1. Introduction
2.1: history of the CSDP and the CSDP now
Ever since its establishment in 1999, the importance of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been undoubted. This policy area of the EU only gained in importance over time, especially since the increased threat of terrorism in Europe in the recent years ( Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2018).
Nowadays, the CSDP of the EU is one of the major components within the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP). Their responsibilities are mainly the decision-making on defence topics, but also on topics such as crisis management and humanitarian aid. Implemented is this policy through military actions, as well as humanitarian actions during crisis situations, everywhere around the world. The CSDP also includes a new-formed alliance between member states of the EU that is focussed on collective self-defence and a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), in which these member states aim for a structural integration of their armed forces (Moussis, 2013).
When we look at the treaties we can see that under article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the competences in the area of freedom, security and justice are shared between the Union and the member states (Foster, 2017).
2.2: The Current CSDP Voting system
Currently the voting within the CSDP is still the same as the one since the establishment of the policy in 1999. For decisions to be made within the CFSP (which the CSDP is part of) the proposals that are put forward need to be agreed upon by the European Council and the Council of the EU, usually with an Unanimity vote and constructive abstention (Moussis, 2013).
The person who puts forward proposals and implements decisions within this policy is normally the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It can also be done on initiative of a EU Member State. This can be found written down in article 42 (4) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (Foster, 2017) which is given below.
Article 42 (4) TEU:
“Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a member state. The High Representative may propose the use of both national recourse and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.”
Analysis
3: how to increase efficiency of the CSDP of the EU by changing the voting system
Exactly this voting system is something that causes trouble for decision making within the CSDP and therefor its efficiency. Since the CSDP is an important policy of the EU I wanted to analyse the reasons for this and the possible change of the CSDP voting system to see an increase in efficiency within the CSDP.
3.1 results of the current CSDP voting system
When we look at research that has been done already, we can see that the current voting system of the CSDP has a negative influence on the efficiency of the policy. Research by Winn states that there is a direct relationship between the lacking capabilities of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP and the fact that decisions must be always be unanimous since the general rules for CFSP decision-making is unanimity with constructive abstention (Winn, 2003).
Another cause of inefficiency in the CSDP, according to research, is that the unanimity vote in the CSDP has caused constant and significant difficulties in getting common positions and promoting joint actions as regards important issues of the EU foreign policy (Titulescu, 2015).
A research done by the University of Saint Cyril and Metodius in Trnava argues that there are three main factors which influence the effectiveness of the CSDP, namely capacities, consistency and cooperation and none of these factors itself are enough, all three are needed for an efficient functioning of the CSDP (Filipec O. , 2017). When we look at the unanimity vote in the CSDP it is clear to see that this only makes it harder to successfully fulfil the last factor, namely cooperation. Especially the inclusion of new Member States in recent years will undoubtedly provide greater possibilities for disagreement on issues within the CSDP (Winn, 2003).
An example case of the CSDP’s inefficiency that researches like the ones above show is the Ukraine crisis with Russia and the CSDP’s respond to that. This case is a good example to show the fragmentation within the CSDP.
In the Ukraine-Russia crisis the EU developed a strong sanction mechanism against Russia, but failed to prevent divergent national policies, leading for example in adopting new energy deals or port access for Russian naval forces (Orenstein & Kelemen, 2016). The EU thus suffers a kind of disaggregation in its foreign and security policy, because central institutions are unable to prevent member states to pursue its own policies. In other words, the CSDP is fragile to the degree of member state willingness and mutual interests. It also shows that situations like this lead to conflicting attitudes of the EU member states (Filipec O. , 2017).
3.3 pros and cons of the current CSDP voting system
Everything of course has its positive and negative sides and this is no different for the CSDP voting system.
The fact that decisions on important security and defence issues are quite hard to make could be seen as a positive thing, since this prevents hasty decisions or decisions based on an emotional impulse. Some Member States will also see the keeping of their sovereignty in this policy with this voting system on these issues as a good aspect. This because every successive treaty amendment has transferred further powers to the (European) Union, with a corresponding loss of sovereignty in those areas agreed upon between the Union and the member states, something not every member state is now happy with (Foster, Foster on EU law, 2017).
In contrast to this however, the unanimity vote with the inclusion of new Member States and thus a greater possibility for disagreements on issues within the CSDP, could be seen as a negative aspect (Winn, 2003). Another negative factor could be the influence of this voting system on the efficiency of the CSDP in general as shown by researches mentioned earlier.
4: changes and possibilities:
4.1: improving the effectiveness of the CSDP by changing the CSDP voting system to QMV
The idea of changing the voting system of the CFSP including the CDSP of the EU is nothing new. The only problem is that it lost its momentum within the member states society. This momentum is now boosted again by growing international challenges that the EU is facing ( Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2018).
There are already voices from strong countries within the EU and the CSDP to change the voting system from an unanimity vote to a different one, for example a qualified majority vote. The German government is an example of one of the member states governments that argues that abolishing the unanimity principle would make the EU a stronger foreign policy actor in face of rising transatlantic tensions. ( Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2018). Now we will take a look at what is already written in the EU treaties on changing the voting system of the CSDP.
Legal possibilities to change the voting system
Under article 48 TEU the treaties of the European Union may be amended in accordance with an ordinary revision procedure or simplified revision procedure (Foster, Blackstone's: EU Treaties & Legislation 2017-2018, 2017). But revising the EU treaties is a long and difficult process since this would change the structure as well as the functioning of European institutions and the way decisions are made in the EU (EU monitor, 2018).
However, in the CSDP case a simplified revision procedure is not an option since article 48 (7) states that it cannot be used for decisions, having military implications or in areas of defence (Foster, 2017).
Under article 31 (3) TEU however, it states that the EU Council may unanimously adopt a decision by stipulating that the Council shall act by qualified majority in cases other than stated in article 31 (2) TEU, so for example CFSP decisions (Foster, 2017). But this would mean that for every single decision of the CSDP, this article would have to be activated. This would clearly not increase effectiveness, but only make decision-making in this policy more time expensive and unclear.
4.2: possibilities with an improved CSDP voting system
Conclusion
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