Advances towards modernisation were constant throughout the period of 1854-1954. The overarching aim of modernisation was to catch up to the other great powers (Britain, France, Germany, USA) and to solidify and protect the regimes that existed. The first of which was the Tsarist regime under the reign of Alexander II, Alexander III and Nicholas II, preceding the popular revolution of October 1917, where the Bolsheviks lead by Lenin asserted their illegitimate communist political system until his death in 1924, where power was transferred to Joseph Stalin. Other factors that could be considered as the fundamental problem of Russia are war and the impact of individual figures.
From the beginning of his reign in 1855, Alexander II inherited the problems that his father Nicholas I could not deal with. The main problem he inherited was defeat in the Crimean war. This emphasised the lack of modernisation in Russia, thereby giving the state and the Tsar an ultimatum to either reform or be subdued by the peasantry, which constituted 82% of the Russian population and were branded as the “dark masses” by the middle class intelligentsia for the fear that they had the ability, with guidance, to overthrow the state. He was named “Tsar liberator” for the reforms he introduced whilst on the Russian throne. The Tsar’s liberal education, primarily conducted by the poet Zhukovsky, is possibly the answer to his step away from far-right politics. Although, as an autocrat, he retained many of the traditional values his father possessed, this combination led to a less reactionary nature than his father but constituted an indecisiveness to push reform in good time. Alexander II’s urgency to reform whilst also seeking approval from the nobility can be best viewed through his speech to the state council in 1861.
‘The matter of the liberation of the serfs . . .I consider to be a vital question for Russia, upon which will depend the development of her strength and power. I am sure that all of you, gentlemen, are just as convinced as I am of the benefits and necessity of this measure. I have another conviction, which is that this matter cannot be postponed . . . I repeat–and this is my absolute will–that this matter should be finished right away. For four years now, it has dragged on and has been arousing various fears and anticipations among both the estate owners and the peasants. Any further delay could be disastrous to the state…. I hope, gentlemen, that on inspection of the drafts presented to the State Council, you will assure yourselves that all that can be done for the protection of the interests of the nobility has been done; if on the other hand you find it necessary in any way to alter or to add to the presented work, then I am ready to receive your comments; but I ask you only not to forget that the basis of the whole work must be the improvement of the life of the peasants–an improvement not in words alone or on paper but in actual fact.’
The source adds value to my argument on the basis that it highlights the need for reform in Russia, with the main factor being the “development of her strength and power”. This reflects the long-term failure of Nicholas I in the Crimean war of which responsibility was transferred to his son after his death. The term “conviction” on the forefront can be viewed as a sense of security in the Tsar’s decision to emancipate the serfs, however when following with the fact that the “matter cannot be postponed” it inadvertently signifies the state of panic in which the reform was created and conveys a sense of indecisive action from Alexander II. This introduced problems with the quality of reform that existed. The speech was written and delivered by Alexander II directly, including the phrase “it is my absolute will” which allows for a more direct expression that can be perceived, of which Alexander’s autocratic nature can be viewed, however as a speech the source lacks the tone and clarity required to fully understand the context of his argument. The source is directed towards the gentry, as can be inferred by his precise use of “gentlemen” which was reserved for the upper class, this lends itself to a more subjective outcome as both parties (land owners and peasants) were not present during this discussion.
By abolishing serfdom in 1861, Alexander II was responsible for one of the most significant reforms in 19th century Europe. Considering this as an act of repression on the peasantry, it took place on an enormous scale. Serfs represented an estimated 37.7% of the population according to the census of 1857. There is speculation to whether the reforms of Alexander II existed for the sole benefit of the peasantry and could instead be regarded as a political compromise between himself and the nobility who were conservative and opposed reform. Some historians view this action as a form of repression in order to appease landowners as many peasants were worse off after the emancipation, for instance the entrapment of ex-serfs who were still economically tied to their landlords, even if not legally. The emancipation fuelled opposition to the Tsar from both the Peasants and the nobility. This ultimately had both positive and negative implications for the Tsarist regime in the long and short term. Short term it provided Russia with the economic foothold it needed to increase industrialisation and promoted an increase in the working class. Long term it led to an increase in oppressive nature from the Tsar. After a failed assassination attempt in 1866, a reactionary and oppressive nature was more prominent in his decision making, censorship increased such as that of art and literacy, and education was strictly limited to the upper class, had controlled syllabuses and in order to learn history, specific permission had to be granted by the authorities. The serf emancipation was arguably the catalyst for Russia’s conversion towards a capitalist economy; With additional freedoms being granted to the newly liberated peasants (ex-serfs), such as the ability to own property, and vote in local elections.
Alexander III understood economic modernisation was essential to allow Russia to support her growing population and to recapture her Great Power Status. At the beginning of Alexander III’s reign, with 90% of the population working on the land, grain was the main basis of the economy, this was not effective enough because yields were low because of problems with emancipation. The country’s economy was also heavily dependent on the weather and from 1891 – 1892 famine affected 17 of Russia’s 39 provinces – the government failed to organise adequate relief and over 350,000 peasants died from starvation. Alexander also needed to see economic development to support the growth of his military (constituted 50% government spending) and to protect the Empire. A railway building programme had started and there was some small-scale development of factories. However, by 1891, Russia’s economic development was still too far behind that of Western Europe and there was a huge gulf between Russia’s potential, given its vast supplies of natural resources and manpower, and the country’s actual levels of achievement. It was not until the reign of Alexander III that a real “revolution” took off.
Alexander’s III reign was more reactionary than that of his father and acted by “reversing” the reforms that took place. An important individual in the process of Russia’s modernisation was Sergei Witte. Sergei Witte was the minister for finance between 1893 and 1903. This was unusual because he was German, but had gained a position of great influence, and his aim was to re-invigorate autocracy through reform. Economic development would, he believed, provide employment and raise standards of living, thus curbing revolutionary activity. Witte wanted to abandon liberal economics, in favour of state intervention. Traditionally the government deliberately played no part in economic matters, believing it to be the preserve of private enterprise. Witte aimed to improve Russia’s industrial capacity, which he did, and better than anyone else before. This was accomplished through deliberate government policy. This included putting Russian roubles on the gold standard in 1897, which consequently made trade easier between other powers. Foreign investment increased from 200 million roubles in 1890 to 900 million roubles in 1900, further solidifying Russia’s ties with other states. Despite significant advances in industry, the countryside and agriculture itself were still lacking and far behind the powers of Britain and France. Witte had a successful relationship with Alexander III, this however did not translate well with his son Nicholas II following his death from kidney inflammation in 1894, which is arguably the reason why the government was threatened with the first October revolution of 1905 after failure in the Russo Japanese war.
Alexander II attempted to give Russia western values and ideas, but failed as he was very inconsistent with his ruling, as he was trying to be radical while trying to preserve autocracy in comparison with Alexander III who preferred a very firm stance, and after his reforms Russia won wars against Turkey, foreign investment encouraged by the state led industrialisation actually made Russia wealthy and led to the improvement many institutions. In this sense the reforms of Alexander II were insufficient and the revert to a stronger autocracy was a promising strategy for Alexander III. Alexander III could see that modernisation was the fundamental problem with Russia and attempted to gradually cultivate it into a strong and stable process.
While Nicholas II was aware of the risks of industrialisation, he was spectacularly unsuccessful in preventing them exploding into direct attacks on the autocracy. Nicholas retained Witte as his Minister of Finance allowing his plans to be initiated. Witte’s new policy created a dangerous and obvious dependency on foreign investments. Between 1893-1896 foreigners invested 144.9 million roubles compared to 103.7 million from domestic sources. In the next three years the gap reached unprecedented levels with foreigners investing 450.7 million roubles and domestic sources only 111.8 million. The large increase in investment allowed Russia to boast one of the fastest growing economies with an annual growth rate per capita of 3.5%. This policy effectively created another restraint on Nicholas’s autocracy, which were foreign creditors. Any action or event that would trigger a flight of capital had to be given serious consideration by the Tsar thus reducing his power.
The most prominent threat that Witte’s reforms had on the autocracy were the increase and creation of new urban classes. In 1900 the proletariat had reached 1.7 million people and grew to an all high 2.3 million by 1913. An organised mass of two million people (less than two percent of the total population) was enough to destabilise the autocracy. This is what happened in October 1905 when mass, worker led strikes left Nicholas little choice but to submit to some of the protestor’s demands. An elected Duma was set up to advise and consult with the Tsar as well as to propose new legislation. This was a serious blow to the autocratic system as opposition to the government could now legally be expressed for the first time. Nicholas did manage to claw back much of his authority after the 1905 revolution but in doing so only antagonised more of his support base. This antagonism made them increasingly willing to support later, far more revolutionary endeavours against the autocratic system. By 1914 Nicholas’s half modernised Russia was in no condition to survive a world war. As such, it should come as no surprise that the autocratic system was unable to find the answers to Russia’s many problems and finally collapsed in February 1917.
By nature, the autocratic system was incapable of achieving sustained economic modernisation without serious social consequences. In an autocracy this meant a revolution. With competent leadership the Russian autocracy may have been prolonged, but the system under Alexander and Nicholas was doomed as they lacked the aptitude to balance the dangers of modernisation with the autocratic system. The nature of Russia especially, and a hint towards revolution can be viewed in Witte’s message to Nicholas
“The present movement for freedom is not of new birth. Its roots are imbedded in centuries of Russian history. Freedom must become the slogan of the government. No other possibility for the salvation of the state exists. The march of historical progress cannot be halted. The idea of civil liberty will triumph if not through reform then by the path of revolution. The government must be ready to proceed along constitutional lines. The government must sincerely and openly strive for the well-being of the state and not endeavour to protect this or that type of government. There is no alternative. The government must either place itself at the head of the movement which has gripped the country, or it must relinquish it to the elementary forces to tear it to pieces.”
The phrase “not of new birth” highlights the past fears of revolution expressed by the aristocracy and the Tsar’s advisers, this is complemented by stating that the movement for freedom is “imbedded in centuries of Russian history” this would make it specifically difficult to change, as the mentality of all Russian people is based on this foundation. Witte also strongly warns that protection of autocracy is a serious threat and should “not endeavour to protect this or that type of government” as is evident by the other throw by the Bolsheviks in 1917. The source was written in 1905 in the flame of the revolution of that year, which is a foreshadowing of what would come 12 years later in 1917, it is therefore valuable in that it successfully predicted a revolution. As the minister of finance, Witte’s insight on the effects of modernisation are considerably valuable as he was in control of most economic decisions that took place within the timeframe.
Nicholas II was certainly the least successful of the Tsars, taking no regard for the effects of modernisation whilst being constantly prompted by the most experienced in the field of economics and politics, his actions, along with some causation from previous Tsars, led to all the revolutions from 1905, to October and February 1917.
After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Vladimir Lenin and his party found themselves contemplating what would be appropriate for Russia’s economy which, at this time, was suffering from social challenges. Although certain reforms had been made, the peasants were still treated poorly and taken advantage of by the nobles. At the same time, WWI was still taking place which not only negatively affected Russia’s economy but also had a great effect on Russian society as well. The revolution did not come without opposition, of which was mainly supported by the bourgeoise, Lenin, in his letter to Dzerzhinsky, addresses the attempts by the bourgeoise to sabotage the Bolshevik regime.
“The bourgeoisie, landholders, and all wealthy classes are making desperate efforts to undermine the revolution which is aiming to safeguard the interests of the toiling and exploited masses. The bourgeoisie is having recourse to the vilest crimes, bribing society’s lowest elements and supplying liquor to these outcasts with the purpose of bringing on pogroms. The partisans of the bourgeoisie, especially the higher officials, bank clerks, etc., are sabotaging and organising strikes in order to block the government’s efforts to reconstruct the state on a socialistic basis. Sabotage has spread even to the food-supply organisations and millions of people are threatened with famine. Special measures must be taken to fight counter-revolution and sabotage.”
The letter explains that “all the wealthy classes” are the ones responsible for attacks on the revolution, which is “aiming to safeguard the interests of the exploited masses”, there is a direct link between wealth and acceptance of communism. As the letter was written, a large amount of confidence can be placed on what was stated, with the negative tone, the letter signifies that a civil war is the most likely conclusion of the actions of the middle class. Lenin also mentions that “special measures must be taken to fight counter-revolution and sabotage” which prompted the creation of the extraordinary commission to fight counter-revolution. This source is useful because it highlights the middle class as a problem, when looking back to the reign of Alexander II, this was similar as landowners were the aspect of society preventing a successful emancipation of the serfs, putting a block on modernisation.
War communism was the first economic policy that Lenin implemented into his Bolshevik regime, however the population nor the economy was prepared for such a drastic change at this time, the unemployment rate sky-rocketed. Almost all manufacturing and retail was nationalised, and peasants’ harvests were forcibly requisitioned by the state, with the idea that it would all go to the State whereupon it would be evenly distributed. Forced-labour policies were also set into place forcing both civilian and military persons to provide service to the state. Lenin realised that the people who had helped him overthrow the provisional government were mostly poor and could not afford to pay for their education. He embarked on providing free education, especially for adults. In the past, education had been reserved for the nobility and a few members of the middle class. He realised that adults had been denied being able to read and write, so Lenin introduced evening classes for workers. This education included a strong component on communism which further reinforced the strength and stability of his regime.
Overall, Modernisation was not as heavily emphasised in Lenin’s period of rule compared to the Tsarist period, but for good reason. He was more focused on converting Russia from capitalism into a communist state. By the time 1921 came around, Russia’s economy had been maimed by the effects of War Communism. Socialism had not begun on a good note, and Lenin was becoming concerned with the unfortunate state of the economy. His response to the poor economy he adopted and how he planned to improve it was called the New Economic Policy. The N.E.P. was masterfully designed to bring capital into the state, which it did, and to help Russia prosper economically. However, some socialists believe it may have gone too far with its free-market economic style and possibly could have led the Soviet Union into permanently possessing a capitalist economy, which would have destroyed the socialist priority. The original plan, however, was to have capitalism in place until the economy was strong enough to achieve socialism.
Unfortunately, the New Economic Policy would be short-lived because after Lenin’s death in January of 1924, Stalin’s infamous Five-Year Plans were instilled upon the Soviet Union. Immediately the New Economic Policy was abandoned; this would prove to be both positive and negative. In a way, The N.E.P. had, indeed, improved the Soviet economy, but only back to the levels at which it was during WWI. The peasants were meeting the expectations of the government which meant that although progress had been made in comparison to the disparity of the days of War Communism, not enough progress was made. In Stalin’s mind, the N.E.P had to go.
When Stalin came into power in 1924, Russia was fifty to one hundred years behind other westernised countries. To maintain their status as a super power, the whole country had to be modernised. It is debatable, however, whether the modernisation of Russia was solely due to Stalin or whether past leaders, whether it be the Tsars, or the New Economic Policy introduced in 1921. This essay will be looking at whether the modernisation of Russia was exclusively due to Stalin or whether there were others that contributed.
One of the main focuses that was modernised within Russia was the industry. It was the main factor that put Russia behind so many other countries. Stalin did a lot that modernised the industrial side to Russia. Production of all raw materials was increased. For example, the amount of electricity that was produced for Russia by Russia was up at least 5000 million kilowatts, coal was up by at least 35 million tons and steel production was up by at least 4 million tons. Therefore, Stalin must have done something that increased production on such a large scale. He had created genuine enthusiasm amongst young pioneers. It was Stalin’s 5-year plans that prompted this Increase in industrial action, through the view of Orlando Figes, a notorious historian, the conclusion of his plans can be reached.
“The Five-Year Plan promised to deliver the socialist utopia. Soviet propaganda persuaded people that hard work and sacrifice today would be rewarded tomorrow, when everybody would enjoy the enjoy the fruits of their own labour in a Communist society. But when the Five-Year Plan had been completed, and the utopia had not been reached, another Five-Year Plan was introduced.