International relations consist of a mixture of ideas and policies that shape the way actors from different states act with one another. An important concept in the field of international relations is the states' security and the known "security dilemma". Many theorists and political scientists have carefully observed and studied the concept of the security dilemma and have tried to justify the reasoning behind it. They have determined that the security dilemma derives from the arms race between states. When it comes to solving the security dilemma and arms race, many theorists propose nuclear disarmament. Although it is more than likely that disarmament will not solve the dilemma, we can predict it could guide us towards transcending the security dilemma like it did with other states. Some of these states that have transcended the dilemma are South Africa, Ukraine, and Brazil. The arrow diagram below demonstrates the possibility of transcending the security dilemma based on the experiences of these states:
Security Dilemmaí Treaty of Tlatelolco íAfrica disarmsí U.S.S.R breaks upí transcendence of the security dilemma
In an anarchic world, any type of international relations policy strongly depends on the actions of each state and the type of relationships they hold with one another. Ultimately, each state looks out for themselves and their own security, and throughout time nuclear weapons have become a key player in the security and power of a state. These weapons have hindered the trust states have with one another, and thus the states have put their guard up. William Walker explains in his book, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order, how the rise in possible nuclear attacks has increased fear in states and thus has strengthened the security dilemma once again, "the risk of nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up…more nations have acquired these weapons." However, the situation gets complicated when there are states that have the weapons and states who do not. The competition for power and better defense has created a spiral that is known as the arms race. The arms race consists of competition between the states and has brought out the factor of being uncertain of each other's actions and intentions. It is essential for each individual state to try to foresee how some states may be using these nuclear weapons; this is known as the security dilemma.
There is a mutual understanding of the security dilemma by different theorists, however, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler give us the most reasonable explanation of it in their book, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics. International theorist Ken Booth and International politics professor Nicholas Wheeler thoroughly explain what the security dilemma is and what it consists of. They argue that there are two levels to the security dilemma. The first level consists of the dilemma of interpretation and the second is the dilemma of response. Depending on the outcome of these two dilemmas you might find yourself facing the security paradox. If you put all these three elements together you will experience the security dilemma.
The first level that Booth and Wheeler describe as the dilemma of interpretation solely consists of the state trying to understand the motive for other states hostility. This level is all about trying to decipher what the other state's motives are for the way they are using their nuclear weapons. Booth and Wheeler describe it as follows, "The dilemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives intention and capabilities of others." When a state decides to use nuclear weapons as their security, other states will have to interpret if they are doing it to protect themselves or if they are trying to use it as a threat towards others. Each state has to take into consideration the motives of other states in order to come to a decision on how to act upon it. Some will interpret the motive of others as wanting to pose a threat or seem superior in the world of nuclear arms. Others can interpret these motives to be an offensive strategy, and not so much a protection, but rather to have the title of a nuclear power state. The security dilemma deals with uncertainty, and this uncertainty is most present during the dilemma of interpretation. Because uncertainty is unavoidable, it creates a fear within states which then lead to the dilemma of response.
The second level of the security dilemma is the dilemma of response. This level of the security dilemma can only be experienced when a state has already gone through the dilemma of interpretation, "a dilemma of response logically begins when the dilemma of interpretation has been settled." . Once the state has come to a decision on how they are interpreting the issue, they come to a decision and develop a strategy or decide how they will go about what they have interpreted from the situation. If the signals that have been sent by the defensive state seem suspicious or untrustworthy, then the others will react with confrontation. Although a state may not intend to seem suspicious, their lack of clarity can make them seem as if they are using their weapons as an offense strategy rather than a defense strategy. When a state tries to use their nuclear weapons as a threat, then it is only reasonable for other states to use nuclear weapons as their defense, and this will escalate the dilemma.
Because of the uncertainty of events and the unclear understanding states have with one another and their intentions, a rise in hostility and competitiveness will occur. Even though one state did not intend for their nuclear weapons to come off as acts of hostility towards others, they may interpret it that way and thus reciprocate hostility when they themselves were not hostile to begin with. When the conflict escalates like this, states are facing a phenomenon known as the security paradox. Booth and Wheeler state, "If the dilemma of response is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of other actors, and decision-makers react in a militarily confrontational manner, then they risk creating a significant level of mutual hostility when none was originally intended by either party." If one state interprets the motives of another state as negative or fatalistic, we then see a negative spiral develop. This will develop a security paradox where we will see both parties being hostile with each other because of the wrongful interpretation of one state. Even if the hostility came from actions that were not intended to be a possible threat, all it would take is for the other actor to interpret it as a threat and react on it, making both sides be on edge with one another.
The security dilemma requires for states to experience all of these levels. Once they have gone through both levels, they will determine whether there will be a security paradox or not. As one state is responding to the dilemma of interpretation, another state is barely beginning the interpretation process, "One state's dilemma of response creates another's dilemma of interpretation." . This psychological relationship between states relies on uncertainty, because if one is certain of the motives of another state, then it is no longer a dilemma of interpretation but rather a strategic challenge. However, for the purpose of this paper, the security dilemma is what many theorists have tried to figure out and find a way to get through it. Political scientists have argued that one of the ways that the inevitable security dilemma can be controlled (since it cannot be eliminated) is by transcending it.
The bigger role players in the security dilemma are nuclear weapon states (NWS), such as the United States, Russia, and North Korea. These three states are some of the few states that hold a greater percentage of nuclear arsenal. However, they have taken part of treaties in efforts to better regulate nuclear weapons. Many non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) continue to hope that if they continue pushing for nuclear disarmament of these powerful states, then the security dilemma will be transcended easier. Although some of these states have been part of treaties, they have pulled out of them as well. However, this does not mean that the possibility of being able to disarm is nonexistent for these states.
The United States is a perfect example of a NWS that has been part of a treaty but later decided to no longer be. In 1987 the United States signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia. President Ronald Reagan and Society General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev agreed through this treaty that neither the United States or Soviet Union would possess, or test missiles that range from 500 to 5500 kilometers. This was a big step towards two of the biggest nuclear powers disarming, "As a result of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty's implementation deadline of June 1, 1991." However, in 2018 President Donald Trump decided to pull the U.S out of the INF Treaty. His reasoning is that Russia has been violating this treaty and thus there is no reason for the U.S. to still be in it, "For the past four years, the United States has argued that Russia is in violation of the treaty because it has deployed prohibited tactical nuclear weapons to intimidate European nations and former Soviet states that have aligned with the West." . In years during the Obama administration, there were efforts to try to reduce the nuclear arsenal, but not disarm. By still being part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), they are showing an interest in trying to establish peace within this nuclear issue.
Russia is the other of the top two most powerful nuclear states along with the United States. Russia had the other end of the agreement in the INF Treaty. Russia has been part of this treaty since they created it, but lately has shown signs of possibly withdrawing, just like the U.S. did. Their reasoning is in part that they are getting behind on nuclear advancements compared to other countries near them, "Moscow contends that the treaty unfairly prevents it from possessing weapons that its neighbors, such as China, are developing and fielding." However, throughout the years Russia has been accused of violating this treaty but they have continued to deny it. Regardless of their stance in the INF treaty, Russia continues to be part of the NPT which shows some effort in continuing the path towards regulating and possibly disarming.
North Korea is notorious for their interest in growing their nuclear arsenal. Similarly to the states mentioned above, North Korea has also been part of a treaty and decided to withdraw, in this case it was the NPT. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, however, throughout its commitment to the NPT is was known that North Korea had suspicious activity violating the treaty. In 2003, North Korea decided to officially withdraw from the NPT being that they had in fact been working with nuclear technology. However, in September of 2005 during one of the Six Party Talks North Korea claimed they would "…abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return to the NPT…" In the end that did not happen, but instead they decided that they would do some nuclear tests in the future. Nonetheless, in more recent years we have seen North Korea make an effort again at taking steps towards disarmament, like in early 2018, Kim Jong Un declared that it will suspend nuclear and missile testing in April. In June 2018 Kim Jong Un met with U.S. President Donald Trump, where they signed the US-DPRK agreement. Kim Jong Un talks about potentially denuclearizing with certain conditions in mind meaning that there is still a possibility of disarmament.
There are also those states who have been nuclear weapon states before, but have chosen to disarm and thus have transcended the security dilemma. Some of those are South Africa and Ukraine. Similarly, Brazil has also decided to denuclearize however, they only sought to begin a nuclear program but never actually created one, so they would not be a NWS. Nonetheless, Brazil has also shown how the security dilemma is transcended through disarmament. Seeing that some of these countries can transcend the dilemma, it proposes the question of the likelihood that the previously mentioned NWS could possibly do so too. However, we must take into account what the similarities between the NWS and NNWS are to determine how possible it is for states like the United States, Russia and north Korea to disarm.
South Africa's disarmament has been one of the most recognized thus far. South Africa is known for their disarmament because they were the first to completely create a whole nuclear program, and then get rid of it completely. The reason South Africa decided to create a nuclear program in the first place was mostly for peaceful and domestic reasons, such as nuclear energy, but not necessarily nuclear weapons. However, the power nuclear weapons could possibly give them was also an incentive to move forward with nuclear project's, "Nuclear weapons would provide not only a direct way of confronting a military attack against South Africa, but also a means of leveraging Western diplomatic and military support during a crisis." . Their decision to move forward with nuclear weapons shows that they were doing it for security reasons. By developing nuclear weapons, South Africa was able to weaken any influence coming from other states and possibly discourage the opportunity for other states to attack. South Africa was now increasing their security and at this point is where we realize that South Africa is becoming involved with the security dilemma phenomenon.
South Africa created approximately six weapons before it decided to disarm. The threat of communism from Cuba was associated with their security dilemma. Political tensions were rising which led to the Tripartite Accord. This agreement led to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola after internal tensions had risen and thus gave Namibia independence. South Africa decided that because they no longer were facing major threats from other states, there was no real reason to have nuclear weapons, "States like Angola could no longer count on the Soviet Union and Cuba for support, and consequently could not pose a real conventional military threat to South Africa." South Africa followed to join the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since their disarmament, South Africa has served as an advocate for disarmament. The disarmament led to a better political relationship within South Africa,
"The core national security threats to the state disappeared simultaneous to a change in the nature of the regime, making large-scale shifts in national security policy much easier than they otherwise would have been." This signified that they were finally at peace with the issue of nuclear weapons and thus transcended the security dilemma.
Ukraine faced similar pressures to disarm as South Africa did. Before 1991, the Soviet Union was facing political turmoil which led to the union breaking up and President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned. After the Soviet Union broke up, Russia's nuclear weapons were divided amongst the sovereign states remaining, which included Ukraine. Ukraine was left with the larger portion of the weapons owned by the Soviets. Now that the weapons were distributed throughout multiple states rather than in one single state, fear began to create tension among the states and triggered the security dilemma, "This unprecedented development spurred fears that the biggest wave of nuclear proliferation in history was in the offing, fears that fortunately failed to materialize." Ukraine feared that nuclear tensions would begin to spread through the states that were left from the Soviet Union breakup.
However, Ukraine did not want responsibility for the weapons, and this was enough to function as a deterrent to give them up. The weapons were a financial burden to Ukraine and brought political tensions. Because of the cost, they decided to give as many weapons as the could back to Russia and destroy whatever was left in Ukraine. Following their independence, "Ukraine pledged not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons." The agreement to disarm allowed for Ukraine to have better relationship with other states and transcend the security dilemma it was facing before, "The newly independent Ukraine received promises that the signatories would refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine." Ukraine disarming signified its efforts to encourage disarmament to help surpass the security dilemma, "The agreement symbolized the new possibilities of cooperation in a post-Cold War world." In 1991, Ukraine became part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to help discourage the creation of any other nuclear weapons, and in 1994 it became part of the NPT.
Brazil's denuclearizing story is somewhat different from South Africa's and Ukraine's. Unlike these two other states, Brazil never fully acquired nuclear weapons, but they did begin working on a nuclear project to develop weapons. Brazil had an abundance of nuclear resources and all the proper technology to create these weapons, but they chose not to. At the time, Brazil was facing internal political issues with a strong left, and they feared that nuclear weapons would not help solve any internal conflicts. In comparison to other states like South Africa and Ukraine, Brazil used a different strategy to transcend the dilemma through disarmament, and that is through the use of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ).
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones technically began with the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, which stated that Latin American countries "…are committed to use the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to prohibit and prevent the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons in their respective territories." This treaty set up the first Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Latin America, which includes Brazil. The treaty's purpose was to protect those areas that chose to be free of nuclear weapons, from any other states that are NWS. This means that the NWFZ cannot possess, test, or use any nuclear weapons, in exchange for the protection that no NWS will use nuclear weapons as a threat towards them. Shortly after the Treaty of Tlatelolco, more NWFZ began to develop in other countries and continued to spread the idea of disarmament.
Months after the establishment of NWFZs and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT was created and signed. Brazil would now have nuclear weapon free zones and would take part of the non-proliferation treaty as well. Both the NPT and NWFZs were good stepping stones for states who wanted to disarm. Ramesh Thakur explains in his book Nuclear Weapons and International Security, that the goal of a NWFZ is "meant to forestall the latter eventuality, signify disarmament before the fact" . Although both incentives have the similar end goal in mind, they are quite different. Thakur points out what some of these differences are, "A NWFZ goes beyond the NPT also in requiring commitments from the NWS not to use nuclear weapons against zonal members." These nuclear weapon free zones are no longer in a position where the weapons could be used a threat, thus they are relieved from the security dilemma. Thakur expresses that NWFZs give hope for those states trying to move away from the hostility caused by the dilemma, "Subsumed within this broad objective are subsidiary goals of lowering the costs and burdens of the nuclear arms race, reducing the probability of war and decreasing the harmful effects if war should nevertheless occur." Nuclear weapon free zones have demonstrated that in these areas the security dilemma is a lot more minimal, which proves the point of transcendence.
Since 1968, only some months after NWFZs were established, the NPT was signed. The main purpose of the Non-proliferation Treaty is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Unlike NWFZs that actually protect a state from nuclear attacks, the NPT does not offer any protection. However, similarly to NWFZs the NPT advocates for a world free of nuclear weapons and free of the security dilemma, "we endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions to achieve that goal." The NPT has three separate pillars within itself, and disarmament is one of them. The proposal of disarmament is found in Article VI where it explains that the goal of the NPT in this category is for states to disarm themselves in good faith. This means that if this were to occur, it would more than likely ease the fear that comes from the possibility of a nuclear attack and thus would help states get past the security dilemma more smoothly. If states were to follow the NPT and use nuclear energy in good faith, it could help get through the dilemma of interpretation easier because now states would know what to expect from other states when it came to nuclear technology. This same reasoning goes for NWFZs because within that zone, actors are aware that they are in a nuclear disarmed zone, where there is a mutual agreement on the use of nuclear technology. Although both the NPT and NWFZs cannot take away the factor of uncertainty, they can help get rid of the fear that comes from the security dilemma. Security Communities work similarly according to Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett.
Adler and Barnett explain the importance of security communities in the transcending process in their book Security Communities. When states begin to see that they have similar interests and motives, they then will realize that cooperation will help them achieve whatever mutual goal they have. This means that they will learn to work together and eventually that fear will turn into a positive interaction. Security Communities are areas that hold the same values and goals which through collective security they protect each member of the community, "The idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust strikes fear" Adler and Barnett argue that security communities help bring unity and move away from hostility and fear, "They [Adler and Barnett] thus argue that although states cannot escape the security dilemma, security communities allow them to transcend it by reversing the condition of fear (not uncertainty) upon which the dilemma of interpretation is based." Security communities will hold a collective identity through cooperation and mutual interests which eventually will lead to transcend the dilemma.
The incentives mentioned earlier, (NWFZs, the NPT, and security communities) all allow for the possibility of getting through the security dilemma. Because there is no way to completely get rid of the security dilemma, the best way to go about it is by transcending it. In all three of these situations building trust is fundamental. When states begin to associate more closely with one another, they are able to develop trust, which will take the place of fear. Once that foundation has been built then they will realize they have mutual interests like we see in security communities and NWFZs. The NPT establishes that everyone who is part of it has the mutual agreement to not spread nuclear weapons and thus one must trust the other that they will follow these rules. Some may argue that another way to transcend the dilemma is by possibly getting rid of the idea of anarchy. Those who have analyzed the Security Dilemma can argue that the fact that states are under an anarchy, does not help the logic of transcending, "Most analysts start with the premise that anarchical nature of the international system is crucial: armed conflicts occur because no higher authority can prevent them" Anarchical rule does not allow for states to work with one another because some choose to isolate too much, such as North Korea. Under the argument of security communities, we can see how being anarchical can go against what security communities stand for thus, it can undermine the idea of transcending.
The idea of creating a global government is still too far of a reach to consider it an option. However, throughout the past decade we have seen some NWS show interest in considering disarming. We have seen two of the five powers, the United States and North Korea, try to make peace in the Korean peninsula, "President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." This shows that if these two states continue to follow the proper path towards disarmament, there is a possibility that hostility between these two major states (and possibly others) will decline. Once the hostility and fear of one another is gone the dilemma will be transcended and other states may possibly follow.
Granted that the relationships of North Korea, the United States, and Russia are much more complex than those of South Africa, Brazil, and Ukraine, there is still some parallel factors that signal disarmament as an option for transcendence, such a political hostility and political pressures. Being that these three NWS are some of the most powerful in the field of nuclear weapons, they are also the three that are hurt by the security dilemma the most. The hostility that is given off between one another and towards other states instigates the security dilemma. A global transformation would be needed for transcendence to be successful, and the cooperation of all states is necessary. However, it seems like Russia is far from accepting the proposal of disarmament. Unlike the United States and North Korea who have shown efforts to create some peace, Russia remains very discreet with their plans of their nuclear arsenal. Without states cooperating it will be very hard for the globe as a whole to transcend the dilemma, but it is possible for each individual state to do so.
At the time that some former NWS denuclearized, it seemed like the idea was politically the correct one. Politically for Ukraine, their choice to disarm could be questioned if it was the correct one for today's society. However, at the time of the dismantling, it placed Ukraine in a good standing and hopeful future when dealing with the security dilemma and the arms race. Africa removed itself from a political apartheid and carried on putting themselves in a positive standing in the international world view. Africa's current society would not have benefited from perks (if any) brought by nuclear weapons. Each state that disarmed had left the concern of the dilemma behind; we see this mostly in NWFZs. In these Zones one can argue that since NWS acknowledge that they are NWFZs, these states do not have to face the spiraling fear we see derive from the security dilemma.
Rivalry and power all feed into the arms race and accelerate the security dilemma, however disarmament can resolve these problems. After seeing former NWS disarm we can answer our question of whether the security dilemma can be transcended through nuclear disarmament. It is possible for NWS to disarm and transcend the security dilemma, but we must be aware that it will not be eliminated. Because of the basis the Security Dilemma relies on, such as trust and cooperation the risk of states falling through with their promises reminds us why the dilemma cannot be completely eliminated but one must remember that fear can be eliminated.