Iran – a nation evolved from rich religious history and resulting turmoil – has experienced yet another thorn in the side of their arguably weakening state, currently the murder of Iranian hero, Major General Qasem Soleimani. This, amongst internal political unrest, economic decline and rising tensions with regional rivals and global powers has culminated in quite the predicament for the Islamic Republic of Iran and its people. How must they conduct themselves in the wake of the death of one of their most influential political and military strategists? In this essay, I will argue that Iran will most likely seek at least some form of revenge on America. However, Iran and of course the rest of the world presently face the ramifications of the increasingly lethal spread of COVID-19. Despite conflicting information, reports suggest that Iran and the U.S. are some of the most affected nations; one would hope that both states can put aside their aversion for each other for the health of their people. But I believe the pandemic will ultimately expose the weak logic of Iran’s operation as they continue to oppress public dissent and reject external interference, fighting to maintain their diminishing power, both domestically and throughout the Middle East. However, they will need to cease tensions with rivalries and accept foreign assistance if they are to control the spread of the epidemic. In this essay, I will explain the influence history had over the development of the state, and how this has contributed to the current logic by which Iran operates. Analysing the political, economic, cohesive and social indicators of their weak state; before explaining the likely outcome and consequences of the sensitive situation for Iran, the U.S. and the wider region.
The historical development of Iran
Islam, particularly Shi’ism, has and continues to influence politics in Iran, effectively controlling the entire functioning of the state. Its dominance spans back to the 7th century, with the establishment of the first Islamic state in Saudi Arabia by Mohammed. The death of the Prophet Mohammed triggered a schism still disputed today, forming the two largest sects of Islam; Sunni and Shi’ism. Sunnis believe the succeeding caliph of Mohammed and thereon, should be elected by consensus – while Shiites believed only direct descendants of the Prophet should become the successor (Harney 2016: n.p). Now, this is important to understanding Iran’s relations with Middle Eastern nations as there are approximately 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide, 85-90% are Sunni, and 10-15% are Shia, with Iran having a 90+% Shia majority (Lipka 2017: n.p). This demography ultimately suggests ‘that religious involvement in Iranian politics has always reinforced the national character of Iranians’ independence mindedness’ (Farazmand 1995: 237). Such ideology has culminated in regional rivalries with Sunni-dominated states like Saudi Arabia with the ongoing conflict in Syria and Yemen, battling for their respective-sectarian ascendancy.
Following Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh’s ploy to nationalise the British-owned oil industry, the Shah (Iranian Monarch) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) enacted a successful coup of the PM, imprisoning what Iranians saw to be a national hero. Not too dissimilar to the American’s murder of Soleimani to again impose their political agenda and western influence by removing a key public figure. Only this time, the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, was not supportive of this action. The consequent public dissent from the coup of Mossadegh erupted in the 1979 Islamic Revolution where Ruhollah Khomeini ‘replaced a U.S.-allied monarchy’ as Supreme Leader with ‘a viscerally anti-American theocracy’ (Sadjadpour 2020: n.p). The effect of such events contributed to strengthened nationalist attitudes and a rejection of Western culture and interference. The Supreme Leader established the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) separate from the civil-military system, to protect himself and his allies; quashing opposition and dissent as soon as it arises to maintain his authoritarian regime. The organisation in which Soleimani was an influential commander, where he strategised military operations to control domestic dissent and support Shia-aligned groups in their Middle Eastern neighbours. This change in power dynamic marks the beginning of a new era in Iran; one of tighter governmental control, Iraqi and U.S. conflict, international sanctions, reformist protests, nuclear controversy and lately, the death of Qasem Soleimani.
Iran: A Weak State
In recent years, the actions of the Supreme Leader, Presidents and the IRGC have exposed the logic by which the state operates as weak. Iran illustrates the characteristics of a weak state because there are recurring problems of governmental corruption, human right’s issues and incredibly brutal security apparatus which serve to oppress any opposition to the state’s primary focus of total, fundamentalist Shia control. Not to mention the economic struggles – in the form of recent fall in GDP per capita, critical unemployment levels and poverty rates, spike in inflation and decline in the value of their currency – mainly as a result of crippling US-imposed sanctions, drops in oil prices and regional conflict.
Firstly, the logic of Iran’s political operation is weak as the authoritative government violently rejects opposition and public dissent, breaching many human rights in doing so. This effectively renders Iranians increasingly powerless in an oppressive state where –
– the state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security… to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion (Rotberg 2003: 3).
In November 2019, Iran experienced its deadliest political unrest since their Islamic Revolution in 1979, with protests across the country calling for the end to the Islamic Republic’s government and the downfall of its leaders (Fassihi 2019: n.p). Mass demonstrators took to the streets to vent their frustration at the sudden spike in gasoline prices, rising by 50% almost overnight. This had been a direct consequence of Iran desperately trying to make up a growing budget shortfall due to strict sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, especially those on oil exports. These sanctions were reinstated after Iran declared an agreement with global powers in 2015 permitting closer inspection of their nuclear industry and restrictions on uranium enrichment (used for nuclear weapons), in return receiving relief from such sanctions. Trump’s reinstatement of the sanctions intended to coerce Iran into renegotiating the 2015 deal he thought was weak, now hoping to curb Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its engagement in Middle Eastern conflict. Iran’s ultimate refusal to renegotiate resulted in a drastic fall in the value of their currency and inflation skyrocketing, much to the public’s disapproval.
In many places, security forces responded by opening fire on unarmed protesters… In the southwest city of Mahshahr alone, witnesses and medical personnel said, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps members surrounded, shot and killed 40 to 100 demonstrators — mostly unarmed young men — in a marsh where they had sought refuge (Fassihi 2019: n.p).
This retaliation by the state’s security apparatus is consistent with the logic of a weak state because it breaches human rights, denying Iranians the right to peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression (U.N. General Assembly 1948). The state quashed the protests through open fire on unarmed civilians, reports suggesting as many as 1500 dead (Sadjadpour 2020: n.p). Iran’s following action to restrict internet access furthers the argument of the weak logic present in the state, fundamentally undemocratic.
In addition to the political oppression, the current economic climate in Iran is another reason that the logic of the state is considered weak because critical economic indicators are deteriorating, impacting greater society. As a result of the aforementioned reinstated U.S. sanctions, Iran’s GDP ‘contracted an estimated 4.8% in 2018 and is forecast to shrink another 9.5% in 2019, according to the International Money Fund,’ while the unemployment rate increased from 14.5% in 2018 to 16.8% in 2019 (BBC World News 2019: n.p). This adversely affects the state and its people, as there is less capital for civilians to support themselves. For instance, IMF studies illustrate the gradual rise in every level of poverty in recent years, along with a decline in average income and food consumption per capita, yet again demonstrating the state has done nothing to benefit the working-class majority (Cordesman 2018: 13).
Now with the rise of the deadly COVID-19 epidemic, officials say Iranians are dying at a rate as often as once every ten minutes. The weak logic of the state is ever more exposed; ‘squeezed between a cruel and incompetent government and a crippling sanctions regime, they lack the leadership and resources to effectively battle their coronavirus outbreak’ (Ghaemi 2020: n.p). COVID-19 is only going to kill more innocent Iranians and threatens to ravage through neighbouring nations if not managed appropriately. Also, elucidating the weak logic of operation in Iran, proving its reluctance to cooperate with, or rely on other states is, in fact, a weakness.
Potential Outcome of the Death of Qasem Soleimani
Now I will explain the likely outcome of this fragile situation resulting from the death of Soleimani on Iran, the U.S. and the Middle East as a whole. Firstly, Iran, I believe that their initial desired response to America’s drone strike killing Soleimani would have drastically changed after the misfortunate events that followed. To begin with, Iran and aligned Shia-militant groups wanted severe revenge on the U.S.; Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah (Lebanese Shia militant and political party), vowed to avenge Soleimani by returning U.S. troops to America ‘in coffins’ (Dagher 2020: n.p). So, Iran responded – firing missiles at an Iraqi-military base hosting U.S. troops, but with no casualties – then four hours later, “human error” caused the IRGC to shoot down a Ukrainian passenger jet mistaking it for an immediate U.S. retaliation. Tragically, all 176 people on board died, leaving Ukraine and the world infuriated; demanding answers, compensation and remorse while Iranian students protested in universities calling for the end of Khamenei and the IRGC’s reign (Cunningham 2020: n.p). This contrasts with the apparent unity and support for Soleimani at his public funeral only five days before the airline incident. Despite the state’s usual disregard for dissent, Iranian and global citizens had elucidated that this was too far, leading to what I believe to be a review and recalibration of their approach to the situation. Couple this with the COVID-19 epidemic and Iran face more struggle where they must take a more cautious overall response to Soleimani’s death to avoid conflict when their population is vulnerable. So, the most likely outcome of this debacle – after recognising the severity of COVID-19 – will be that Iran must accept foreign aid from their usual rivals, putting their significant political differences to a side to effectively minimise the infection and death of more people. The U.S. may not ease sanctions in consideration of COVID-19. However, I argue that it is safe to say that Iran and America will not engage in a direct attack of each other; at least until COVID-19 is better controlled in both states.
Ultimately, I believe the whole situation, now attributed by COVID-19, will assist in establishing temporary peace amongst Iran, the U.S. and the wider region. The coronaviruses are proving to be equally as devastating in America, now experiencing a two-fold increase in cases approximately every three days. And Iran’s neighbours will be concerned looking at the state of their Middle Eastern counterpart. In an ideal world, ‘the Trump administration should immediately suspend all sanctions that affect the delivery of humanitarian goods to Iran, including banking sanctions on Iran and vote yes on the $5 billion emergency funding Iran has requested from the International Monetary Fund’ (Ghaemi 2020: n.p). Although this will probably not happen, international political tensions may halt for the duration of the epidemic while states prioritise the health of their country.