Essay: Ethiopia – largely spared from European colonization in 19th/20th centuries

Ethiopia is something of an outlier in modern African history in that it was largely spared from European colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some have ascribed this anomaly to the strength of the Ethiopian state compared to other African polities, the difficulty of the geography, and the ineptitude of the Italians as a colonial power, and while there is some element of truth to these statements, the crux of Ethiopia success lies elsewhere. What ultimately spared Ethiopia from colonization was not its inherent strength, but rather the decision on the part of Emperor Menelik II to trade a degree of independence for sovereignty by submitting to the European system of international order and using European rivalries to maintain Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. In affect, Ethiopia became complicit with colonialism to prevent the fate that befell its contemporaries.
The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 divided Africa into a series of spheres ascribed to particular European powers. Per the conference, Italy was granted dominion over what are now Somalia (minus British and French Somaliland) and Eritrea, with Ethiopia listed within Italy’s sphere of influence1. In 1889, Menelik II, emperor of Ethiopia recognized Italian rights to Eritrea in exchange for Italy’s recognition of Ethiopian sovereignty in the Treaty of Wichale (or Wuchale). However, Italy proceeded to expand upon this claim, encroaching on Ethiopian territory in the process. Ethiopia’s position separating Eritrea and Somalia gave Italy impetus for expansion and colonial aspirations. The ensuing 1st Italo-Ethiopian war ended in Ethiopian victory, cementing Ethiopia’s independence in an otherwise colonized continent. It would not be until the 1930’s that Ethiopian independence was threatened, when fascist Italy successfully invaded Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s success initial success against Italian colonization has much to do with the strategy implemented by Menelik II. Though he had been able to unify a number of local groups, some through conquest, to form an empire encompassing modern Ethiopia, Menelik did not seek to oust colonial powers in the region, and recognized Italian and British claims to neighboring territories. The Italian version of the treaty contained articles not included in the Amharic version, including provisions that would have made Ethiopia a vassal of the Italian Empire2. Menelik understood it would be impossible to oust the Italians in an offensive campaign, so instead he made use of the system of competing alliances that formed the Concert of Europe at the time. Italy was part of the so-called “Triple Alliance” or “Triple Entente,” composed of Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. The Franco-Russian alliance stood opposed to these states, a fact which became crucial to Menelik’s plan. Russia, which had been focused on assimilating large parts of Eurasia, had been left out of the “Scramble for Africa,” but found commonalities in Orthodox Christian Ethiopia. Tsar Alexander III began sending emissaries to Menelik’s court beginning in 18873, and soon established a trade relationship between the two states. In exchange for Ethiopian goods, Russia provided machinery and experts to help modernize Ethiopia’s infrastructure and economy, and also armed and trained the Ethiopian army4.
With the assistance of Russia and their French allies, Ethiopia defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adwa (or Adowa) in 18965. Italy retained control of Eritrea, while Ethiopia was finally recognized as a sovereign state, albeit one inextricably tied to the Franco-Russian alliance. Menelik had correctly recognized that Europe would continue to dominate the continent, but his astute understanding of the principles guiding post-Westphalian Europe informed his decision to play off the system of alliances. His decision sacrificed part of Ethiopia’s independence on the world stage, as they became a junior partner in the French and Russian led alliance, but in doing so he preserved the sovereignty that had been taken from the rest of the continent.
It has been contended that a number of other factors hold more of the responsibility for Ethiopia’s ability to prevent colonization. Some, like Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia, have contended that the geography of Ethiopia, which is especially mountainous, proved difficult for colonizers to traverse, and thus impeded efforts to pacify and hold territory. In their work The Battle of Adwa, they write, “For Italy, the main logistical problem of waging colonial wars in the Horn of Africa was physical distance from the home base and the need to transport troops and supplies over the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and then negotiating the terrain inside the region.”6 However, the Italian army was well versed in operating in these conditions. They had successfully pacified Eritrea, a state with a similar mountainous topography to Ethiopia, and even deployed special mountain infantry units known as Alpini.7 These elite troops worked along side Askaris8, indigenous African soldiers who fought for European powers, who had extensive knowledge of the land as most had come from the region surrounding Adwa and Eritrea. The reason this force lost at Adwa despite previous successes lies primarily with the arms and training provided by France and Russia, which allowed Menelik to create a modern army capable of fighting a defensive war against Italy.
Second, many point to Ethiopia’s centralized structure and relative strength in the region as to why they succeeded in defeating Italy. This claim, however, fails to recognize both that Ethiopia was not unique as a centralized polity and that Ethiopia’s strength on the eve of the war had been greatly diminished. Aside from Ethiopia, several states, including “Madagascar, Egypt, Buganda, and Bunyoro,”9 had similar centralized structures, and yet all were either colonized or reduced to tributes. While centralization likely conferred an advantage to Menelik as he raised and trained an army to defeat the Italians, as Acemoglu and Robinson correctly point out when writing on Ethiopian absolutism in Why Nations Fail10, it could not have conferred enough strength in of itself to cause Ethiopia’s success, given that all other centralized African states capitulated to European imperialism. Additionally, the Italian invasion came towards the end of a famine that is estimated to have killed nearly a third of Ethiopians. The strength of the state had been significantly diminished by the famine, as much of the population was displaced, killed, or weakened, meaning that the invasion came at a time when the Ethiopian state was least capable11.
Third, there is a perception of the Italians as an inferior colonizing power, which was unable to conquer Ethiopia because it lacked to resources of more successful colonial powers like Britain and France. It is true that Italy was not as industrialized or wealthy as the United Kingdom or France, but it was still much more powerful than any African polity of the day. Far from incapable colonizers, they established colonies in Libya, the bulk of modern Somalia, and Eritrea12, all of which it held until after the Second World War. While Ethiopia was a more powerful state than those that existed in the previously mentioned Italian colonies, Italy was still more powerful than Ethiopia, a fact that is evidenced by Menelik’s decision not to invade Eritrea after routing Italian forces at Adwa due to the low chance of success13 and risk of international outcry14. Additionally, in Wars of Imperial Conquest, Bruce Vandervort points out that the Italian army at Adwa was amongst the largest forces raised during the colonization of Africa, numbering some twenty thousand Alpini, Bersaglieri (sharpshooters), and Askari15. Italy was not too weak to take over an independent Ethiopia; what saved the Ethiopians was the infusion of arms and military training from rival European powers that allowed them to fight a successful defensive campaign against Italy.
Finally, a counterfactual could be posed that it was not European patronage that allowed Ethiopia to maintain sovereignty, but rather the success of Ethiopia that attracted Russia and France to aid Ethiopia. However, timing quickly invalidates this assertion. Russian aid to Ethiopia began in 1887, a full two years after the Berlin Conference, meaning the deal was struck prior to Ethiopian success against the Italians16. Russia and France knew that supplying Ethiopia gave them a satellite in East Africa while simultaneously undermining their European adversaries; Menelik knew this as well, and chose to deal with Russia and France because cooperation with them was preferable to cooptation and conquest by Italy. Had Ethiopian success triggered an influx in aid, Russia and France would not have begun to supply arms and aid until after the cessation of hostilities in 1896, nine years later than when Russia’s supply mission began.
Ethiopia’s strength rested with the guarantee of support from France and Russia. With the end of World War I, and the replacement of the Concert of Europe with the collective security of the League of Nations, the alliance system faltered. Russia, reborn as the USSR after the end of a civil war, and France, still reeling from the calamity of World War I, turned away from curtailing Italian ambition, especially since Italy joined the alliance during the war. By the 1930’s Italy was resurgent, with a new Fascist government at the helm, and a revitalized ambition for dominance in East Africa. Emperor Haile Selassie pleaded before the League for help in preserving Ethiopian sovereignty, but without the incentive to act, European powers largely ignored his appeal. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, and by 1936 most of the country was under Italian administration17. Without the patronage of European powers, Ethiopia was relegated to colonization, just like the rest of the continent. It was not until competition between European state and hostilities were renewed that Ethiopia was liberated by a coalition of British Colonial forces, Free French troops, and Ethiopian irregulars.
The image of Ethiopia as the lone state capable of resisting imperialism is a misrepresentation of a complex moment during the “Scramble for Africa.” Menelik did not stand and face a colonial aggressor alone, rather he accepted Europe’s dominance in the region and used it steel his nation against conquest. In choosing to assent to European hegemony, and choosing a less invasive patron state over an aggressor power, Menelik became complicit in Europe’s colonial mission for the sake of Ethiopia’s integrity. For all the dominance it exerted in Africa during the 19th and 20th centuries, Europe’s weakness was the alliance system that defined international relations. The instability of this peace allowed Menelik to exploit the balance of power, and in making his state a Franco-Russian proxy on his terms, he retained the agency of his nation and stopped the conquest that had befallen the many millions in neighboring regions of Africa.