‘Is there evidence for a deterioration of standards of living of British workers during the late 18th century and the early 19th century? What are the implications for the debate over the standard of living of the British working class during the industrial revolution 1760-1850?’
During the industrial revolution from 1760-1850, there was an expansion of the British economy, the likes of which had not been seen before. Crafts estimates an average expansion of consumption of 0.8% per annum per capita, suggesting a significant improvement in the standard of living of the population. However, this figure tells us nothing of how this increased income was distributed among the population, and thus with growth figures alone, no conclusions can be made.
Much of the historical argument around living standards during this period was largely politically motivated, such as the debate between Hobsbawm and Hartwell, which was largely based on theory and value judgements over whether an improvement should have taken place, not whether it actually did, with Hartwell keen to point out that the theory would trump any contradictory evidence. However, despite his Marxist leanings Hobsbawm provided the superior argument of the two in terms of the volume of empirical evidence used to support his claims, and the strength of argument. He points out that during the early 19th century there were a number of economic downturns, especially severe in 1841-2, in which unemployment increased dramatically, reaching almost 50% in Liverpool, meaning that for certain periods workers were earning no wage whatsoever. Moreover, he claims that the fact there was no recorded increase in the consumption of luxury products (namely tea, sugar and tobacco) shows that the standard of living cannot have increased, as some workers were still at a subsistence level, and others could not afford more of these luxury goods. In a later postscript to Taylor’s ‘The Standard of Living in Britain in the Industrial Revolution’, he points out that to some extent, qualitative factors are much more important in determining a person’s standard of living than quantitative ones, and thus claims that the work by Thompson on the actual living standards in cities is more important. However, much of the historical debate, as useful as it was for starting new research, was based on little, or unfounded, evidence and thus we should rely more on modern data and analyses to make our conclusions.
The most common way of determining standard of living is real wages (most commonly male due to the lower proportion of the female population employed in the formal sector of the economy). One of the first comprehensive studies of real male wages was carried out by Lindert and Williamson in 1983, which appeared to present an overwhelmingly optimistic view of living standards through this period, with real wages rising in excess of 60%. However, the methodology and data used to calculate the cost of living index was, to a certain extent, flawed, and the other evidence regarding qualitative factors did not seem to fit. The most convincing set of data (forming the current consensus) on this topic was provided by Feinstein in 1998, who used a sound methodology which has stood the test of time, and a number of recent challenges. He used broadly the same nominal wage data as his predecessors, but a much refined cost of living index, which encompassed all of the best knowledge about weights (using Eden and Davies’ studies as well as Horrell’s recent household budget data) and the most thorough analyses of prices to date. He found that there had been a 30% increase in the real wage in the period 1780-1850, but, taking account of the declining poor relief brought about by the 1834 New Poor Law, poor housing quality, inadequate health and an increased number of dependents per household, rationalised this figure to a mere 10-15% increase over the period, which makes for an insignificant increase on a year on year basis, but does not show a deterioration based on this measure alone. Allen improved further on Feinstein’s data in 2007, using some new techniques and series pioneered by Clark in 2005 (although Clark’s overall analysis was ultimately flawed). Allen went perhaps further than Feinstein in suggesting that there had been a pause in real wage growth from the 1790s until the 1830s as first noticed by Engels. Once again, this data on its own does not necessarily suggest a deterioration, but it definitely lends more support to the pessimistic side of the debate.
In a fundamental addition to the debate, Horrell and Humphries rightfully point out that male real wages on their own do not show the standard of living for families in the UK. Instead, family income is a more useful measure, as it takes into account the overall income available to all family members, which surely is the true measure of standard of living, as it encompasses all members of the population. They found that family income grew by a lower degree than did male income due to declining poor relief and a number of other factors depending on family location and occupation. This means that welfare gains must have been lower during this period than was initially thought. With Feinstein’s price index, this puts an upper ceiling of 21% on real wage growth over this period, which, with his adjustments, would eventually give a figure of 1-6% improvement in living standards; with Allen’s price index it is possible that we could see a deterioration in living standards. There are issues with this study; for example, its inclusion of only households with a man and wife means that it cannot be representative of the entire population, and there is some uncertainty over the specific data for male wages collected (which appears to differ from most other series), although in any case this is more likely to lead to an overstatement of any increase rather than an understatement, due to potentially inflated figures in the 1830s/40s. The most important thing for our purposes, however, about Horrell and Humphries’ study is that it shows that real wage growth most likely overstates any gains made during this period, and in doing so, suggests that there may have been a deterioration in living standards over this period, due to Allen’s suggestion of a stagnant real male wage.
Another approach which suggests that any possible gains in living standards from real wages are overstated is that of Voth, who studied labour inputs in England from 1760 to 1830, and found that worked time went up significantly. In his improved 2001 study of witnesses’ accounts from London and the North of England, he found, based on his calculations, that worked time went up by around 23% in early industrialisation, which suggests that workers were substituting their leisure time (a clear indicator of quality of life) in order to work longer for a better wage, which in fact, according to much of the evidence above they were not achieving. Thus it could be said that workers were in fact substituting their leisure time and working longer hours merely in order to maintain their current real wage and consumption, which clearly represents a deterioration in the standard of living. This is further backed up by the long exhaustive days they were working – often in excess of 10/11 hours; one would assume that this excessive impulse to work would have been driven by necessity rather than by choice. This study is by no means conclusive; due to a lack of data in 1830, the 95-percent confidence interval for the increase in the number of hours from 1760 to 1830 actually stretches from an increase of 4-55%, with 23% merely being the most likely (average) value in this set. However, there was certainly some increase in worked hours in this period, showing once again that welfare changes may have been negative, supporting the pessimistic view of living standards in this period.
As with the example of leisure time, the standard of living does not necessarily just mean the real wage. An individual’s standard of living can be said to include health and wellbeing as well as pure consumption capability. In light of this, studies relating to heights and mortality have gained prominence in the standard of living debate, as they give us a good idea of the health of the population. Nicholas and Oxley found that there was a small downward trend in both rural and urban areas, suggesting a possible deterioration in health. This cannot be taken as fact, however, due to the uncertain nature of the evidence and the possibility of other factors having caused a decrease so small, or indeed any change whatsoever. One of the main determinants of height appears to be racial background (Floud), and thus any changes must not be taken too seriously as they could imply migration to or from a certain area rather than a change in living standards per se (although naturally a causal link between living standards and migration could potentially be established). Another blow to this method’s utility for this issue comes in the form of the study done by Floud et al in ‘Health, Height and History’, which suggests that heights were increasing at the point in time that Nicholas and Oxley found them to be decreasing, and that they then decreased after this from around 1840-1850 (although Floud et al only use army recruits which may not be a random enough sample for the data collected to be reliable, and who may have over exaggerated their heights, particularly during the Napoleonic Wars in order to be accepted into the army). More encouraging evidence comes in the form of mortality data, with a general consensus that life expectancy at birth (particularly in cities) was decreasing from the late 18th to early 19th century. Using the example of Glasgow, Szreter and Mooney show that life expectancy in cities (to which the rural population was migrating) was often up to 10 years lower than the national average, and declined by up to 5 years in the early 19th century. Another influential study was carried out by Huck in 9 locations across England, which showed infant mortality rising substantially from 1813-8 to 1831-6, suggesting poor health of the mother during pregnancy and of the infant during its first couple of months, potentially due to disease, spread quickly in the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions commonplace in many urban areas at this time.
The poor health leading to this reduced life expectancy and increased infant mortality was most likely caused by worsening nutrition. Gazely and Horrell carried out a comprehensive study into the nutritional intake of the population during the industrial revolution period and found evidence of a reduction in the amount of key nutrients consumed by agricultural workers, seen as a baseline group. This could explain an increased incidence of disease and thus mortality, as the lack of these nutrients can lead to a number of ailments, such as scurvy, blindness or in extremes death (and for many the complete lack of certain vitamins from their diet could have made this a possibility). Moreover, a study by Allen in 2005 saw a reduction in calorie intake per capita in the late 18th and early 19th century. He theorises that although there was a rising real wage over the industrial revolution, trends in relative prices were important. For example, rent went up massively due to an increasingly dense urban population, meaning that workers had less money to spend on food. Additionally, Allen theorises that the reducing cost of clothing due to the increasing productivity of the manufacturing process may have meant that consumers switched their consumption away from food and toward clothing. However, this argument is unconvincing, as it is unlikely that consumers would reduce their food consumption to unhealthy or fatal levels merely to take advantage of lower cost clothing. Still, it is clear that given a pause in real wage growth and a not unsubstantial reduction in food intake, there must have been some kind of change in relative prices, which based on our current evidence, must have been mainly attributable to increased rent costs.
As alluded to throughout, a number of contemporary reports suggest that the general quality of life (particularly in the cities) during the industrial revolution was very poor. In the 1840s Engels visited Manchester and found incredibly overcrowded conditions with up to 20 people in small, dirty cottages. He also describes very poor air quality with refuse on the street causing foul smells and the air ‘darkened by the smoke of a dozen tall factory chimneys’. Thompson (gathering evidence from various contemporary accounts) also describes similar conditions in his ‘The Making of the English Working Class’, which he attributes to the unwillingness of the rich to fund improvements in poor areas of cities, which the government made little attempt to improve in this period. Although both famous socialist/Marxist thinkers, which may have given them cause to exaggerate accounts, it seems clear that general living space was restricted and sanitation much poorer than it was in the countryside (for which we have reports dating back well before the industrial revolution). Thus it appears that, in cities, the quality of life did worsen for the poor in society (who made up a large proportion of the population at this time).
In conclusion, when looking at the real wage data it appears that there was a pause in growth between the late 18th and early 19th centuries (from about 1790-1830), as observed by Engels, and his qualitative studies. However, due to the huge relative increase in the cost of rent it is likely that the disposable incomes of many working class families would have decreased. Moreover, the poor conditions in the cities many workers were moving to, with overcrowding, disease, and squalor rife, made the quality of life much worse for many than it had been in rural areas. This shows up in stunted growth (in the anthropometric studies carried out by Nicholas) and increasing mortality rates (especially in the cities). Thus, whilst the evidence is not certain, the quantity of factors pointing toward deterioration suggests that this is most likely what was being experienced by the majority of British workers.
In terms of the overall debate for the standard of living of workers during the industrial revolution, the picture for the English working class was relatively bleak; there is relatively little reliable real wage date for before 1790/1800 (Feinstein 1998), suggesting that to gain a wider perspective we should look at the period from 1830-1850. The fundamentals that caused worsening conditions in the earlier period remained in this period, with a very severe downturn in 1841-2 only making economic conditions worse. Also, if we are to trust Floud et al’s data, a notable fall in heights took place in this period suggesting once again worsening health in general. Therefore, from the perspective of the evidence provided above, it appears that the pessimistic view of deteriorating standard of living for the working classes during the industrial revolution has been proven correct.