Parliamentary System in the Spanish Case
Spain has one of the highest levels of decentralization among all the Western European democracies. The country is considered to be a “state of autonomies” in that it is comprised of 17 autonomous communities, in addition to two autonomous cities, all with their own parliaments, elections, governments, and party systems. The Spanish parliamentary system itself is fragmented, as it depends greatly on the relative successes of the various political parties found throughout the country. Due to Spain’s history as a collection of kingdoms, “Spanish” nationalism is relatively weak as it is contested by several nationalist alternative projects within Spain.
History
The functioning of Spain’s parliamentary system today lies in its beginnings as a series of kingdoms. With the marriage of Prince Ferdinand and Isabella, Aragon and Castile were consolidated into one state. The monarchs did not stop there – they convinced other principalities to join the project under the auspices of creating the first powerful Catholic kingdom after the fall of Rome. In 1491, Aragon, Castile, the Basque Country, and Portugal were united, forming the beginnings of modern-day Spain. One year later, Andalusia was absorbed into Spain.
Andalusia, or Al-Andalus, was formerly a Muslim caliphate, and thus the majority of its citizens were Muslim. Due to the monarchy’s strict emphasis on Christianity, Muslims were forced to abandon Islam and convert. Those who refused to convert lost their jobs and property, so many Muslims – as well as Jews – left the Iberian Peninsula. During this time, diversity in Spain was shunned, and so religious and political colleges were established to ensure strict adherence to Catholicism (Moreno, 2001).
Christianity was central to Spanish culture during this time, and the monarchy used the religion as a tool for homogenization. Spain was the first modern country to take this step, and it is clear that Catholicism succeeded in maintaining the government’s control of the populace. Even today, there is the notion that the “ends justify the means” in Spanish politics. At the end of the fifteenth century, this idea held strong; the mission of Catholicism was emphasized over everything. Politics and religion in Spain during this time were inextricably linked – church leaders were chosen by the king and queen themselves. Though it has been over 500 years, the most important political value in Spain remains unity over all.
Similarly, political unity was augmented by the Roman presence in Spain. The Romans had controlled Spain for half of a century and the laws and customs of the country reflected this. Rather than a loose code of conduct, laws were explicitly stated and written down. Roman Hispania also aligned with Visigoth Spain in that Muslims were the common enemy. The Spanish Reconquista lasted 800 years and enabled the country to emphasize the similarities among populations, forging a country with a common goal (Moreno, 2001).
With the discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus, Spaniards began to believe that God had rewarded them for creating a Christian country. Goods extracted from the West Indies enabled Spain’s economy to flourish. Isabella, however, was not satisfied with the conquest of the Americas and moved to consolidate the Spanish empire into the rest of Europe. The rulers’ children were sent to all corners of the continent in order to increase Spain’s political influence.
Spain solidified its place in the European political scene with the marriage of their daughter, Joanna, into the Habsburg family. Though the Habsburgs did not unite Spain by homogenization (Moreno, 2001), this event marked the peak of the Spanish empire. Spain at this time had control of all of Europe and America’s riches and strong alliances with Germany, England, and Portugal. The country had expanded rapidly, up until the loss of the New World colonies, as an authoritarian state. The impact of Spain’s historically absolutist political system is ever-present in the functioning of the Spanish government today.
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Spanish state began to be viewed very differently throughout the populace, especially among the middle classes. The Spanish government had adopted the Jacobin ideals of the French Revolution, which emphasized centralized bureaucracy. Two general perceptions emerged of the government in Spain – one of state institutions as alien, remote, and brutal and the other of institutions as providers of stable jobs and political positions. These perceptions were greatly regional – Castile and Andalusia were two such regions that regarded the state as the main source of opportunity (Moreno, 2001). These sentiments were thoroughly at odds with one another, and ultimately led to the Spanish Civil War.
The Civil War ended in the 1930s, enabling nationalist dictator Francisco Franco to come into power. The Franco dictatorship was staunchly anti-Communist and anti-separatist, though Catalonia was awarded its Statute of Autonomy during this time – presumably to stave off future conflicts in the region (Moreno, 2001). Catalans opposed the dictatorship for the most part and effectively created a four-point program to voice their opposition. After Franco’s death in 1975, the Spanish transition to democracy began. In addition, Catalonia, as well as the Basque Country, began movements toward self-government. Autonomy meant different things for different communities; in some it meant having the greatest possible degree of self-government and narrowest possible gap between people and power, while in others it called for a greater emphasis on measures against unemployment, underdevelopment, and poverty. These different viewpoints have made their mark on the functioning of Spanish politics – today, there is a tendency towards decentralization in the country.
Since June 1977, Spain has been governed by a parliamentary system in which the party with a majority in parliament names a prime minister or in which a plurality party forms a coalition government.
Key elections
Territorial organization is one of the most divisive issues in Spain, with the country containing 17 autonomous communities. Each of these autonomous communities contain their own regional parties, which compete in local, regional, national, and occasionally European elections (Hamann, 1999). Because of the plethora of political levels open to these parties, Spanish voters are able to differentiate their voting behavior. Federalism, which was the political system adopted after Franco’s death, enables this manner of voting.
Federalization has shaped Spain’s political landscape in that it organizes “multiple communities that elect multiple parties or politicians” (Hamann, 1999). This system creates complex and varying identities among populations. In Spain and other federalist states, minority groups in the national arena are able to come to power sub-nationally, and thus gain power in regional governments. For example, Catalonian politics have an influence on Spanish politics due to the presence of Catalonian nationalist parties in parliament. This relative ease of access to government is an incentive for regional parties to form – regions that might otherwise be shunned are given voices in national politics. Federalism creates “multiple and varied party systems” which enable voters to decide their representation in different arenas (Hamann, 1999).
Two territories that have regionally dominant systems are Catalonia and the Basque Country. Such regional parties have grown in popularity over the years – though plateauing in the 1990s, taking seats in the national parliament. What is particularly interesting is the voting behavior of historically autonomous regions, however. Studies have shown that Catalans tend to vote left – PSOE – in national elections but vote right – Convergence and Union (CiU) – in regional elections (Hamann, 1999). This phenomenon is called dual voting, which is the result of varying electoral turnout in regional and national elections respectively (Perez-Nievas & Fraile, 2000).
Most regions in Spain follow a similar pattern of voting, though there is one exception. Galicia is the only historical region where regional parties are relatively unimportant. This is an anomaly in Spanish politics. Because autonomous areas have a wide array of government arrangements, regional parties are more successful in gaining access to government positions – especially in areas where no single party can consistently form a government.
On a national level, however, two parties typically take center stage. The left being the PSOE, or the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, and the right being the PP, or the People’s Party. Before the general election of 2004, the PP had maintained control of parliament for the past eight years. This pattern of domination by the PP came to end after the worst terror attack in the history of Western Europe, however (Colomer, 2004). On March 11, 2004, bombs were detonated in commuter trains in Madrid, killing nearly 200 people. Faith in the PP began to dwindle as the populace began to question the competence of the national government in dealing with the aftermath these attacks.
The PSOE, headed by Jose-Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, had a long history of problems with voter coordination. The fragmented nature of Spanish political parties had made it extremely hard for left-wing parties, the PSOE in particular, to win an election. Though most Spaniards consider themselves to be left-leaning on the political spectrum, the multitude of left-wing parties complicates election season by diluting left wing power. Participation was unusually high in the March 2004 election – several million voters were able to come together in support of the PSOE, in addition to voters who did not typically vote for that particular party (Colomer, 2004).
Both sides of the political spectrum in Spain have had issues coordinating voters. After the transition to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the right was extremely divided. There was a wide array of right-wing parties, but the former-authoritarian Popular Alliance (AP) was rebranded as the PP and was able to collect votes from all points on the right side of the spectrum with Jose Maria Aznar. In 2000, under Aznar, the PP had an absolute majority of seats in the Spanish parliament, enabling the party to essentially form the entire government (Colomer, 2004). The PSOE has never been able to easily garner this type of widespread support.
There have only been two instances in which the left, and thus the PSOE, has been able to coordinate on this level. Each time it has occurred “from below,” under extreme shocks. The first time being after a failed government coup in 1981 – Spain’s democracy was young at this point and the military threatened its survival. Due to the fear of Spain once again falling into a military dictatorship, all points left of center voted for Felipe Gonzalez, the candidate for the PSOE. The second instance of coordination on the left lies in the aftermath of the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attack (Colomer, 2004).
Before the attacks, the PP was projected to win the general election as it had for the past terms. Mariano Rajoy, the PP’s candidate for prime minister, however was not perceived as having any innovative policy proposals. This proved to be a major misstep of the party in the 2004 election. Historically, the PP tended to rely on the failures of the left, rather than on creating new policy. In addition, Aznar’s support of the United States’ involvement in the Iraq War damaged the party’s reputation (Colomer, 2004). To this day, many Spaniards harbor a general distaste of Americans due to the widespread destruction caused by this war.
The PSOE, on the other hand, had historically placed an emphasis on social issues as terrorism in Spain prior to March 2004 was limited to nationalist movements within the country. Still, the party firmly denounced the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), an armed Basque separatist group (Colomer, 2004).
In the aftermath of the attack, the incumbent PP government immediately placed blame on ETA, when it was still very unclear who was responsible. Under closer investigation, it became doubtful that ETA was capable of orchestrating such an attack while under such close vigilance by the Spanish authorities. It became clear that the attack was not ETA, but al-Qaida, when tapes in Arabic were found in claiming responsibility. The PP’s outright denial of al-Qaida as the perpetrators of the attack was a “political mistake” for the party (Colomer, 2004) as this was very likely with Spain’s involvement in Iraq.
Three days later, the general election was held, and the PSOE won 11 million votes, the highest number won by any single party in Spain. Turnout was high at 77%, further confirming national political sentiment. Interestingly, prior to the results of the election, there was a huge disparity between preferences and expectations. Though most Spaniards wished to see an end to the PP’s control of parliament, there was a general expectation of a failure of the left and the PSOE (Colomer, 2004). At this time, the government was a PSOE-controlled minority, which gathered support from other smaller left-wing parties. It is not uncommon in Spain for this kind of activity to occur.
Current state of government
Today, the Spanish parliament is led by Mariano Rajoy of the PP who came to power in December 2011, after the PSOE-led government by Zapatero. It is a relatively young bicameral parliament which is made up of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. Though characteristics of the Spanish parliament can be traced back to the government of Spain in the late nineteenth century, it can be attributed to the period of time after Franco’s death. The framers of the Spanish constitution were more concerned with creating stability in government, than with “empowering citizens (Colino, 2016).
Linz (1990) argues that the majority of the world’s stable democracies are parliamentary systems, with the exception of the United States of course. This fact is particularly applicable to countries like Spain with “deep political cleavages and numerous political parties.” A parliamentary system is imperative to hold together countries that are harbor divisions. In a parliamentary system, the prime minister is on more “equal footing” – than say, a president – with their fellow ministers of government. In Spain, this is more or less the case.
After Franco’s death, parliamentary elections allowed Adolfo Suarez, a centrist and member of the UCD – or Union of the Democratic Centre – to remain in power. Due to Suarez’s position in the center of the political spectrum, parliament was able to successfully move away from the far-right political tendencies of the past. With the passing of time, it has become apparent that Spain’s parliamentary system and its parties are far more complex. The Spanish Senate, for example, is made up of both constituency elected and regionally-appointed senators. The lower house, Spain’s Congress of Deputies, is quite fragmented, as evidenced above by certain coordination problems (Colino, 2016). Despite this, parliamentary systems on the whole enable voters to choose the exact parties in which their beliefs are aligned (Linz, 1990).
With robust multiparty democracies come frequent changes in prime ministers. Parliamentary systems allow corrupt prime ministers to be more easily removed with a vote of no confidence (Linz, 1990). In order for such systems to succeed, however, two conditions need to be met; first, prime ministers must be responsible with their power, and secondly, political parties must be well-disciplined and strong. Colino (2016) expounds on the ability of executives to pursue their own policy agendas due to the informal nature of parliamentary coalitions.
Linz (1990) expounds on the benefits of parliamentarism in Spain and similar countries, though it is still unclear as to whether the Spanish case can be considered a successful one. In his words, parliamentarism “provides a more flexible and adaptable institutional context for the establishment and consolidation of democracy”. But with the high degree of regional fragmentation in the country, it is questionable whether Spain can be used as a shining example of the parliamentary system.
Civil society itself works best to consolidate new democracies, though does not serve to replace other conditions necessary for democratic consolidation. Civil society, according to Encarnación (2001), represents “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, and bound by a legal order or set of shared values”. Historically, there has been a misunderstanding of the manner in which civil society impacts democratic consolidation. Encarnación argues that political systems should support civil institutions and that the institutional-political framework is most important when considering the effectiveness of a democracy.
In addition, historical processes impact the functioning of democracies greatly. Spain’s tumultuous political history structures its diverse populations’ preferences, interests and values in society (Encarnación, 2001). And due to Spain’s relative poverty during the beginnings of its democratization process, its political institutions do not necessarily align or support its civil institutions. The fragmented nature of Spain’s historically autonomous regions further complicates this issue – “anti-civil” institutions have cropped up in areas where populations have felt left behind by the centralized government. Such organizations, such as ETA, have hindered Spain’s progress in governance.
While Spain struggles with nationalist groups within its borders, corruption in Madrid is also at the forefront of the country’s problems. Heywood (2005) raises questions about the “poor development” of Spanish civil society and a political elite that retains power in government. Both major parties – the PSOE and PP – have had countless corruption scandals throughout the political history of Spain. It has been argued that the Spanish parliamentary system almost incentivizes corruption – “parties act as patrons but establish a relationship of mutual dependence with the electorate on account of the need to win votes”. No party in Spain is free from this kind of misconduct, and the situation is complicated further by the differing wishes of the various regions.
Spain’s parliamentary system has a great many strengths, yet as the country’s autonomous regions demand further of the government, new challenges are posed. The next section explores the effectiveness of the American presidential system in relation to the Spanish system.