Philosophy, ethics and law are often considered at the forefront of human rights. Owing to the interdisciplinary nature of human rights these approaches have taken a stronger presence in the field, therefore noting a lack of political dimensions. This neglect of human rights in the discipline of political science was seen between the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) and the mid-1970s. Freeman (2017) explains that this is due to two crucial influences in political science: realism and positivism. He suggests that “’[r]ealism taught that politics was overwhelmingly the pursuit of power and that ethical considerations, such as human rights, played at most a marginal role… [p]ositivism taught that social scientists should eliminate ethical judgements from their work because they were unscientific”. However, as years past and human rights became more salient, political science has become increasingly important especially in international politics.
Landman’s (2005) model of the International Human Rights Regime highlights the fact that international human rights need to be understood through multiple perspectives including international law, international relations and comparative politics. This is particularly important as there is often a misconception that law is at the forefront of human rights. Although law and politics are inter-related, legal scholars primarily make judgments on whether the law has been violated or observed, political scientists, on the other hand, explain why and how the law is violated or observed. Political science looks at theories that deal with the reality of the world by building upon a variety of different methods from social sciences. This goes beyond the scope of suggesting what should happen or what could happen in the world, and rather what is happening in the world. Political scientists bring social science methodologies to rationalise behaviour through evidence in order to identify key influences and causal mechanisms. These, therefore, identify strategies through which human rights can most successfully be promoted.
This essay seeks to shine a light and break down complex insights that political science provides in its approach to human rights. Topics discussed include research observations on whether international human rights instruments have played a role in protecting human rights, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) ‘spiral model’ and whether it establishes a general theory of human rights change and the concept of human security and whether this has the potential to undermine human rights. All of these provide essential research in the field of human rights and is pivotal as it goes deeper in its understanding of human rights and states behaviour.
One of the biggest questions that arise in terms of human rights, is whether international human rights instruments truly work in protecting and promoting human rights. In order to determine this, observing countries that have ratified treaties and declarations is pivotal as it can help measure the effectiveness of such instruments. While some human rights advocates may be cautious of these experiments, this type of investigation can offer insights into the understanding of human rights. Experiments often have three important characteristics: control measurements, manipulation of the independent variable, and random assignment to condition (McDermott, 2002). Using experimental research methods to study the impact and effectiveness of human rights can give an explanation as to why rights are violated and allows for a possible determination to the possible causes of human rights abuses. There has been an array of experiments conducted that help determines whether international human rights instruments actually promote the implementation of human rights into national policy.
Linda Camp Keith (1999) observation on whether becoming a member state to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Optional Protocol had an impact on the state’s behaviour led to interesting results. Her study was conducted on 178 countries across an eighteen-year period from 1976-1993. Findings led to the conclusion that despite ratification of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, there was no significant difference in behaviour from states before and after becoming state parties to the conventions. Accordingly, regardless of whether states have ratified a legally binding convention, it does not necessarily mean they are willing to oblige. This is alarming as often states that sign Optional Protocol’s generally show an improvement in their human rights performance as it suggests a ‘thick commitment’ to human rights (Hill, 2010; Cole 2012). This is due to the fact the Optional Protocol allows for an individual complaints procedure which would insinuate its commitment to the relevant human rights instrument. It may, therefore, be overly optimistic to presume that being a party to an international instrument will have a significant impact on states behaviour. This supports many scholars who suggest that international mechanisms are inherently weak and that they only serve a promotional or socialising function instead of a tool that promotes rights (Donnelly, 1989; Forsythe, 1991; Opsahl, 1995; Robertson, 1981). States are able to recognise these weaknesses which may encourage them to ratify international covenants as there is less of a threat to their sovereignty or their continuation of policies that may violate individual rights. Their ratification is thus merely a public relation stunt rather than a way to show their policies are changing in terms of ensuring human rights are promoted and protected. Political science has thus highlighted that although law attempts to improve states obligation to human rights, it does not necessarily work on the ground. However, what the study did take into consideration were the domestic situations that may face the state itself which has interfered with their commitment or lessens their will to keep up with their obligation e.g. national and non-international armed conflict. Studies have suggested that domestic threats have increased the probability of state repression due to its interference with good governance (Alfatooni and Allen, 1991; Davenport, 1995, Poe et al., 1996, 1997). International armed conflict is another serious threat which often compels regimes to resort to political oppression in order to ensure domestic order is intact throughout a state of emergency (Gurr, 1986). With the various international and non-international conflicts occurring around the world at the time the study was taken, Eastern Europe as an example, it would explain why some states did not comply with the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol as it may destabilise the government. In events of national security states often use repressive strategies in order to ensure that power and control are maintained. Though this can cause various human rights abuses, national security is often seen as important in order to keep stability—whether states use this as an excuse to violate rights is questionable. However, it is also important to note that implementing these protections can be a long process. It does not necessarily mean that countries are unwilling or unable to implement them into their system, it may mean the state has accepted these international standards and are gradually acting upon them. Political science thus allows us to see the progress of human rights in some states. Judging by Camp Keith’s findings human rights protections among member states of international conventions is no better than non-party states, suggesting an underlying reason as to why states do not conform to international standards.
Furthermore, James Vreeland’s (2008) study found that those who signed the UN (United Nations) Convention Against Torture (CAT) were more likely to practice torture. His study showed that dictatorships that subject individuals to torture are more likely to accede CAT than dictatorships that do not exercise torture. Torture was more likely to arise when there was shared power and differentiated depending on the regime type. Findings showed that democracies indicated modest progress, a dictatorship that had no space for opposition had no changing effects and states with competitive dictatorships showed a worse percentage of torture after the ratification of CAT. This is due to the fact that there are multiple political parties in competitive dictatorships thus political parties utilise their power and pressure regimes into acceding to the CAT (ibid). Pressuring the ruling governments into ratifying international instruments leads to uncertainty as it does not infer they are willing to oblige. Democratic states, on the other hand, are more likely to be responsive to its citizens, provide citizens with tools to overthrow potential abusive leaders from becoming a serious threat and make it easier for citizens to publicise attempts of repression worldwide (Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994). Though it is necessary for political scientists to provide for a clear definition of democracy – such as those given by Bollen (1980) or Gurr (1995) – research has shown democracies which are based on civil and political rights, such as free speech, decrease a government’s use of political repression. Therefore, establishing what system of governance a state use is pivotal in order to measure the likeliness of protecting and promoting human rights. This is often forgotten through legal approaches to human rights as it is assumed that ratifying treaties equates to implementing international norms into domestic legislation.
Further studies on the ratification of CAT supports Vreeland in that states that ratified CAT was more likely to torture than non-ratifying states (Hill, 2010; Cole, 2012). Though the above studies were conducted almost a decade ago, this can still be applied in present times. China, for instance, has ratified CAT but have been under the limelight recently as reports suggest that over one million ethnic Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Hui have been involuntarily subjected to “re-education” centres from which reports of torture and murders have surfaced (Freedom House, 2019). China for decades has also been criticised for their continuous mistreatment of citizens in the Xinjiang and Tibetan regions despite their ratification of CAT in 1988 (Treaties.un.org, 2019). This contradicts the assumption that implementing human rights into society and domestic law occurs gradually and proves for a compelling argument that some states ratify treaties for international acceptance, rather than their willingness to conform to international standards. It is likely that Conservative regimes such as China are less likely to comply with international instruments as they are intransigent in their position of ensuring human rights are protected as power and control can impede. Again, these studies allow insights into whether legal instruments do have an impact on states behaviour and whether or not they exist in reality. Political science, however, fails to acknowledge the arguments that some non-Western states argue. Non-Western governments often imply that international human rights are a product of Western imperialism and fails to acknowledge the cultural relativist approach whereby values and practices should be understood based on individual’s culture rather than what is considered ‘normal’ (Freeman, 2013; Herskovits, 1972). This may explain why some states undermine human rights instruments, as to them human rights are not universal. However, whether this is a viable justification can be disputed as many states can use cultural relativism as a way of upholding a one-way relationship where they are able to maintain power and control allowing them to continue violating human rights. Though research into whether this is accurate may be difficult to obtain, it is worth noting that it is a possibility for government’s refusal to oblige to international human rights instruments.
It is important not to be pessimistic about the all research findings and rather acknowledge that some international human rights instruments have worked in certain states, whereas in others ratification has had no difference in states approach to human rights. Simmons (2009) reaffirms the liberal theory that international human rights law has had a positive role in the realisation of human rights on a global scale. Signatories to the CAT were found to have lower rates of brutal torture or abuse whilst in custody. Though this challenges Vreeland, Hill and Cole’s findings, it is important to look at regime structure. Simmons found that treaty ratification had positive effects in states that were neither repressive nor completely democratic (ibid). Though it could be argued that this contradicts Vreeland’s findings, the states studied in both these observations differ and thus cannot be compared. Political science has therefore extended beyond legal scholars by providing concrete research into whether the law has been successful in protecting and promoting human rights and although findings from research may seem negative, it may pave possible solutions in improving the law in the future. Furthermore, Simmons (2013) also argues that previous empirical studies ignore the fact that some states are unable to improve such as Norway on torture as they were already compliant from the start and that other ratifies had no intention of complying with their ratification anyway e.g. North Korea. Political science thus needs to take into consideration the status of some states and their stance on the promotion and protection of human rights.
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) offer a theory in which international norms can lead to human rights improvements through their five-stage ‘spiral model’. The five stages include “(1) repression; (2) material and normative pressures met by resistance; (3) tactical concessions, empowerment of domestic opposition, and dialogue; (4) legal reform; (5) internalisation of human rights norms in routine behaviour” (Freeman, 2017). International human rights norms are dependent on the establishment and maintenance of networks between domestic and transnational actors associated with the international regime. With the influence of transnational advocacy networks and social mechanisms to induce progress, it may create a ‘boomerang effect’. Domestic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rally international actors which leads to domestic NGO empowerment to pressure repressive governments into change. They are also able to put repressive regimes on the international agenda and back domestic opposition groups which further assists the socialisation process in order to force the government into real commitment and compliance to human rights norms. Civil society actors (CSOs) play a significant role as their aim is to defend the human rights of marginalised groups from oppressive regimes. Vis (2017) used the spiral model to analyse three countries, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt during the Arab Spring and examined the extent to which these countries respected international human rights norms before and after the demand for regime change. In all three states, there were signs of change and progression towards compliance, especially in Tunisia as international human rights treaties were respected to a far greater extent post-Arab Spring. Despite Ben Ali’s government ratifying various human rights treaties, from 2000-2010 the regime made numerous tactical concessions as he continued human rights abuses and faced a political backlash. His regime led to many violations to individuals civil and political rights, torture practices and freedom of expression and association. As each of the five stages of the spiral model makes the next stage more likely, the third stage is pivotal as “instrumental adaption (by which states make concessions from practical motives) involves ‘talking the talk’ of human rights, and this may lead to ‘walking the walk’ but institutionalising human rights norms in the fourth and fifth stages “(Freeman, 2017; Risse and Sikkink, 1999). However, this was not necessarily the case for Tunisia and as seen previously in this essay, ratification of treaties does not always force governments to comply with international standards. Western states and international governmental organisations (IGOs) had to express their concerns about Ben Ali’s regime in order to gain international activity. Domestic NGO’s such as National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT) and the High Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (NHRI) were able to advocate human rights within the state and together with the international community they were able to name and shame which showed slight improvements in governments recognition of human rights. This recognition of human rights norms during this time period may correlate to the successful regime change post-Arab Spring which enabled the third stage of the model to thrive. The spiral model, therefore, provides for a useful structure for comparing the methods by which international human rights norms may or may not be established in domestic legal systems.
Jetschke and Liese (2013) explain that only a few states shift from stage four to stage five of the spiral model as it is challenging to sustain internal or external pressure on noncompliant states such as China and Indonesia. To them, the spiral model “overestimates the power of civil society actors and underestimates the cultural heterogeneity of civil society, which typically includes forces unfriendly towards human rights” (Freeman, 2017). They argue that “[h]uman rights advocates assume a causal link between governmental action and human-rights protections: if a government does not control its territory and population, this link is broken; if a government can legitimise its human rights violations, for example by claiming that there are threats to the state and/or the nation, the causal link is maintained but the violations are legitimised” (ibid; Jetschke and Liese, 2013). With the studies mentioned above that have aimed at observing states behaviour when they ratify international human rights mechanisms, we are able to see how this causal link is not certain. The spiral model seems to only conceptualise a portion of the constitutive relationship between the state and international human rights norms. It, therefore, fails to explain why recalcitrant states such as China have had such a significant influence over the enforcement mechanisms on international human rights norms. Powerful economic states like China are able to reconstitute their own international normative structure, it is, therefore, important to examine whether world position makes a difference in human rights protections and whether this has an influence on the domestic impact of human rights norms (Landman, 2005). The spiral model is unable to acknowledge the impact of the economy, and how this can impact states behaviour and their hesitance from moving from stage four to stage five. This leads to other various criticisms of the spiral model as although it seeks to address the processes by which countries transition from denial of human rights abuses to transparency, commitment and compliance it does have limitations on its ability to effectively do so. It is questionable to suggest that target states generally go through these specific stages without highlighting possibilities of whether different paths are possible too. Marsh and Payne (2007) go further with this critic stating that “we may be able to place all countries in the world into one of these phases, the fact is that most states in phase five did not get there by progressing through earlier stages. Many countries have reached phase five through human rights movements from primarily domestic sources which evolved over centuries”. Thus, theories in political science must take into account the historical evolution of human rights when analysing state parties as this may be a better way of explaining some states responses to human rights. This is not to say one discipline is to have a hierarchal worth for its approach to human rights, it is that human rights are best understood by multiple perspectives as individual experiences are far more complex to only look at one approach.
The human security approach, which arose from the ashes of the Cold War, has also become a tool to help understand and tackle today’s multi-dimensional challenges. For many people, the world is an insecure place with loads of threats in many areas. National and international armed conflict, natural disasters, terrorism, poverty and economic crisis create hardships and endanger peace and development. Often, when these insecurities overlap, they can affect every aspect of people’s lives, destroying communities and separating families which can make entire regions insecure. Addressing these insecurities is a central pillar in the agenda of sustainable development as human security provides protection of the integrity of the individual. The use of the term ‘security’ encourages states to take citizens seriously because if citizens are insecure state destabilisation may occur (Howard-Hassman, 2012). Though national security is still important in protecting and ensuring security to all citizens, the state cannot always guarantee this protection. The development of the human security model shows signs of influence from the human rights tradition: both use individuals and both argue that issues such as civil rights, healthcare, and access to education are crucial to human dignity. Human security “not only helps us evaluate the effectiveness of our security policies, but it also highlights the importance of preventative action to reduce vulnerability and points the way for remedial action, where prevention fails” (Axworthy, 1990). Human security framework focuses on “early warning and prevention” (Fukuda-Parr, 2003) adding to the established human rights regime as it uses a range of actors and creates issue-specific approaches which can function on a national and international scale. The goal of human security is to go beyond the concept of national security in order to force states to focus on the needs of their citizens. International human rights laws oblige states to respect and protect individual rights that are often considered political, human security on the other hand de-politicises threats and allows states to adopt human rights obligations into policy discussions which lead to the creation of new policies about human rights – this is often considered to be the broad definition of human security. The issue with the broader view of human security is that it often refers to threats already identified in human rights law instead of acknowledging new threats, state duties or remedies to human insecurity. The narrower view of human security may thus provide for better understanding in identifying new or more severe threats aimed at focusing on every individual.
A narrower view of human security was proposed in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which identified universal threats to human wellbeing. There are essentially seven issues associated with human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, physical security, community security, political security (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). The UNDP identified not only individual threats, but collective threats that are not direct human rights abuses, such as climate change but affect the lives of many individuals (ibid). Human security thus adds to human rights law and establishes a framework of analysis for states and international organisations to ensure the promotion of human rights and democratic values through new actions such as the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P). This doctrine attempts to legitimise and normalise international intervention when states are unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens (Howard-Hassman, 2012). R2P suggests that sovereignty is not a right, but instead demands states to provide protection and security to their citizens. Even when states have ratified human rights instruments it does not mean they are to prioritise one right over another right. Human security aims to ensure that states do not abuse this power and instead makes sure that all rights of the individual, no matter how trivial, are protected. This is an important element of political science as often law is considered to be the biggest protector of human rights. It further unites diverse states, agencies and NGOs who aim at safeguarding citizens’ rights under international law without having to resort to force. This has proved successful in a many UN peacekeeping operation including Cambodia, El Salvador and Guatemala whereby basic security has helped end conflicts and the destabilisation of many states (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). The narrow view of human security, therefore, advances human rights law as it provides concrete objectives and offers a framework of analysis that directly helps in promoting human rights standards and take new actions to counter new threats.
Although human security aims at promoting and protecting individual rights, particularly when states are unwilling or unable to do so, there are criticisms it faces in regard to the extent to which these rights are actually protected. Howard-Hassman (2012) has argued that the human security discourse has the potential to inadvertently undermine the international human rights framework. For instance, R2P can allow for powerful countries to invade countries under the guise of humanitarian intervention. This is all at the expense of human protection and is justified under the pretext of ‘human security’. An example includes Libya, where military intervention was used in response to Gaddafi’s planned air strikes upon civilians (Kaldor, 2011). However, “having crippled Libyan air capabilities” NATO continued to aim at Gaddafi’s compound (Modeme, 2012) leading to critics saying that “the boundaries between protecting civilians and pursuing regime change became increasingly blurred” (Dembinski and Reinold, 2011). Though NATO won, it left the country in turmoil with no government and depriving Libyans of protection. Reports suggest that NATO was responsible for twice the amount of civilian deaths as Gaddafi (Ostroumova, 2012) suggesting how R2P can be more of a threat rather than serving as a protector. Human security was also used as a justification of the Iraq War (a now internationally criticised intervention). Mentan (2014) argues that “the association of human security with Western imperialism and overzealous military intervention (e.g. Iraq and arguably Libya) has provoked international apprehension towards further implementing it”. Therefore, powerful states inconsistency in its application of human security has rendered the practice ineffective as it deprives citizens of protection. This highlights how human security can be used by states, organisations and corporations as a tool to continue to violate individual rights. Critics have also expressed concerns that “[p]owerful states will determine whose human rights justify departure from the principle of non-intervention” (Macfarlane, Thielking and Weiss, 2004). This would consequently risk citizens protections for the sake of securing ‘powerful states’ interests – a threat seen in Palestine in the 2008-2009 Gaza War. There was no intervention undertaken by the international community despite 1,385 Palestinians and 12 Israelis deaths in the course of 22 days (Humanitarian Coordinator, 2009). Despite the term’s ‘genocide’, ‘war crimes’, and ‘crimes against humanity’ authorising military intervention through R2P (General Assembly, 2005), no intervention was undertaken. This again shows the dangers of human security and the effects of political science discourse, as powerful states are able to ‘pick and choose’ what countries to intervene in for their own political gain. However, despite some of the disastrous impacts human security has had, it allows for political scientists to establish other means and measures in order to prevent such crisis from reoccurring. This, along with other disciplines aimed at promoting and protecting human rights, may play a huge role in bringing fundamental change to human rights.
To conclude, political science has provided various insights into the promotion of human rights. As law seems to play a crucial role in the promotion of human rights, political scientists have conducted studies to see how far international instruments truly work. Camp Keith’s study showed that despite ratification of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, there was no significant difference in rights before and after becoming state parties to the conventions. This shows that law does not necessarily guarantee the promotion and protection of human rights as there was no difference between parties to the treaty and non-state parties. Her research did, however, provide reasons for this such as international and non-international armed conflict being motivators of destabilising the state, thus national security takes priority. Vreeland, Hill and Cole studies also found that those who signed CAT were more likely to practice torture such as China in regard to minority groups such as the Uighurs. This again suggests that legal mechanisms do not necessarily promote human rights, and political science is able to observe greater on what kind of states are likely to conform. However, criticisms arise as political science fails to look at the cultural relativist approach to explain why some states may undermine human rights instruments – however even so it does not justify states that grossly violate human rights. Conversely, Simmons found differences in states that are neither repressive nor completely democratic and was able to see a difference in states that did ratify CAT. However, establishing types of regimes is necessary when observing state behaviour of human rights as some states may not be able to progress as they have always been compliant to human rights, whereas other states the complete opposite. Political science then provides evidence that helps establish which states are likely to comply with human rights and which states are not. Furthermore, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s five-stages ‘spiral model’ addresses the processes whereby countries transition from a denial of human rights abuses to gradual compliance. The use of transnational actors such as NGOs has often helped states move from repressive regimes to compliant human rights advocates e.g. Tunisia. The spiral model was able to provide for a useful framework in how states are able to progress from non-compliant to cooperative. However, Jetschke and Liese and Landman argue that the spiral model overestimates CSOs and fails to consider how some powerful states such as China are able to use their economic power to undermine human rights. The model also does not allow for other possible paths some states may take and thus fails to acknowledge other disciplines such as history as some states oblige due to historical compliance. Though these criticisms are convincing, the spiral model does provide for a basic framework in which political science can use to further improve its approach to human rights. Lastly, human security has provided individuals certainty of their protection when states may ignore citizens lives. A narrower view of human security allows better protection for individuals as it includes not only individual threats but threats that are not directly human rights abuses. It also establishes the doctrine of R2P which demands human rights to be prioritised – which has been successful in many UN peacekeeping operations. This framework of political science enables all individuals’ protections when states fail to do so. However, what must be taken into consideration is the possibility that human security has in undermining human rights. This can be seen in the overthrowing on Gadaffi in Libya by NATO, the Iraq War and the idea that powerful states pick and choose where humanitarian intervention goes to (e.g. Palestine). Therefore, although political science does offer approaches to ensure the protection of human rights, it is also probable that it can be utilised to continue human rights violations. However, political science does play a vital role in its approach to human rights as it offers different means and studies that other approaches do not. A mixture of all these approaches may, therefore, provide for a better way of promoting human rights.