What balance of power (BoP) and interdependence share is a rational analysis of the potential for rapprochement between states, yet, they differ in their view of the potential to achieve this. This essay will analyse factors which correlate to both concepts. First, the two ideas will be defined in the context of Sino-American relations, with reference to the historical context of their relationship. Second, the BoP model will be applied, with the use of examples; this will be contrasted with the CXI paradigm. Finally, the essay will argue that a potential synthesis between the two is possibly the most appropriate way to characterise Sino-American relations. For the purpose of this essay, interdependence will be predominantly replaced by complex interdependence (CXI), an enhancement of the concept, which better suits the arguments put forward.
BoP can be defined at a regional and global level. On the assumption that the US continues the role of the ‘hegemon’, Beijing’s attempts to balance the power with the US can be viewed in a global sense. Conversely, yet belonging to the same theory, US attempts to balance the power in the Asia-Pacific region can be understood on a regional scale. This is a concept defined as ‘offensive realism’: developed by John Mearsheimer, and contextualised in Sino-American relations by Evaghorou & Mertzanidis (2012). In this light, alongside concepts developed by structural realists, an emerging BoP between China and the US relates to the Cold War bipolarity between the US and the Soviet Union:
“For many in the US security community, China has become the new Cold War adversary, or at least a potential one, a ‘strategic competitor’ that constitutes the biggest threat to US interests” (Wickett, Nilsson-Wright, and Summers, 2015: 16).
CXI, on the other hand, is a concept developed by neoliberals
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye; and, as He (2008) confers, “refers to ‘situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries’”(494). In the bilateral context of Sino-American rhetoric, “interdependence refers to the mutual dependence that develops in any bilateral economic relationship” (Saunders, 2000: 57). Economic forces are particularly important in defining the interdependency between China and the US. Application of the neoliberal perspective to this narrative cannot be done so in the absence of neoliberal institutionalist analysis, which emphasises the usefulness of institutions (such as ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum). Both BoP and CXI present a dichotomy in understanding Sino-American relations. Yet, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there is a potential “synthesising between the two parts” (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 105), as shown through developments in North Korea and the global War on Terror: such issues will be explored further in the essay.
These theoretical paradigms do not take place in isolation however, and this debate is far from ahistorical. It is therefore imperative to situate Sino-American relations in a chronological context. In particular, ‘China’s Rise’ comes off the back of years of colonial repression, and therefore the mere fact that they are being compared in terms of capability to the US is an outstanding achievement. The Tiananmen massacre of 1989 dented such progress, yet since has developed into an economic powerhouse. On the side of the US, an ‘Open Door Policy’ at the start of the twentieth-century introduced their intentions to create a sphere of influence in the region. As Cohen (2000) reflects, America have been historically concerned with markets and the BoP in East Asia (35). Guoqi (2014) goes as far to suggest, “These two self contained continental countries share a long and complexly intertwined history” (14). Such complexity derives from strained relations throughout the Cold War, which is best understood through the BoP paradigm. More specifically, China’s alignment with the communist-led North Korea in the Korean War exacerbated Sino-American relations. In spite of their differences, Beijing’s decision to intervene in the Vietnam War led the way for Sino-American rapprochement (Connolly, 2005: 523). Historical events pave the way for an ambivalent relationship; this essay aims to characterise Washington’s current rapport with Beijing in light of this history, in order to consider whether a BoP or CXI is a more suitable characterisation.
Here, the essay will focus on the suggestion that Sino-American relations are characterised by China balancing the power on a global level. The focus here is not consigned to the Asia-Pacific region alone, yet ‘China’s Rise’ will be considered in a globalised scenario in which China is challenging the world’s hegemon, the US. BoP is principally reflected through military power, although military power in this case is a reflection of China’s growing economy. With a superpower’s economical characteristics, China is now abler to challenge US hegemony. For example, “While China’s economy grows at 9 percent annually, the US reels from economic recession, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget deficits” (Beckley, 2012: 41). Upsetting the balance and the unipolarity that has been predominant in the international system since the Cold War now seems more likely than ever. As Beckley implies, “The Habsburg, French, and British Empires were defeated and surpassed by rising challengers. It is therefore natural for America’s ‘unipolar moment’ to be similarly consigned to the ash-heap of history” (2012: 44). Reformation of China’s economy can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping, who believed that peace and development were the dominant international trends and therefore, China ought to focus on economic development (Saunders, 2000: 58).
Indeed, the Financial Crisis and Recession of 2008 opened up a vacuum for the Chinese economy, and Beijing’s quest for equilibrium in the international system gained significant momentum, which threatened the imbalance that the US had become so comfortable with. Achieving this hegemonic status is understood by offensive realists, who consider military power not the sole characteristic of achieving a BoP:
“What a great power requires for hegemony is not only military power – the dominant form of power according to Mearsheimer – but also ‘latent power,’ which is defined as the entire socio-economic structure of the state that has to be solid and robust in order to allow the expansion and enhancement of the military power” (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 107).
Washington’s reaction to China’s economic power projection is a reflection of the paradigm shift in the international system: towards a Cold War-like bipolarity. In fact, despite the monolithic threat of communism diminishing after the bloc’s disintegration, American officials did not proclaim that their defence budget could be reduced at all (Waltz, 2000: 19). This illustrates not only the ability of the Chinese to match US capabilities, but also is a reflection of the US recognising that they have a suitable challenger. China’s reputability was often undermined by the state’s repression of certain sects in society, however, “Thirty years of sustained high levels of growth have increased China’s capabilities, buttressed regime legitimacy and brought unprecedented prosperity to hundreds of millions of people” (Fingar, 2012: 197). Economic prosperity has subsequently confirmed Chinese legitimacy in the international arena, an important characteristic for a nation eager to gain hegemonic status.
China’s military modernisation is also a key factor in their efforts of balancing the power; and, as Waltz infers, “Strategically, China can easily raise its nuclear forces to a level of parity with the United States” (2000: 32). Nuclear capability is a key factor in determining Sino-American relations, in particular the notion of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Structural realism implies that hostilities did not escalate into violence in the Cold War thanks to MAD, and friendly Sino-American relations are maintained through this concept of security. As Waltz sees this relationship: “nuclear weapons moderate the behaviour of their possessors and render them cautious whenever crises threaten to spin out of control” (2000: 36). Furthermore, China’s military modernisation is not limited to nuclear power, with a rejuvenated “navy and air force, as well as the remarkable expansion in China’s cyber security and space-development capabilities” (Wickett et al., 2015: 19). The Taiwan conundrum is an example of how Sino-American relations are characterised by a BoP. With reference to MAD, why peace is maintained can be grasped here. As Ross contends, “China cannot contend with U.S. naval power throughout the Western Pacific. But the PLA can now reach across the Taiwan Strait and target Taiwan’s civilian and military centres” (2006: 194). As this shows, China’s increased military and nuclear capabilities mean they are now in a position to contend with those of the US, thus achieving a BoP. As a consequence, risk of confrontation or conflict is now unlikely, as both sides will be deterred by the other’s nuclear power potential.
It is evident that modernisation in economic and military terms has resulted in ‘China’s Rise’ to hegemony, laying claims to a balance of power between China and the US. However, such projections seemingly undermine the normative Sino-American relationship, which continues to be dominated by the US. Thus, it would seem that unipolarity, with its limits, still exists. For example, “the modernization of the Chinese military has thus not affected the immediate US – China force-on-force balance in the vicinity of the insular countries of East Asia” (Ross, 2006: 196). Moreover, Beijing’s reliance on the US economy means that Chinese leaders would find it too costly to disrupt the US-led system from which it benefits (Fingar, 2012: 203). Despite the Recession of 2008, stock markets have recovered and the US continues to control trade, and is still recognised as the global mercantile hub. As Beckley confirms, “the basic argument of the alternative perspective is that the laws of history do not apply to contemporary world politics” (Beckley, 2012: 45), and America’s fate will not follow that of former colonial powers.
The essay now draws attention to the US balancing the power in Asia, in this context, BoP can be understood on a regional scale: specifically, East Asia. This perspective is exhorted by Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. What “Mearsheimer’s offensive realism proposes, either explicitly or implicitly, is a description of the post-Cold War international system in terms of BoP, that can be divided into several regional systems” (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 108). In East Asia, China is considered the regional hegemon, and therefore has the capability to attempt a BoP globally with the US, as was explored in the previous part of the essay. Consequently, within the East Asia region, “Mearsheimer mentions the obligation of the US to prevent the rise of China” (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 114). Although critics would argue the US was never at threat from ‘China’s Rise’, and therefore balancing the power in East Asia was needless, it is becoming increasingly likely that the US will pursue its diplomacy through a BoP. This policy of ‘containment’ seeks to balance the power in the region, pre-emptively disrupting China’s BoP with the US on a global scale:
“The strong emphasis on the rise of China – particularly by the United States, echoed powerfully in Japan – has led to the growing dominance of a narrative of changing power distribution in Asia centred around an emerging bipolar scenario involving the United States and China” (Wickett et al., 2015: 15).
Bipolarity is reflected through US military deployments throughout the region, in particular, “The US Pacific Command (PACOM) is geographically the largest unified command in the US defence structure, encompassing 43 countries” (Shambaugh, 2000: 103). Likewise, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are being encouraged by the US to join forces in their fight against Chinese hegemony. This can be seen through the multilateral security dialogue which aims to constrain China, manifested during the 1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (Hue, 2008: 503). This ‘dialogue’, channelled through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), is a crucial tool of the US and ASEAN states in balancing the power in the region. In particular, Beijing’s claims over oil-rich territories in the South China Sea are a reflection of their pursuit for dominance. Subsequently, as Hue suggests, the ARF’s success “lies in its inclusive balancing strategy towards China in terms of constraining China’s assertiveness over the South China Sea” (2008: 504). In balancing Chinese dominance in the region, it also limits the chances of conflict between China and Vietnam. From a Chinese perspective, going to war with Vietnam would be too costly, as the US support Vietnam’s claims over such territories.
US balancing acts do not stop there: they have provided military training and subsequent alliances to East Asian states. This provides security to these states, whilst providing the US with an ideal balancing strategy. In fact, “Since 1995 countries throughout maritime Southeast Asia have conducted annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) bilateral military exercises with the U.S. Navy” (Ross, 2006: 215), as a means of containing China’s naval power in the region. More specifically, alliances with Japan and South Korea are viewed as balancing methods in a practical and political sense. Firstly, “Japan has become the most active U.S. partner in the development of missile defence technologies” (Ross, 2006: 212), clearly a projection of US deterrent strategies. In a more political tact, the concept of soft power balancing can be introduced to Sino-American relations here. Clearly, Washington’s aim here is to balance against any perceived threat of communism; indeed, it has been suggested that the US is one of the most change-seeking states in Asia, out of a desire to promote its values (Wickett et al., 2015: 20). In particular, liberal democratic values, although manifestations of neoliberalism, drive US balancing acts in the region; and, “according to this view, liberal democracies such as […] Japan will naturally align with the United States in opposition to authoritarian regimes such as China, producing in the process an inherently competitive dynamic of ‘China versus the democracies’” (Wickett et al., 2015: 25).
Sino-American relations cannot be studied solely in a BoP narrative, however. In fact, interdependency between the two superpowers is ubiquitous. Here, the essay will consider the various facets of their economic dependence on one another. Firstly, China’s economic rise has led to the suggestion that they are indispensable to one another: in particular, trade flows between the two states epitomise the nature of their interdependent relationship. Not only is the US China’s leading trading partner, but the openness of China’s expanding economy has enabled it to become the largest global trader in goods measured in aggregate annual trade volumes (Wickett et al., 2015: 15). With China becoming a global trader, this necessitates interdependent relations between the two, as the US continues to lead the way in “global supply chains and production networks” (Wickett et al., 2015: 15). As such, this developing economic dependency has led to suggestions that G7 has now become G2. Moreover, “For smaller powers in the region (and also for Japan), there is […] also some nervousness about too close a US–Chinese relationship (Wickett et al., 2015: 16).
Despite China’s meteoric economic rise, the general consensus regarding their dependency tends to focus on China being more reliant on the US. Hence, Sino-American interdependence in the aftermath of the Cold War can be best described as asymmetrical economic interdependence, where one country is more dependent on the other (Saunders, 2000: 57), emphasised by the fact that America’s leading trading partner is Canada, whereas China’s is the US. In spite of this, the US has taken advantage of cheap labour in China to reduce production costs. Aside from trade, energy dependence illustrates how CXI applies to Sino-American relations. As Evaghorou & Mertzanidis argue, “Interdependence exists where the effects of a transaction are particularly costly (or beneficial) like in oil prices rate”, it is this need for interdependence which led to neoliberals “Keohane and Nye introducing CXI as an enhancement” (2012: 109). Put more simply, Sino-American relations can be defined through cooperation especially when, for example, oil prices are high.
Moreover, the role of non-state actors (NSAs) is important in conceptualising Sino-American relations through CXI. Forces of globalisation deem it necessary for a relationship between to great economies, whose interests expand into the majority of regional markets, to be channelled through international organisations. This shows that the great powers are not always concerned with seeking refuge in hegemony (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 113). Rather, both China and the US can utilise NSAs to accommodate their interests. This analysis focuses on a neoliberal institutionalist perspective of how states cooperate, this standpoint believes international organisations promote negotiations and resolve misunderstandings; and involves states in various networks of interdependence, decreasing the potentiality of being deceived (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 113). Although this neoliberal perspective does not believe security is states’ priority, the reassurance that CXI and international organisations offer will be of great value to China and the US who are both concerned by each other’s power. Yet, neoliberals insist security does not take precedence on states’ agenda, rather “in a system of CXI, other issues (beyond military) may emerge and different coalitions may be formed” (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 109).
The attractiveness of being interdependent for China and the US has led to cooperation elsewhere: China’s involvement in Africa and South America. One may argue this is no more than a reflection of China trying to balance the power, as it “has made important inroads in expanding its influence abroad, particularly in developing regions” (Roett & Paz, 2008). Perhaps this argument has substance, but from the US perspective, this further enables economic interdependence:
“For example, China may use the weak dollar against the euro to put pressure on the US, it has offered many states in Africa and South America preferential economic treatment and most significantly, large US corporations (re: General Motors) have already invested tremendous monies in the Chinese economy, since China is now the bigger and at the same time less exploited market” (Evaghorou & Mertzanidis, 2012: 114).
Significantly therefore, Sino-American relations can be understood by ‘multipolarity’, rather than a BoP ‘bipolarity’ scenario. This is a reflection the two’s vested interests in the international, as well as each other’s thriving economies. It is for this reason therefore, that “theoretically, it is possible that economic interdependence between two superpowers could be high” (He, 2008: 494).
The essay will now briefly examine two examples which perhaps show Sino-American relations can be characterised by a synthesis of BoP and CXI. Thus far, the arguments put forward prove that defining this relationship as one or the other is contentious. For both states, North Korea is considered unpredictable and a potential threat; therefore, they both look to balance the power against a nuclear power in North Korea. In doing so however, they are mutually dependent on one another’s economies and militaries. Similarly, as Friedberg (2002) suggests, “After some initial hesitation, Beijing eventually chose to acquiesce in American military action against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan” (34). At face value, this reflects an effort to balance the power against rising terrorist organisations, yet in doing so, a CXI develops through financial ties and military alliances between the two. This is confirmed by Keohane & Nye (1987): “Our analysis linked realist and neorealist analysis to concerns of liberals with interdependence. Rather than viewing realist theory as an alternative to liberal ‘interdependence theory’, we regarded the two as necessary complements to one another” (730).
In conclusion, both a BoP and CXI both fit as characterisations of Sino-American relations. The essay’s analysis proves that both structural (and offensive) realist and neoliberal institutionalist theories can be applied to this relationship. On the one hand it can be defined through a hegemonic struggle, with both parties balancing the power on a global and regional level. Yet these power struggles are enacted through both states being economically dependent on one another. The essay therefore concludes that Sino-American relations are a synthesis of both a BoP and CXI.
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