US Intervention in Panama: Ideas driving foreign policy
Introduction
This paper examines the 1989 US invasion of Panama and gives perspective into what drove this interventionist foreign policy choice. The paper aims to give a better understanding into both why specific policy decisions were made and what drove the policy stance. The level of analysis shall focus on the role of ideas as the primary explanatory analytical tool in understanding. The guiding question of the paper shall be the following: What led the US to see Panama as a threat and why was an invasion chosen as the method of intervention?
Background
The history of the United States and Panama goes all the way back to 1903, when the United States intervened to help Panama gain independence from Colombia. The Panamanian national identity existed centuries before, however, and as such the US was more of an enabler than the “parent” of Panamanian nationality (Mabry 1990). The idea of unfair treatment of Panama by the US stems all the way back to its independence, when Panamanian representative Philippe Bunau-Varilla offered the US a treaty in violation of the Panamanian authority’s instructions to wait for the arrival of their delegation, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, that largely signed off authority the US, who in return established a Military dictatorship in the canal zone. Outside of the zone, the US military had control over key public services. The importing of English speaking black workers for construction of the Panama Canal, and the subsequent refusal to repatriate these added to the resentment of Panamanians toward the United States (Mabry 1990). In 1936, after decades of Panamanian pressure, the US guaranteed Panamanian citizens equal opportunity with the Americans, although never completely fulfilled. US military expansionistic measures were imposed and supported by a pro-US government in 1942, under the understanding that it was for a just cause, during World War II. With Panamanians consistently discriminated against, anti-US riots were prevalent all through the 1950’s, culminating in the killing of 120 Panamanian students in a confrontation with US military. Especially President Torrijos succeeded in forcing the US to make concessions, pushing for the full independence of the Panamanian state, ultimately succeeding in the ratification of key treaties in 1978, granting it significant steps toward independence. Manuel Antonio Noriega then emerged as the new de facto ruler of Panama in 1983. Noriega proved himself a staunch ally of the US. He supported a significant military expansion in Panama and working together with US agencies and their agendas in Latin America, while himself leading a violent authoritarian regime, involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Such activities were conveniently ignored by the US, given the benefits of Noriega as an ally. In 1986 this stance was completely turned around, with Noriega reportedly aiding the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua and in 1987 the United States called for his resignation, sparked by Panamanian protesting of US support of Noriega. With this turn, the US stopped ignoring his illegal activities and began branding the Panamanian leader a drug trafficker. By 1989 public opinion had pivoted so significantly against Noriega and became supportive of US military intervention, when Noriega manipulated the elections and violently oppressed the opposition.
In 1989, the US government decided to take military action under the codename ‘Operation Just Cause’ and deposed the then de-facto leader Manuel Noriega, to instate pro-american Gillermo Endara.
Having established a brief history of US-Panama relations, the following section of the paper shall zoom in to the specifics of the ’89 invasion, highlighting the dynamics in the decision-making process, before continuing with the Analytical section.
Trigger Events
On the 15th December 1989 two crucial events took place that would trigger the US to take military action. First, the National Assembly passed a resolution stating that Panama was in a state of war vis-à-vis the United States. Secondly, Manuel Noriega declared himself the Maximum Leader of the country.
The following day, four soldiers were killed by Noriega’s Panama Defence Forces (PDF), marking the first instance of state aggression toward the US (Cole 1995, 27).
A major concern to US military officers and the white house in determining action to be taken, was if the shooting incident was accidental or not (Cole 1995, 28-29). The report shows considerably little importance given to the events of the 15th December as described above. Nonetheless, the events of the following day can be seen as evidence of the statements by Noriega and the National Assembly to carry executive weight.
Perceived Options
In order to understand why this specific action was taken, understanding the perceived alternatives can aid in identifying key factors of the decision-making process. The options as laid out by General Thurman were “do nothing, try to seize Noriega in a snatch operation, or execute Operation BLUE SPOON” (Cole 1995, 28). Operation BLUE SPOON represented the following political objectives: “to safeguard the lives of nearly 30,000 U.S. citizens residing in Panama; to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal and 142 U.S. defence sites; to help the Panamanian opposition establish genuine democracy; to neutralize the PDF; and, to bring Noriega to justice” (Cole 1995, 29). Operation BLUE SPOON refers to the decision to launch a military invasion. The report indicates that the choice was between snatching away Noriega and Operation BLUE SPOON, the option of doing nothing never really considered (Cole 1995, 29).
The role of Ideas
When analysing the unfolding of decisions and policy stances leading up to the final military intervention, I choose to examine the role of ideas as the leading explanatory factor.
Goldstein and Keohane argue that ideas matter in policy formulation and divide ideas into world views, principle beliefs and causal beliefs. Under the condition of uncertain environments, ideas can act as road maps and shape policy preferences (Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework 1993). These are, very briefly put, the main points that I find relevant in disassembling the events of Operation Just Cause. I find the institutionalist approach to understanding the role of ideas as most relevant, as it does not discard the notion of rationalism, when the conditions under which ideas matter are not present. While I see merit in the constructivist approach, I will not consider it here, due to its weak empirical applicability.
I find that some ideas have higher standing than others in shaping policy decisions, based on their respective categorisation. World views and principle beliefs show themselves to be dominant, while cause-effect beliefs are seen to hold a subordinate role. The following paragraphs shall then highlight ideas that played a decisive role in the decision-making process as well as the dynamics of the conflict.
Communism
The idea that communism is a threat to liberty quite clearly falls into the world view category. US foreign policy in Latin America during the cold war largely concentrated on stopping the spread of communism (Knott n.d.). When Noriega turns his back on the US fight against communism in 1986 and aids the Soviets, Cuba and Nicaragua, US officials stop ignoring Noriega’s illegal activities in drug trafficking, money laundering and arms dealing (Mabry 1990, 12). Although not explicitly stated as a reason for invasion, the prevalence of an anti-communist stance, and the variation in public tolerance toward Noriega’s illegal dealings coincide perfectly with his allying with these countries. Assuming this premise is true, it holds even more relevance than justice, considering that these ‘immoral’ illegalities only publicly became an issue after ‘switching sides’.
Just and Justice
The idea of what is right and what is wrong is a principled belief, and as Goldstein and Keohane note, it is encompassed in world views (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Therefore, I see it as interlinked but subordinate to world views, as I hope to demonstrate below.
The concepts of justice and just action cannot be said to creep up covertly, but are quite publicly used continuously by the US. In formulating the political objectives, this conceptualisation is used and even in the operational code name of the invasion, operation just cause, the concept is utilised, pointing to its centrality in the decision to invade. This raises the question: What is justice and how does the United States define what is just and what not?
The report talks about policy advisers worrying about if the shooting incident of the 16th December was “enough of a smoking gun” to invade (Cole 1995, 28), and General Powell and Lieutenant General Kelly are described to have examined the prior two months to determine if the incident was isolated or if more instances of violence and harassment had taken place (Cole 1995, 29). This quite clearly demonstrates the perceived need by US officials to intervene only in the case of it being justifiable. In this case, as the report suggests, it is the aggression of Panamanian forces toward US citizens which finally trigger the invasion, after having determined that the shooting incident of the 16th of December was indeed enough to paint the United States’ intervention as the right thing to do.
Another instance of the government legitimising their stance toward Noriega is their framing of the leader as a drug trafficker. Funnily enough, the president himself, in a 1989 address to the nation, blames “…everyone who uses drugs, everyone who sells drugs, and everyone who looks the other way”, and states that “…the gravest domestic threat facing [the US] is drugs” (Bush 1989). In framing drugs as the greatest domestic threat, action taken to take down drug traffickers like Noriega can be deemed justifiable; even a responsibility toward its people to protect it from this threat. The irony in blaming those who did nothing about drug traffickers is the US’ close allying with Noriega until 1986, when he was an invaluable asset to the US. This evidence of political stance fluctuation inherently suggests that the idea of justice within the Operation Just framework is key not in defining Policy toward Panama, but key to enabling military intervention.
So, why does the idea of justice idea carry such importance to United States foreign policy?
This bridges us over nicely to public opinion. The importance of public opinion is tied into justice, in that it plays a central function in determining what is just and what is not. It is reported that US officials tried to sway public opinion against Noriega before any military action could take place (Mabry 1990, 13). The proactive manner in which this was done, through shows just how important public opinion really is to the US, who launched a full-scale anti-Noriega media campaign and psychological operations (Cole 1995, 12). Public opinion thus becomes the tool, or necessary condition, under which the United States can intervene in a perceivably just manner.
The Past Comes Knocking
Instances of analogies are also evident within the decision-making ranks. These are usually a source of concern, linking back to past mistakes and the fear of repeating them. President Bush is reported to have been reluctant of military action initially, voicing his concerns that it may “…backfire as had the attempted rescue of U.S. hostages in Iran during the Carter administration. He also wanted to preclude the interservice problems that arose in 1983 during the intervention in Grenada” (Cole 1995, 29). Such concerns are clearly cause-effect beliefs, under circumstances of imperfect information and uncertainty. The report goes on to explain President Bush’s dropping of this concern after General Powell explains the rationale behind operation BLUE SPOON as the most viable option over a snatch operation, which “…would not solve the problems with Panama” (Cole 1995, 29-30).
The idea thus becomes less relevant in this instance, through the filling in of expert information and therefore diminishing the extent of uncertainty. This is consistent with Goldstein and Keohane’s framework referenced above, in terms of the conditions under which ideas are deemed to shape decisions fading. Analogies thus played a subordinate role in shaping decisions.
Conclusion
In analysing the 1989 invasion of Panama by the United states, I find that ideas played a significant role in shaping political stances of the US vis-à-vis Panama, as well as in the more direct manner, the decision of military intervention in solving the Panama problem. Using Goldstein and Keohane’s categorisation I find that world views, especially in terms of ideological differences, were the most dominant category of ideas in determining threat and shaping policy stances in a broad sense. Principled beliefs are also found to have played a significant role in determining whether to take military action or not. Specifically, the idea of justifiability of actions plays a determining role in defining what specific measures may be deemed adequate. Backed by violent acts toward the US, loss of Panamanian support for Noriega, and the implicit framing of Noriega as a threat to the American people through his drug-trafficking activities, the US was able to step in militarily and declare its actions as just. The role of cause-effect beliefs was also present in the decision-making process, but played a subordinated role when compared to the other categories and failed to make a significant impact on determining stance or intervention.