The Severan dynasty was a period of Roman Imperial rule which began upon the accession of Septimus Severus after the 193 ‘Year of the Five Emperors’ (Dio, LXXIV.17.4).Beginning with civil war from 193-197, the dynasty began a steady process of decline after Septimius died in 211 and left the empire to his sons. As a result of internal plots, external border threats and the usurpations of Macrinus and Maximinius Thrax, Rome by the third century was in some ways unrecognisable when compared to the Augustus empire of the First Principate. One of crucial changes of the period were the reforms to the Roman military, in areas such as pay, organisation, and policy, perhaps most notably with regard to soldiers’ newfound freedom to marry, the army changed to such an extent that it can be suggested this was a contributing factor to the period termed by scholars, the ‘Third Century Crisis’, an issue that will be explored further. The reforms began with Septimius Severus, who at the beginning of his reign reorganised the Praetorian Guard, increased military pay, gave donatives and increased the number of legions in the army from thirty to thirty-three (Dio, LXXV.1.1-2). Military reforms continued throughout the Severan dynasty after this precedent, leading up through the death of Severus Alexander and resulting in sweeping discontent in the military which heralded the Third Century Crisis, a leading the empire to almost completely collapse. These reforms can be explored either chronologically or thematically. For the duration of this essay, however, the focus will be upon military reforms, explored in chronological order of the emperor who enacted them, with special focus to Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Highlighting the most crucial, I will analyse their overall contemporary efficacy, and subsequent contribution to the Third Century Crisis. I will also pursue the thesis that the army of this period was generally quite similar to that of the centuries prior in some terms, i.e. equipment, tactics, organisation and structure, and therefore suggest the period may have contained more continuity than suggested by its traditional nomenclature. The image given to us by the sources, such as Dio, show that the Third Century was a period of growing importance and power for the army, affecting areas beyond that of military and growing roots in political, dynastic, social and economic areas.
When looking at the military reforms of the Severan Dynasty, beginning of course with Septimius Severus himself, one is reminded instantly of the famous words by Septimius Severus that Dio claimed were uttered on his deathbed to his sons: ’‘Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers and scorn all other men’’ (Dio LXXVI.XV.2-3). This might arguably have too much of an epigrammatic feel to be accurate. Especially so when paired with the generally negative presentation of the Roman military at the time by Dio and others of the upper classes, his record of Severus’ final words may lie more with ingrained bias – a resentment toward the emperor for seeming to privilege the army over the senate – than truth. Regardless, these views reflect some important consequences of the Severan era. Campbell presents the results as such:
‘‘the inevitable consequence of the first capture of Rome with an army for 124 years was a closer relationship between emperor and army, which made it difficult to conceal the reality of an autocracy backed by military force.’’
Furthermore, the increasing importance of the army, coupled with the requirement of the Emperor to be a military leader, led to the inevitability of the army becoming widely prominent and crucial to all aspects of life in the Roman World. Septimius Severus made key changes such as the increase of the number of legions and auxiliaries alongside pay rises under himself, a trend later continued under Caracalla, leading to an image of a treasury being looted to pay for an increasingly influential and powerful Roman army (Dio 77.9-10.1). This increased spending was in large part paid for by debasement of the coinage, another consequence of the military reforms that one could argue contributed to the crisis of the Third Century.
Further to this, at the outset of his reign, Severus removed and replaced the existing Praetorian Guard with Danubian veterans (Dio, LXXV.1.1-2); stripping the existing guards of their ceremonial equipment, it was demanded, on pain of death, that they kept 100 miles away from the city of Rome. Arguably this severe treatment was one of the more effective reforms of Severus’ rule, as the Praetorian guard in the years prior had been particularly out of control. This was highlighted particularly within the years directly prior to Septimius gaining the throne, when the guard, headed by the Praetorian Prefect Laetus, were implicated in the assassinations of both Commodus and Pertinax. Therefore, replacing the guard was not a negative reform, but a necessary move to ensure the security of Severus’ position. With the guard’s increased ability to determine who held the principate (a trend which continued to be definitive for the remainder of the dynasty), Severus needed loyal men holding praetorian posts.
We also see changes in more social areas of soldiers’ lives, highlighting the increased importance and military-centric approach the empire was taking, and potentially contributing to the decline and crisis scholars have seen as definitive to the Third Century. Soldiers were in this period given the right to official and legal marriages, which had previously been forbidden in the army (Herod. 3.8.4). This reform, with soldiers also being able to live outside of military quarters with their wives, along with their increased pay and, indeed, power, led to what Santossuosso argues was a decline of the high discipline of the legions in prior periods, such as that seen under Marius. This lessening discipline was not just restricted to the rank and file, however, as the traditional dichotomy between senior posts in civil and military areas crumbled during the Severan Dynasty. With the typical aristocratic upper echelons being increasingly replaced, or pushed out of senior military posts, the class hierarchy that had previously been central to the army’s structure became disrupted as the Italian hereditary aristocracy was progressively replaced in the senior echelons of the army by the promipilares (former chief centurions).
In the early 3rd century we also see a rise in the number of equestrians being given top military posts in the army, a reform also given a jump start by Septimius Severus, who gave his three new legions over to Equestrian command. This reform was at the time seen as a positive one, increasing the number of experienced military commanders to help secure Rome’s increasingly destabilized orders, and providing greater heights for equestrians and decorated officers to aim, itself a point which would surely increase morale. However, with hindsight the reaches of these new commanders was too high: an increase in rebellions by over-ambitious generals, civil wars, revolts and coups form a staple of the Third Century.
Overall, the reforms of Severus can be reflected upon in two ways, with empathy and with hindsight. If one places themselves in the shoes of Septimius Severus, the reforms he enacted are logical, and seem to be the effective reforms that were no doubt intended. However, with hindsight the reforms were mostly effective at setting the foundations for the Third Century Crisis, and the empire’s decline – a point highlighted by Severan contemporaries Dio (LXXV.2.3) and Herodian (III.9.2-3), and shown to have immediate effect upon his successors.
Following the death of Severus at York in 211, Caracalla ruled as sole Emperor of Rome, after disposing of his brother Geta. Caracalla continued with his father’s policy of nurturing the army and ignoring the rest. He did so by raising the salary of a legionary by around 200 Denarii, a generous pay rise, and publicly imitating military dress and mannerisms. This policy was not in itself a negative reform, but a necessary continuation of prior reforms, which would have no doubt been expected by the soldiers of the time, an issue that likely contributed to the rise of army power and independence that led to the Third Century Crisis. Indeed, the trend of increasing military pay so as to gain support upon ascent is poignantly bemoaned by Macrinus to the senate in 218; Dio reports he said to the senate that “…it was impossible, on the one hand, to give the troops their full pay in addition to the donatives that they were receiving (for the increase in their pay granted by Tarautas amounted to two hundred and eighty million sesterces annually), and impossible, on the other hand, not to give it…” (LXXIX.36.3).
However the main contribution Caracalla made to military reforms during his rule was the Constitutio Antoniniana, in 212. While not specifically a military reform, the Constitutio was of such grand scale that it had military repercussions: granting citizenship to all free peoples in the empire, it broke down the traditional dichotomy between citizen soldiers and auxiliaries. While granting citizenship to those who resided in the empire may have seemed like a logical action, Rowan suggests that ,due to the de-centralisation the empire was experiencing, the decree’s underlying purpose was, in part, to fix a problem caused by prior military reform. Indeed, Rome had for a time been financially struggling with the need to pay for the aforementioned new legions, coupled with lavish pay rises and donatives conferred on the military to ensure their loyalty. The edict created a wider obligation for taxation and public service, with the intention to increase revenue through taxes that had previously been restricted to Roman citizens. This all is made explicit by Dio: "This was the reason why he made all the people in his empire Roman citizens; nominally he was honoring them, but his real purpose was to increase his revenues by this means, inasmuch as aliens did not have to pay most of these taxes.’’ (DioLXXVIII.IX).
It could thus be suggested that the Edict was in fact a military centric reform, with the goal being both an increased revenue to pay for military expenditures, and an increase in the numbers of men eligible for service in the legions. If we are to adhere to the works of E.Gibbon, this led to the barbarisation of the Roman Army, the Third Century Crisis, and inevitably the downfall of the empire. If Caracalla intended the strengthening of the empire through the enrichment of the army, he failed. Before the edict, acquiring Roman citizenship through auxiliary service was one of the most attractive rewards for military service, however with the edict, enlistment would have been less appealing, potentially contributing to troop numbers in the latter half of the Third Century. Therefore, if one looks at the issue of whether the military reforms of this particular Severan contributed to the Third Century Crisis, it is clear that again, the Third Century Crisis was set in motion by Severan reform of the military, and of Roman society in general.
Following Caracalla’s assassination by his army, his praetorian prefect Macrinus took the purple (Dio LXXIX.4.1), but his brief reign will be ignored for the sake of sticking to Severan reforms, excepting its importance as a stark example of the military unrest which led to political upheaval. Elagabalus (r. 218-222), is also notable for little as regards military reform other than continuing to pay the rising pay of the legions in the empire, and generally causing discontent to the point of minor revolt and finally assassination by the Praetorian Guard (Dio. LXXX.20). Furthermore Herodian suggests that the reason soldiers deflected to Elagabalus was because they knew with a new emperor they would receive more donatives and/or pay (Herodian 5.4.2). Thus it can be suggested that the tradition of giving donatives encouraged instability within the army itself, a fact clearly exemplified in the 3rd Century AD.
Finally, we come full circle to Severus. Severus Alexander, the last of the Severan dynasty (r. 222-235), is traditionally viewed as the final emperor prior to Third Century Crisis. Alexander Severus took charge of the empire at a troubled time and ruled for a nearly-unprecedented thirteen years. He too undertook reforms, as the focus of his later rule remained on strengthening the Eastern frontier and preventing Germanic incursions into Gaul. Legal reforms for the soldiers, again, contined the Severan policy of keeping the army happy: soldiers became able to name whoever they chose as heirs in their will, a clear instance of preferential treatment, contrasting the restrictions placed on other civilians. He also confirmed protection of their property when on duty and that any property gained through military service was theirs alone to claim.
After the death of Severus Alexander in 235, the empire was in dire straights, with military defeats in recent memory and rebellion across the military frontiers. The financial crisis and rising power of the army, coupled with dissatisfaction of the troops headed by ambitious generals led to the Third Century crisis: a period that nearly brought the Empire to total collapse. When looking at the question of if Severan military reforms were effective in this period, it is clear that as temporary measures and taken independently of one another, these could have been effective stop-gap reforms. However, the continuation of traditional reforms such as the pay rises and donatives, left the Empire in a bleak condition, leading us to surmise that overall, the Severan military reforms were negative, and indeed did contribute to the Third Century Crisis.
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Primary:
Cassius Dio, Roman History
Herodian, Roman History
Secondary:
Alfoldi, Andrew, (1969), The Crisis of the Empire (AD 249–270), in S A Cook et al. (eds.), The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. XII: The Imperial Crisis and Recovery (AD 193–324),
Birley, Antony (1988) The African Emperor: Septimius Severus. London.
Boatwright, Mary Taliaferro; Gargola, Daniel J; Talbert, Richard J. A. (2004). The Romans, from village to empire. Oxford University Press.