On August 10th 1945, Korea was historically divided along the 38th parallel. Separating the peninsula into spheres of influence for the United States and the Soviet Union was the last step in an extensive and complex process of speculating possible reactions to Japan’s final surrender that concluded World War II. The arbitrary line would split apart a nation that was unified for centuries and pose major consequences for the Korean population in the decades to come. So, what exactly caused the two nations of North and South Korea to exist where there once was a unwavering, unified kingdom? In this paper, I will explore forces that pushed for the inevitability of the divide and the different outcomes that could have been produced if those forces were transformed even in the slightest. It will be revealed that the division would not be a result of Korea’s actions, but an unfortunate consequence of a gradually intensifying relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Due to the complex events leading up to the different forces wanting possession of Korea, the creation of the 38th parallel was in fact inevitable. Furthermore, through viewing the US and the Soviet Union’s relationship through Kenneth Waltz’s three images, this holds true.
Before understanding the causes of the divide, it is critical to recognize how Korea came to be a nation up for grabs. The long journey to the ultimate divide was commenced with the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea that broke the rule of the longstanding Joseon Dynasty. The Japanese not only took over Korean territory but also undermined Korean cultural identity, leaving its nation fragile. Everything from its language to its customs was suppressed; Tokyo even once attempted to impose a law that required Japanese second names to all Koreans (Edward). From 1910 to the end of World War II in 1945, the people in Korea lived as members of a Japanese colony. As people’s identities were suppressed, anti-Japanese rallies ensued across the nation. Looking at Waltz’s second image, because Korea was a Japanese colony, its government had no political power. As a state, Korea essentially acted as Japan’s puppet and the Korean people didn’t get to have a say in the decision-making process behind the split. But most importantly, as I will clarify later on, it was the distinctive domestic politics of the U.S. and the Soviet Union that played the most decisive role in the split, rather than Korea’s or Japan’s.
When viewing the events preceding Japan’s surrender through the first image, the spotlight lands on U.S. presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. According to Waltz, the first image focuses on how the nature of particular political leaders impacts their behaviors and the affected historical events. These two presidents are significant because they directly impacted whether the U.S. would decide to cooperate with or back away from the Soviet Union, and their differing attitudes influenced how the events in handling Korea played out. Roosevelt was certainly more optimistic and advocated the establishment of an allied four-power trusteeship in regards to the ownership of Korea, largely because he didn’t want the Soviet Union to take unilateral control of the peninsula after the conclusion of the war (Matray). It is widely believed that during the Yalta conference, Stalin actually supported this form of cooperation in return for territorial concessions from Roosevelt (Grey). The mystery of the Korean divide largely circles around what exactly was discussed at the Yalta conference and whether Stalin believed in a partnership early on. If the trusteeship was extensively discussed between Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta conference, Russian entry into the war and the following Russian activity in Korea would have been virtually inevitable. But to this day, it is unknown to what extent the partnership was discussed upon. The succeeding president Truman, on the other hand, was more skeptical and believed that Soviet actions would mimic its behavior in Eastern Europe. Truman was afraid of Soviet expansionism and wanted to spread democratic ideals in order to stimulate peace internationally. This led him to reject the trusteeship idea and find ways to deter the Soviet Union from occupying the Korean peninsula.
The most influential cause of the split was the uncertain relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This can be seen through Waltz’s third image, one he argues that is more powerful than the first or second, that highlights the international system. Waltz explains that in a world of anarchy, a state must realize their goals through exerting power on another state. In this case, because the U.S. and the Soviet Union both sought to survive and grow their respective spheres of influence, and both powers had a level of distrust for each other in the circumstances preceding the Cold War. Through the lens of political realism, one can see that their respective actions were driven by a need for security and fear of the other. In this context, Waltz’s third image and realism are closely related. Although Truman had the option of cooperating with Stalin and having joint ownership of Korea through the trusteeship, he knew that Stalin’s actions after the war ended would be unpredictable. Truman thought that the Soviets would attempt a so called “sovietization” of Asia, so he wanted to stop Stalin from being a part of Korea’s reconstruction (Matray). In the case that partnership was agreed upon, if Russia acted out and pursued expansionist ambitions, the U.S. would have no international organization to rely upon to enforce order. Because of this, the U.S. only had itself to ensure its security as a global power. As one American official wrote, “neither area could be expected to be satisfied with the status quo” (Matray). The inevitability of both of their behaviors can be explained through this lens of political realism and Waltz’s third image.
Now that the international system has been addressed, the budding tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union can be foreseen through the second image. The second image rationalizes historical events by comparing and contrasting the makeup of the states themselves such as their policies. In terms of the U.S.-Soviet connection, the distinctions between the two were growing far before the spread of communist ideology. As we learned in class, Russia was a land power and extended influence militarily, rather than through economic means. Contrastingly, the U.S. was a sea power and was a prominent player in the international economy. Ideologically, Russia was a communist nation while the U.S. was democratic. This situation of two nations with opposing ideologies and mannerisms caused a classic political situation in which tensions between rising powers can produce a clash. Because American and Soviet leaders wanted to develop Korea to reflect their own political, economic, and social models, the U.S. had to search for a method to ensure that the Soviet Union wouldn’t unilaterally occupy the peninsula. These forces justify the inevitability of the event, especially in comparison to the Peloponnesian war.
The split was also inescapable because the alternative could have been an event resembling the Peloponnesian War. The conditions leading up to both conflicts resemble each other when examining all three images. In the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, we can observe Athens and Sparta being two great powers in a bipolar system with diverging state behaviors. Athens was democratic while Sparta was oligarchic; Athens was a great sea power while Sparta was a great land power; Athens was involved in the international economy while Sparta relatively wasn’t (Holladay). These are just a few of the key differences between the city-state makeups. The U.S. and Russia had very similar differences as described by the second image analysis earlier. Particularly, in both cases, there were grey areas that were highly sought after by each power – Milos and Korea. Athens and Russia refused to accept the status quo and wanted to assert their interests. To avoid conflict that could have escalated to a situation similar to the Peloponnesian War, the U.S. proposed to portion off the newly neutral peninsula of Korea, and the Soviet Union accepted the proposition. This preventative measure was chosen because history has proven that in a bipolar system, two great states are bound to clash because one will eventually use unrestrained aggression to assert their interests.
The final trigger that forced the split to emerge was the bombing and consequent surrender of Japan. After Japan failed to respond to the U.S.’s ultimatum, Truman incorrectly predicted that attacking Japan would stop the Russia from being involved in the reconstruction of Korea. On the contrary, this prompted the Soviets to quickly declare war on Japan, an action completely unexpected by U.S. strategists (Henderson). This would be an oversight on Truman’s part because it was reasonable for Stalin to seize this opportunity to acquire territory. Once it was clear that both the Soviet Union and the U.S. would want a share of the peninsula, the only way to ensure U.S. received a slice was to propose the 38th parallel division (Barry). A diplomatic settlement was not possible because both sides were so apprehensive towards each other – neither end wanted to settle an agreement that would make the other side stronger, even as the divide was becoming more and more deep-seated as time passed. This failure for both sides to convene and discuss reunification at a local level resulted in the permanent emergence of two separate Koreas. While the result was unfortunate, you will soon see that the alternatives to the split could have been more disastrous.
Although there is a widely held belief that the Soviet-American partition of Korea was the result of a hasty U.S. military decision, this does not stand entirely true because the surrounding relationship between the 38th parallel decision and the onset of the Cold War should not be overlooked (Barry). Strategizing with Korea’s future could only be precisely done until the after-effect of Japan’s surrender was clear (Henderson). No matter how much prior planning Truman did with his many intelligent military strategists, he would never be able to know for certain how Stalin would react to Japan’s surrender in this balance of power setting. If a trusteeship were to have happened like Roosevelt wished for, peace would’ve unlikely remained steady, and the Soviet Union would’ve jumped at a future opportunity to take full control, as we saw the Soviets are more than capable of in the following Cold War. If the U.S. hadn’t settled for even at least half of the peninsula, the Red Army already occupying part of the region could have easily invaded the remaining portion. It was only Stalin’s agreement to the conditions of the split that allowed the U.S. to occupy the southern portion (Grey). Truman had to take the deal immediately because if he hadn’t, the Soviets could have attempted to not only dominate all of Korea but also ultimately Japan and China.
So, why was Russia so quick to agree with the U.S.’s proposed separation at the parallel? America was only permitted to take a portion of Korea because Stalin approved of the surrender agreement. Although there is no one clear-cut answer and this matter remains a bit of a mystery to historians, I have my own speculations based on my extensive research and reasoning. I believe that this event was inevitable because Russia strategically decided to forfeit the possibility of amassing the entire peninsula for political motives. Before the U.S. could act, the Soviet Union had already begun to plant military forces on the Korean border, so preventing Soviet forces was out of the question. Because Stalin was occupied with preserving a Russian presence in northeast Asia, he was fixated on Korea long before the U.S. even considered the peninsula a place of interest. So by the time the Japanese surrendered, the Soviet Union was in a stronger position than the U.S. in regards to Korea. Although Stalin could have attempted to occupy the rest of Korea, I speculate that Russia wanted to keep a stable relationship with the U.S. so that the Soviets could participate in East Asia’s future development. Rather than take a larger piece of Korea now, Stalin wanted to stall and wait for a larger opportunity to occupy more of East Asia and he would only be ensured of this if he settled with Truman for the time being.
Any slight change in a number of these forces could have yielded a dramatically different result, but the most obvious one would be if Russia instead decided to pursue unbounded expansionism towards Korea. Russia could have attempted to lead their forces onto the rest of Korea and transformed the ideology of the whole nation. Many of the other theoretical results point to similar conclusions of Stalin pursuing expansionism with the peninsula. For example, if the trusteeship that Roosevelt advocated occurred, we’ve learned from the following events of the Cold War that the Soviet Union’s expansionist goals caused unpredictable actions. Even with a joint-ownership of Korea, Stalin would have eventually pursued ways to singlehandedly control the nation. As we saw in the Peloponnesian War, the neutral area of Milos was destroyed because Athens was relentlessly greedy for territory. In this case, Truman had no choice but to prevent Stalin from having a similar reaction. Also, many believe that it was unusual that there was zero effort on the U.S.’s part to advise the Soviets to stay out of the peninsula. But, as research shows, because Soviet forces were already occupying a part of Korea, Truman had no choice but to concede total control. Any alternative action could have caused the entirety of Korea to be controlled by Kim Jong-Un today. The U.S. had to make the best of its circumstance by pushing the parallel as far north as it could because Stalin’s troops were already in a stronger position. The U.S. simply didn’t have enough power to stop the Soviet forces from occupying Korea once Stalin decided to enter war, so it did not have an alternative choice but to at least share a portion of the peninsula.
Today, some 70 years later, North and South Korea are starkly different, independent nations. Although the Korean people of both sides share the same language and many components of culture, they remain torn from each other. In 1945, the decision to designate the 38th parallel as surrender areas seemed to be merely a temporary solution, but to this day, the separation remains a permanent artifact of World War II. The separation of the country sparked a growth of confronting ideologies that remain forcefully polarized today. Although the split has been seen by some as a mishandling of a military decision on the U.S.’s part, my research and reasoning has revealed that the divide was an inevitable result in preventing the Soviet Union from attempting to occupy the entire peninsula. Now, the next question is if reunification of the two sides is feasible for the future.
Works Cited
- Barry, Mark P. “THE U.S. AND THE 1945 DIVISION OF KOREA: MISMANAGING THE ‘BIG DECISIONS’.” International Journal on World Peace, vol. 29, no. 4, 2012, pp. 37– 59. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24543683.
- Grey, Arthur L. “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, 1951, pp. 482– 487. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20030853.
- Edward I-te Chen. “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of The Systems of Political Control.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 30, 1970, pp. 126– 158. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2718768.
- HENDERSON, GREGORY. “Korea: The Preposterous Division.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2, 1973, pp. 204–212. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24356557.
- Matray, James I. “Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel.” Pacific Historical Review, vol. 50, no. 2, 1981, pp. 145–168. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3638724.