Essay: Fourth Crusade (1202-4)

Fewer periods of European history have attracted modern scholarly attention than that of the series of Christian wars now formally known as the Crusades. This is very much reflected in the fact that there has been no century since that of the eleventh in which scholarly publications on the crusades have not been published. Of particular controversy is the Fourth Crusade (1202-4), widely regarded as the ’most infamous episode of the age’. Part of the fascination with the Fourth Crusade undoubtedly lies in the extraordinary reversal of its original intention. The diversion or, in the opinion of many, the perversion from its original goals in Egypt culminated in the capture and eventual sack of the ‘greatest’ Christian City, Constantinople. Historians, such as Steve Runciman and John Godfrey, have since labelled the Fourth Crusade as ‘ungodly’ and ‘unholy’. Runciman furthers his condemnation by suggesting that the Fourth Crusade was the ‘ultimate perversion of the crusading ideal’. The historical problem we face as historians when considering this notion lays not within the decision to divert to Constantinople but within the evolution of the crusading concept, should it even exist. Debate as to the religious credibility of the expedition is essentially subjective to this problem. We must therefore firstly aim to define the crusading ideal. From this, we can then consider the arguments proposed by advocates and critics of Runciman’s notion.
Despite the efforts of historians, a single set definition of the concept of crusading remains yet to be seen. We can however look to the accounts of contemporaries to identify the fundamental aspects of the crusading ideal. Crusading rhetoric was first partially conceived by Pope Urban II in his call to arms at the Council of Clermont, 1095. Although no surviving material of Urban’s speech has yet to surface, we can employ the reactions of contemporaries to envisage the key aspects of the early crusading ideal. For example, in William of Malmesbury’s account, all those who take up the cross would enjoy ‘absolution from all their crimes’. Robert the Monk also wrote that anyone who would ‘set out on this journey [would] obtain the remission of sins and be sure of the incorruptible glory of the kingdom of heaven’. From this, we can identify two fundamental aspects; the taking of the cross and the remission of sins. Historians have since emphasised that the prime motivator for crusaders was the opportunity to serve God. Norman Housley for example, suggests this was the intrinsic link from the first until the very last crusade, in which all crusaders were ‘united by the common bond of assuming the cross for penitential service in Christs war’. The final feature of the early crusading ideal is that expeditions to recapture Holy Lands could only be declared by the pope in his capacity as Christ’s vicar or representative. Riley Smith suggests ‘from its inception, crusading represented a practical expression of papal ideology, leadership and power’. It is important to also acknowledge the evolution of the crusading ideal, of which Jabowski argues is partially due to the ‘failure of the papacy to truly define crusade’. Whilst traditionalists such as Hans Mayer, stress that the utmost defining aspect of a crusade was in the recapture or defence of Jerusalem. Pluralists on the other hand, insist that the evolution of the crusading rhetoric encompassed the holy expeditions that ventured to different lands. From establishing these fundamental aspects, we can compare and contrast the Fourth Crusade with the crusading ideal.
Exploring the financial motivations of the crusaders is essential to understanding the extent to which the participants of the Fourth Crusade remained true to their religious commitments. We must firstly look to the developments prior to the decision to attack Constantinople. Most significantly, the attitudes of the crusaders and the justifications of the decision to accept the Treaty of Zara. Savvas Neocleous, argues that the ‘real reason’ behind the diversion to Constantinople was ‘the payment of outstanding debts’. R.H Schmandt on the other hand, contests Neocleous’ view and instead argues that a ‘major factor of a religious nature counted for much with the crusaders’ in reference to the decision to accept Prince Alexios’ proposal. Madden and Queller reiterate Schmandt’s views, suggesting ‘certainly the proponents of the German proposal urged the virtue of reuniting the Greek Church to Rome’. In support of his claim, Necleous relies upon the account of Robert of Clari, who states that the crusaders did not have money because of ‘the great sum which they had given to the (Venetian) fleet.’ Clari’s account is substantiated by a baronial letter sent to the West in late August 1203, following Alexios’ accession to the Byzantine throne. In this letter, Baldwin of Flanders, Hugh of Saint Pol and Louis of Blois, addressed Pope Innocent III, Otto of Brunswick and ‘all the Christian faithful’, claiming that the crusading army would not be able to ‘effectively land in the territory of Saracens’ as a result of ‘lacking all foodstuffs and supplies’. Both Clari’s account and the letter reveal that those in favour of Alexios’ proposal were insistent on the crusaders lack of supplies and monies. The generous nature of Alexios’ proposition (200,000 silver marks) must be considered. It is therefore no surprise that the financially stricken crusaders were keen to accept the proposal. Queller on the other hand disregards the financial motives of the crusaders and insists that in reference to the reparation payments owed to the Venetians, the crusaders ‘paid no attention to them’. This claim can be debased when considering that the repayment of the debts owed to the Venetians was concealed by the crusade leaders during the discussions at Zara as well as the letter sent to the West. An explicit reference to the crusaders’ outstanding debt would compromise the positions of the leading barons such as Baldwin of Flanders and Louis of Blois. This therefore emphasises that the faction in favour of Alexios’ proposal prioritised their financial motives and ignored their religious commitments by deliberately masking their debts when communicating with the Roman Curia.
Religious commitments did not entirely exit the fray of discussions made prior to the acceptance of Alexios’ agreement (the Treaty of Zara, 1203). Schmandt can be supported by Villehardouin’s account of the discussion. According to Villehardouin, those in favour of Alexios’ proposal claimed ‘by way of Cairo or Greece, the (Holy) land will be recovered’. This engages with the traditionalist definition of the concept of crusading — the capture or defence of Jerusalem. Villehardouin also recorded the motivations of the Cistercian abbots of the faction favouring Alexios’ proposal. Abbot of Simon for example, urged the crusaders to ‘accept this (Alexios’) agreeement, because it was the means by which they could better recover the land of outremer.’ Neocleous acknowledges that the faction in favour of Alexios’ proposal advanced the argument regarding the strategic importance of the Byzantine Empire in the recapture of Jerusalem. Although, Neocleous remains critical of their arguments by questioning the strategic importance of the Greek peninsula and instead suggests ‘it was something much more’ in reference to the Frankish barons decision to support Alexios’ proposal. Although, we can compare this to the Second Crusade (), in which Housley suggests the prime target – Edessa, had ‘no significant religious connotations’.
Schmandt also relies upon Hystoria Constantinopolina, an account produced by Cistercian monk Gunter of Pairis. According to Gunther, the crusaders ‘knew that this very city (Constantinople) was rebellious and offensive to the Holy Roman Church’. We must however consider that Gunther wrote with hindsight in which the crusaders, portrayed as knowing Constantinople was rebellis et odiosa, simply serving his apologetic purposes for the Latin conquest of the city. Gunther further suggests the crusaders did not think the capture of Constantinople would ‘displease very much either the supreme pontiff or even God’. This suggestion in itself is enough to discredit the source. Although, according to Madden, the reunification of the Church was a ‘papal priority’ for Innocent III which implies that the crusaders may have been attempting to prioritise the ambitions of the Pope in their diversion to Constantinople. From the surface, Hugh of Saint Pol’s letter to Henry of Brabant appears to further support Schmandt’s claim. In reference to the decision to divert to Constantinople, Saint Pol suggests the crusaders advanced the business of Christ, in that the Eastern Church – whose chief city was erstwhile Constantinople – along with the emperor and his entire empire…acknowledges itself to be the daughter of the Roman Church.
The origins and nature of the source can however be used to discredit Schmandt’s argument. The letter was drafted by a learned cleric in the crusading army and derives its argument from the eleventh century reforming popes view of all individual Christian churches as daughters of the Roman Curia. It therefore, likewise with Gunther’s account, merely serves as a propaganda piece to legitimise the diversion to Constantinople. Religious commitments can also be evidenced by the reactions of the crusaders to both the initial proposal and the decision to accept the proposal. Jonathan Phillips for example argues there was a ‘huge split within ranks’. This is supported the account of Clari, who records that, in May 1203,  dissent among the crusaders erupted on the Byzantine island of Corfu ‘the detour to the Byzantine capital was still far from acceptable to the majority of the crusaders’.
Neocleous’ argument is far more convincing than that of Schmandt when considering the notion that the Fourth Crusaders was ‘ungodly’ and ‘uholy’. This is primarily because the leadership of the Fourth Crusade deliberately concealed their ulterior motives of the leading barons from Pope Innocent III, defying papal authority. Whilst this argument can be countered using examples of dissent amongst the crusading party, we can also re-use the account of Villehardouin, who reveals the Treaty of Zara was ‘executed by only 11 Frankish nobles’, suggesting that the crusade was conducted on the behalf of a minority group. In addition, in his letter to Henry of Brabant, Hugh of Saint Pol recorded that those in favour of the proposal were ‘few more than 20’. In a different version of the same letter, Hugh listed the names of thirteen Frankish nobles, eleven of which were belonged to Baldwin of Flanders and Louis of Blois, whose representatives had agreed the Treaty of Venice. Clari also reveals that these representatives had negotiated that the treaty of Venice had granted them (Blois and Flanders) ‘full authority to act, as if they were lords in person’. This demonstrates that those bound to the Treaty of Venice were strongly inclined to pursue the Treaty of Zara in pursuit of personal gain. Secondly, Villehardouin’s account reveals that under the terms of the treaty of Venice, the Venetians were obliged to ‘carry food for nine months’, of which the crusaders only consumed two months worth. The subsequent attack on the city of Zara also exposes the false claims of shortage in provisions as the city, ‘well furnished with all goods’, provided a surplus of supplies for the Frankish crusaders. Lastly, the examination of the primary sources used by Schmandt reveal that the desire to seek ecclesiastical union was falsely promoted in an attempt to gain papal authorisation. Instead, the true concerns were that of Alexios’ reinstatement and the generous returns promised. The crusading barons were however fully aware of the fact that from a byzantine constitutional perspective, Prince Alexios’ claim to the throne was weak but it still served as a ‘good and reasonable excuse’. This therefore emphasises that the most pressing concern of the crusading barons in the decision to divert to Constantinople and accept the Treaty of Zara was the pursuit of financial gains. In turn, the crusading party abandoned their religious commitments thus undermining the religious credibility of the crusade itself and significantly contributing to the notion that the Fourth Crusade was in fact a perversion of the crusading ideal.
The defiance of Pope Innocent III in both the decision to accept the proposal of Prince Alexios’ and the subsequent attack on the city of Constantinople further substantiates the idea that the Fourth Crusade was a perversion of the crusading ideal. Controversy surrounding the Pope’s involvement is first seen prior to the siege of Zara. Achille Luchaire accepted Villehardouin’s claim that Innocent welcomed the treaty of Venice and argued that Innocent was ‘willing to accept anything to keep the army together’. Luchaire cited Gunther of Pairis, who claimed that the papal legate with the crusade, Peter of Capuano, refused to let Abbot of Martin of Pairis abandon the crusade. Innocent, Harris argues, was therefore ‘anxious to publicly discountenance the deed but was in fact eager to let it run its course to profit from its consequences and to establish papal primacy over Constantinople.’ Housley disputes Luchaire’s argument and instead argues that Innocent instructed Peter to ‘forbid the assault’ (on Zara) and ‘threaten them with excommunication’. In addition, Housley instead claims that Peter ignored the will of the Pope thus giving ‘tacit endorsement’ to the crusading leaders. Housley claims are well founded when considering Innocent’s letter to the crusaders in 1203. Innocent warned the crusaders ‘not one of you should rashly flatter himself that he is allowed to attack or pillage the land of the Greeks’. Andrea also suggests ‘the letter, when it did arrive, forced the crusaders to choose between obedience to the pope and fulfilling their vows to the Venetians’. Clearly, from the decision to attack Zara as well as the decision to overlook Innocent’s last ditch attempt to prevent the diversion to Constantinople, the Crusaders chose to defy the will of the Roman Curia. More importantly, in his reformation of papal policy, Innocent declared himself Christ’s vicar.  At the time, the Crusaders were therefore resisting the word of Christ himself, further supporting the notion that the crusade was a perversion due to its unholy nature.
The justification of the attack on Constantinople following Alexios’ IV assassination was a significant insult to the authority of the papacy and further undermines the religious credibility of the crusade. Neocleous argues ‘the pope had expressly forbidden an assault on the Byzantine capital.’ Kenneth M. Setton on the other hand, argues ‘Innocent III…undoubtedly saw the Fourth Crusade primarily from a religious standpoint, and took immense satisfaction in the prospect of concluding the long schism by conquest’. Neocleous centres his claim around the scheming actions of the crusade clergy, of whom he argues manipulated the crusaders by denouncing the Greeks as enemies of the faith.Robert of Clari detailed the clergy’s attempts to inspire hatred against the Greeks;
The bishops and priests in the camp conferred together, and their opinion was that the battle was just and it was right to attack them (the Byzantines). For in times past the people of the city had obeyed the creed of Rome, and now they were disobeying it.
Setton instead argues that the justifications advanced by the clergy were derived from Innocent himself. Drawing upon the clash of civilisations thesis, initially composed by Walter Norden and later advocated by Runciman, Setton argues that the papacy hoped for the destruction of the Byzantine states to facilitate Greek recognition of papal primacy in Christendom. Setton cites that centuries of conflict, dating beyond the Cerularian schism of 1054, particularly the Byzantine imperial claim to universal temporary sovereignty (challenged by the popes crowning of Charlemange in 800 and of Otto in 962) acted as a catalyst in the division of Christendom into the Greek East and Latin West. Contemporary evidence for Setton’s argument is however somewhat questionable. The fourteenth century Chronicles of the Morea, speak of Innocent’s justifications for the attack to be carried out; how the expedition to Constantinople would be more honourable and more profitable than that to Jerusalem, because the Greeks were Christians and yet, for some error which had got into them, they were rebellious and unwilling to receive the sacraments of the Holy Church of Rome, and that it was better to regain and covert the Greeks and return them to the obedience of Holy Church.
The source must be approached with caution as it romanticises the Venetian tale of events. Neocleous’ argument remains more favourable than that of Setton’s. The nature of the sources cited by Setton and the flaws of the clash of civilisations theory casts doubts as to the credibility of his argument. We can also look to the account of Clari, who detailed the agreements made in the treaty of March 1204;
All those in camp were made…to swear on relics…they would not use force on any women or rob her of her clothes…For anyone who was guilty of this would be killed.
This reveals that the clergy were fully aware of their treason against the papacy thus they sought to prevent any severe abuse of their fellow Christians. Neocleous also argues that Clari’s account demonstrates that despite their attempts to ‘dechristianise’ the Greeks, they still were still acknowledged as members of the Christian community, rather than enemies of the faith. We can therefore conclude that not only did the clergy actively work against the authority of Pope Innocent III in spite of his position as Christ’s vicar, they also encouraged the crusaders to attack fellow members of the faith.