Beginning with the Syrian Arab Spring movement of 2011, the Syrian civil war has been a central point for one of the most complex and convoluted conflicts of the modern day. After pro-democratic uprisings in Turkey and Tunisia lead to dynamic political change, peaceful demonstrations began in Syria after schoolboys were detained and tortured for writing graffiti supporting the democratic revolutions. When one of these tortures led to the death of a thirteen-year-old being killed, mass calls for the resignation of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad were being heard, and demonstrators took to the streets. In response to these protests, the Assad government killed hundreds of peaceful protestors and imprisoned many more. This led to the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FRA), comprised of Syrian military defectors with a standing objective of overthrowing the current regime. Underlying the economic worries of the population was also a tone of religious tension between the Sunni Muslims, who make up the majority of Syrian citizens, and the Alawite sect, who Assad supports and is himself a member. The complexity of the conflict was seen further with the emergence of the terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS), and their military push into eastern Syria. IS continued to be the world’s most affluent terrorist organization, making upwards of one million dollars per day from oil production. After IS began to take over border towns in Northern and Eastern Syria, the United States (US), backed by an international coalition began a bombing campaign in 2013 against IS and simultaneously, began supplying the Kurds, an anti-Assad ethnic minority group and other rebels with weapons, and CIA backed training. This was in part due to a suspected chemical attack with a nerve agent that left 80 people dead, and the US firmly believing that it could only have been an Assad-backed strike. The Assad regime, now backed by Vladimir Putin and the Russian authority, firmly denied this claim and placed the blame on a rebel depot that was hit by an air-strike. The emergence of IS, however, was a key moment in the conflict, as it complicated the US military interest. The IS presence caused the US to focus its bombing campaign on the terrorist group, while simultaneously trying to continue to support the rebel forces. Currently, the situation in Syria is much more complex and involves an array of foreign backers. Iran has backed the Assad regime since the outbreak of civil war, while the oil-rich Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia have supplied the rebel forces with resources in an attempt to fight against the Syrian government. The Lebanese militia group Hezbollah entered the war in 2013 to back the Assad government, and this led to Saudi Arabia sending even more money and weapons to the rebel forces in the South through Jordan. The Kurds, who have long sought autonomy, broke away from the Syrian government in the North, have been fighting a two-front war against Assad and IS. With so many actors supporting so many different groups, the Syrian civil war has become a chaotic confrontation fueled by political and ideological undertones. Between the US backing of Syrian rebel forces, and the Russian supported Assad regime, the country has been torn apart in an east-west proxy-war. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been a firm supporter of Assad and the catalyst for the Assad government’s recent surge and re-taking of the capital city of Aleppo. This convoluted and complicated international issue has many key players and many international influences. On one side, there is Assad, Russia, Hezbollah, and Iran/Iraq backed Syrian government regime; on the other, there is the Free Syrian Army, the Kurds, and the United States backed training and bombing campaigns, as well, there is the rise of the extreme and affluent terrorist group, ISIS. Russia’s recent announcement for withdrawal from Syria has left many questions unanswered, yet it remains clear that “[u]nless a Russian-American deal were struck in the halls of power in Moscow or Washington over the fate of Syria… the outcome of the peace talks is still not in sight.” This essay will specifically explore the Russian administration’s historical precedence in Syria, their motives and the extent that they were successful in their own political and military goals, as well as how their support for the Syrian government is also a means of masking broader political goals and military goals.
Historically, Russia and Syria have existed in a politically and militarily symbiotic relationship. They both enjoy the political freedom to maintain embassies in Damascus and Moscow, respectively, and Russia sustains its only Mediterranean naval base in Tartus, Western Syria. This is possible due to the post world war two relations that were established that states that the Soviet Union would support Syrian independence. In 1980, the Soviets and Syria signed another treaty called the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that strengthened the strategic relationship between the two countries. The Palestinian Liberation Organization cause a brief rift in the mid-1980’s between Russia and Syria, but Russia continued to support Syria with various types of aid. When the Cold War was over, and the Gulf War was becoming an issue in the Middle East, Syria was adamant on focusing on US ties and support, and with a new Russia president Boris Yeltsin wanting the same relationship with the US led to the historical ties becoming even stronger. There are deeper ties within the Syrian regime that need to be highlighted, as the president of Syria at this time was Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father. The importance of this family tie is extremely useful in analyzing the unmoveable stance in which Syria has relied on Russia for support because these historical ties have transcended politics and move towards family matters. Recently however, the relationship has been rocky, and the Russian Prime Minister stated that “Moscow has “good working relations” with Assad — but not the “privileged relation” that existed with his father, Hafez al-Assad.” This is clear evidence that while Russia currently supports the Syrian government, it stems from a long history that established military and strategic alliances that are beneficial to Russia in the modern era, and therefore, they will continue to support Syria for their own benefit. The key idea here is as such: What does Russia define as a victory in Syria, and are those victories secure?
Russian success in Syria cannot be measured in any single quantitative unit, as there are many political, military, and geographical, and religious reasons for their involvement in Syria. However, one can assess to what degree the Putin administration was successful by breaking down these points further. On the political front, Russia has promoted an image of mediator, and diplomatic interventionist; Putin himself stated that “[i]t is not about Russia’s ambitions, but recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world.” While this masquerades as a valid reason to be involved in the conflict, many people are unaware of the historical ties between the countries as mentioned before, as well as the military bases in Syria. This tactical stance has been lined with vague proposals of peace and provocative statements of the western world’s failure to stop the war with ISIS. Russia itself had many reservations about the influence and power of ISIS and were worried that if they were able to achieve a victory in Syria, then the radical terrorist group could enter Russia territory and promote violence against the Russia government. As well, it serves Russia well to be a direct part of the intelligence of the alliance against the Syrian rebels, which includes Iraq and Iran. This is considered a political move against the US and moves to advance the Russia hidden agenda that essentially would undermine the US influence in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russian intervention in Syria also draws from the western world opposition to the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Western political and economic response to this crisis was strongly enforced, and therefore, “U.S. and European sanctions and diplomatic pressure catalyzed the Russian decision to intervene in Syria.” By switching the West’s focus from Crimea to Syria, the Russian administration was aiming to force President Obama into deserting the sanctions in Ukraine in order to find a way to settle the conflict in Syria. While this tactic was mildly successful averting attention away from the Ukrainian crisis, the US sanctions remain in place. In fact, the US and international sanctions in Ukraine caused the collapse of the Russian Ruble and led to financial and economic instability within Russia. This caused the outlook to change towards Crimea, as the international community stands firm on only lifting the sanctions if the Minsk II ceasefire agreements are met. These sanctions continue to hurt the Russian economy, and therefore, the goal of diverting the attention to Syria was not achieved. What the Russians did achieve however, was a shift in media attention and focus. One has to only access any credible news source such as CBC or BBC to see that most of the international focus has been on Syria, and Ukrainian issues have fallen by the wayside. Speaking in strictly economic terms, Russia had a vested interest in providing arms to the Syrian government and had sold over 15 billion dollars by 2012. While this may seem like a significant amount of money, Syria is in a state of ruin, and will be completely destroyed by the end of the civil war. Furthermore, the Russian base in Tartus has been a main talking point in the attempt to speculate and understand Russian motives. From an outsider standpoint, the base serves as a link to the Mediterranean, a way to show Russia influence through a small fleet of Naval ships, and an extension of surveillance capabilities that extends beyond the Russian border. When examining this Naval influence further, it appears that the base in Tartus is no more than a small fleet used for resupply and repairs. In fact, it was not until 2017, after years of direct involvement in the war, that Russia announced another huge lease of this naval facility and a plan to dramatically increase its capabilities. Finally, the religious aspect of this conflict cannot be overlooked. What is less commonly known and less commonly discussed is the number of Muslims in Russia. The latest studies show that there are around 20 million Muslims currently living in Russia, and when the Syrian crisis began, with the rise of IS, this posed a significant problem for the Putin administration. Politically, Putin had to deal with this potential threat, while balancing the historical promises between Russia and Syria, as well as promoting Russian arms dealing, and the ultimate goal of taking the focus away from the Crimean Crisis. Putin has reinforced his stance on Russian political involvement in stating that he “do[es] not think [he] ha[s] the right to determine the political future of Syria, be it with or without al-Assad. Th[at] is for the Syrians themselves to decide.” While this contradicts the fact that Russian efforts have been directly focused on backing Assad, it also highlights the Russian incentive to work independently of Assad in achieving their personal goals.
A critical point in this conflict continues to be the Russian relationship with Iran. If Russia could oversee an Iranian takeover of the Middle East, they help could control an area that has been the site of many alleged pro-Russian deals, such as the nuclear connections between Iran and North Korea. As well, with “the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq, there is bound to be a further increase in Iranian influence there and Iran may come to dominate a vast area stretching from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean – a disagreeable prospect for both the US.” From this standpoint, it can even be argued that Syria was not the main Russian objective in the Middle East, but more of means of using an international crisis to hide yet another ulterior political motive. As one can observe and analyze in Crimea, this is not outside the scope of normal Russian political efforts. Another reason for Russian intervention in Syria pertaining to the safe guarding of Iran relates to the Putin administration’s relationship with Hezbollah. In fact, “a change in regime in Syria would cut off Iran from Hezbollah, since Syria is seen as a transit point for Iranian training, assistance and weapons transfer[s].” A regime change in Syria could prove economically, and militarily damaging to Russia interests.
Russian interests in Syria can also be historically linked to a similar situation that shook Russia in the late 1990’s; the Chechen war. Putin has as much of an interest in fighting extremism as the US, as he showed in his offer to help fight Taliban forces in Afghanistan in 2001. Returning to the point about the substantial Russian-Muslim population, it is clear that Putin has “expressed his fear of Sunni Islamist extremism and of the risks that “Jihadist” groups pose to Russia” because of the threat it poses to Russia on the home front. Putin’s actions in Chechnya, specifically his stance on rebellions and terrorist acts, relate directly to his actions in Syria and his condemning of the Syrian rebels and ISIS on both fronts. However, Russian assumptions that the Assad regime would be able to easily contain the opposition forces have led them into a tough position. Their political position within the Middle East has been somewhat compromised due to the longevity of the conflict, as well as the intense losses that Assad and Russia experienced. In this instance, while the joint efforts both the US and Russia to extinguish ISIS power were successful and the spread of extremism was greatly stifled, Russia may have had to compromise other goals due to a bad judgment call in the strength of the Assad regime and the stability that Putin thought could be provided.
In March 2016, Russia announced the unforeseen withdrawal of its troops, while maintaining an aerial and naval presence in Syria. This was seen by the international world as the Russian administrations’ final acceptance that the war is Syria either could not be won or was not worth fighting any longer due to a fracturing of confidence in the Assad government. It can be said that Russia achieved many underlying motives and because of their success in those areas, the Syrian conflict was a success. To the outside world, it was noted that “they have concluded that the situation in Syria remains hopeless and that Assad lacks the power to reunite the pieces of the smashed Syrian jigsaw puzzle.” This seems to be the end of full on Russian military intervention in Syria, the only question that remains is if Assad can continue riding the wave of victory that Russia has put him on, and if Assad will turn out to be the stabilizing force in Syria, or will the country fall further into political instability.
Recent events in Syria such as the use of chemical weapons for a second time on 7 April 2018 have now sparked extremely important questions about Syria’s future and the future of intervention in the country. In Douma, the last rebel stronghold in Syria, more than 70 people are reported to have been killed in yet another chemical attack. While the Assad administration fervently denies the use of chemical weapons, Maja Kojicancic, spokeswoman for the European Union Foreign Policy and Security Policy says that “the evidence points towards another chemical attack by the regime.” The Syrian government claims that this was an attempt by the rebels to spark an international response and possible military intervention. However, if this attack was the result of Assad’s decision, then it requires an international reaction. This becomes increasingly difficult considering the recent promise for the removal of US and Russian forces from the area, but also brings into question whether those forces will be able to leave Syria in a stable state when they do vacate. The UN has called an emergency meeting on the matter, and from there they will have to investigate and decide what can be done. Ceasefire talks were held between Russia and the rebels the day before the chemical attack, and after the talks collapsed, airstrikes were resumed on Douma, killing numerous civilians. While it seemed as if the Syrian conflict was going to begin to settle, and US and Russian forces could start to leave the area, this chemical attack shattered any sort of stability that the country did have. Even with their advances on the rebel forces, if the Assad regime was found responsible by the UN, it could resurrect a dying military campaign for power in the area. This in itself could lead to massive worldwide conflicts, and with the emergence of Turkish military ambitions, the Syrian conflict could transform yet again into a more complex and violent engagement.
Hundreds of thousands dead, a country has been completely leveled by bombs, and a radical leader has been restored to power under a shaky and unstable regime. This is Syria in the modern day, and it continues to be a focus of the international community, despite the withdrawal of Russia and American forces, and the exponential shrinking of IS power in the Middle East. Assad’s regime in 2011 was volatile, and “demonstrated that the appearance of stability and strength projected… was a false façade.” Through various failed ceasefires, major bombing campaigns, and chemical weapons use against civilians, Syria is a nation with a deep uncertain outlook on their future. Opposition fighting and unrest continues to grow around the nation, and in some places, the situation is actually getting worse. Vastly different from the civil war it began as in 2011, the conflict has evolved from a campaign in which to keep Assad in power, into “a series of battles for geo-political dominance.” By early 2018, The UN had made multiple attempts to intervene in the crisis, however none of these movements were taken seriously by Syrian forces, and by late February, a large offensive in Ghouta had claimed the lives of a further 568 civilians, now bringing the death toll to over 400,000. Examining a war like this that has now spanned over eight years, is extremely complicated, and complex. However, one must break down Russian goals and purposes within Syria, and what victories can be clearly claimed by the Putin administration to fully understand the intricacy of the moves that were made.
In reviewing Russian actions taken in Syria, one thing becomes clear: “Russian approaches are undoubtedly explained by a desire to maximize its growing political influence and trade advantages to serve its legitimate foreign policy interests.” The underlying question is, did Vladimir Putin really intend to have Bashar Al-Assad remain in power, or was the Syrian government just a vessel in which Russia could flex its political and military power against the United States and its allies to promote Russian visibility and authority on the international level? There have been clear victories that Russia can claim through their support of the Syrian government, which include but are not limited to – the showcase of Russian weapons systems for sale, the diplomatic influence now seen in the middle east through Russia, and the shift of media focus from Crimea to Syria and the middle east. While these goals were never clearly stated by Putin or Russian foreign ministers, they are a clear product of direct interference in Syria, and the ultimate result of stating one sharp message to the world: Russia is back, and on an internationally recognized level.