violations of human rights.”2 These words reaffirmed the president’s belief in the U.S.’s identity as a defender of human rights both domestically and abroad, and, though Obama did not specifically mention an intent to employ U.S. military action, a door had ultimately been opened to extensive international conversation on a joint obligation to hold Qaddafi accountable for his actions. During these critical moments of decision-making in the United States, there were also many government officials who were especially forthright in expressing their opinion on the U.S.’s role in the international community and its duty to intervene. Of these officials, perhaps the most outspoken was U.S. Ambassador to the United States, Susan E. Powers, who came out strongly in favor of the U.S.’s responsibility to intervene, having already seen the cost of the Clinton administration’s lack of intervention during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.3 Republican Senator McCain and Democratic Senator Lieberman also came out in joint defense of a world power’s responsibility to intervene in conflict, stating that “[the] United States must not be passive at this critical moment in history,”4 expressing a bipartisan desire for military intervention in defense of the Libyan people.
The 2005 UN General Assembly’s adopted global commitment, titled Responsibility to Protect (R2P), also placed considerable pressure on the United States during the growing Libyan conflict. In principle, the joint commitment prioritized an initial obligation by every state to uphold the rights of their citizens, and prevent any efforts to commit acts of genocide or other violence.5 In the case of a state-sponsored violation of this agreement, however, the global commitment articulated that “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means … to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”5 In reference to use of force, an agreed responsibility was also established for the international community “to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, … should peaceful means be inadequate… .”5 As the conflict within Libya escalated, Qaddafi’s growing violence against protesters of the regime was not only agreed to be a certain and intention abuse of power against the people of the state, but also proved to be a Despite being charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, Qaddafi's actions seemed unimpeded by numerous calls from the international community for him to step down. Even Secretary of State Clinton, for example, a previously skeptic of U.S. intervention, spoke to the UN Human Rights Council citing a common responsibility within the international community “to protect universal rights and hold violators accountable.”6
Finally, constructivism explains that the growing pressure from French president Sarkozy, British Prime Minister Cameron, and other organizations within the international community in favor of military intervention formed a coalition of sorts in which a U.S. decision to respond to the Qaddafi regime with force would easily be legitimized. On February 25, President Sarkozy took the lead as one of the first leaders to publicly denounce Qaddafi’s actions following a Libyan UN Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi’s request for an imposed no-fly zone. The United Nations Security Council took action just one day later, passing UN Security Council Resolution 1970 which formally called for an ICC investigation into Qaddafi’s human rights violations, and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban, and freezing of assets. Prime Minister Cameron soon followed in support of taking action against Qaddafi, calling for a no-fly zone to be imposed over Libya. Finally, on March 12, the Arab League announced a unanimous agreement of all member states present for a no-fly zone to be imposed as a means to protect Libyan civilians.7 Though many of these initial actions might have eventually been enough to encourage U.S. joint intervention, leaders and organizations pressing for immediate action still noted U.S. hesitation, and continued to communicate closely with President Obama in the following days to formulate an acceptable course of action, and by March 17, the U.S. decided to vote in favor of an imposed no-fly zone, and soon after made the decision to use military force in the form of bombing to totally halt violent actions against Libyan citizens and ultimately put an end to the Qaddafi regime.7