Section 1: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
This investigation will explore the question: To what extent was the battle of Kursk a Soviet victory? This will mainly focus on the time period during the Battle of Kursk, an unsuccessful German assault on the Soviet salient around the city of Kursk from July 5, 1943 to Aug 23, 1943, but it will also discuss the preparation for the Operation Citadel, a German offensive campaign to Kursk that leads to the Battle of Kursk, to examine the long-term causes of the German defeat at Kursk.
The first source that will be evaluated is Colonel David M. Glantz’s report, “Soviet defense tactics at Kursk, July 1943,” written in 1986. The purpose of this source is to access the Soviet tactics at Kursk and how the Soviet tactics have developed throughout the Battle of Kursk from July 5, 1943. The content of this source contrasts the Soviet tactics before the Battle of Kursk and during the Battle of Kursk, how the Soviet tactics have adopted to the German blitzkrieg, and how effective the Soviet adjustments were in the Battle of Kursk. The origin of this source is valuable because Glantz is a an American military historian who is known for his books on the Red Army during World War II and the chief editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, proving that he is knowledgeable on this topic. The date of publication of this source, 1986, is another value since it indicates that Glanz has been able to analyze other sources from other military historians. In fact, he has cited documents from the militaries around the world, including the US Army Foreign Military Studies. One limitation of this source is that this source doesn’t take into the account of the German situations, like the fact that Germany were running low on reserves and resources during the Battle of Kursk, which is a significant factor that contributed to the outcome of the battle. The purpose of this source is another limitation for historians since it doesn’t present a balanced argument whether the result of the Battle of Kursk is a German tactical failure or a Soviet’s tactical victory.
The second source evaluated in depth is Robert M. Citino’s presentation in the International Conference on World War II at the National WWII Museum in 2013. The purpose of this presentation is to provide a tactical – how the generals’ plans for the battle– and operational – how it really turned out – approach to the Battle of Kursk in an entertaining way to the audience. The content of the source outlines the course of the battle, from the beginning of the Battle of Kursk to the end of the battle when Hitler ordered the halt of the operation, through two perspective: military tactical perspective and operational perspective. One value of the source is that the address provides insights from the preparation of the Battle of Kursk and doesn’t only focus on the course of the battle. By providing information about the German’s and the Soviet’s preparation, the source gave the audience a better understanding of the outcome of the battle. Other value is the fact that Citino’s address presents multiple perspectives: the German and the Soviet generals’ perspectives and German factors and the Soviet factors that contribute to the outcome of the war. However, one limitation is that Citino had only about 70 minutes to present. Therefore, he may have not given all the details due to the time limit. The purpose, to present the facts in an entertaining way, is also another limitation as some of his points maybe exaggerated or blurred for the purpose of entertainment.
Section 2: Investigation
The Battle of Kursk (July 5–August 23, 1943) was an unsuccessful German assault on the Soviet salient around the city of Kursk during World War II. Prior to the Operation Citadel, which was a German offensive to take Kursk and led to the Battle of Kursk, the Heer (German Army) was facing a shortage in infantry and artillery. To initiate the offensive, Germans moved the majority of their Panzer units near Kursk, increasing the chance of Red Army to counterattack and weakening other fronts. Furthermore, the German industries were unable to replace damaged war equipment. On the other hand, the intelligence gathered by the Soviet and German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov (map in Appendix A) alarmed the Soviet in advance, enabling them to fortify Kursk. It seemed like the Red Army had the upper hand. But, the Soviet defences were ineffective against the Germans and had to suffer from heavy losses during the battle. In fact, historians argue that the war was not a Soviet victory. In fact, the Western Allies have saved the Soviets as they landed on Sicily, and Hitler had to halt the Operation Citadel and pull the forces out of the Battle of Kursk in a fear of Western Allied invasion of mainland Europe.
The Germans were ill prepared for the Operation Citadel, as they did not have the resources, like manpower and oil, and industrial capacity to initiate and sustain the offensive. Prior to the operation, the German army suffered from the results of Operation Barbarossa that resulted in a shortage of infantry and artillery. By 1943, it had lost a considerable amount of its elite forces and was replaced by newly recruited soldiers, who were undertrained. Although it had managed to acquire around 777,000 men for the operation, its actual combat strength was equivalent to two-third of its rational strength.10 Even these newly recruited soldiers cannot eliminate the shortage of men. By the start of the Operation Citadel, units were in total 470,000 men understrength. Germany was also facing shortages in fuel for the Luftwaffe. In fact, the Luftwaffe could only sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began. Along with shortage in resources, Germany lacked the industrial capacity to sustain the offensive. On May 4, when Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to discuss the Operation Citadel, Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments and War Production, delivered the limitations of German industry to replace losses to Hitler. German industries couldn’t replace damaged aircraft and tanks over the course of the operation. Due to the shortage of resources and lack of industrial capacity, which made Germany ill prepared for the offensive, Hitler’s top officers, Col General Jodl and Col General Guderian, oppose the operation. In fact, Col General Guderian even advised Hitler to “Leave it (Kursk) alone.” But, Hitler initiated the operation and the Battle of Kursk began. As the operation continued, the problems became evident. Germans were had to face a gradual decrease in the total number of their tanks and aircraft as the operation continued and gradually losing its strength and air support, preventing the Germans from advancing at their full momentum. The lack of infantry became a bigger problem during the operation. For the Germans to undertake a successful offensive in 1943, they had to hold their ground to secure counterattacks while advancing into the Soviet defenses. However, the deficient in infantry divisions made it harder for the Germans to secure their original front and new territories.12 This meant that the German Panzer units had to carry out defensive and offensive at the same time, slowing the Germans down. In addition, they had reallocated 70% of all the tanks located on the Eastern Front to for the operation, leaving the fronts defenseless against Soviet attacks.10 Soviet counterattacks, concentrated on the German weak points have slowed the German advance even further. Slowed German offensive meant that the Germans could not conduct their primary strategy, blitzkrieg, and couldn’t win a decisive victory, which the Germans needed. The prolonged battle caused problems as the majority of elite German forces and resources were devoted to the battle. These weakened other fronts, making Allies land on Sicily. Hitler had to promptly halt the operation to reinforce Italy (map in Appendix B) in fear of the Allied invasion of Italy through Sicily.
Although the Red Army prepared thoroughly against German offensive and attempted counterattacks, the result of the Operation Citadel wasn’t a complete Soviet victory. In fact, the Allied forces saved the Soviets. Before the Germans began their offensive, Soviets were able to fortify Kursk after receiving intelligence about German troop concentrations at Orel and Kharkov (map in Appendix A) and details of an intended German offensive in the Kursk sector. They constructed three main defensive belts in fronts around Kursk and placed each subdivided into several zones of fortification. They interconnected each belts barbed-wire fences, minefields, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles, dug-in armored vehicles, and machine-gun bunkers. They hoped to draw the Germans into a trap and destroy their armored vehicles, creating an optimal condition for counterattack. In addition, special training was provided to the Soviet soldiers to help them overcome the tank phobia. However, the defenses were less effective than the Soviets have hoped. German tank losses were lower than Soviet expectations. The Soviet defenses slowed the German advance, but German advancements still were faster than the Soviets’ expectations. As the battle continued, the Soviets were in danger of getting encircled by the German Panzer units. Despite the strong Soviet defense, the German generals were still considered the German victory likely. The Germans able effectively eliminate Soviet units. During the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet lost roughly three times more men, two times more tanks and four times more self-propelled guns than the Germans. However, Hitler cancelled the Operation Citadel on July 12 to reinforce Italy as the Western Allies had invaded Sicily, in a fear of Allied invasion of Europe. Therefore, it is safe to say that the Soviet defenses, which were well prepared as Professor Geoffrey Wawro described, “Maginot line put on steroids,” weren’t the main reasons that Germans halted the offensive but, instead, the invasion of Sicily. Some historians, like Dennis Showalter, argue that the Battle of Kursk tactical defeat for the Red Army due to the Soviet losses.
In conclusion, the outcome of Battle of Kursk was a German failure instead of a Soviet victory. Although the Soviets were heavily prepared for a German offensive, the major reasons for the defeat came from German’s attention was too focused on Kursk and couldn’t win a swift victory due to their ill preparation. German victory seemed likely until the Allied invasion of Sicily, which saved the Soviets, as Hitler had to halt the offensive and pull the forces out of the Battle of Kursk in a fear of Western Allied invasion of mainland Europe.
Section 3: Reflection
When investigating history, a historian could find many limitations. For example, identifying the number of death may seem reliable since I am identifying a quantitative data. A problem that I came across though is that it is very hard to prove the reliability of the numbers of causalities as the numbers vary according to the origins of the sources. This is because the governments have often deflated the causalities to inflate their military pride. Maybe the biggest task of a historian is rather to minimize the bias. During my investigation, I noticed that this task is much easier to fulfill when there are multiple sources from multiple origins so historians can compare each source to minimize the bias of the sources.
Winston Churchill once said, “History is written by victors.” This was true when I investigating the Battle of Kursk. While I was researching, I had to consider the fact that the Allied perspective dominates the examinations of the battle. Number of sources often exaggerated the Allied successes and neglected German failures. This was a challenge as I tried to give a balanced argument. To give a balanced argument, I explore further by reading some sources written by German general who were involved in the Operation Citadel. When investigating, historians struggle to find balanced arguments as most of the sources are dominated by one perspective.