Essay: Hungary’s struggle for freedom in the 20th century

Gorbachev’s effect on Hungary was substantial and is without a doubt one of the core aspects as to why communism collapsed in Hungary which suggests that not all the elements which lead to the demise were internal. However his speech in Denmark in 1985 at the United Nations can be seen as a landmark throughout not just his time as general secretary of the central committee or leader of the USSR but for Soviet history as well ‘he declared that all nations should be free to choose their own cause without outside interference’  . These transformations that he brought to the eastern bloc countries are unquestionably one of the significant reasons as to why communism failed in Hungary in 1989, which makes me question the validity of my argument.
Nonetheless internal elements did play an integral part in the end of communism in Hungary. Nationalism was rampant throughout Hungary in the 19th and 20th. Hungary until the end of World War 1 was a country ran by a dual monarchy, where then it became a republic, however it kept extremely nationalist views as shown by the 1956 revolution ,where Hungary as a nation rose up and rebelled against the soviets. University students created the 12 points that were all peaceful demands that they would have like to see change in Hungary, including the departure of the Soviets. This was followed by intense street fighting against the ARVO and eventually the Russian military when they re-invaded Budapest. This suggests that from an early stage in Russia’s inhabitation of Hungary that nationalism was still a key piece in the internal factors that brought communism to its knees. Although nationalism had not been birthed under Soviet rule, it had also featured in the interwar period, Horthys revisionist plans could be argued to have drove the public towards nationalism. Molnar supports this view and implies that the motive for nationalism to increase was due to the fact that ‘they were refused a hearing at the peace conference’  this would’ve only  created a stronger sense of patriotism, which can be seen as a fundamental reason as to why communism collapsed in Hungary due to the nations willingness to resist communist control and there disgruntlement to the peace settlements and the treaty of Versailles, which they felt that they had been unfairly treated by. The treaty of Trianon, in which Hungary lost ’31.59%’  of their territory leaving 3,250,000 Hungarians outside of the country. Hoensch states that ‘Every section of the Hungarian population felt disappointment at the scale of losses demanded by the peace treaty’  this presents the argument that not only was the lower classes effected, but also the higher class that were involved in the country wide upsurge of nationalism, which suggests that Hungary would unite as one during challenging times, which is shown by the 1956 revolution and also shows that nationalism is an essential internal reason as to why communism was over thrown in Hungary in 1989.
However the death of Stalin in 1953 is a pivotal issue that further pressed the pressure on communism in Hungary. In the last few months of his life, Stalin an increased amount of politicians and so called ‘enemies of the state’, although this onslaught did not reach Hungry or any other satellite state as he realized that he couldn’t use terror as much in the ‘bloc’ as he needed them to conform to the economic plans he was introducing, such as the 5 year plans and industrialization. Stalin was seen across the globe as the figure of communism and with his death the whole of east Europe began destalinization, this was the beginning of a more lenient time as it could be argued that some of the least favourable parts of the Stalin regime began to fall, for example gulags as well as the cult of personality. Sugar argued that ‘Hungary also experienced a period of “thaw”- a gradual relaxation of the totalitarian controls’  this supports the fact that the USSR was weakened by the death of Stalin and communism across the satellite states became mildly less enforced. His death seemed to threaten the security of communism as people saw it as a possibility to end it, Hanak claimed that it was a ‘increasingly hopeful era’  showing that the fall of Stalin gave renewed optimism to Hungary and is one of the central forces behind the 1956 revolution, presenting the argument that Stalin’s death was one of the undoubtedly main reasons that communism collapsed 36 years later.  This argument is furthermore supported by Hoensch ‘the new Soviet leaders were obliged to leave the leading party officials in fellow socialist countries more to themselves’ this idea reveals that Stalin’s death brought around a slightly diminished role of the USSR in Hungary’s government, so they could enjoy a loosened noose from communism, which enabled them to create a reformed view on their country. Khrushchev was his replacement as the leader of a collective, and this already spelled weakness. From the very start some might argue his reign was more lenient than Stalin’s as Hoensch further argued they ‘didn’t dare intervene in the internal affairs of European Peoples Democracies’ giving the Hungarians relief from the constant oppression they were familiarised with off Stalin. The appointment of ‘Imre Nagy, a little known member of the Politburo’  as prime minister was seen as a beacon of light for Hungarians and shows the extent that Stalin’s death had had, as they introduced a new leader of Hungary who was notoriously lenient towards the peoples demands and soon became popular amongst Hungarians but not the USSR. However Hoensch argues that this was perhaps the reason he was promoted to the head of the country ‘at a point when the agrarian policy and an economic crisis was seriously shaking the stability of Communist power’ this creates the argument that perhaps the Soviets only promoted Nagy in case the country fell into a deeper depression, they would not be saw as responsible. Suggesting that even very early after his death the Soviets were trying to seem more progressive to the satellite states, showing they realised there weakening with the death of Stalin.  This shows the damage that Stalin’s death had to done to communism, they had installed a soft leader in Hungary and become less authoritarian which ultimately led up to the 1956 revolution which is seen as one of the main elements of cause for the collapse in 1989, meaning ironically that Stalin was the catalyst of his creations demise.
The closest hungry got to defeating there over lords and casting off the chains of communism was in 1956. Despite the revolution being a failure, it found a flaw in the control of communism in its satellite states and embarrassed the soviets by managing to make the troops based in Budapest withdraw. However the revolution was swiftly ended by a ‘ruthless bombardment’ , it could be argued that the Russian’s reacted so forcefully due to being embarrassed by ‘street fighters’. However no matter how hard the Russians destroyed Budapest Lendvai argued ‘it could by no means destroy the revoulution autonomous organs or administration, especially the workers councils and the local revolutionary committees. In particular the organizations of the local workers councils soon became the strongest and most effective centres of natural resistance’  Lendvai’s argument was supported by the eventual collapse of communism in Hungary, it suggests that no matter how much the USSR pressured Hungary they couldn’t prevent nationalism spreading and inciting the country into a nationwide revolt. Which in itself can be saw as the first glimpse of the end of communism, as for 5 days there was as Hoensch described a ‘struggle for liberation’  as Hungarians saw parts of their past re-emerge, such as no secret police and freedom of speech, government powers ‘ceased to exist’ .Which under a full strength  Soviet government would not be possible, showing that for this brief moment, communism had in effect collapsed in Hungary. An additional way that communism could be saw to have collapsed momentarily was the appointment of Imre Nagy, which was a request of the population, however on the other hand, Victor Sebestyen hinted that the only reason for his reinstatement was ‘buying time in order to reinforce’  suggesting that the Soviets were always in control and wanted to make an example to other ‘bloc’ states if they decided to rebel, this view can be backed up as Lendvai talked about Hungary being the ‘disciple satellite state’   and saw as the next target for mass purges but were saved by Stalins death, implying that the Soviet’s saw Hungary as a easy target to make an example out of Hungary.   There was only one way that the 1956 rebellion was going to be a triumph, it needed western support as well as intervention, but was not going to happen. Imre Nagy made radio broadcasts across the world ‘Help Hungary’  appealing to western forces to aid in their struggle. However as suggested before Western involvement never occurred as foreign powers were not willing to escalate the cold war anymore. This argument is supported by Sebestyen who claimed Eisenhower didn’t want to ‘involve the US in a foreign adventure’  this view is widely shared by historians as no external western force wanted to intervene with the uprising in case war broke out between the two world super powers. Lendvai stressed that despite the failure of the revolution, it achieved in showing the weakness of Russia’s satellite states and their policing of them and displaying the resolve of Hungarian of nationalism across the globe. The Soviets expected they could crush the revolt with force but they could not prevent the insurgence of nationalism that would prevail till 1989. This nationalism is seen as one of the main internal factors of the total collapse in 1989, showing that the 1956 revolution was a catalyst in bringing an end to communism in eastern Europe as it ignited the patriotism in Hungary.
Hungary’s struggle for freedom in the 20th century has numerous attributing external as well as internal aspects as to why communism collapsed in 1989. I feel that the internal factors contributed to an extent in the demise of communism in Hungary because the nationalism that was subdued until 1956 was unleashed by the rebellion that gave the population, a sense of liberation and freedom, which was predominant consistently till the eventual fall of communism. On the contrary in could be argued that external factors played a bigger role in the ending of communism, such as Gorbachev’s role which was undeniably significant as he brought changes to Hungary with freedom of movement as well as his polices of perestroika and glasnost. Although the economy of Hungary is also seen as a decisive internal point in the fall of communism, but depending on the view point you could argue that Soviet control which is external effected the economy so the debate is challenging nevertheless internal factors such as the revolution and nationalism are extremely poignant in the argument. Despite the influence of Stalin’s death and Gorbachev’s role which both build a persuasive argument to suggest that external factors were more imperative in the fall of the Soviets, such as Gorbachev allowing the border with the Austrians to be cut down, bringing free movement around the east into west. Nevertheless I believe internal elements were definitely responsible for the collapse considerably, nationalism had featured consistently throughout 1889-1989 showing that national belief and hope lead to the eventual goal of the demise of communism. Lendvai argues that ‘radical reformers set the pace toward a multi-party system and free elections’  this supports the argument that internal factors contributed extensively to the final demise of communism in 1989 as nationalism and nationalistic Hungarians were at the fore front of returning their country to normal after nearly 50 years of Soviet occupation. In summary there are a multitude of reasons as to why the final demise of communism came in 1989, but internal factors unquestionably played an integral part of this.