The inquiry into the world in which we live that is Geography (Royal Geographical Society, 2018) has been performed for millennia, however its definition and practice throughout history has been a dynamic and often disputed one. As put by Professor Derek Gregory in The Dictionary of Human Geography “no definition of geography will satisfy everyone, and nor should it” (2009, p.288), but where other disciplines such as Geology and History are able to settle around a common centre (Fenneman, 1919), it would seem that Geography has far less certainty in its footing within the academic community. It is with this concern that this essay deals, specifically on the topics of difference and similarity in definitions and practices of the post-modern era, exemplified by contrast of Nevin M. Fenneman’s The Circumference of Geography (1919) and Mei-Po Kwan’s Beyond Difference: From Canonical Geography to Hybrid Geographies (2004). The essay will begin by setting the authors and their essays in context, followed by a comparison of their respective philosophies. It will then finish by considering what practices they advocated and those which they have dismissed.
To thoroughly appreciate the authors and the views which they present, it is important to understand their respective contexts—both of their time and their positionality as individuals. At the time of Fenneman’s The Circumference of Geography (1919), the western world was emerging from World War I—a time of stark conflict and pragmatism. This underlying theme is evident in Fenneman’s analogy that “Geography wages no aggressive wars and seems to covet no new territory” (1919, p.168). In particular, this implication is likely to have had an effect on the views of Geography as a purposeful discipline, as something that needs regimenting—a central domain rather than a broad and chaotic circumference (Fenneman, 1919). Fenneman also has a positional bias, having been born in Lima, Ohio in the United States of America, son of William Henry, a reformed church clergyman (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1945). This, alongside the mentorship of William Morris Davis—stemming from a Harvard summer course in 1896 (University of Cincinnati, 1986)—no doubt had an influence on his epistemological perspective of the world, namely an “American attitude” (Fenneman, 1919, p.169). Furthermore, Fenneman speaks directly of the disparity between American geography and European, with the latter having “no such concern for its own purity or fear of being absorbed” (1919, p.169). This would indicate that Fenneman not only recognises a divide in the perception of the Geography of his time across national borders, but also that Geography of the American calibre has far more uncertainty in its definition and practice.
In contrast, Mei-Po Kwan’s Beyond Difference: From Canonical Geography to Hybrid Geographies (2004) was written in an age of global interrelatedness (Chanda and Froetschel, 2012) where such distinction between American and European Geography is far less the case than in Fenneman’s time. In addition, she notably has a more global footing in her positionality having graduated from the Chinese University of Hong Kong before studying for a master’s and PHD at University of California, USA, and then later becoming a fellow at the Royal Geographical Society, UK, in 2004 (Kwan, 2018). Despite this comprehensive grounding, Kwan’s work at the “intersection of poststructuralist-feminist theory and GIS-based geocomputation” (2004, p.759) might justify a bias towards her proposal of hybridity between quantitative and qualitative studies, namely of social- cultural and spatial-analytical (2004).
Aside from their differing contexts, there are a number of key themes relating to the practice that are present in both essays: notably an appreciation of the diversity of geography and the notion of interdependence and collaboration. Fenneman remarks of the diverse ensemble of facts that inform Geographic practice, all joined solely by a “common locality” (1919, p.171). He refers to the distilling of this overarching material as where the geographer is supreme: capable of developing new composite insights and “secondary compounds” (1919, p.171). This, he claims, is unique to geography and beyond the scope of intellectuals of any other singular discipline (1919). Kwan makes similar remarks in her perception of Geography as a distinct amalgam of science, social science and
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humanities (2004). She too values this diversity within geography, and within each speciality area, and advocates a forging of “productive relations” (2004, p.757) for the enhancement of geography’s status. In fact, Kwan goes so far to suggest that hybridisation—"a movement that seeks to integrate elements that are thought to be incompatible of conflicting” (2004, p.758)—is the way forward for Geography, declaring the vision of a unified identity, as crusaded by the likes of David R. Stoddart (1987), as an “untenable project”. Relationship is also a core part of the practice that Fenneman advocates in two senses. Firstly, claiming that studying singular elements in isolation falls short of the “distinctive geographical flavour” (1919, p.172) which comes only from a holistic, bigger-picture inquiry with an appreciation of the interrelations between elements. Secondly, in his valuation of the principle of “scientific trespass” as forwarded by G. K. Gilbert (1909). Here, Fenneman interprets and furthers the analogy of cross-fertilisation between specialisms and disciplines to say that the Geographer is the “great insect” (1919, p.171) that carries the pollen of insight between fields—as if to suggest some sort of interdependent relationship.
On the other hand, while both essays a deal a great amount in the practice of Geography as a mode of inquiry, there is a notable imbalance in the defining of the subject itself. Fenneman makes a strong point of claiming that sciences cannot be defined by their “circumferences” (1919, p.174); instead they often are and should be defined by their centres. He uses the example of Botany to exemplify this idea: there is no uncertainty as to what the discipline is because we understand its central premise. However, there will be botanists who specialise in broader aspects of the subject, such as chemistry, medicine and geology—they could be described as working on the circumference—but this does not pose as an issue or conflict in definition (Fenneman, 1919). Thus, Fenneman attempts to define Geography by focusing in on its centre: the study of areas in relation to man (1919). A core part of this, he claims, is “regional geography” (1919, p.172), in other words, the study of areas in their “compositeness or complexity” (1919, p.172). This links back to how Fenneman advocates geography should be practiced – an investigation into the interrelatedness of the complex and compound elements shared by a common locality (1919). On the other hand, Kwan’s Beyond Difference: From Canonical Geography to Hybrid Geographies (2004) was written less from the perspective of defining geography, and more so with a goal to “enhance its status” (2004, p.759) and improve relations within the discipline (2004). This change of concern from defining to enhancing is a possible result of Geography having “evolved into a field of enormous breadth in the last century” (2004, p.756), which would suggest it is less at risk of Fenneman’s “proposed partition” (1919, p.169) in Kwan’s time. As such, the only perceptible definition that Kwan makes note of is her estimation of the nature of geography as a “mixture of science, social science and humanities” (2004, p.757).
Whilst both essay authors attempt to make clear their visions for the practice of Geography, both also exclude a number of practices in doing so. Fenneman highlights what he deems as the “unnecessary discrimination against geologic terms” (1919, p.173) as an example of a practice that he sees as illogical. In reference to his own circumference analogy, Fenneman claims that the insistence on coming up with geographic names for geological phenomena is an illustration of “warring on the border” (1919, p.173). He comments how this attempt to term identical features under different titles is merely an echo of nature’s first law of “self-preservation” (Fenneman, 1919, p.174) and instead he advocates a Darwin-esque law of survival approach: “then every field of study that answers to an intellectual need will have due recognition” (1919, p.174). In comparison, Kwan’s fosters a vision of a future where the polarised practices of social-cultural and spatial-analytical geographies, and the academics who pursue them, are no longer grouped under categorical terms like “postermodernist, quantifiers and GISers” (2004, p.759). For the most part, she puts the fault of this divisive practice in the hands of Thomas Kuhn (1962) and his model of scientific revolutions, which advocates a “clean break … and the dominance of a singular vision” (Kwan, 2004, p.759). This resonates with Fenneman’s focus on an academic centre and purpose rather than attempting to define a clean break between the fringe of geography and other disciplines where it is often overlapping (Fenneman, 1919).
The differing temporal, spatial and academic contexts in which these authors wrote their essays has influenced the definitions and practices which they advocate. While Fenneman’s essay attempts to defend the value of Geography despite its encroachment into other disciplines (1919), Kwan focuses less on the validation of the subject, and more on the strengthening of ties between distanced specialisms (2004). As such, the focus of these essays if very different, but where they do converge is on their perceptions of the nature and practice of Geography as a diverse and collaborative effort: one where those working on the borders, or in specialisms deemed incompatible, are encouraged to centralise and converge.