Introduction:
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is one of the longest operating terrorist organizations in all of history. After centuries of war, discrimination, retaliation, and hatred, the PIRA turned to terrorism in the hopes of a united Irish Free State. The PIRA started with strong Ethnonationalist roots, deep psychological and emotional pain from years of oppression, and the decision that terrorism was its only pathway to freedom. Therefore, when action was finally taken, the PIRA was able to survive off of a self-fueling capacity of hatred and its internalized commitment to the long war. It was not until the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 that the PIRA, Irish Unionists, and England were able to begin the process of reconciliation. This paper will discuss what the Provisional Irish Republican Army is, why it began, how it was sustained, and how these factors contributed to its deradicalization and the reconciliation process.
Background on the PIRA:
Before going in depth into the Provisional Irish Republican Army, it is important to look at the larger movement of Irish Republicanism. The struggle for an independent Irish State has been present since the Norman Invasion by England in the Late 12th Century.1 Beginning around the 17th Century, Catholics in Ireland wanted to split from the Protestants in their land that represented their English occupiers. However, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) only began to form in the mid-1910s as the remnants of a former republican movement, the Irish Volunteers.2 With England distracted by World War One, the republican dissidents saw a perfect opportunity to revolt in attempts to obtain a Free Irish State. This revolt became known as the Easter Rising and resulted in the death of over 1,300 people.1 The Easter Rising led to the Irish War of Independence that lasted from approximately 1919 to 1921.3 The war ended with the Anglo-Irish Treaty which released 26 counties in Ireland to become a Free Irish State while the remaining northern 6 counties remained a part of the United Kingdom.4 This treaty was disputed between the ranks of the Irish Republican Army, causing a split between pro-treaty members and anti-treaty rebels. Those who were against the treaty participated in small, periodical attacks from about 1923 to the mid-1960s.5 However, being inspired by the Civil Rights movement in the United States and decades of discrimination, many Irish Republicans in the Loyalist-dominated Northern Ireland started to rebel against what they considered to be an English occupation.1 This begins the era known as “The Troubles” from the 1960s to the 1990s.
In the time period of The Troubles, the Irish Republican Army split into two separate groups, the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).3 The OIRA was defined by its Marxist political motives and eventually faded into the background, becoming a political movement rather than a militarial one.1 On the other hand, the PIRA was the continued armed sect of the Irish Republican Army that was committed to a united, sovereign Ireland no matter the cost. When most people think of the Irish Republican Army, they are actually thinking of the PIRA. In 1969, the predominantly peaceful protests during The Troubles turned into violent encounters between Loyalists and Republicans. The PIRA began as a protector for the Catholic communities in protestant Northern Ireland but soon began to broaden its reach.6 In response to the PIRA’s growing activity in the region, England began to send in more troops to control the uprising. This action only fueled the republicans’ preexisting belief that England was an occupying military force.7
The tensions came to a breaking point on January 30, 1972 when British soldiers opened fire on a massive civil rights street protest killing 13 unarmed Catholics later known as Bloody Sunday.8 This event began decades of war and strife between the republican dissidents and the English occupiers. The PIRA was ultimately responsible for approximately 1,800 deaths of the over 3,500 people killed in “The Troubles” using car bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and other violent acts to promote their cause.2 In 1981, multiple imprisoned PIRA members began a hunger strike in the English-controlled Maze prison. Before the strike was over, 10 members had died from starvation. The death of the Irish prisoners garnered popular support for the republican cause and was the launching point for the PIRA’s political arm, Sinn Fein (meaning “We Ourselves” in Gaelic). Sinn Fein got multiple positions in the Ulster Assembly with over 40% of the popular vote.6 After this point, the PIRA started to differ from acts of terrorism to a more political means of revolution in the 1990s by starting to search for peace agreements with England and their Irish Loyalists. The outcome of these talks was the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 which gave Catholics a more equal say to Protestants in Northern Ireland along with other anti-discriminatory measures. While some members of the PIRA did not support the agreement, the PIRA was for all intents and purposes finished with its armed campaign in 2005 with an official call to end armed resistance.3
Why the PIRA Began:
In order to discover why the Provisional Irish Republican Army ended, it is important to analyze why it began. The PIRA is considered an Ethnonationalist group, best identified by the “common goal of meaningful autonomy for their ethnic community, reunification of ethnic homelands, or complete separation from the state and the establishment of their own independent statehood” (159).5 This identification of the Provisional Irish Republican Army led to Terrorism Scholar Richard English to identify three primary sources for its creation: the geographical/political/historical context in which it was created, the psychological and emotional rationale for terrorism, and the strategic logic of moving into terrorism over peaceful resistance.9
The geographical and political context is the primary identifier for an Ethnonationalist group such as the PIRA. Since the beginning of Irish Republicanism, the goal of many Irish has been to obtain a sovereign and unified Ireland.5 Because of the division between the Free State of Ireland and Northern Ireland after the original revolts, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was destined to fail. While England may have seen it as the realigning of political boundaries, the Irish (especially Catholics) saw it as the division of its ethnic community between political lines. To them, being Irish was not a political matter defined by nationalist boundaries, but it was a cultural, ethnic identity that had formed over centuries. The Irish did not want to be controlled by any power other than themselves whether it be in part or as a whole. This staunch nationalism gave the IRA and PIRA and strong foundation of resistance as well as the Sinn Fein a strong political platform rooted in the strong Irish identity to build its campaign off of.9 These geo-ethnic struggles and sense of nationalism combined with decades of historical tension and turmoil between the Catholics and Protestants, leading to the creation of the PIRA.
Another major factor behind the creation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army was the psychological and emotional strain on the Irish people. It is important to recognize that the Provisional Irish Republican Army identified as an oppressed people against its oppressors and not as one political identity trying to gain control over the other. Because of this, Irish Republicanism was more than the fight for political sovereignty but it was the struggle for the people’s ability to express their identity. The suppression of the Irish identity and autonomy fostered a sense of rebellion within the Irish people. Republicanism was passed through generations, embedding rebellion into the DNA of the Irish people. When the PIRA started to act, it was not an unruly revolt by a power-thirsty people, but it was a necessary act of cultural, psychological, and emotional liberation that had been embedded in Irish culture for generations.9
The shift of Irish Republicanism from peaceful protest to violent action was not an irrational plight that was taken without a second thought, but it was a strategic and logical decision. From approximately 1966 to 1968, Irish Republicanism took the form of predominantly peaceful protests inspired by the Civil Rights movement in the United States. The dissidents attempted to reach their political goals through peaceful means, but after repeated failures and increased discrimination, the majority of Irish Catholics found that the peaceful route towards revolution was unsuccessful and started to demand for action. In August 1969, riots occurred throughout the entirety of Northern Ireland in response to attacks on peaceful protesters and the destruction of civil infrastructure leaving thousands of the Republican Catholics without water or energy. Member of the Irish Republican Army decided that any hope for a peaceful reconciliation of their lands had passed by and the only viable option for the liberation and autonomy that they hoped for would be in the hands of armed resistance. The PIRA believed that, “Irish history is littered with the corpses of Irish politicians who genuinely believed that political process set up by the English would achieve justice and freedom for the Irish nation” (65).9 The time for protest was over, and the time for revolution had finally begun.
How the PIRA was Sustained:
The IRA as a whole is known for being one of the longest operating terrorist groups in history. It defies the “Waves of Terrorism” of the terrorist expert Dr. James Forest (24)5 (eras of growth and decay of terrorist groups) and its transition from a terrorist organization to a political entity is one of the most studied aspects of terrorism by scholars. Even the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s greater than 30 year influence greatly surpasses the average life span of 7 years for a terrorist organization. Ultimately, the PIRA’s success and longevity can be defined by two factors: its self-fueling capacity and the preparation for the “long war.” 9
Dr. Richard English introduces the idea of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s self-fueling capacity in his book Terrorism: How to Respond.9 This self-fueling capacity is best described as a “tit for tat” system that focuses on the escalation of violence by both the Irish Republicans and Protestant Loyalists. One of the best examples of this is the Bloody Sunday attacks. After years of built up anger and tension between the two groups, a group of around 20,000 unarmed Catholic civilians held a peaceful protest in the City of Derry in Northern Ireland. At some point, riots began to ensue and British soldiers shot and killed 13 unarmed protesters and injured 17 more.8 This attack on the Irish Republicans was used as a rally cry and justification by the PIRA for further and greater attacks on the Loyalists and England. However, these attacks further enraged the Loyalists which led to a stronger and more violent response. This stronger response, in turn, fueled the fire of rebellion within the PIRA. This process goes on an on. If the PIRA dealt a major blow to the British occupation, it was seen as a major success for the movement and inspired the nationalism of the group; if the PIRA was attacked and injured by the Loyalists, they would vilify and demonize the Protestants and use the attack as a rally-cry for their cause. This circular system of gain and loss led to a constant escalation of the commitment to the Republican cause.
The second factor that led to the longevity of the Provisional Irish Republican Army was its focus on the “long war.” 9 Every single fighter and recruit came into the PIRA knowing that the war was not going to be quick and easy. The Irish people had been fighting their British occupier for centuries, and both sides knew that the other was not going away easily. However, this idea of long war provided hope for the Irish people. By knowing and being prepared for a longer struggle, the Irish were not dismayed at momentary setbacks but had a larger image in mind. The integrity of the movement did not rest on the successes or failures of the attacks, but it rested in the life and persevering nature of the Irish community.7
The End of the PIRA:
There is probably nothing more fascinating about the Provisional Irish Republican Army than its transition from an active terrorist organization to a peaceful political entity. The PIRA is one of the only terrorist organizations that has ended peacefully. Studying how the PIRA began and how it was sustained shows the ultimate reason for its eventual decline. By the time the peace talks had begun, many of the influences that had formed or sustained the group had disappeared from the Republican movement. The Catholics realized their own ethno-supremacy, it was no longer logical to engage in warfare, the self-fueling capacity had run out of gas, and the long war had become a bit too long.
One of the biggest components to the end of the PIRA (and essentially the IRA as a whole) was that revolution through political means became more effective than through acts of terror.9 Terrorism was no longer logical and was viewed as a hindrance to political reformation. While there were still many attacks by the Provisional Irish Republican Army throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, they had lost their effect. Bombing and assassinations may have gotten a lot of media and attention, but they ultimately did not change the political climate of Ireland.10 Sinn Fein was making greater strides than any bomb was in the later days of the campaign.11 The PIRA was founded because the peaceful, political route for freedom was impossible, and by the end, the peaceful path was the only route left to take that could bring any chance of redemption to their war-torn homes and communities.
Secondly, the self-fueling capacity of hatred stopped being a motivational entity.9 Both the Irish and the English people got desensitized to the acts of the other. These acts did not go unnoticed by any means, but they lost the “shock-and-awe” of the early bombings. At some point, the Republicans realized that they put their hatred for the English over their pursuit of freedom. The hatred provided by the attacks and England’s responses to those attacks became the very thing that was stopping the Irish people from receiving the freedom they desperately longed for. When an attack happened, it was no longer met with a rally cry but with tears of mourning for lost family members and a lost Ireland.12
There was also a point where the long war got too long. The war-weary Republicans were tired of seeing their own people dying and imprisoned with little to no gain. They no longer fixed their eyes on a future of freedom and autonomy, but they stared at the body bags their streets and the holes in their families. The hope of liberation through armed resistance had come and gone, and all that was left was politics. Although the long war was instrumental to sustaining the PIRA, it could not stand the reality that war itself was ineffective and did not offer the promises of freedom that it had given in the decades earlier.10
Finally, the remaining factor that led to the deradicalization of the PIRA was the recognition that they could not achieve their goals by forcibly removing the British, but that they had to win the hearts and minds of the Unionist Protestants as well. One PIRA member said, “In a way we made [the unionists] a non-people. We just said: you can’t move the unionists until you move the Brits. So we didn’t even see them as a part of the solution” (81-82).9 The PIRA failed to realize that the divisions and diversity within their own people was causing a stumbling block towards achieving their goals. The strength of an Ethnonationalist group lies within its unanimity and, by rejecting the perspective of the pro-British north, the PIRA weakened its position and influence. The reconciliation of these two groups began the moment the dialogue between the Irish Republicans and Irish Unionists had begun.10 Of course there was still hesitation and animosity between the groups, but both sides recognized the humanity in the other. Rather than blowing up bridges (literally and metaphorically), the PIRA decided to build them in attempts to reconcile their shared Irish heritage with the people of the North.12 The ethnonationalist PIRA lost its radical tactics when it decided to sacrifice its goal of political dominance for social equality and reconciliation.
Conclusion:
The Provisional Irish Republican Army is a unique example of how a radical terrorist organization can transform into a political power and hatred can lead to reconciliation. By analyzing how the PIRA was formed and sustained and comparing those to the reasons for its deradicalization, it is possible to uncover the answer for addressing terrorism in the future.
The PIRA began due to three primary factors: the psychological and emotional effect of oppression, the logical necessity for terrorism, and the Ethnonationalism of the PIRA. The Good Friday Agreement gave the discriminated and oppressed Catholics in Northern Ireland their voices and political liberation. The PIRA’s attempts to achieve freedom through terrorism was no longer effective, leaving political and social revolution as the only pathway towards achieving their goals. The divisive and counter-intuitive nature of ethnonationalism was realized when the PIRA and Unionists came together and discussed their common humanity. When both sides of the conflict were able to come together, they addressed and essentially resolved the struggles that led to the creation of the PIRA.
The final two factors that needed to be resolved could be found in how the PIRA was sustained: its self-fueling capacity and the idea of the long war. Even when the reasons for fighting in the first place had been removed, it was difficult to break the cycle of hatred that had been apart of the Irish Republican identity for so long. In the end, the self-fueling capacity of hatred became seen as a system of death and loss for no gain rather than its initial call for rebellion. The hope that the Irish people had vested in the long war seemed to fade when war itself was no longer seen as effective. Terrorism no longer fed the Irish dissidents with the immense hatred and hope that was necessary to keep on fighting. The only hope that remained was in the process of reconciliation.
The transition of the Provisional Irish Republican Army into a peaceful resistance not only provides hope for the people of Ireland but for all who engage in and are affected by Terrorism. This war-torn land and community had fought for generations with no end in sight. However, by reaching across the aisle and holding fast to the humanity of “the other,” social and cultural unification began in a divided land. Although every terrorist group is unique and different, and the situation in Ireland is still far from perfect, the reconciliation of the Irish Republican and Unionists shows that there is hope for peace in times of war.