Introduction
Certain people claimed, Malayan Emergency (1947-1960) was part of a wider communist plan to gain power in South East Asia. However, it is more likely is the fact that the Malayan communist party was actually on almost collapse having failed in any legal attempts or to gain widespread popular support, insurrection may have been their last hope and it was a case of now or never. In 1954-1975, Vietnam War was operations against communist insurgents in Southeast Asia as well, called “American War” or “War Against the Americans to Save the Nation”. The war was also part of a larger regional conflict and a manifestation of the Cold War between the United States and the Sovient Union and their respective allies. However, each conflict of Malayan Emergency and Vietnam Wars occurred at different time frames with different economic, political, sovereignty status and social backgrounds. These differences were very important in deciding and determined outcome of the conflicts. It was the main reason of success or failure to both conflict operations.
Objective
The objective of this paper is to analyze comparison between Malaysia (Malayan) and Vietnam counter insurgency operation.
MALAYA
The British rule the Malaya area as one of their territory for nearly a century. They been quarrel the communist terrorists (CTs) of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), who were mainly Chinese allied with a small number of Malays and Indians from 19481 until 1960. The British identify several areas which they take over the CTs. They believed that the war between the communism was a war of political ideologies and established it as a civilian’s war. A unified of command and control system involving an integral political, military and intelligence program under a director of operations had been implements. The new villages were set up to remove homesteader which conquered mainly Chinese, from the CT areas of influence under police surveillance. The policy has brought a significant result from this method which is The CTs had lost one of their main sources of supply of food, and information on security forces (SFs) activities. Foot patrols are given superiority whether these were reconnaissance or fighting patrols. Deep patrols had been initiate by the Special Air Service (SAS) to hunt the CTs and destroy vegetable crops which they grew in the middle of the jungle when the source of supply was cut off. They use many ways to make the CTs and to counter the insurgency. The forcing of gate checks, road blocks and curfews including constant patrolling of the jungle fringes prevented illegal foods, clothing, medicine and money from leaving towns, villages and estate labor lines and reaching to the CT hand’s. Forward bases which could either be permanent tactical bases or temporary patrol bases had been set up in order to make a way easier for some of the logistical and administrative difficulties in administering the needs of troops in a jungle environment. They use a Psychological warfare to against the CTs and to emphasize their isolation from the people which to undermine the confidence in their leadership and its policies. Besides that the want to create mistrust within the CT organization and to secure surrenders of individual CTs or even whole platoons. The government introduce a system of reward which they will give to whoever give the information to the killing or capture of CTs, for example, the introduce and announced to give reward for $80,000 to whoever give the information about Chin Peng and although the system was effective it also had a negative effect mainly on members of the SFs who did the dirty jobs of fighting the CTs but received little in return. The Briggs Plan had originally visualize that they can clearing the country from the CTs from the south region to north region but when execute the plan, it shows the difficulties to encountered and it proved that it’s easier to create “white areas” which were cleared of CTs as and when the opportunities presented itself. Later they establish a primary school throughout the entire country and allowance to attend this schools are free. The most dramatic decisions which outstripped communist policies were they planning on guarantee of citizenship to the Chinese and Indians and a complete independence of Malaya in 1957 giving all races the same status of identity. However, the remnants of active communist influences only ended in 1960.
VIETNAM
The Americans in Vietnam faced a different kind of enemy, they faced an enemy who wanted to reunite the country after it was divided at the 17th parallel after France signed a ceasefire agreement at Geneva on 20 July 1954, followed by the nearly eight years of fighting. They divided into two main land which the Viet Minh forces were to regroup in the north of the dividing line while the French union forces were to regroup to the south. The communists started to rebuilding of the devastated at the northern half of the country. Through ruthless suppression of the opposition, the economic development proceeded steadily with a very stable political framework. The south had been suffered through several periods of political crisis and changes of leadership between 1954 and 1967. The Emperor Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister who had a very difficult situation at that time. Much of the country rice growing area was uncultivated communications were chaotic under French command until 1956which they demoralized the command. Most of the administration was in the hands of the political religious sects like Cao Dor and Binh Xuyen and Some one million refugees from the north crowded into Saigon where at here it has an already weak administration which they found it difficult to cope with the situation. However, the situations eventually settled after Ngo Dinh Diem had virtually broken the power of the religious and secret society sects. Diem ousted Emperor Bao Dai in a voting and proclaimed the South Vietnam as republic with himself as president in that area. The Geneva Agreement had envisaged a holding of general elections through the whole of Vietnam in July 1956. The election never materialized by the citizen. The north continually maintained and they desired an election but the south took the view that such elections would not be positively free the north area. From 1956 Diem’s popularity began to fade and some of the economic progress was made, but this largely confined to towns. Land reform was not met and Diem’s limited program of land distribution and tenancy reform contrasted favorably with policies of the government. Arbitrary arrests, censorship, suppression of opposition and the ever increasing power in the land of his family were more and more resented by the people. Diem had decline to listen to a guidance and suggestions from Washington in spite of increasing the amounts of American aid. The general discontent and insufficiency of meaningful social and economic reform was made full use by the communist party who set the stage for the resumption of conflict. Terrorists incidents had clashes with South Vietnamese Army which become frequent and by early 1960 the South Vietnamese government was faced with a full-scale of insurgency which the communists are in controlled of a large segment of the land and population and they had developed a formidable army. The United States who retrain South Vietnam as a strategy to contain China to dominate Southeast Asia intervened militarily rather than looking the problems through political terms. The United States become recognize with a highly unpopular regime of President Diem but the South Vietnamese government continued to lose control of the countryside to the communists which is Viet Cong. The “hearts and minds” policy of attempting to concentrate the farmer in “strategic hamlet,” based on the Malayan model was unsuccessful method and contributed little towards the growing the sense of security of the Vietnamese farmerry. The establishment of free fire zones by the use of aerial defoliants was obviously counterproductive in a country where subsistence agriculture was the way of their life. The total demolition techniques that been use are artillery and aerial bombings were used against many villages or areas suspected for harboring the communists. Foot patrol was often put aside and swap by the use of high technology of massive firepower.
Main Point (Comparison)
In Malaya, British ruled over as a colony for long time. They fought communist terrorists (CTs) of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), whom were mainly Chinese allied with a small number of Malaya and Indians from 1948 until 1960. The British believed that the war against communism was a war of political ideologies and established it as a civilian war. They implement operation unified command and control system involving an integral political program under a director. By removing and were resettled away beyond the influence of the insurgents, mainly Chinese to the new village in the jungle, from CTs area, it brought a significant result. The CTs lost one of the main resources to survive which is supply of food and useful information on security forces activities. Which is all of these things was supply by mainly Chinese. This strategy was known as ‘winning the hearts and minds.’ While in Vietnam was an independent country, the United Stated therefore allied with an independent government. Based on the Malayan model, the United Stated realized that to separate the population from the communist was necessary, therefore an implementation of the “strategic helmet” was applied. This operation was attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. The objective was to isolate the population from the insurgents, provide them education and health care and strengthen the government’s hold over the countryside. However, the operation was not a good idea since it required farmer to move out into new villages in areas under the control of the South Vietnamese army. The strategy was failed and some claimed that it actually increased the number of farmer joining the communist. As one pointed out: “Farmer resented working without pay to dig moats, implant bamboo stakes, and erect fences against an enemy that did not threaten them but directed its sights against government officials.” Thus, it could not be instituted effectively. This shown the similarities between Malayan and Vietnam on how their government control the races that influence and assist the movement of communist terrorist. However, the Malayan operation on removing mainly Chinese was a very good idea since it brought huge result to CTs.
The timeframe also had significant effect on the success and failure of both conflicts. Since Malaya Government had been co-operation with British Military Administration which lead to a successful in signing the peace between communist Thailand and Malaya in 1989. Although in Malaya television could not show the horrors of war during that time, but through the story from people to another we knew that the Malaya had establish a campaign to the citizen about the violence of the Communist towards Malaya citizen especially in isolated area. For example, Sir Robert Thompson offers six essential principles for how to succeed in counterinsurgency warfare. First, the government must have clear political aims, such as a free, stable, united country. Second, the government must function in accordance with the law. Only by doing so can the government preserve its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Third, the government must have an overall plan for coordinating civil and military efforts. Fourth, the priority should be to defeat political subversion, not the guerillas themselves. Fifth, after military operations have been conducted in a specific area, civic action programs must be initiated. Finally, the government must have already secured its base areas first and by working outwards from their secure areas, government forces are more likely to have some morale-boosting successes early on. From this example we can surely know that this timeframe had led to the successful of the counterinsurgency in Malaya. While in Vietnam, historical tells us that United states eventually lost their war through lack of national support. This is because the Government Vietnam and United State army only focuses on the first layer in the devising their strategic Hamlet program as mention pervious point. The plan and strategy were dawn very neat with full of preparations, but when it comes to execution the whole thing became waste. The sensitivity to the citizen does not given priority as the program conduct. They execute the plan without taking into consideration to the population of the Vietnam’s. thus this kind of time frame are one of the reason that led to the failure of both conflicts.
In this part we will discuss about the comparison between the organization cultural of military forces between the British army that help in counterinsurgency of Malaysia(Malaya) and U.S Army that help in Vietnam War. The organization culture can be defined as a decisive determinant in their effectiveness and hence help to determine the course of international politics. In simple words, the organization cultural of military forces can be defined as the ability of military organization to adapt or to change whether that change occurs in military technology and in the structure of the international system. This organization cultural are one of the main component of state’s ability to guarantee their own security and their allies. The point that will be discuss is about the evaluating the literature on military innovation. As for the British Army, the civilian leaders in Britain which had institutional incentives to act as a unit that had an easier time agreeing for both policy goals and oversight options to ensure that the British army followed these goal that been framed by the leader’s. By setting these goals, the British army will react more flexibility to change their mind set same as the civilian leader’s goals. In contra, as for the U.S Army, the civilian leaders in the United State army which have an institutional incentive to act separately and found it harder to agree on policy goals which often to choose more complex oversight mechanism and did not always induce the U.S Army to respond easily. Besides that, the British army officer’s response directly with their political master cabinet which this will create a improve way of flexible military. As for the American system, the military has the ability to “trade off” demands that made by the congress that against the president. From the argument that been elaborate, we can conclude that different in political system of the government will led the nation’s politicians to create different militaries. Besides, the critical independent variable is not the nature of the national government which has the most cases that has a little impact on which policies the military to adopt but it is the organization culture of the military institution that determine whether innovation of the military will succeed or fail for each country. The other point of comparison for this paragraph is the impact of organizational cultural on organizational learning. The organization culture that been adapt by the British army had been develop through the years. This development is develop based on their experience in a war such as in colonial war. The leadership of the British army shared a common belief which they trust that the organization is include the policing and administration. For example, when the convectional strategies and tactic which they practise in Malaya had fail, the British army going through a few problems regarding to create an internal consensus that change was needed along with the political rather than using purely military solutions that been use by the British army. An innovative and varied past experience will create a cultural amenable to the changes in organizational process requires to defeat a complex opponent in a new kind of a war. Conversely, the organization culture that been practise by the U.S army has no doubt in the army’s leadership about the essence of the organization and they belief that it is a core competency defeating a convectional enemy army in frontal combat. Their belief that the essence of the organization precluded organizational learning and it has continued to prevent the formation of a consensus on the lesson of previous war in Vietnam and the change are required to make the army more capable in the future conflicts. From this argument, we can conclude that each of the organizations acquired the personalities as time passed by. They will develop an ability in certain area to make sure they complete their task of the organization but are constrained by their experience to innovate only within the self-defined parameters that see in their purpose.
Conclusion
It is important and interesting to know the different between these conflicts, to see what was done wrong and right. However, one has to realize that there is not an exactly same counterinsurgency strategy that is going to work in every given conflict. Whether it be Vietnam or Malaya, each and every conflict, both of them has its own set of unique condition which had to settle down. In example for Malaya, it was lucky to be experiencing a financial boom during the Emergency which made it easier to finance the effort going into fighting the insurgents but also for the infrastructure and overall financial well-being of the country.
One can certainly draw great lessons from Malaya: A good focus on hearts and minds to win over population is an excellent approach when carried out by individuals who have knowledge about the culture and language. Separation of population is a classical counterinsurgency strategy and same thing applies to the Strategic Hamlets which had conduct by Vietnam during wars. A good COIN strategy is simple, which is to be more civic action and less shooting. A reliance on smaller units of armed forces fighting guerrillas together with strong intelligence gained from the local population usually leads to great successes. To co-ordinate political strategy, economic and military agencies and leadership into one is also important, so that everyone is pulling towards the same goal. However, each counter insurgency is different from another. It is depends and need to be flexible and adaptive due to on sovereignty of their people and organizational culture in determining the success or failure of operation.
Reference
- Rufus Phillips, (2015, April) Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Lessons for Today, http://www.afsa.org/counterinsurgency-vietnam-lessons-today
- Lieutenant Colonel Shari Bin Ahmad, (1987) Comparison Of The Malayan Emergency And Vietnam War And Application Of Lessons To Solve El Salvador Problems And Appropriate U.S. Military Assistance.
- Tal Tovy, Fighting against Irregular Forces: Afghanistan as a Test Case
- Major Nazar Bin Talib, Malaysian Army (2004) Malaysia’s Experience In War Against Communist Insurgency And Its Relevance To The Present Situation In Iraq
- John Simkin, (1997, September) Strategic Hamlet, http://spartacus-educational.com/VNstrategic.htm
- MAJ Soh Yen Chu, Elizabeth, The Limits of The Malayan Emergency as the Universal COIN Paradigm, The Limits of Malayan Emergency as the Universal COIN Paradigm.
- Noel Barber, David Kings, David Donovan (2007, April) The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas 1948-1960 1st Edition, by Cassell.
- Sergio Miller, (2016, April) Malaya: The Myth of Hearts and Minds. Journal Article, Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/malaya-the-myth-of-hearts-and-minds
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