Nicolette Yohn
Sylvan
POLITSCI4327
21st November 2017
Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations
Iran and Saudi Arabia have historically had rocky relations characterized by periods of hostility and rapprochement that have created a bipolar Middle East landscape. As it stands today, the two nations are not engaging in outright hostility, but are certainly not on extremely diplomatic terms. There were visits to respective consulates in August (CNN) and a statement from Iranian President Rouhani last week in regard to some combative rhetoric from Saudi Arabia in which Rouhani iterated that Iran is committed to dialogue, stability, and security in the region (Economist Intelligence Unit). The conflicts in Yemen and Syria are largely responsible for the current strain on relations, in which Iran has supported the Syrian government and Yemeni forces while Saudi Arabia backed the Syrian rebels and is hostile towards Yemen. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been and will continue to be tenuous due to a few key factors: the primarily allied relationship leading up to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iranian revolution itself and its implications, the position of Iraq in the Iranian-Saudi balance of power, sectarian differences, and economic contexts.
When the al-Saud dynasty was established in 1928, there were formal visits between the Saudi and Iranian heads of state, marking the beginning of their diplomatic relationship. The two nations remained largely neutral towards one another until the mid-1960s when the King was overthrown in Iraq by nationalist forces, which created the possibility of even more populist revolutions against monarchies in the region (Jahner 39). This event meant an alliance between Saudi Arabia’s monarchy and Iran’s Shah would be most strategic. There existed a shared stake in preserving their regimes in order to maintain their flow of oil and exports which was at odds with the emerging radical-nationalist influences (Jahner 39). Saudi Arabia and Iran also jointly opposed Naser’s pan-Arabist influences in Egypt for similar reasons (Wehrey et al 12). The sectarian differences between the Sunni Saudis and Shiite Iranians were not nearly as important at this point as they would become later; the conflict was between conservatives and radicals. This characterization of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s relationship operates on an international level in that the two nations united against multiple states in order to maintain their influence and political, social, and economic control over the region.
Despite these efforts, the populist influences in Iran gained enough support to overthrow the pro-Saudi Shah in 1979. This caused a drastic change in the relations between the two nations, as the success of the Iranian revolution represented everything they had previously been united against (Jahner 40). The ideology of the revolution was ”anti-monarchical, universalist, and anti-imperial” (Wehrey et al 12) which greatly antagonized the existing geo-political rivalry that was once quelled by common interest. The revolution also appealed to the Shi’a minority population in Saudi Arabia that was continually disenfranchised by the Sunni monarchy and other rising populist sentiments in the region (Wehrey et al 13). The ideology of the leader of the revolution, Khomeini, was explicitly populist and cemented clerical authority in Iranian politics which was at odds with Saudi political structure (Jahner 40). To make matters worse, in 1987 Saudi security forces clashed with Iranians doing haj which ended in a stampede that killed hundreds of Iranians, wounded hundreds more, and killed a good number Saudi security forces (Jahner 40). Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for inciting the violence and violating the spiritual significance of the haj. Iran questioned Saudi Arabia’s ability to keep safe one of Islam’s holiest site and called for the downfall of the Saudi regime. This resulted in a complete break from diplomatic relations and an Iranian boycott of the haj in following years (Jahner 40). This period of hostility primarily operated on a national level. Iran’s tumultuous regime change and reorganization of political and social structures was a key influence on the relationship between the two states. Saudi Arabia’s commitment to conservatism and preservation of their political and social institutions on a national level also contributed to this kind of operation.
Further defining moments in the history of Saudi-Iranian relations were the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, and Iraq’s position in the US invasion following 9/11. It has been said that “a weak Iraq can arguably be said to increase rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whereas a strong Iraq can stabilize or moderate the tensions” (Wehrey et al 16). The dynamics between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been characterized as a triangular regional order of the Gulf (Jahner 40). The varying positions of Iraq have particular implications for the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq mostly because Saudis feared that Iran was an existential threat and politically and economically aiding Iraq in the war could mitigate this threat (Jahner 40). The Gulf Cooperation Council was also established during the Iran-Iraq war which comprised of six Gulf states that together engaged in an anti-Iran agenda (Jahner 40). The war also allowed for the entrance of US intervention and aid which Iran viewed as change in the balance of power that put Iran at a disadvantage (Wehrey et al16). The end of the war and the death of Khomeini subsequently demanded a reevaluation of Iranian policy and the successors Rafsanjani and Khamenei acknowledged Iran’s stake in creating tension with Saudi Arabia (Wehrey et al 16-17). Just a few years later, the Gulf War caused a repositioning of power, especially when Iran did not support the Shi’a uprising in Iraq (Wehrey et al 17). The hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran eased with Iraq’s shift in position and the emergence of Iraq as a common enemy. Diplomatic relations between the Saudis and Iranians resumed in 1991 (Jahner 42). The nineties were a decade of rapprochement between the two states what with Iran’s evolving economic and foreign policy and the decreased threat of radical nationalism (Jahner 42). Following the attacks of September 11th in 2001, the US staged a massive intervention into Iraq and Afghanistan. This once again implied a shift in the balance of power while exacerbating sectarian differences that were once not so close to the forefront (Jahner 42). The US invasion effectively eliminated Iraq as a “regional buffer” and enforced the bipolarity created by the Saudi and Iranian historical tension (Jahner 42). While the diffusion of Iraqi influence solidified common interest in regional conflicts and Western disillusionment with the West, it still posed the question of which state would come out on top of the bipolar configuration. The dynamics discussed above operate on an international level in that three states compete for power and are influenced by more actors still like the US and others in the West. The results of the various conflicts ultimately produced a new systemic configuration that destroyed the former triangular configuration of power and reinforced bipolarity.
Sectarian differences were always present between Saudi Arabia and Iran but their importance has developed along with political context. Saudi Arabia is almost entirely made up of adherents of Sunni Islam. Iran is majority Shiite which makes it unique both in its relation to Saudi Arabia and to the rest of the Middle East. These differences have manifested in varying ways throughout the years. For example, the make the Iranian revolution less appealing especially to the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia, there was a wave of anti-Shi’a sentiment published by the Saudi clerics (Wehrey et al 27). Following this tumultuous period, Saudi leaders would go on to claim that they mistrusted Iran not for Shiism particularly but for their wielding it through what they believe to be concerning policy behavior, yet the state remains almost explicitly anti-plurality (Wehrey et al 28). On the other hand, during the Iranian revolution, Khomeini vehemently opposed the Saudi practice of Wahhabism and characterized the Saudi monarchy as un-Islamic. It becomes clear that sectarian differences are utilized as a political weapon as opposed to a genuine divide between states (Wehrey et al 28). The Sunni-Shiite divide can be thought of as a means of geopolitical maneuvering but not the sole cause for tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Jahner 45). This factor operates on the national level as the differences are used by the respective states to manipulate the balance of power and sway public support in a direction that supports this manipulation.
Finally, economic contexts are central to understanding the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia has consistently been the leading voice in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This yields significant power, wealth, and influence. A relationship with Saudi Arabia is thus strategic because of its position, especially after the Iran-Iraq war which left Iran’s economy devastated. There was high inflation and unemployment that necessitated rebuilding the broken relationship with Saudi Arabia (Jahner 42). Saudi Arabia’s power within OPEC also creates strong ties with the West which further produces economic advantage. Further, the haj creates a huge amount of revenue for Saudi Arabia. Prior to the Iranian boycott of the haj following the events of 1987, they accounted for the largest amount of people making pilgrimage to Mecca and the lesser pilgrimage, the umrah (Jahner 42). Restoring diplomatic relations in the nineties was mutually beneficial for the nations economically, but I would not go so far as to say the benefit is equal. The amount of economic power afforded to Saudi Arabia through their oil reserves and position in OPEC is undeniable. This factor in the relationship operates on an international level. Saudi Arabia’s power in OPEC creates a specific systemic landscape in the Middle East and abroad. It creates Western ties that increase its influence. Further, the possession of Islam’s holy sites like Mecca in Saudi Arabia generate even more wealth and solidify their spot in the Islamic world. This great amount of power results in tension with Iran as they contend for regional control while impacting the global economy.