Divine Command Theory is the theory that morality depends on God – an act is only right if and because it is commanded by God (Austin). Adams in his work A New Divine Command Theory upholds that this is only possible if morality is commanded by a loving God (Adams, 2013, 223). When considering the success of Divine Command Theory, I believe that this view is essential. Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma criticises the traditional Divine Command Theory, arguing that it implies two different consequential scenarios – both of which are problematic. However, Adams’ new theory that one must follow the commands of a loving God solves the dissatisfactory outcomes that the original theory presents (Adams, 2013, 224). Thus it is Adams New Divine Command Theory which is more successful than the traditional theory. Concentrating on this therefore, in this essay I will analyse the issues that Plato provides with the traditional theory and use Adams’ theory to underline how the issues Plato emphasises may be solved by acting in respect to the commands of a “loving God” (Adams, 2013, 224).
Firstly, I will discuss the criticisms of the Divine Command Theory that are stressed by Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma. With reference to the two horns described in the Euthyphro Dilemma, I will underline how believing that an act is moral because it is commanded by God is equivocal. I will then consider a solution to the issues discussed which is exampled in Adams’ updated version of the theory. I will underline how Adams (2013) adds an alternative twist to the original theory which failed to understand the importance of God’s love in relation to morality. Finally, I will accentuate both the advantages and disadvantages of Adams’ theory, concluding that Adams’ (2013) version is successful in resolving the problems addressed.
In response to the Divine Command Theory, Plato questions whether actions are right because God has commanded them or whether God commands actions because they are right (Austin). This reversal of values is the conflict which Plato makes the source of his debate. God’s omnipotence is questionable when assessing the downfall of the Divine Command Theory. This can be exampled in the dissatisfactory two options which are results of the Divine Command Theory that Plato presents in order to underline the flaws of the theory. The first of these cases being that if God decided that, for example, murder was right, it does not follow that it would be right (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2006/2014). However, if God commands us to murder which is morally wrong, it becomes right under Divine Command Theory (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2006/2014). On the other hand, the second case would be that if morality is independent to God’s commands, God cannot command murder to be right as it is always wrong and it is thus morally independent to God’s will (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2006/2014). In this view God only wills what is right he does not control it. God’s must conform his will to what is good. However, conflict arises in deciding which one is most convincing as both options seem unsatisfactory. This is known as the Euthyphro dilemma. Plato debates both alternatives in a dialogue between Euthyphro and Socrates, whereby Euthyphro finds it impossible to determine what morality is when separated from what the Gods love (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2006/2014). It is arguably possible to reject the second case that Plato presents as God would not be omnipotent because he could not will what is good. If God could not change morality then God could not be all-powerful. This suggests that the only reasonable case is the first, yet this too seems equivocal. If God could pick anything to be immoral then there is no particular reasoning for picking murder as immoral. Thus it would become difficult to praise God for His goodness. Therefore, Plato’s response to the Divine Command Theory highlights it’s flaws but in doing so also is subject to criticism.
To address this dilemma with the Divine Command Theory that Plato discusses, Robert Adams (2013) provides his own version of the theory in A New Divine Command Theory which attempts to resolve the original theory’s flaws. Adams (2013) states that “being contrary to the commands of a loving God” (Adams, 2013, 224) is always ethically wrong. The emphasis here must be placed on the “loving God” (Adams, 2013, 224). With the assumption that God loves us, to go against His commands and morality is wrong (Adams, 2013, 223). This modified version of the Divine Command Theory provides an objective property of wrongness. It could not be possible for God to command that murder is right because it would not be God’s nature to do so as God is loving. He would not use his omnipotence to create wrong because that would be contradictory to him being a “loving God” (Adams, 2012, 223). Therefore this resolves the criticism that morality may be arbitrary because omnibenevolence here is the foundations for morality. Morality cannot be external as God creates the moral laws. It also leaves out the doubt of God’s omnipotence – if He could not command morality – because God is seen as the creator of all morality. Adams’ (2013) believes in both the omnibenevolence and omnipotence of God which supports the original reasoning of the Divine Command Theory.
It may be argued that Adams (2013) modified Divine Command Theory is successful in a world where there is a loving God. Yet, on the other hand, there may be other possible worlds where immorality is not considered to be acting contrary to the commands of a loving God as there may be no loving God (Austin). This may be the argument from a theist as it identifies the flaws in the modified version as there must be a God and it must be loving. If this were to be true, in a possible world without a loving God, it would follow that there would also be no morality as every action would be not in line with the commands of a loving God – because there is not one. Thus it is possible to disagree with Adams claim that is a necessary truth to follow God’s commands.
However, on the other hand, Adams (2013) modified version of the Divine Command Theory does avoid both horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma. In this respect, it is successful. The modified version that Adams (2013) presents avoids the questioning of God’s power as it is reliant upon God’s unchanging omnibenevolence. Therefore there first horn is undermined as God would not say that doing wrongful acts such as murder are right because that would be against God’s nature. Likewise, the second horn is also avoided as God is the ultimate source of morality. God’s omnipotence is not in question, as it could be in the second horn that Plato describes, because God is the moral commander. Thus Adams version provides a useful insight into an alternative to the original Divine Command Theory. It successfully refutes Plato’s criticisms and places God at the forefront of morality but does not undermine the substance or sense of the original theory.
Ultimately, Adams’ (2013) version of the Divine Command Theory is successful in resolving the issues which Plato underlines in his Euthyphro Dilemma. Whilst the original theory undermines God’s omnibenevolence by allowing God to command evil or to not be able to command anything at all, Adams’ (2013) interpretation of the Divine Command Theory avoids these flaws. By introducing the idea of a “loving God” (Adams, 2013, 224) Adams’ establishes God’s position as moral commander and emphasises the common belief that people must follow His commands. Adams rightfully states that “God’s commands constitute a law or a standard that seems to believers to have sanctity that is not possessed by any merely human will or institution” (Adams, 2013, 222). This emphasises how Adams restores this “sanctity” (Adams, 2013, 222) by using God’s love as the cornerstone for his own Divine Command Theory. In doing so, Adams (2013) does not undermine or take away from the beliefs of the original theory, but adds a new dimension to cement to love of God to morality.