Introduction
Throughout the nineteenth century, the region of Italy faced internal and external issues that caused tensions to rise on the peninsula. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, after the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna in 1814, much of Italy was controlled or greatly under the influence of the Austrian Empire. Indeed, the first ruler to unite Italy since the fall of the Holy Roman Empire was Napoleon, a foreign conqueror. Although in its unification, parts of Italy were conquered, the conquerors were Italians taking back Italian de jure lands from Austrians. However, it can argued that regardless of Austrian occupation, the Italian states would not have coalesced into one independent country without being forced to through conquest. Many states had different cultures, traditions and a history of independence. Therefore, Italy was united, though through conquest and the emancipation of Italians from Austrian rule by the foreign intervention of the French in the Second War of Italian Independence and the British in the Sicily campaign.
Supporters of Unification
In April 1847, Austrian Chancellor Prince Klemens von Metternich dismissed Italy as a ‘geographical expression’. However, the idea of independence persisted in the hearts and minds of many Italians at that time. In a speech composed by Niccolò Tommaseo in 1848, he expressed his concerns about Venetia’s future and touched upon the topic of forming a union with Piedmont, which was an increasingly important debate after Venetia declared independence from the Austrian Empire earlier that year. Tommaseo writes, ‘until lately she [Piedmont] thought of herself as being not Italian’, showing that to be Italian before the unification was a concept open to debate as there were many differences between the states on the peninsula such as language, culture and forms of government, which may effect how a future unified Italy would be governed. Moreover, Tommaseo talks about the ‘resentment and suspicion’ that may cause in the Assembly, showing that there were sectors of Italians that did not believe in unification, hence the need to convince them. Tommaseo sued the Assembly to be pragmatic and ‘take into account the different natures and traditions of the various Italian provinces’; to choose unity with Piedmont rather than be annexed by more foreign Austria. Niccolò Tommaseo represented the view of some Italians by 1848, preaching unity by declaring that ‘Venice cannot and ought not to remain alone’. Clearly, Tommaseo believed that Venetia should unify with Piedmont out of necessity, which may support the argument that Italy was unified, not conquered. However, on the other hand, Tommaseo’s argument was not victorious, Venetia did not join Piedmont and was re-annexed by the Austrian Empire after the end of the First War for Italian Independence. When Venetia eventually did join Piedmont, it was through conquest and foreign French aid in war.
There were tremendous levels of patriotism in the Italian peninsula in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1847, future Piedmontese Prime Minister, Massimo d’Azeglio (1849-1852), urged rulers in Italy to function in a ‘tight union’ and focus on shared political goals in order to inspire and lead the ‘progressive moderates’ to form an ‘Italian national opinion’. Clearly, Metternich was hyperbolic in his judgement of the Italians; patriotism flowed throughout the echelons in the peninsula. D’Azeglio, a high ranking politician, called for a unity of political agenda, not Piedmontese aggression against other Italian states to increase their territory.
The First War of Italian Independence
The First Italian war of Independence (1848-1849) may arguably favour the view that parts of Italy were conquered, or were attempted to be conquered, in the road towards unification. Although the war resulted in Piedmontese defeat at the hands of the Austrian Empire, it showed that the Kingdom of Sardinia was prepared to use military force in order to retake parts of Italy, namely Lombardy in this case. King Charles Albert of Sardinia retreated to Milan in 1848 with the intention of preventing a republic being established in his absence, with use of his intimidating military force. Charles Albert, who had started the war to support Venetia and Milan’s independence from the Austrians, could now have arguably become a conqueror as the occupier of Milan, although under the guise of protection. However, on the other hand, it could be argued that although Piedmont invaded Lombardy, it was under foreign control, and Piedmont was simply on a mission of liberation. Moreover, as many Lombard peasants aided the Piedmontese in the early stages of the war against the Austrians, it could be argued that the First Italian war of Independence was in fact an instance of Italian unity rather than a conquest as many Italians in Sardinian occupied territories supported the war. Moreover, the support of the Milanese for the war was strong showing unity for the cause, even causing Marshal Josef Radetzky of the Austrian Empire to abandon his siege of the city early in 1848. Many Italian states joined the war effort on Sardinia’s side, namely the Provisional Government of Milan, the Republic of San Marco, the King of Sicily, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchy of Modena and Reggio, the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza and the Roman Republic, showing the unity in Italy against a common enemy. Overall the First Italian war of Independence was a victory for the Austrian Empire, however the unity of the Italians was revealed through support of citizens in Milan and Lombardy for the war.
According to Historian Denis Mack Smith, it was ‘the concept of Nationality’ that brought the war, however ‘it was not enough to bring victory’. The lower classes were convinced by the rich citizens to band together behind King Charles Albert, as he was the ‘one ruler with an army prepared to fight and win’. The lower classes main aim was to drive out the Austrians and Charles was willing and able to achieve this. Moreover, although the campaign in Lombardy was a royal war and not a people’s war, the war in its youth was an incredibly popular venture in the eyes of many Italians; ‘His army was keen, in good trim, and numerous; twenty-six million people were proclaiming him hero and saviour of the fatherland; in other words he had both strength and prestige’. However, later in the war, Italian unity waned. Charles allowed Austria to take Venetia with no resistance, consolidating this troops in Lombardy. To other rival Italian states who had joined the war against Austria, this revealed Charles’ agenda to simply increasing his own power through conquest of Lombardy, rather than that liberating all of Austrian occupied Italy. This caused them to drop out of the war effort, losing faith in the war.
The Second War of Italian Independence
Sardinian Prime Minister, Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour’s machinations in the unification process of Italian, show Piedmonts aim to unite Italy through conquest. Although Cavour was far from a proponent of Italian unification, once remarking that the Venetian patriot Manin was preoccupied with ‘the idea of Italian unity and other such nonsense’. Cavour believed that he could expand the realm of Sardinia across northern Italy by expelling the Austrians, naming this effort ‘the aggrandisement of Piedmont’. Cavour sought to achieve this by the acquisition of allies for Sardinia, convincing Piedmont to join the Crimean war against Russia in order to pander to their northern allies. Moreover, increasing anglophile Cavour, offered Piedmontese assistance to the British during the Indian mutiny and opposed Irish independence. Of course, Cavour and Piedmont had no interest in the mutiny or the Irish question, their main concern was to gain strong military allies in preparation for conquest. Cavour promised to cede the Piedmont territories of Nice and Savoy to the Emperor of the French, Napoleon III if the French could aid them successfully in the conquest of Lombardy and Venetia, showing Piedmontese determination to secure enough manpower to for their ‘aggrandisation’. This paid off in July 1858, when the Emperor of the French agreed to lend a helping hand, as long as Austria was the aggressor. Clearly, by this point in the Risorgimento, the Piedmontese looked as if they were planning a land-grab with no casus belli, rather than trying to unify Italy. In 1859, King Victor Emmanuel exclaimed to the Piedmontese parliament that there was a ‘cry of anguish’ resonating from across the peninsula, calling for Austrian lands in Italy to be restored to their rightful owners, the Piedmontese. Of course, this was a view not shared by the majority of citizens in these areas. Although the people despised Austrian control, they did not despise it enough as to repeat the events of 1848, the Habsburg viceroy Archduke Maximilian was tolerant; times were not as desperate and opportune. When the Second War of Italian Independence was eventually declared in 1859, after the Austrians offered Piedmont an ultimatum; they had to accept Austrian terms of disarmament or face the consequences. Piedmont went to war with seventy thousand against the Austrian force of one hundred and forty thousand, however due to Cavour’s machinations, a French force of one hundred and seven thousand men reinforced the Piedmontese, ensuring victory in the war. However, the end of the Second War for Italian independence was a disappointment. Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph and Emperor of the French Napoleon III met in secret to discuss the term; Piedmont received Lombardy but crucially Austria retained Venetia, leading to Cavour’s resignation in protest. Regardless, the acquisition of Lombardy from the Austrian Empire was a conquest, Cavour did not mean to unify or create a kingdom of ‘Italy’, he only wished to expand Piedmont and utilised the French to do so.
Many Republicans and patriots such as Gioberti, Mazzini and Manin either abandoned their causes or joined the camp of Piedmont as by 1855, it was clear that Piedmont was the only independent power in Italy capable of achieving Italian independence from the Austrian Empire. Venetian republican Manin remarked, ‘we say to the Monarchy of Savoy: ‘Make Italy and we are with you. – If not, not.’ Although Italian unification would result in a unification of ethnic Italians, many Italians knew that this could only be successfully achieved through conquest, namely Piedmontese. Garibaldi too knew this, saying that he would not support a Mazzini-esque expedition as he would ‘not risk making Italians a laughing stock by supporting an utterly useless rebellion’. Notably, Garibaldi did later lead a successful expedition into the Sicily, deposing the monarchy. Overall, in the eyes of many Italians, including staunch republicans, the only way to successfully unify Italy was by conquest led by the Piedmontese kingdom.
Conquest of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by Giuseppe Garibaldi and the Mille
The Spedizione dei Mille led by Giuseppe Garibaldi in 1860, was arguably an example of Italy being united by conquest. The taking of the south by Garibaldi was no doubt, the most influential factor of the unification and the founding of the Kingdom of Italy. When Garibaldi arrived in Sicily in 1860 with one thousand men, his aim was to achieve a united Italy, however Garibaldi acknowledged that an expedition of that kind had ‘little chance of success’. Although, some one hundred local volunteers joined the ranks of the Mille after Garibaldi made promises of land to every male that volunteered, when victories came to Garibaldi’s troops it was caused by his military prowess and the ongoing peasant revolt which aided in making his movements difficult to detect and had the side effect of demoralising the Sicilian Bourbon troops. Moreover, the southern peasants of Sicily did not welcome Garibaldi with the intention of becoming unified with Piedmont. The ongoing peasant revolt in Sicily quickly developed into a communal uprising against the government and landowners, far removed from Garibaldi’s ambitions of Italian unification. Garibaldi had to pacify the peasantry and utilising lessons learnt from the republican Mazzini Garibaldi introduced public works to decreasing the rising crisis of unemployment and most importantly decreeing that property was sacred and had to be maintained, so much so that Garibaldi later introduced, as self-imposed dictator of Sicily in the name of King Victor Emmanuelle of Sardinia, capital punishment for theft and looting. Looting hordes of the peasantry roaming the countryside of Sicily and murdering landowners became such an issue that the landowners turned to Garibaldi’s conquering revolutionary army for aid in controlling the peasantry. It took the conquest of Sicily by Garibaldi’s Mille, the repeated defeats of the Sicilian Bourbon army and the threat presented by the peasants who dreamt of jacquerie to finally convince the galantuomini, the middle classes of Sicily to embrace patriotism and Garibaldi’s vision of a united Italy. Essentially, Sicily had to be conquered or else it would have never joined the kingdom of Sardinia.
Conclusion
Italy was united, although due to necessity and the application of force, not choice. Austrian influence on the peninsula and Piedmontese desires of expansion pushed the drive for eventual Italian unification. Republicans such as Mazzini and Manin eventually acquiesced, admitting that Italian unification would only happen as a result of intervention from Piedmont and importantly their armed forces. Moreover, if Garibaldi and his Mille did not invade the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1860 during the tumultuous time of peasant revolt, the Sicilian citizens would have never embraced the ideology of Italian unification. Although there were leading figures that desired unity between Italian states, such as the politician and future Sardinian Prime Minister Massimo d’Azeglio, other politicians such as the succeeding Sardinian Prime Minister, Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, only desired to strengthen the Kingdom of Sardinia’s power on the peninsula. Overall, although there were patriotic individuals that wished Italians to unite as one republic or kingdom, most Italians were only swayed to unity through conquest. Italy was not united, by conquered.
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
- Niccolò Tommaseo, All’assemblea di Venezia: discorsi due (Venice, 1848)
Secondary Sources:
- Denis Mack Smith, The Making of Italy, 1796-1866
- David Gilmour, The Pursuit of Italy, A History of a Land, its Regions and their Peoples
- Christopher Duggan, The Force of Destiny, A History of Italy since 1796
- John A. Davis, Italy in The Nineteenth Century
- Anthony Cardoza, Cavour and Piedmont
- Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy: Liberal Policy and Local Power
- Woolf, A History of Italy 1700 – 1860