El Salvador’s foreign policy is consumed by the perpetual crimes, mainly in regards to gang warfare. Street gangs rival one another and against the state. It’s murder rates are the highest in Central American countries, and their swift economic regression does not help them; their jails are overcrowded; approximately 38,700 prisoners not including juveniles, which are about 5,000 in holding cells (World Prison Brief, n.d.). The infamous gang, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), are undocumented immigrants that settled in Los Angeles during the 1980s Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) revolt. With time, they spread out through Canada, Continental United States and continued further South. This group is infamously known for their undocumented immigration in the U.S., and repressive efforts to keep them out has made the situation only more hostile. In 2014, El Salvador government developed a ‘Safe El Salvador’ program to reduce massacres, where not much has been reduced, and the government’s ‘mano dura’– iron fist– has increased instability from its lacking stringent enforcement (Lobo, 2016). So what’s to be done on an international scale, because current US government only demonizes the group, and associates all immigrants to behave this way? Reformation for El Salvador’s punishment policies and those seeking to escape a murder-ridden country to be able to seek asylum are possible solutions, however; a legal framework for a rehabilitation process may need to be considered and aided by allied countries, including themselves, to work towards pacifying this issue.
In 1979, President Carlos Humberto Romero of El Salvador, was put out of office as a result of a coup and faced political resistance that helped to develop the civil war between the government and civilians; the period between 1979-1981, resulted in the most conflict (WPF, 2015). The coup was in view of the fact that human rights and democratization were not being considered for a more equitable development, and so right-wing entities within the military and security forces began to dominate power. Their methods on counter-insurgency were placed upon the civilians and subject them to mass displacement of dumping bodies, and death squads. This enraged the newly created guerilla, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), and weakened El Salvador’s government. Before they completely started losing control of the state, the Reagan administration warned them that if violence against civilians continued to ramp their fatality count, then the US government would restrict their military aid. During the mid-1980s, FMLN adopted guerilla tactics and, as a result of ongoing violence, Salvadoran refugees increased to 1.5 million by 1984. US allowed for a military support with the new election, allowing El Salvador’s government to minimize the threat of the FMLN using direct confrontations; however, insurgency repossessed with even more guerilla tactics such as booby traps, mines and sniping. Overall, lethal attacks were not as prevalent during the later years of the decade; regardless, citizens were negatively impacted. FMLN’s severe and final point of violence was in 1989, where the guerilla’s action and the government’s response cost nearly 2,000 deaths, especially murdering Jesuit priests, appalling the international allies, leading to the US to cut their military the following year. As this did push towards a peace process, it was not until 1992, when final peace accords were titled in Mexico City, ending the conflict over 12 years.
After the Peace Accords, the El Salvador Truth Commission (TC) was created and statistically, found that 85% of serious acts of violence were as a result of the state, and another 60% was due to extrajudicial executions (ICTJ, 2013). The assumption of the Accords intended to move away from war and into peace, transforming their political life in the state. Despite the initiation of peace, Los Angeles, California, dealt severely with the Mara Salvatrucha, as they did spread all over continental US and further South. MS-13’s main purpose was to protect Salvadoran immigrants in the city of Los Angeles after the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s. They are notorious for their violence on political and cultural retribution and have drawn attention of the FBI and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, whose teams have raided against suspects, arresting several hundreds of gang members across the US (Brice, 2017). There is also a presence of MS-13 in Ontario, Canada; internationally, they have estimated to have 30,000 (McGraw, 2018).
MS-13 and failed government policies have contributed to the high levels of violence torment the country. In the early 2000s, Francisco Flores launched Mano Dura strategies to combat gangs, and gang-related violence. These led to spikes in the number of gang members arrested. As a result, the prison population proliferated from a rate of 130 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000 to 567 per 100,000 in 2016 (Rosen, 2017). The increase in the prison population has led to severe overcrowding within the prison system. Moreover, officials separated gangs within prisons. The separation of prisoners seems logical as prison officials do not want to place gang members from rival organizations in the same cells. However, scholars, such as José Miguel Cruz, note that such strategies have had unintended consequences (Rosen, 2017). Prisons served as “schools of crime” as gang members from different cliques housed within the same prison complex began to network and organize.
In sum, prisons became an integral part of gang life, and gang leaders “call the shots” while incarcerated. Prisons throughout the country requires significant reforms. The prison system is plagued by high levels of overcrowding at around 348 percent. The high levels of overcrowding lead to serious concerns about human rights abuses due to the poor living standards of the prisoners. Overcrowding can also increase tension among inmates and foment high levels of violence. In addition, Salvadoran prisons do not effectively rehabilitate former gang members. Former prisoners face major challenges as they attempt to find employment after leaving prison. Ex-gang members face high levels of discrimination by society. Not only do former gang members have enemies within their former gang, but they also have to be careful as rival gang members may seek to harm them. The current government of Salvador Sánchez Ceré has continued a tough crime approach to gangs in the country, and in 2015, the Supreme Court labeled both the 18th Street gang and MS-13 as terrorists. These controversial counter-gang strategies have increased levels of violence between the police and gang members. Such policies have also contributed to prison overcrowding. The government cannot afford to continue incarcerating so many young Salvadorans. New strategies must be reinforced to reduce the number of people in the prison system and attempt to prevent the youth from becoming involved in criminal activities and the gang life.
The Salvadoran government is at a critical climax. Gang strategies are often popular among the public because people want to feel safe and increase security levels. Gang members partake in crime and other delinquent behavior, which help increase the levels of insecurity in El Salvador. Harsh anti-gang strategies can help the current government demonstrate to society that it is tough on crime and serious about combating gangs and gang-related violence. However, history shows that such policies only lead to more violence and do not resolve many of the underlying issues. Studies, such as the one conducted by José Miguel Cruz and his colleagues at Florida International University, demonstrate that gang members in El Salvador are from marginalized communities and are highly uneducated.
It is important to address the underlying causes of why people join gangs. Solving these issues is not easy as a magic solution does not exist. Yet the lesson of past policies is that mano dura strategies only lead to more violence and are not effective. Finally, Central American governments that are plagued by high levels of corruption, impunity, and inequality are ripe places for gangs and other organized crime groups to operate. As the elections in El Salvador approach, it remains to be seen who will win and what security strategies will be implemented. These outcomes could determine whether the same hardline strategies designed to combat gangs and gang-related activity continue unabated. The next president will have to address many of the underlying problems in the country, including the high levels of violence as well as corruption and lack of transparency. Institutions throughout the country, including the executive, have been tainted by corruption scandals. Former President Antonio Saca, for instance, is currently incarcerated in La Esperanza, Mariona for stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from the country. In addition, former President Mauricio Funes fled to Nicaragua after corruption allegations. Other institutions, such as the police and the military, had allegedly been involved in death squads. In reality, the future of El Salvador looks bleak and bland unless the institutions, be it NGOs or the government itself within the country can be strengthened through serious reforms (Cruz, p.67).
The deadlock between a tarnished set of security policies and a gang phenomenon that thrives on the contempt of mainstream Salvadoran society can only be resolved by resettling the way this country treats its security dilemmas. Judicial and security institutions require careful change to ensure resources are distributed to areas with the highest concentrations of violence, and used to boost regulations that targets gang members committing the most serious crimes. Jail-based reinsertion, and cooperation with diverse churches, NGOs and businesses that offer second chances to former gang members, must be strengthened to provide a legal framework for rehabilitation as well as material incentives for the gangs to eventually disband. Although the country’s main political parties (and most of the public) oppose any hint of negotiation with gangs, the reality is that many poor areas is at constant daily reminders, and encounters with these groups. Tolerance for these efforts, despite the already enforced legal restrictions on any contact with gangs, is essential to build the confidence that will be required for dialogue in the future.
And this won’t be easy, and it’s also not very likely to be aided by US policy toward either gangs or Salvadoran immigrants. The potential rights to residency in the US of 195,000 beneficiaries of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program threatens to overwhelm the Salvadoran state’s capacity to accommodate those who want to return; like the late 1990s, when mass deportations of gang members from the U.S. to El Salvador exported the criminal capital that led to the immediate rise of the MS-13 and its main rival, the 18th Street gang (Cruz, p.7). El Salvador is unprepared economically and institutionally to receive such an uprising, or to handle their 192,700 U.S. children, many of them at that age for recruitment or victimisation by gangs. At a time when levels of violence remain extraordinarily high, and an relentless exhaustion toward an unwinnable conflict from both sides, the arrival of thousands of migrants back to their crime-affected homeland would impose huge strains. To escape its perpetual violence, El Salvador needs global support, not the recurrence of past mistakes and neglect (ICG, 2014).