Paste your essay in here…Motivation
Motivated by Self Actualisation
The state of nature in Hobbesian political theory presents a condition of war, the cause of which is one of the distinctive factors differentiating a radically egoistic nature from the benign. A well known interpretation of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature is inevitably a state of war simply because of the unavoidably selfish nature of humans’ (300), rooted significantly in the motive to self actualise. This is seen in Hobbes’s focus on the pursuit for glory, in which his work of Leviathan understands to be a result of ‘a general inclination all mankind, to perpetually and restlessly desire power over power that ceaseth only in death’ (6). This Hobbesian understanding underpins a clear conception of radical egoism in which man is naturally inclined to enter into other spheres in order to actualise his desire for power. ‘The vain, aggressive and indeed evil natural will to dominate others’ (299) sees the inevitability of a war in which ‘every man is enemy to every man’ (159). Abizadeh, alongside Piirimäe forwards this interpretation of Hobbesian human nature, claiming radical egoism in Hobbes’s work through the active pursuit of self actualisation, analysing this form of egoism through the power dynamics of the state of nature. They pursue the concern for power, depicting the Hobbesian state of nature as a realm of ‘natural aggresses which lead us to the desire of glory’ (9). The causes of war are rooted in the conditions of two premises, firstly that all men are natural competitors for power, and secondly that no one can assume natural superiority (6). Men find little pleasure in the company of others because each wishes to be esteemed as he esteems himself (193), thus the nature of man inclines him to use the capacity to acquire glory and extort a greater value (193) from others (Lev 183), and thus ‘it Is manifest that during the time men live without common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war’ (159).
Hobbes has been so consistently misinterpreted that it is now difficult to read him properly (4), and the radical conception of egoism for Hobbes often disregards the crucial dynamic of defensive behaviour. The literary glory seekers are usually identified with natural aggressors, warmongers as described by Matrinich (9), however this presents misinterpretation of Hobbes’s more complex account of glory (9). Even in The elements, the only work where a charge of egoism it’s justifiable, the political theory does not depend on egoism (503) According to Hobbes, violent conflict necessarily is not fuelled by the aggressive desire to dominate others, Hobbes glory argument focuses instead on the more reactive disposition triggered by a perceived insult on social interactions (299). This now changes the dynamic of glory seeking to present a more benign representation, as it presents the defensive role of glory seeking to be a mechanism in protection of one’s own sphere, rather than the pursuit into another’s. Defensive glory seeking guarantees a certain measure equality,it is a crucial precondition for war in the state of nature (8). It is clear that the dynamism of power incentives is constructed not as an active motive for the war of all against all, rather it represents the rooted stimulus to self preserve. Hobbes’s passion for glory is not natural to human psychology, he believes that its character depends on intersubjective processes of socialisation (300), in essence, the motive to seek glory is to restore the natural egalitarianism of the state of nature, rather than to pursue the progression of his own social standing. Violent conflict is directly the result the natural human urge to dominate the others in an aggressive animus dominandi (298). In order to define Hobbes a radical egoist, man would have to be motivated by self actualisation, a process which would require active pursuit and invasion into other individual spheres in order to exceed self preservation and be definable as self actualisation.
Motivated by Self Preservation
With regards to the writings of Hobbes, it is important to account for the order in which he aligns his causes for the war of all against all, firstly competition, secondly diffidence, thirdly glory (159). This takes precedence as Peacock describes his literary organisation as relevant to the organisation of his political theory. Before glory comes diffidence, a measure which is particularly exigent, as it describes the actions taken to secure one’s life, encouraging one to subdue others, thus pre-empting their attacks (193). This line of analysis takes into consideration the defensive mechanism of man in his pursuit, as man is born apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual violence (110). In diminishing the radical nature of man’s motivation, benign egoism does not deny the self interested nature of man but rather, see’s motivation to lie within his own sphere and contained to self preservation. Most sophisticated readers of Hobbes find the primary cause of war has relied not on self-interest in general but on the feet of death and the concomitant desire for survival (301). It is important to refer to the uses of Hobbes’s works and how the political theory across his work is not always coherent. ‘Human nature is an early work, which Hobbes did not even publish, and has written years prior to Leviathan’ (509), it is also the work used to justify the radical nature of Hobbesian egoism, and for the fact that Hobbesian political theory was in early conception, the following relies more heavily on the works of Leviathan and The Elements. Man’s motivation for self preservation is the primary cause for war, as the conditions of the state of nature heightens the vulnerability of man; humans are fragile in two senses, existentially because they are mortal, in what Hobbes famously called their natural equality, and epistemologically (303).
Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind (158), where The weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with other that are in the same danger with himself (158). This capacity can be interpreted to increase the competition in the state of nature, which was mentioned by Hobbes as the primary cause of war, however, this also increases the primacy of self preservation as, in any case, each is vulnerable to death at the hands of others (34). The ‘pure defence argument infers admissibility of strategic defence’ (626), reducing the motive of conflict from self actualisation to strategic preservation. ‘An act is purely defensive according to the motivational criterion if and only if the predominant motive of the gent is the prevention of possible harm’ (626), and in the case of Hobbesian political theory, conflict most significantly arises in the repulsion of physical harm through the deflection of harmful force. The traditional interpretation of Hobbes arises from humans seeking – above all else – their own survival (301), an interpretation well acknowledged for its Hobbesian foundations and rooted in benign egoism as it relays the motivational characteristic of mans actions as founded in preservation. My reading of Hobbes’s political theory displaces the premise of related material scarcity within epistemological premise (302) founding conflict, and focuses on the natural endeavour for peace as far as man has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war (160). The causes of war appear a defensive mechanism used only after the dismantling of peaceful existence; it’s my overwhelming desire is to preserve my life, confronted with uncertainty about this threat that another poses to my life forms an overwhelming incentive to strike first (Glaser, Charles 1997, the Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics 50(1): 171-201). Most significantly, in the attempt to conclude that man is benignly egoistic, the motive of human action is evidently centred on the premise of survival and the protection of his own sphere.
Motivated by Desire
There are those who would undermine this interpretation of Hobbesian human nature, focusing on the dynamic of emotions to conclude desire as overpowering the fear associated with self preservation. This interpretation would assume that, for Hobbes, human beings are by nature rational egoists who pursue their own good, which is determined by their desires (Hobbes’s moral philosophy, The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, Patricia Springborg, Cambridge 2007, p133-5). To claim mans motivations aligned more closely with his desires would affiliate Hobbesian political theory with radical egoism; Gert describes this connection through the mechanism of desire. On this version, appetite and aversion are not merely emotions, instead one takes these terms (346) as the conditions upon which man acts. The mechanism of mans actions is associated with Hobbes’s attempt to apply scientific measures to politics, where Hobbes envisaged a single chain of derivation leading from physics, through psychology, to politics (Alan Ryans book ‘The Philosophy of the social sciences’) , resulting in the analysis of human action by the understanding of motion.Hobbes’s main philosophical doctrine is that ultimately, the world does not consist of power at all, but of motion, known as the Hobbesian kinematist theory of power (185). Appetite and aversion are no longer considered motions but rather terms to desire those things would help our vital motion and have an aversion towards those things which hinder it (346), this forms a greater plausibility of radical egoism as the mechanical account of causes of desire not just behaviour, but rather a conditioned process which creates a man victim to his desires. Out of the necessity of nature, these calls by which hope, fear, joy, and the like are signified (40) result in the pursuit of desires, exceeding those vital wills which maintain life, therefore, man errs more widely and dangerously than can other animals (41). However, in analysing desire in the scientific nature discussed by Hobbes, it is important to acknowledge that maintaining human action in terms of matter in motion would be denying that there were ever any motives the human action (344) as action is contingent solely on external stimuli, instigating responses based purely on the maintanence of motion, the completely mechanical account of voluntary action leaves no room for motives egoistic or otherwise (345), and further seems to align more effectively with the motives of self preservation, as mechanical responses acts to preserve motion rather than actualise desire.
With desire being the driving motive for mans action according to Hobbes, the conceptualisation of psychological egoism takes precedence in current interpretations. Psychological egoism is a theory of human psychology claiming that all human actions are ultimately motivated solely by ones own self interest (197). Hobbes was condemned to psychological egoism, with the claim that his description of the passions aligned him to a certain form of relativism that is a claim to anything that is good is good for specific individual, the preference satisfaction theory of the good (13). Man as a self maintaining engine is constantly active seeking revenue object of desire (15), which would conclude Hobbes to be a psychological egoist, and in terms of the motivations of human action, a radical egoist also. Potentially, this would be supported by the Hobbesian analysis of the causes of the state of nature, where one prominent reading explained wars inevitability in the state of nature as the outcome of the competition of the scarce material resources (299), this arises as a result of selfish egoists whose desires will eventually resort to violence to satisfy their competing wants (298). Hampton refers to the Hobbesian focus on desire through the passions account, maintains that all our desires are caused by a self interested bodily mechanism (197). In doing so he opposes the idea of interpreting Hobbes as a psychological egoist who claims that all our desires have self regarding content, and goes on to disregard the psychological egoism of Hobbes claiming his views align more closely with the ideas of tautological egoism, a view which sounds like psychological egoism but which is a direct consequence of Hobbes’s definition of will and has no empirical consequence thereafter (7). Nevertheless, Hampton does underpin the boarder concept of radical egoism in Hobbes, supporting the conclusion that man is ultimately driven by desire and thus motivated by self actualisation.
As aforementioned, Hobbesian political theory can appear inconsistent throughout his works, thus encouraging (McNeilly 1966 (197)) to conclude that Hobbes may have appeared commited to radical egoistic theory in his earlier works, but far less so in his later works. McNeilly draws on the idea of psychological Hedonism, the idea that all human actions are motivated ultimately by one self interest, namely by desire to experience pleasure as constrained by the avoidance of pain (200). In the development of political theory, Hobbes confirms he was not a psychological egoist after he had wrote Leviathan because, unlike Hobbes’s earlier works, pleasure no longer played a central role to his philosophy (200). The increasing focus on fear and aversion allows for the solidification of benign egoism in Hobbesian political theory as it aligns more closely with the motivations of self preservation. Were men not self maintaining engines, but rather destroying engines, and if their maintenance depended necessarily on the destruction of others, then war would be the inevitable condition of human existence (19). Where discrepancies arise in the conclusion of man as radically egoistic sees inference from Hobbes’s ‘second state of nature’ (503). With the inconsistencies in Hobbesian political theory, there are those who claim Hobbes’s psychological egoism is confined to the second state of nature, representing the bourgeois man. Hobbes represents two key characters within the state of nature, he who is naturally motivated by self preservation, and the bourgeois man who exists in the second state of nature. Even when Hobbes turned from his theoretical accounts to a historical explanation of the English Civil War… he did not solely focus on the natural dispositions of human psychology and the systemic incentives that instrumentally rational action (299) but placed emphasis on the socialisation of man in adapting to the competitive conditions of the state of nature. Hobbes’s conception of the natural man does not depict the solipsism of radical egoism, rather his form of self interest describes the capacity for altruism. Slote describes this capacity ‘psychological inclination’, claiming that that people can sometimes act in a seemingly benevolent way (148). It is therefore crucial in the reading of Hobbes that one a kind of rhetorical exaggeration (7). There is no denying that Hobbes sometimes makes statements that seem to commit him to psychological egoism (7), however, the conditions of his theorisation see’s generalised statements which often contradict eachother, as his texts were used to persuade, and were not always as precise as he could have been (7).
Motivated by Fear
Whilst many have hastily concluded that Hobbes was a radical egoist, it is clear that fear is the greatest emotion (154) in Hobbesian human nature is fear rather than desire. Hobbes encapsulates the causes of war and presents the case that Hobbesian war arises primarily not out of scarcity, ruthless seeking of survival; or because we are naturally selfish competitive or aggressive brutes (298), war rather arises because of the vulnerability of man and the consequent need to act defensively in order to self preserve. Man is described as fragile and susceptible to ideological manipulation (298), thus due to the incapacity to discern the intentions of other man, benign and vulnerable actors each have incentives to engage in pre-emptive strikes to guarantee their safety (298). Where Hampton’s passions account was less convincing his rationality account of conflict provides a more coherent explanation of the Hobbesian motivations for war. It proves that ‘Hobbes approves of defensive violations of stated nature agreements’ as the rationality account describes the incapacity to determine the actions of a second party, thus in order to protect one’s own sphere, he is seen to attack pre-emptively. This defensive depiction of war aligns with Hobbes’s understanding of the state of nature as a nature of war consisting not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereunto (Leviathan 13:185). For Hobbes, ‘Warre consisteth not in battell only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battell is sufficiently none’, showing that Hobbes’s account of nature was not the active pursuit of desire described by radical egoism but more benignly characterised by self preservation and motivated forthright by fear.
The discussion of the Hobbesian state of nature is often explored through Game theoretic expositions which introduced analytical rigour into Hobbes’s studies (191) and has provided an effective explanation for the lack of cooperation in the state of nature. In understanding the motivations behind human action it is almost commonplace to depict the strategic situation in the Hobbesian state of nature game theoretically as a prisoner dilemma. Game theory is an economic tool used for modelling strategic interactions with people (9), where the Prisoner Dilemma (PD) condition represents the interaction between two subjects in cooperating or defecting in the state of nature, the paradoxical result seeing that everyone loses out (9).
As seen above, the conditions of the state of nature conflicts rival’s individual rationality with collective rationality, a condition which inevitably results in defensive attack as aforementioned, due to the vulnerability of man in the state of nature. The Nash Equilibrium, the most stable condition for each on an individual basis where neither play will change his strategy, therefore presents an outcome regarded as worse by both players than the alternative outcome. Hobbes argues forcefully that they would prefer mutual peace than the mutual aggression, which fulfils the condition that CC is greater than DD, however the conditions of the state of nature results in defection as the dominant strategy, where both unilateral aggression and mutual aggression is preferred to unilateral peace. With reference to game theoretical approaches, some argue that Hobbes situation is considered game theoretically it is not a prisoner dilemma as it imposes a logic of breaking covenants and fails to encapsulate an important dynamic in Hobbesian human nature (Brian Barry, political argument Page 253-254). The ‘Chicken Game’ as discussed by Slomp argues that the most plausible description of the state of nature is the payoff ranking where unilateral aggression is preferred to peaceful independence, but unilateral avoidance of fight is preferred to war (SLOMP 2000:34). The conditions of the prisoner dilemma are still applicable, but Slomp incorporates an important dynamic which Hobbes highlights in his political theory, and which overwhelmingly concludes Hobbes to be a benign egoist. Whilst the Nash Equilibria presents a dominant strategy to war, where man is not coerced into war he will ultimately avoid conflict as Hobbes argues that rational individual in this situation has not only the desire to preserve their life but also the interest in securing their long-term well-being (300).
Acting on Irrational Desire
With regards to the rationality of man in his pursuit of self interest, one way to define egoism as benign is to characterise man as a completely irrational actor, who is incapable of acting in any other way than in conjunction with his passions. Hobbes is methodological mechanist (2) and his perception of human nature is no different from his conceptual key to the understanding of all reality (2). The Hobbesian understanding of motion sees modern physics and ontology in which everything is reduced to causally determined events in a world of matter in motion (110). This conception of rationality holds the Hobbesian natural man captive to his desires, where the fulfilment of motion results in the unavoidable pursuit of egoistic action. When desiring, one can, in truth, be free to act, one cannot, however, be free to desire (46), showing representing a lack of alternate direction for motion other than to act in conjunction with desire, for nature is arranged that all desire good for themselves (46). The Hobbesian atomistic conception of man proceeds to advance the view that humans were impelled into motion by the mechanical effects of our senses (32), thus the consequent reflex reactions exerting motion through the direction of sense results in use of human volition to guide actions away harm and towards desire (32). This is further extended to the animalisation of human desire and action, where the active appetite of the animal spirits towards the object which moueth them (110). Hobbes understands all phenomena in terms of motion living beings, thus the passions of the natural man in the state of nature are equated to those of any other beast, as there is no species of motion peculiar to man (5), for these powers we do unanimously call natural, and are contained in the definition of man under these words, animal and irrational (21).
While some claim that Hobbes’s description of man’s motives is that of psychological egoist, others claimed it mechanism (341) as encapsulated by Gauthier with the idea of the natural man as ‘self maintaining engines’ who are just programmed to pursue their own self interest without being consciously aware they are motivated in this way. The irrationality of one’s motives and the automatism of his reflex reactions is understood through the concept of non maximising egoism where the motives of man are completely dissociated from his rational capacity. The concept of non-maximising egoism presents the case for benign egoism as it undermines the possibility of a calculated egoism; the ‘brute’ is depicted as the person who has no second order desires but acts unreflectively on his strongest desire of the moment (38). Man is therefore solely reliant on the direct effects of motion on vital motion, when it helpeth, it is called delight, contentment, or pleasure, and when such motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion, then it is called pain and in relation to which causeth it hatred (43). However, this justification of benign egoism fails to recognise that, though Hobbes does offer a mechanical account of appetite and aversion, he does not completely ignores the more complex psychological phenomena (504) of rationality. Hobbes does often refer to the mechanism and animalism of mans actions, though never himself compared mans mental capacity to machines or animals. Michael Oakshotts introduction to leviathan, p xxx).
Acting Radically Egoistic on Rational Desire
It is clear that although Hobbes uses mechanistic terms and animalistic similes to describe human action in the state of nature, he does assume a level of natural rationality, which would undermine the possibility for benign egoism on the basis of irrationality. Hobbes’ kinematist theory can be seen to fail in giving an account of the activity of human reason (186), whilst the theory of motion would assume reflex motions to arise through external stimuli, what Hobbes describes as ‘ratiocination’ involves active operations of reason in the strong sense of being causally independent of sensations and other bodily affections (186). Hobbes defines reason as constituted by nature (lev 33) and dissociates what is rational from what is driven by desire, concluding that humans are reasonable creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason (lev 36). Throughout Hobbes’s political theory, there is a presupposition of higher mental capacity (30) due to the presumed presumption that man is linguistic, curious, forward looking being, and all the flows from it (30), hence Hobbes’s account of peoples peculiar features is not far removed from the classical definition of man as rational animal (30)
As the Hobbesian natural man is rational, there are those who would conclude man as radically egoistic, on the basis that man uses his rational capacity to pursue self interest. There are those who would account the Hobbesian conception of rationality of desires to the Humean conception of instrumental rationality, which assumes no desires can be irrational in themselves and that the role of rationality is confined to informing the agent (687). The instrumental account of reason which many ascribe Hobbes to assumes that actions are assumed rational or irrational subjectively on the basis of the compatibility of desires with the other ends (244). There is no limit on the possible ends that count as rational, all that is required is that the desires of a personal system are mutually coherent (244). The clear rational capacity of humans in Hobbesian theory appears to align most effectively with radical egoism, with the analysis of reason in the Humean depiction of instrumental rationality. This form of rationality assumes it natural to think that the only role the reason and rationality is to inform the individual the best available means to satisfy the title of preference (11) and effectively assumes that cognitively, mans actions are driven towards self motivation. Under this assumption, the rational and self motivated nature of man depicted supports the conclusion of a radically egoistic Hobbesian man.
Causal egoism suggests that we desire states of affairs according to the amount of pleasure that we have experienced in conjunction with similar states of affairs in the past (35). This interpretation assumes that man is able to use his cognitive reason to associate his experience with consequent desires for the future, and make calculated decisions to enable the pursuit of the passions. Though this view on rationality assumes a level of radical egoism, it is important to consider that causal egoism accounts for all desires, whether a desires is self interested or not depends upon the nature of the object of the desire, not on it causal aetiology (35). This therefore removes the reflexivity of responses with regard to desire and it becomes clear that causal egoism neither is a form nor entails psychological egoism (35) as it enables man to cognitively calculate to act against his own preferences, or to act in accordance with others preferences. Gert discuss the capacity for the Hobbesian natural man to act in accordance with social or benevolent motives, and the rationality behind this. Man can be motivated to act egoistically but benevolently in accordance with his long term survival, whilst in the mean time can also act sadistically, wanting ‘to see evil done to another… not because it is evil but because it is another’s’ (7). Here, the motive for human action appears less centred on desire and more focused long term survival, the action to self preserve, more closely aligned with benign egoism. With the development of Hobbesian theory, human nature has become more adapted to including concepts which are potentially counteractive to ones individual desires, allowing rationality to realign more closely with concepts of self preservation. A key example where this is seen is in the definition of concepts such as benevolence and pity, the change is always in the same direction, away from egoism (509), in its radical conception.
Acting Benignly Egoistic on Rational Desire
Instrumental egoism is underwritten by a subjectivity of desire; which Hobbes removes in his understanding of rationality. Contentions open up the possibility in the collision between reason and interest (427), and the developments in the concept of rationality appears to align more significantly with the benign understanding of egoism. Hobbes undeniably rejects the instrumental rationality imposed on his theoretical standing as for Hobbes, natural reason according to which a rational person seeks to avoid death or pain, is a basic sense of reason (243). Rationality then effectively aligns with the motivation behind benign egoism, as rational action is confined to a goal, lasting preservation, and it discovers the means to the goal (14) through rational calculation. Reason is not the slave of the passions, rather the passions are to be controlled by reason (14), thus, Hobbesian natural man is not victim to desires by which reason acts to fulfil, rather rationality is the natural tool for which man decides to pursue to deny himself his desires. The failure to recognise that the avoidance of violent death is the end of reason has distorted almost all accounts of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy (15) and presented a biased depiction of a radically egoistic man.
Many interpretations of Hobbes fail to recognise a crucial quality of the naturally rational man, namely prudence, a quality which is but experience, which equal time equally bestow amongst men (158). This quality confines the motivations behind human action to be future orientated, men are concerned not only with the satisfaction of their present desires but also with the ability to satisfy the desires of future (6). The rationality of this approach denies an overriding rationality to fulfil desire and rather, places greater emphasis on the capacity to rearrange current desires in order to ensure self preservation for future desires. The two major components of ones rationality are prudence and reasoning (37), where the capacity to deliberate on conditional statements is developed, natural reason is developed.
This natural reason is described in De Cive as ‘ the faculties of human nature as reduced onto four kinds: bodily strength, experience, reason and passion (248). Natural reason has an end goal of its own and Hobbes takes the common sense view that rational person seeks to avoid death pain and disability (248), through the deployment of his four key models of rational reasoning. The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death and thus reason in this sense is a part of human nature (249). It is for this reason it is deniable that Hobbes aligns his theories of natural human motivation with concepts of glory seeking or irrational desire, as for Hobbes, any preferences for which the satisfaction is inconsistent with the achievement and one’s long-term self-preservation are irrational. The concept of the ‘mad men’, who are misguided by reason (245) appear to describe the rational and radically egoistic beings which many theorists have understood to be the conception of man in Hobbes. Hobbesian man has reason as a guide to the passion cannot possibly be an instrumental reason which does not set any limits to the ends of the passion (245), rather it can be concluded that he who does not prefer to act in ways which best secure one’s long-term self-preservation (38) are described as the ‘foole’ and the fact that person values desire more than his self-preservation signifies that person is irrational or mad that he desires the wrong thing (19). These ‘mad men’ who exist in the state of nature are key for