On the 31st March 1939 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that a British guarantee of independence had been offered to Poland, declaring “His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.” The guarantee followed the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia, thus signalling Hitler’s defiance of the 1938 Munich Agreement. The guarantee to Poland has been the subject of contentious historical debate, indeed it is widely regarded as the trigger-cause of the Second World War. Why then did Britain offer a guarantee to Poland given her reluctance to offer a similar guarantee to Czechoslovakia the year before? It is the aim of this essay to answer this question. In doing so this essay will explore the role of both Chamberlain, and his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. Halifax was the driving force behind the guarantee and successfully persuaded the Cabinet to adopt his proposal. Personally, I believe that the guarantee to Poland was offered because the British government feared both a German-Polish rapprochement and a German-Polish war. The outcome of either of these would be detrimental to British interests. I shall be arguing as such throughout this essay.
In order to understand the British guarantee to Poland an overview of Poland’s relationship with her neighbours by March 1939 is necessary. Poland was in a very precarious position by March 1939, situated in-between two great continental Powers. Poland found herself under threat by Russia to the East and Germany to the West. Both Powers harboured revisionist territorial aims against Poland that dated back to the end of the First World War. Poland had received White Russian territories following her victory in the 1920 Polish-Soviet War and German territories under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, including the Danzig and ‘Polish Corridor’ which separated Germany from East Prussia. Both Powers longed for the return of their respective territories. As a result, between 1919 and 1939 Poland adopted a foreign policy of neutral balance between her two neighbours at the behest of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. In order to achieve this policy two non-aggression pacts were signed, the first with Russia in 1932 and the second with Germany in 1934. Poland stretched both of these pacts in September 1938 however, when Poland aligned herself with Germany over the Sudetenland Crisis. Poland demanded and received the Teschen coal-mining district from Czechoslovakia, alarming both the British and French governments.
In September 1938 Britain, France, Italy and Germany met at Munich to formally acknowledge the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany. Between 1918 and 1938 it is estimated that more than three-million ethnic Germans were living in Czechoslovakia. Hitler wanted to reincorporate the predominantly German-speaking territories back into Germany; Britain, France and Italy acquiesced. Chamberlain returned to Britain declaring “It is peace for our time” while Hitler declared “I have no more territorial demands to make in Europe”. Following the Munich Agreement, Hitler turned his attention to Poland and the Danzig.
The Treaty of Versailles had deprived Germany of the port of Danzig in 1919 and internationalised the region under the League of Nations. The Poles had consistently challenged the League’s authority by October 1938 leading Hitler to believe Poland would not object if Germany assumed the League’s position. At the Imperial Conference in 1937 Chamberlain himself made clear his belief that “German-Polish friendship would lead to amicable solutions over Danzig and stop oppression of Germans in Poland.” In October 1938 Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister aired the aforementioned German proposal of assuming the League’s position to Jozef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany. Ribbentrop stated that if the Danzig question was settled, there could be a joint “anti-Comintern Pact” with Germany. Poland did not respond to the offer, instead maintaining their foreign policy of neutrality.
On the 14th March 1939 Slovakia declared independence from Czechoslovakia, at the behest of Germany. This was followed by the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, the remaining Czech territories the next day. On the 20th March Ribbentrop demanded Lithuania handover the Memmel region, largely inhabited by Germans; Lithuania agreed. By the 29th March fears arose over the security of Poland, reports surfaced of an imminent attack on the Danzig by Germany. As a result, on the 31st March 1939 Chamberlain stood before Parliament and announced that a British guarantee of independence had been offered to Poland. It is the aim of the following paragraphs to explore the reasons behind this guarantee and Chamberlain’s motives for offering it.
Firstly, the guarantee to Poland can be explained through the British Governments fear of a German-Polish rapprochement. As early as October 1938 the British Government feared a situation in which Poland would fall into the German orbit or “adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality towards Germany.” These fears originated from Poland’s decision to align herself with Germany during the Sudetenland Crisis in September 1938. The clearest, initial signs of a German-Polish rapprochement came in the form of a letter by Sir Howard Kennard, the British Ambassador in Warsaw to Sir Orne Sargent on the 25th September 1938. Kennard wrote that Czechoslovakia should conciliate Poland by ceding the Teschen coal-mining area “not from any parti pris in Poland’s favour, but in view of the overriding importance of keeping this country [Poland] from slipping on to the wrong side in the event of general hostilities.” Following the Sudetenland Crisis, Halifax expressed alarm at Poland’s blatant disregard of her Non-Aggression Treaties. In a letter to Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to France on the 1st November 1938 Halifax warned “What is to be the role of Poland…If France relaxes her alliance with Poland the latter can only fall more and more into the German orbit.” Such an eventuality worried the British Government, especially in November 1938, in large part because the Foreign Office was receiving indications of a possible surprise attack by Germany on the West. It was therefore imperative the Foreign Secretary argued that a rapprochement be stopped. If Germany secured Polish neutrality, or brought Poland into alignment with the anti-Comintern Pact, Poland would provide cover for Hitler’s eastern front. As a result this cover would assist in a possible attack on the West.
In January 1939 Beck met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden where the two discussed the future of the Danzig. Hitler had made it clear to Beck the previous year that he was not interested in any change in the status of the Danzig. At Berchtesgaden however, Hitler declared “Danzig was German, will always remain German and will sooner or later be part of Germany.” This reassured the British Government who believed Beck would naturally turn to Britain to protect the Danzig, and Poland thus deviating from a rapprochement with Germany. However, Beck instead downplayed the threat thereby troubling the British who feared a German-Polish deal over the Danzig. This sentiment was captured by R.L. Speaight who wrote “The very fact of M. Beck’s more than usually marked evasiveness may indeed be taken as a further indication that he has gone further than he wished to admit in yielding [the Danzig] to German pressure.” This was followed by Kennard’s report that Beck had been extremely evasive under questioning, thereby suggesting Poland was indeed looking to a German-Polish deal over the Danzig. William Strang concluded that Beck’s interview with Hitler was “amicable and on the whole reassuring for Poland” while also noting “the attraction of Hungary and perhaps other States into the anti-Comintern Pact, and the attraction of Poland into the German orbit would give Germany an assurance of at least benevolent neutrality along her Eastern frontier.” Collectively these reports suggested that a German-Polish deal to secure Germany’s eastern front was possible if Britain failed to reach out to Beck. At the Foreign Policy Committee on the 23rd January 1939 Halifax expressed his alarm at Germany’s attempts to draw Poland into alignment with the anti-Comintern Pact. Halifax therefore suggested that the Danzig be made the pretext for inviting Beck to London. The Committee agreed.
On the 21st March 1939 Halifax met with Georges Bonnet, a French politician and suggested that even if no formal agreement was in place at the time of a German attack on Poland, Britain would still be likely to defend Poland “even if no assurance of Poland’s collaboration could be obtained in advance…it would still be very difficult for France and Great Britain to take no action if there was a further act of aggression by Germany.” Between March 21st and 29th Halifax became convinced of the need to prevent Poland from slipping onto the wrong side. Halifax’s eagerness to protect Poland against Germany can be explained in part by Jan Ciechanowski’s memorandum. Ciechanowski was a close friend of Halifax’s Private Secretary Oliver Harvey. Ciechanowski argued that Germany had altered the map of Europe and disrupted the balance of power, he therefore recommended that Britain and France “jointly declare without any further delay that they will definitely oppose any German aggression against Poland, and will support her should she be forced to defend herself.” Here for the first time was the mention of an unconditional guarantee to Poland. However, it is uncertain if Ciechanowski’s memo had an impact on Halifax’s thinking or merely reinforced his prior convictions.
It is important to note here that an unconditional guarantee to Poland was not the first proposal presented to the British Government. Following the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia on the 15th March, Britain had hoped to sign a Four-Power Declaration with France, Russia and Poland as its joint-signatories to support Rumania and Poland. However, from the outset the prospects of Polish-Soviet cooperation were dismal. Poland rejected any agreement that included the Russians, due to their aforementioned history. Furthermore, Josef Stalin announced to the 18th Communist Party Congress on the 10th March that Russia “would not be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them”. Russian foreign policy focused instead on serving Russian interests, namely collective security. On the 22nd March the Russians stated that they would only sign the declaration if both France and Poland agreed to sign. France, acquiescing with British foreign policy agreed. However, Poland was reluctant to align themselves with the Soviet Union. The Poles feared that if they granted Soviet troops to enter the territories recently won by Poland under the 1934 “Eastern Locarno Treaty”, the Soviets would never leave. Poland had also negotiated the ‘Declaration of Non-Aggression’ with Germany just four years prior. Poland instead opted to maintain the policy of a neutral balance between Russia and Germany. As a result of Poland’s reluctance to sign the agreement Britain assumed Beck was pro-German “since he was apparently unwilling to be anti-German”. The French meanwhile sought to secure a Polish guarantee for Rumania in the event that France became involved in a war against Germany. After negotiations failed in March 1939 the Four-Power Declaration was dropped. Britain opted instead to secure a Mutual-Assistance Pact between Britain, France and Poland in support of Rumania while abandoning hope for Russian involvement. This too failed however, and Britain was faced with the prospect of losing Poland entirely.
On the 29th March, while Britain was negotiating the proposed Mutual-Assistance Pact a report written by Ian Colvin, a junior Berlin correspondent from the News Chronicle surfaced. Colvin wrote that Poland was under imminent attack by Germany. This undoubtedly focused Whitehall minds as Britain was now faced with both a German-Polish rapprochement and a German-Polish war. Both of which would prove detrimental to post-war peace in Europe. While Sir Alex Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs was sceptical of the information in the report, Halifax was impressed. Simon Newman makes the point that Halifax was “probably far more impressed with its potential as a means of persuading the Cabinet [to offer a guarantee].” Indeed, Halifax took Colvin to meet with Chamberlain that evening and persuaded the Prime Minister of the need to offer Poland an unconditional guarantee. Whether Halifax believed Colvin’s report or not is irrelevant, he masterfully used the information to obtain his long-sought after protection of Poland.
Chamberlain wrote to his sister on the evening of the 29th explaining “we agreed to the idea of an immediate declaration of support for Poland.” The following day both Halifax and Chamberlain spoke before the Cabinet and convinced them of the need to guarantee Poland. Chamberlain proposed “a clear declaration of our intention to support Poland if Poland was attacked by Germany.” This was in line with Ciechanowski’s memorandum. The Cabinet minutes of the 30th March also illustrate that while Chamberlain agreed to the guarantee, it was not his proposal. This is evidenced by Chamberlain’s repeated references to the guarantee as “the Foreign Secretary’s proposals”. Following the Cabinet discussion R.A. Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs wrote in his diary “Sometimes he [Halifax] has moved the Cabinet by the use of what appeared at first sight to be rumours…the Berlin correspondent was used to impress the Cabinet with the possibility of the invasion of Poland.”
While the immediate threat to Poland by Germany was worrisome to Chamberlain, the prospect of a German-Polish agreement would be equally disastrous. This is evidenced by Chamberlain’s uneasiness “at the fact that our ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland.” These concerns were complemented by two reports, the first was drawn up by the Foreign Office for the Chiefs of Staff on March 29th, the same day Colvin published his report. The Foreign Office’s report observed that “Poland has reached the parting of ways, and will quickly have to choose between resistance to German expansion in co-operation with other States, or an agreement with Germany which would give her no guarantee against future dismemberment.” The second report was published by the War Office on March 31st and concluded “there is as yet no concrete evidence that Germany is determined to force an immediate solution of the Danzig problem.” However, the War Office thought that the Poles, under pressure from Germany would “accept any solution of the Danzig problem which bore the semblance of an agreed solution”. Chamberlain told his colleagues on the Foreign Policy Committee that the latest information made it unlikely that Hitler was “contemplating any immediate coup de main” against Poland thus discrediting Colvin’s report that an attack on Poland was imminent. On Friday 31st March it was therefore evident that the guarantee, in light of this new information was “designed to prevent German-Polish agreement rather than a German-Polish war”. This being the case, Chamberlain as a skilled political operator believed it to be best not to use the rumours of a German attack as a pretext for announcing the British guarantee to Poland. It was noted by Chamberlain’s colleagues, particularly those that had been persuaded by the same argument by Halifax and Chamberlain the day before, that if the Prime Minister did not refer to the rumours of a German attack, MPs would ask why it was important for Britain to make a unilateral declaration in favour of Poland, thus giving up Britain’s “trump card”. Chamberlain’s reasoning was two-fold, first Britain could not guarantee that Hitler would not attack over the weekend, traditionally his preferred time. Secondly, the British Government feared that Poland would accede to German demands to cede the Danzig, if Germany in response pledged not to attack Poland. The guarantee can therefore be explained by the British Governments fear that Germany would either attack Poland, or force the Poles into an agreement over the Danzig.
Chamberlain’s reasons for agreeing to the guarantee were subtle, but should not be understated. Without Chamberlain, Halifax’s proposals would have fallen on deaf ears. Firstly, it should be noted that Chamberlain guaranteed Polish independence not her territorial integrity. Chamberlain did this because he believed Poland’s borders should be open to revision. The guarantee therefore promised British support only if Polish independence was endangered, Chamberlain noted on the 31st March after the announcement of the guarantee “it is we who will judge whether their independence is threatened or not.”
Chamberlain’s reasons for guaranteeing Poland were two-fold, firstly Chamberlain recognised that public opinion towards appeasement had shifted since Munich. By March 1939 Chamberlain was politically weakened, constrained by the opinions of his Cabinet and the opinions of the public. In the event of a German-Polish war or a German-Polish rapprochement Chamberlain “would, assuming he could remain Prime Minister, be compelled at least to remodel his government.” It is also evident from his speech to the Birmingham Conservative Association on the 17th March that Chamberlain’s own attitude towards appeasement had shifted, it is unclear whether this was genuine or for political purposes. The speech followed the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, Chamberlain was criticised for his lacklustre response in the House of Commons following the invasion. As a shrewd politician, Chamberlain was likely aware of the consequences of failing to denounce Hitler’s actions. Hence, on the 17th March Chamberlain declared “no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if ever it were made.”
Secondly, it could be argued that Chamberlain agreed to guarantee Poland in order to counter the relentless campaign by prominent Conservatives, and the Labour Party for an alliance with Russia. Speaking before the House of Commons on the 13th April 1939 Winston Churchill stated “The other day I tried to show the House the great interest that Russia has against further Eastward expansion…I am sure we shall hear from the Government that the steps they are taking are those which will enable us to receive the fullest possible cooperation from Russia.” The issue of an alliance with Russia dogged Conservative Party politics in 1939, Chamberlain wrote that he had formed the impression that Russia “would be of little or no assistance except for defensive purposes.” Chamberlain also faced the geographical realities. If an agreement were signed with Russia, Russian troops would have to enter Poland in order to reach Germany. Poland was not willing to permit such an eventuality. Prominent MPs such as Antony Eden and Churchill argued for a different course of action however, namely a ‘Grand Alliance’ with Stalin to preserve Western democracy.
At the Foreign Policy Committee on the 27th March Halifax shared Chamberlain’s view, arguing that Britain should opt for Poland over Russia. Halifax thought little of Russia’s capacity for offensive warfare, believed her airforce to be obsolete and predicted chaos in her supply arrangements. This was due in large part to the ‘Great Purge’ of the Red Army’s officer class after the First World War. Halifax’s reluctance to contemplate an alliance with Moscow was also largely conditioned by his fear of “alienating the Polish and Rumanian governments”. The above reasons can therefore help to explain why Chamberlain chose to beat “his furled umbrella into a flaming sword” instead of “throwing another baby to the wolves” by guaranteeing Poland.
In conclusion, I would argue from the evidence noted in this essay that Britain offered a guarantee to Poland for two reasons. The short-term reason for the guarantee was undoubtedly Britain’s fear that Poland was under imminent attack by Germany, as reported by Colvin. This report gave Halifax the necessary ammunition to bounce both Chamberlain and the Cabinet into offering a guarantee of independence to Poland. From the evidence provided I would argue the long-term reason was the fear of a German-Polish rapprochement. This guided British foreign policy up until the 30th March 1939; the British Government was undoubtedly worried that Poland would slip from their net. This can also help to explain why Britain was so eager to secure both a Four-Power Declaration and a Mutual-Assistance Pact with Poland and Russia in the weeks preceding the guarantee. In any case both scenarios posed a fundamental risk to British interests. If Germany attacked Poland or reached an agreement with her, Poland would provide cover for Germany’s eastern front. This in turn would provide assistance in a possible German attack on the West. I have used the term “long-term reason” because as early as October 1938 it is evident that Britain feared a German-Polish agreement over the Danzig question. Colvin’s report is important in the historiography however, as I do not believe the Cabinet would have agreed to a guarantee on the basis of fears of a German-Polish alignment alone. In this sense, both a German-Polish agreement and war complemented each other in Britain’s decision to offer a guarantee. Chamberlain agreed to this guarantee for personal and political reasons. He had advocated appeasement and was now witnessing its destructive power on Europe, Chamberlain also had to counter the political campaign by members of his own party and the opposition for an alliance with Stalin. If he failed to do so, Chamberlain would be forced to remodel his government, if it survived. Ultimately, Chamberlain hoped that by guaranteeing Poland Hitler would see sense. He was sadly mistaken and on the 1st September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. As a result, the guarantee became operational and Britain was plunged into the Second World War.