Freud Flipped: An Evaluation of the Illusion of Atheism
In his psychological critique of religion, Sigmund Freud does not treat belief in God as a manifestation of knowledge and truth reflected in reality, but rather as an independent and relational experience within the sphere of illusion. In his work titled The Future of Illusion, Freud emphasizes that faith is nothing more than a “vague abstraction which people have created for themselves” and “derived from human wishes,” deeming it a psychological projection that stems from childhood desires of an ideal father figure which has, in all epochs of human history, continually acted as a source of consolation in facing the difficulties of life (190).
However, paradoxically, by using Freud’s technical definition of an illusion, it is also very possible to reach the reverse conclusion that atheistic belief systems are naive, neurotic, and illusory. While Freud views religious believers as emotionally weak individuals who require imaginary support to cope with the difficult realities of life, one can insist that non-religious believers are similarly practicing a grand illusory form of wish fulfilment, insisting that they themselves are stronger and do not need God’s support in the face of frustration and anxiety in their lives. In this paper, I will refute the plausibility of this counter-argument to Freud’s psychological investigation of religion in determining the existence of God. I will argue this by defining the concept of illusion, apply this definition to the premises of atheistic belief systems, and finally, determine the internal validity of the argument.
According to The Future of An Illusion, illusion is characterized by wish fulfilment, the satisfaction of a desire of protection of humanity against the forces of nature. Freud states, “we call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfilment is a primary factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality” (189). According to Freud, an illusion can incorporate certain aspects of reality, and is complemented by myths perpetuated by the mind that lead individuals to believe it as a fact. Therefore, by this definition, it is important to recognize that the question of the illusion’s truthfulness should not be considered in order to truly understand this term. When applied to belief in God, the truthfulness of the religious faith becomes irrelevant, and there should be no connection with the question of falsehood or truth. In his writings, Freud claims that “no sensible person will behave so irresponsibly or rest content with such feeble grounds in his opinions” (189). As evidenced by this unequivocal opinion towards religious belief, Freud was an impassioned proponent of atheism. However, he admits that the truth of religion cannot be rejected when considering it as an illusion, stating that in definition, “an illusion is not the same thing as an error; nor is it necessarily an error” (189). Based on this examination of illusions, he agrees that while the truths of religion are unlikely, they are certainly not impossible.
When employing psychoanalytical analysis, one can often come across antagonistic views towards religion. However, with Freud’s definition of an illusion in mind, I believe that it is possible to consistently utilize the same argument to postulate that atheism also has an illusory nature. Led by their emotions and wishes, people reject the objective existence of God due to their search for solid evidence, individualistic attitudes, or the reluctance of accepting the aspects of Christianity that can be found to be disturbing, such as the doctrine of hell and judgment after death. By the definition of an illusion, atheism represents an alternative mode of wish fulfillment. For individuals who adopt such beliefs, God does not exist beyond the realm of personal faith in an all-encompassing reality. However, the obvious problem is that when defining atheism as an illusion, whether the belief is true or not is, again, completely irrelevant. Insisting on the objective truth of religious illusion would, after all, verge on uninformed dogmatism, creating a misconception that differentiating between truth and falseness is valuable when discerning the existence of God.
As I have shown in my reconstruction of Freud’s argument, the word “illusion” must be interpreted consistently with Freud’s application of this term to religion as a cultural artefact when evaluating the plausibility of the argument for atheism as an illusion. Despite its theoretical insights, this argument adopts psychological assertions without having significant proof. Further, it does not offer very much deductive or inferential support of its premises. In the end, it can be concluded that the Freudian notion of illusion is ultimately of no help in deciding whether or not to believe in God because what initially appears to be a reversal of Freud’s argument against the existence of God is logically invalid. It is very unclear why any of the premises that create a parallel between atheistic convictions and defense mechanisms have overriding authority to guarantee that a God does not exist. Ultimately, although both arguments are powerful psychoanalytical indicators for belief and disbelief in God, neither argument offers support for or against His existence. Although they are sound from a psychoanalytical standpoint, these claims do not acknowledge the mystical and non-rational elements of religion, as our minds can only grasp truths about the universe within our own anthropomorphic contexts.