Strategic Intelligence Background.
Governments collect, analyse and act on the use of information, which can be considered the ‘general importance of knowing’, as stated by J. Keegan. Governments have many branches, institutions and systems that help them ‘know’, most prominently ‘ at least these days ‘ governmental intelligence services, security services, secret services or as they are colloquially referred to ‘spooks’. Moreover, intelligence as a permanent governmental institution only dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century in the west. Still, European intelligence cultures re preceded by the traditions of the Roman armies, who used to collect information through their scouts and speculatores or by the intelligence activates of the Norman and Angevin kings amongst other ancient and medieval sources. Collecting intelligence has always been an important asset to governments in peacetime and war and also in the ancient near east can intelligence activities be observed as early as in the Assyrian Empire. Indeed, the first intelligence organisation first emerged in the Ancient Near East, at the same time when western intelligence can still be considered unorganised and not necessarily in accordance with grant governmental strategies. Indeed, the history of intelligence has been influenced by the rich inheritance left by the Assyrian Empire, which built one of the earliest structured intelligence organisations after the Babylonians and ancient Egyptians. One common theme can be observed throughout intelligence history, which is its close connection to those in power and those who are influential in a state system. This is since many times in history has a craving for power been followed by expansion and a necessary side product of expansion has been conflict and war, taxation and the need for sophisticated and fast information services, which could benefit from and support newly established trading routes and economic as much as military strength. Truly, one of the earliest information systems could be found on trade routes of ancient near eastern merchants but also within the diplomatic services, which became institutionalised in Europe in the 16th and 17th century and was largely a established due to the need of governments for information on their economic and political competitors.
Western secret intelligence ‘ as we commonly know it today ‘ employing a range of covert source and tools, can be said to have started with the first British attempts to intercept messages during the Victorian age, whilst the first recorded attempt at gathering secret Signals Intelligence dates back to an Arabic approach in the 9th century. Secret intelligence, throughout history, has never been clearly associated or separated from the state and governments have employed great sophistication in hiding certain covert intelligence activities ‘ mostly for operational reasons and since certain activities might hold the potential to either embarrass, undermine or nullify political decision-making or diplomatic efforts. Particularly since diplomacy is inherently linked to intelligence collection and intelligence operations secrecy and counterintelligence is imperative. Still, up until the second half of the nineteenth century, intelligence had not been institutionalised properly and was mainly used against internal revolutionary threats.
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE HISTORY SHORT ON EUROPE AND EXTENSIVE IN ORIENT
However, also paramilitary organisations and non-state actors like jihadi groups in particular make use of intelligence and the values it holds. GENERAL HISTORY REMARK ON JIHADI INTELLIGENCE AND ITS HISTORY BACK TO ANCIENT TIMES
In order to understand the jihadist approach towards intelligence one has to first discuss what intelligence is and how it can be defined within the context of ‘Jihadi intelligence’ as much as within the framework of what can be termed ‘Governmental Intelligence’. Intelligence functions within a state are different from most other governmental functions like defence, agriculture or infrastructure. Indeed, most intelligence activities can be considered secret and confidential since governments aim at hiding certain activities, strategies and information from other governments. Thus, the field of intelligence studies is comparatively new and has only been widely explored by scholars after the end of the Cold War. Previously, some states even denied the existence of their secret intelligence services, most famously the British MI6, and even declared reporting the colour of the carpet in MI6 a breach of the Official Secrets Act. Unsurprisingly the history and methodologies of various governmental security services is highly understudied compared to less secretive branches of government. However, despite the inherent secrecy within the ‘Intelligence Community’ (IC), basic functions, processes and issues can still be assessed in great detail and based on openly available sources. Based on democratic values ‘ like checks and balances ‘ intelligence activities are at times linked to controversies, particularly since activities like spying, surveillance, eavesdropping or in some cases covert action and clandestine operations may seem to contradict the ethical, moral or privacy concepts of some citizens, observers and scholars.
Indeed, in many cases, governmental intelligence is not only restricted to mere ‘knowing’ and in most cases intelligence ties in with international relations, defence, national security or ‘ most controversially ‘ covert operations, economic warfare or sting operations.
Today the IC consists of various multinational and national agencies, staffs, and intelligence contractors that have as their primary task the provision of information. Some may regard intelligence as merely secret information but it needs to be stated that, at least according to a definition outlined by M. Lowenthal, intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of decision makers and has thus been collected in order to meet these needs. Thus it can be said that all intelligence may be information but not all information is intelligence. Indeed, the decision maker actively influences intelligence and ideally provides direction for the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination according to what will later be described as the ‘intelligence cycle’. Based on the understanding that decision making actively influences intelligence it can be distilled that most intelligence agencies exist in order to avoid strategic surprises, to provide long term expertise, to support the decision making process and to ensure the secrecy of information, information needs and methodologies, which is commonly termed ‘counterintelligence’.
Particularly due to the large scope of varying activities intelligence services pursue and due to the different approaches and perspectives governments have selected it has proven to be a difficult task to define what intelligence is, to establish a definition, which would encompass all of its activities and to consider all the different varieties and actors who utilize intelligence and conduct intelligence operations. Sherman Kent, one of the founding fathers of strategic intelligence, defined intelligence in 1949 as:
"Strategic intelligence is the knowledge upon which our nation's foreign relations in war and peace, must rest."
Indeed, strategic intelligence allows governments to forecast and predict the future. M. Lowenthal argues that avoiding (strategic) surprises must be the foremost goal of intelligence and thus it continuously assesses threats, potential enemies, hostile events and international developments that could jeopardise the security landscape. Indeed, as different as intelligence agencies, cultures and approaches may seem, the tasks of avoiding surprises and to assess potential threats could be regarded as the lowest common denominator.
Intelligence services commonly also provide long-term expertise, support the decision making process and maintain a certain level of secrecy also known as counterintelligence. Providing long-term expertise that can outlast the legislative period of a policy maker can be regarded an important factor of governmental intelligence, yet since most jihadi organisations do not necessarily operate in accordance with legislative terms (aside of those that have transcended from jihadi organisations to proper political parties like Hezbollah, Fatah or Hamas) this factor appears to be less relevant to jihadi intelligence concepts. Supporting the decision-making process, moreover, is certainly an intelligence task also practiced by Jihadi groups, since the need for tailored and timely intelligence, that provides background information, insights, risks, benefits or warnings is also crucial to the jihadi cause. Lastly, maintaining secrets, deception, denial and counterintelligence are essential tasks of most governmental intelligence agencies. However, counterintelligence is even more important to jihadi intelligence than to its governmental counterpart since secrecy ensures the operational and strategic survival of a jihadi groups whilst an information leak or espionage penetration may cause significant damage inside a governments security structure but such an incident would hardly jeopardise the survival of most states.
The intelligence landscape has undergone significant changes and developments due to the end of the cold war, which has lead to once secret information now being accessible. An analysis of the intelligence methodologies prior and after the end of the cold war has shown that the ratio of open to secret information has changed drastically. However, there are still governmental secrets worth pursuing for intelligence purposes ‘ which may at time also include allied states that conduct friendly relations with each other. Non-state actors like jihadi groups, whilst having also played a significant role in the cold war, have also managed to adapt to this new intelligence landscape.
Secret intelligence in one form or the other, with all its different cultures, names and approaches is as old as government itself. Information collection and analysis are integral parts of a state’s effort to avoid strategic surprises, whereas within the realms of governmental intelligence the pursuit of secret information is the mainstay of intelligence activity. In sum, Intelligence can be considered to be ‘the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed and provided to policy makers; the product of the process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.’
Whilst most people tend to think of intelligence as being merely of military nature and limited to the movement of troops or military decision-making, intelligence may as well provide information with respect to cultural, social or environmental aspects. Thus, many different kinds of intelligence have emerged over the years and in accordance with technological or geopolitical developments.
The influence of middle Eastern intelligence services on jihadi intelligence.
Intelligence services, depending on their interests, location, culture, history amongst other factors, tend to have a certain area of expertise with respect to certain collection requirements, political- or security related issues or with regards to a geographic location. Larger intelligence services may have a broader range of expertise (like the Central Intelligence Agency or the British MI6) whilst smaller intelligence services tend to be specialised and focused. Smaller intelligence services are thus highly influenced by the imminent threats or enemies they have to face and in some cases have decided to cooperate with other services.
The Jihadi Intelligence Cycle.
Governmental Intelligence is normally produced in a five-stage process, commonly referred to as the Intelligence Cycle: INSERT IMAGE
Each part of this ever-spinning cycle encompasses several functionalities, which are generally identified as: (1) direction; (2) collection; (3) processing (4) analysis; and (5) dissemination. In order to arrive at a targeted intelligence product the consumer of intelligence provide the service with direction, which consequentially leads to requirements, which in turn triggers the collection agencies. What follows are the stages of analysis and dissemination and the finished Intelligence product may at this stage integrate with other intelligence from other sources or agencies. The final result is an assessment that helps in the decision making process.
Although the ‘intelligence cycle’ is commonly seen as a feature of governmental security services, one can clearly identify similar approaches within the context of jihadi intelligence. In fact, the so-called Islamic State has issued guidelines on intelligence and espionage, which indicate that jihadi groups follow a specific intelligence cycle unique to this subculture.
The first stage of the intelligence cycle – direction – can also be considered as the identification of requirements. At this stage areas in which intelligence can make a significant contribution and what certain priorities will be are decided. It may also encompass the specification of collection requirements or a consideration of what type of intelligence might be the most useful or appropriate fro the task at hand. Since intelligence capabilities are always limited ‘ in the jihadi context as much as in the governmental context ‘ priorities must be set and making these decisions among always-constrained collection capabilities is key, especially since jihadi groups face even greater limitations than governments with regards to their collection and analytical capabilities. Inspire magazine no. 14 offers a very detailed view and insight into what can be regarded as the stages of the jihadi intelligence cycle ‘ nay ‘ the jihadi tactical intelligence cycle, to be correct, since tactical intelligence appears to tower over strategic intelligence (STRATINT), which is more commonly found within the more abstract spheres of jihadi operational art. Still, jihadi groups focus on strategic intelligence, as the example of the Islamic State group’s Emni illustrates, but their unique version of the Intelligence cycle is best illustrated on the tactical level regardless.
In the Inspire magazine the jihadi intelligence cycle is actually not a cycle but a list of different stages of what is called an ‘intelligence operation’. However, although the stages are labelled successively from stage A to stage D one must as well consider the ‘introduction’ of the list and ‘lessons learned’ from previous operations, which are not considered stages by the jihadi group but which have a significant affect on the intelligence cycle and do in fact constitute stages. As such the ‘introduction’ contains ideological and historic justifications for the ‘intelligence operation’ ‘ in the case of Inspire magazine, an assassination:
‘The disbelievers and Mushrikin had tried to assassinate the prophet in many different ways. They chose to assassinate him by an individual approach’They also resorted to assassinate him using a group. An example is when a group of Jews wanted to throw a huge stone at the prophet while he was sitting, but Allah saved him’ By the grace of Allah all of these attempts were futile.’
After having provided the ideological foundation the authors called the ‘External Operation Team’, continue with stage A, which is termed ‘Specifying the Target’. Similar to governmental intelligence agencies, the authors consider the first stage ‘ direction ‘ relevant due to its guiding affect on later stages of the cycle and the tactical or strategic outcomes. This stage appears to be highly influenced by jihadi operational art and by the ‘lessons learned’ of previous operations.
‘The size of operation mainly depends on the type of target’Selecting a target for assassination, is divided into two categories; assassinating a target in order to achieve either strategic or tactical goals.’
Stage B also mirrors governmental approaches and is called ‘collecting information’ by the jihadi authors. Much like governmental security services one can recognise a prioritization of collection over direction and analysis, a trade-off and cause for frequent tension over the allocation of resources, with collection coming out the winner, as recognised by M. Lowenthal.
‘This is the most important stage in your operation. Your choice of strategy will be selected basing on the information at hand. The acquired information will direct you to opt the best and effective technique and path for your operation.’
The intelligence sources considered by the ‘External Operation Team’ are either open source intelligence (OSINT), which they have categorized as general means of communication, newspapers, magazines or television and Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT): ” – especially the social media where one can very much benefit from [sic].’ Furthermore Human source (HUMINT) are suggested for the collection operation at this stage and the authors suggest gaining ‘access to the target's friend, close person or a neighbor [sic].’ Lastly, it is suggested to collect information by observing the target in order to acquire critical information. The jihadi operative is advised to ‘blend-in with the environment or camouflage himself during the process.’
What would be the stage of ‘Analysis’ within the governmental version of the intelligence cycle has been replaced by ‘Generating a Plan’ by the jihadi operatives. What would be the ‘Analytical Product’ in the governmental realms of security has been termed a ‘plan’ by the jihadi group but in fact the two outcomes are rather similar, since the ‘External Operation Team’ proposes the following:
‘A plan is generated basing on the information at hand and the capabilities available [sic].’
Whilst the jihadi concept of an intelligence cycle falls short of proper intelligence analysis and analytical tradecraft one can still recognise an effort to process and understand the information available and to put it into a larger context. Furthermore, a certain strategic and analytical level is added by the fact that the entire ‘intelligence operation’ aims at assassinating prominent individuals from various backgrounds in economy, military or politics in order to achieve the strategic goal of destabilising the American society and economy. As such, the analytical element is not necessarily a stage in itself but is found inside the ‘introduction’, which lays the ideological groundwork, and ‘specifying the target’, since the latter stage requires a minimum of prior analysis and specific subject matter knowledge and information.
‘And our war with America will be prioritized by targeting its economy; and we will select targets by prioritizing economic personalities.’
Stage D appears to be split in two sub-stages of ‘Preparing for the Operation’ and ‘Executing the Operation’. Preparation for the Operation includes the choice and acquisition of weapons and a certain amount of training with said weapon. Most of this stage is of highly tactical nature and thus once again illustrates the tactical nature of the jihadi intelligence cycle, as this stage contains ‘processing and exploitation of information’ as much as ‘consumption of information’ in order to reach tactical decisions. However, the authors stress that at this stage also spiritual preparation should be considered. Hence, re-manifestation of ideological believes and operational art is conducted prior to the execution of the ‘intelligence operation’. Consequently, critical viewpoints or contradicting information, which could have found their way into the rather minimal analytical part of the intelligence cycle, are eradicated again by the jihadi interpretation of Islam, which ultimately either ends in martyrdom or in the operative’s retreat from the area of operation.
‘So it is important for the brother to increase in worship and remembrance to what Allah has promised for the Martyr in His path. Contemplating on the great role he is playing for the Ummah. And remembering that he is a building block in the revival of the Khilafa, returning its glory and strengthening the religion.’
The stages of the ‘intelligence operation’ outlined by the ‘External Operation Team’ appear to end here and with the climax of martyrdom. Within the realms of government one would in any case continue the cycle with the stages of ‘feedback’ or ‘dissemination’ and ultimately start over from the stage of ‘direction’. These last stages have in fact been taken over by the publication of ‘lessons learned’, which are frequently published on most jihadi operations and ‘ although highly biased ‘ continue to feed back into the cycle since they are providing ‘feedback’ and allow for the dissemination of findings ‘ i.e. the analytical conclusion that adversaries can also be harmed on an economic or societal level or which individuals need to be targeted in order to achieve a certain economic, political or societal outcome.
INSERT DRAWING OF JIHADI INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
Jihadi Intelligence is based on a unique version of the already established intelligence cycle and jihadi operatives have embraced the specific stages of said cycle. In contrast to a governmental version of the intelligence cycle we can see a very clear differentiation within the realms of ideology and operational art, which are stages that would normally not directly influence a governmental intelligence cycle. However, the jihadi version is overshadowed with specific ideological motivators and justifications. These ideological elements are not only used to infuse operational art into the cycle but also to connect an individual with the cycle and its goals at the stage of ‘direction’ and to re-establish jihadi doctrines after the analytical stage termed ‘Making a Plan’. The appearance of ideology at this stage must not only be seen as a herald of impending martyrdom but also as a mechanism that de facto renders analytical reasoning and possibly contradicting information, which could have come up in the research phase meaningless. Indeed, at is at this very stage where the governmental intelligence cycle and the jihadi intelligence cycle appear to be the most different where we can see its true uniqueness to the jihadi sub-culture and its intelligence activities
CONCLUSION INTELLIGENCE