What Is Freedom?
Almost all the thinkers in human intellectual history have sung the praises of “freedom”, but the exact meaning of this concept varies in each of these thinkers. Debating on the definition of freedom for a long time, the central conflict of various political theories on the notion of freedom in a contract-based civil society is, as Berlin claims in his lecture Two Concepts of Liberty, a constant tug-of-war between the individual and the centralized control of the State. The degree of freedom one has in a civil state is interpreted as the space within the prescribed line drawn by the centralized control.
Using Hobbes’ Leviathan, I shall show that natural freedom of men need to be restrained by a covenant between each of the individuals and the State because one’s freedom interferes with someone else’s. This mutual restraint allows individuals to pursue other more felicitous elements of freedom. I will show that Hobbes is correct that this covenant needs to protect some portion of the human existence by leaving necessary space outside the Sovereignty, yet he is mistaken that the line should be drawn to limit the freedom severely. In a Hobbesian State, individuals give too much to the state, thus they compromise on the possibility of freedom.
While the line between individual freedom and social control drawn too absolutely in Hobbes, I shall then present that in Locke, citizens do not have to sacrifice so much freedom. Also, one’s natural freedom shall be preserved along with your possessions. according to Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. However, I will also demonstrate the Lockean State’s only purpose is to protect one’s property that preexisted the social contract; Locke’s assertions on the popular consent is too guarded as if the general will can be tacit, thus oversimplifying man’s will and consent to enter the social contract.
Through the reading of Rousseau’s The Social Contract, I shall agree with him in this paper that the general will must strictly include a unanimous consent to alienate the citizen’s natural freedom in exchange of the greatest form of freedom, civil freedom, which people make laws together and follow them. One’s true freedom is exerted through the share of every right (property, law, decision etc.) by every citizen for the common good.
The answer to the aforementioned tug-of-war on “what is freedom” and “where should the line of individual non-interference versus consented regulation be drawn” can be raised through the discussion of three thinkers. In a desired relationship between non-interference and governmental control, the area of individual and of sovereignty merge into one, thus the real freedom of men is achieved.
Having freedom in the state of nature means to Hobbes “the absence of externall Impediments”, whether from another man or from another external force. (Hobbes 189) For Hobbes, if a free man has a will to do a thing, he “is not hindred to doe what he has a will to.” (Hobbes 262) A free man’s liberty can cover an enormous realm that everything he sees, he is able to have a hope to obtain it. However, that non-interference only lasts until another free man enters the picture. Afterwards, the liberty of these two men interfere with one another and they both are furious that the other person limits his freedom. As long as they both “holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh”, they are in an overlap of freedom.(Hobbes 190) They enter the state of war, a bellum omnium contra omnes.
In order to end the infringement upon each other’s freedom, Hobbes offers a solution of establishing the Covenant with the Sovereign. These “Artificiall Chains” called civil law ties the subjects, the previous free men, on one end, and the man or assembly they gave sovereignty via mutual Covenant to on the other. (Hobbes 263) This Covenant is effective that it eases the quarrel of interference between Subjects in the state of nature.
Hobbes is also right that some portion of human decisions must remain independent of the Sovereign’s social control. Firstly, if the Sovereign orders his Subject to willingly give up his life or well-being or something “without which he cannot live”, the Subject has in his Liberty the right to disobey this unjust demand. (Hobbes 269) Secondly, Subjects have freedom in the loophole of the law, that is, they have the liberty “to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion” where the law does not prescribe. (Hobbes 271) Other than these two rare conditions where Subjects have their infinitesimal freedom under a Sovereign, men in a Hobbesian State give up every right to the Leviathan.
The two situations that citizens do not have to obey the Sovereign are most certainly exceptions under the reign of the Sovereign. The normative relationship of the subjects and the Sovereign in Leviathan is an absolute dominance of the Sovereign and an absolute obedience of the Subjects. A symbol of this extreme relationship is the Leviathan’s Sword shown on the frontispiece. The Sovereign uses this Sword to enforce his authority and the sanctity of his civil law because “Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.” (Hobbes 223) As a result of this totalitarian control, men in the Commonwealth compromise almost every possibility of freedom after they profess to give up their right to govern themselves. The line between individual choice and governmental regulation, therefore, is drawn too absolutely to limit people’s freedom.
To explore the possible outcomes of drawing the line more loosely, a close reading of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government can be introduced. Locke, similar to Hobbes, also defines natural freedom as a negative one that man is “free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man” but only under the law of his own rules. (Locke Sec. 22) Yet very different from Hobbes’ view of a horrifying state of nature, Locke claims that it is a much more felicitous one: everyone’s equal, independent, harmless, and has natural freedom to preserve his “life, health, liberty, or possessions.” (Locke Sec. 6)
As a result of this difference, a Lockean man’s intention of joining a civil society is not the same as that of a Hobbesian man. A Lockean man’s will to join a civil society is not to appease the conflict with other men because of his fear of death, but with an intention “to preserve himself, his liberty and property.” (Locke Sec. 131) He still has to yield himself to some extent of government regulations by giving up “the equality, liberty, and executive power [he] had in the state of nature”. (Locke Sec. 131) This sacrifice of freedom, obviously, is far less than that in the Leviathan. A much more reasonable amount of civil freedom is preserved in Locke. For example, men can “choose what society they will join themselves to”. (Locke Sec. 73) When a government is dissolved, the people are even at liberty to set up a new government “whenever they take offence at the old one.” (Locke Sec. 223) The Lockean government serves always for the common good, which, as these examples indicate, leaves its citizens great freedom and rights within the commonwealth.
In contrast with Hobbes’ harshness in drawing the line of freedom, Locke believes that it should be drawn so that citizens can maintain their property. In a civil society, a person appropriates objects in nature because his labor removes those objects “out of that common state they were in”, thus property, not just possession, is fixed in that person. (Locke Sec. 28) Property is different from possession that it frees its owner from potential fights over its ownership. Therefore, property and freedom are intertwined in the Lockean commonwealth and shall be preserved together. Meanwhile, as freedom and property ownership are too inseparable, Locke’s civil society exists mainly for protecting property. His definition of state and liberty is, consequently, too economic that other assertions in his political theory are reduced.
The most important concept Locke underestimates is the popular consent as he believes there is a category of it called “tacit”. Lockean citizens “tacitly agree[d] in the use of money”, children tacitly “make way for the father’s authority”, and citizens are tacitly subjected to the government by “barely travelling freely on the highway”. (Locke Sec. 50, 75, 119) It is insufficient for a person to voluntarily alienate his rights to a certain commonwealth not by words, but by actions as trivial as walking on a highway. Giving consent to the civil society marks the abandonment of one’s negative freedom and cuts back on “the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others”. (Berlin 16) Although men gain civil freedom, the freedom in society preserved and enlarged by “the end of law”, by sacrificing negative freedom, the consent still makes them subject to centralized control. (Locke Sec. 57) Therefore, Locke needs a more explicit consent from each individual, not simply a tacit agreement.
In the contest of strength over freedom between the individual and the government, Hobbes’ strong central authority exceeds the limits of reasonable control and Locke’s explanation of economy-based civil society proves insufficient. In Rousseau’s Social Contract, a man in the state of nature discovers by agreeing to the social contract a civic freedom from which “he gains the equivalent of everything he loses and more force to preserve what he has.” (Rousseau 173) Discussing Rousseau would introduce a more logical form of social contract: the sovereignty of the general will.
In addition, to clarify the confusion raised from Locke’s theory: the insufficiency of a citizen’s “tacit consent”, Rousseau proposes that the people should assemble periodically in order to renew or change the commitment of the general will. Under the social contract, each man has an equal extent of freedom that they all own “an unlimited right to everything”. (Rousseau 176) Therefore, the free will of “the humblest citizen” is equally inviolable as that of “the first magistrate.” (Rousseau 234)
In Rousseau, in order to achieve true freedom, the society cannot imitate Hobbes or Locke that the sovereign and the subject are strictly separated by a line, whether the line favorites the sovereign or to the subject. The only plausible path to the highest form of freedom, civil freedom, is that “each gives himself to all, he gives himself to none.” (Rousseau 173)
Civil freedom is by itself a wonderful concept because it is produced by “substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and by giving his actions the morality they previously lacked.” (Rousseau 175) Under civil freedom, men live with each other in unison of ideas and harmony of agreements. Civil freedom is a more enjoyable freedom compared to natural freedom because it is the freeing of the better part of a man. Through freeing oneself civilly, “he gains such great advantages from it— his faculties exercised and developed, his ideas enlarged, his feelings ennobled, his entire soul so greatly elevated”. (Rousseau 176) Civil freedom also elevates a man “from a stupid and limited animal” in the savage state to “an intelligent being and man” in a collaborative society. (Rousseau 176) The Rousseauian freedom is, therefore, much more free and noble than natural freedom. It also declares the armistice between the individual and the sovereign because after adopting the social contract, an individual is both a subject and a part of the sovereign. The aforementioned tug-o-war automatically stops as one cannot pull in two directions.
Then, what is freedom after all? A Hobbesian freedom is a felicity condition under a strong authority in which desires can be met and can be followed by other desires. A Lockean freedom is a guarantee of one’s life, but more importantly of one’s property that preexists the state. Where should a state draw the fire lane beyond which the sovereign cannot park his car? Both of these thinkers’ freedom fails to mediate the tug-of-war between individual choice and sovereignty. A Rousseauian civil freedom, however, is a fulfillment of “the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of self-mastery by, classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind.” (Berlin 33) This freedom created by the general will is the real freedom that liberates men and allows them to substitute their narrow, personal interests with a transcendent and communal interest. It is a far, far better freedom that they have, than they have ever had.