Essay: Analysis of Russia and the Ukraine using theories of international relations

Theories of international relations are developed to explain the nature of the international system and predict future behavior. Realism in international relations is primarily concerned with security issues and the distribution of power. The Ukraine crisis provides examples of both of these concerns. Russia unofficially annexed the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 not to simply increase her territory, but rather as an offensive threat to the current global powers and just one step towards Russia’s ultimate goal of global hegemony. In this paper, I will discuss the implications of the annexation for Ukraine and her allies, evaluate the annexation through both offensive and defensive lenses, and finally propose that Russia is not concerned with Ukraine itself, but is rather seeking to engage Ukraine’s allies and increase Russia’s relative power.
Ukraine’s position in this conflict can be understood through the realist assumption of actions based on survival. Each state is inherently self interested and all actions are first and foremost to ensure their own survival. In early 2014, Ukraine had a revolution popularly called the Maiden Revolution which ousted President Yanukovych and put an interim government into place. Russia took advantage of this period of relative instability to move into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, an annexation that has not been recognized by the Ukrainian government or international community. The government of Ukraine has been clear that they wish to remain independent of Russia as they have been since the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine does not want to be re-absorbed into the Russian sphere of power, an interest that can be defined most basically as an action to ensure Ukraine’s survival. If Ukraine is officially taken over by Russia, she will lose her sovereignty, an important characteristic to be internationally recognized as a state.
In contrast, Russia is less concerned with survival than with relative power. According to realist thought, states are more concerned with their power relative to others than absolute power because authority is based on who has the most capability when it is distributed among states. Russia’s move to annex the Crimean Peninsula can be interpreted through either an offensive or defensive lens. The offensive perspective would claim the Russia is trying to expand her territory and gain the included population and resources, all of which are forms of latent power. Latent power is crucial because the included economic resources may be easily converted into military power (i.e. increased manpower, new technological developments, a larger military budget). The annexation of Crimea is important to Russia because it would increase Russia’s access to the Black Sea and spread the Russian range of influence to have a closer proximity to Western Europe. The annexation may be interpreted as an offensive move against the Western powers– the United States, Great Britain, and France– because Russia would have moved closer to their sphere of influence in Europe. Influence is synonymous with authority in a region; Russia wants to have the most influence relative to other states who also have interests in the same region.
The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula may alternatively be interpreted as a defensive move. Russia’s aim may not in fact be a threat to the Western powers but rather a response to feeling threatened by the competing power in such close proximity. By annexing Crimea, Russia may be attempting to establish a buffer zone between her borders and the powers in Western Europe. This buffer zone would serve to protect Russia in case of an attack because there would be more notice and therefore more time to respond to an immediate threat. The problem with this defensive analysis, however, is that attempts to establish buffer zones are often unintentionally threatening due to the security dilemma, in which one state’s attempts to increase their own security unintentionally threatens the security of another state (Jervis 169). The action, while possibly intended to be defensive, is more likely to be interpreted by realists as an offensive move due to the security dilemma. In this case, the impact of an action is more relevant than the intent because other states do not know the intentions of their rivals (or whether statements of intent are completely truthful) and therefore respond in such a manner to ensure their own survival.
In order to maintain an image of acting defensively, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, has released statements since the unofficial annexation that Russia’s intentions are to maintain the status quo. He claims that the annexation of Crimea is an attempt to return to Russia’s historical territory from the days of the Soviet Union; however, Putin’s history of dishonest discourse makes his statements difficult to believe. The system in which Russia functions is assumed by realists to be anarchic because it lacks a central global authority which would give credibility to statements or agreements made between states (Waltz 32). Due to this lack of supranational authority, states can never be sure of another state’s intentions because there is no power to ensure accountability. This prevalent uncertainty adds to other states’ unwillingness to take official statements of intent at face value. The question that the international community must face is whether Russia is truly a status quo power as Putin claims, or rather a revisionist state with the goal of creating a new balance of power (J. J. Mearsheimer 79) in which Russia is the new reigning hegemon.
Contributing to the sense of uncertainty is Russia’s consistent support of pro-Russian rebel groups in Ukraine. These groups enhance the instability in the region, giving Russia control of whether there is or is not conflict in the region. The support of pro-Russian groups gives the conflict the appearance of being an offensive move rather than a defensive one. If the annexation is truly to defend Russia’s borders, the government should not be supporting potential conflict so close to home and should instead be trying to keep the region as peaceful as possible. Therefore, it is practical for the international community to disregard Putin’s official statements and look at actions in Crimea to consider Russia as a revisionist state aiming for global hegemony.
Russia’s actions are consistent with the interpretation that her ultimate goal is global hegemony. Therefore, it is likely that the Crimean Peninsula annexation is a ploy to engage Ukraine’s allies, weaken them, and increase Russia’s relative power. Ukraine is closely tied with the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union with her eventual goal to be integration into the Euro-Atlantic region. Because realists consider states to be the primary actors in international relations, NATO and the EU can be considered in terms of their main powers– Great Britain and France. States are constantly competing to have the most power relative to other states, often resulting in an unintentional balance of power (Waltz 32). The United States, Great Britain, and France are an example of balancing against Russia to prevent the rise of a new hegemon who would threaten their regional and global interests. The United States has enjoyed a preponderance of power since the end of World War II and should therefore be concerned with the possibility of a rising power with whom to compete for global influence. Great Britain and France are responsible to Ukraine because she has been a supporter of the EU even though the organization’s power has been seriously undermined (Sushko) by doubts in the EU’s ability to handle instability across the region. None of the Western states want to relinquish any power to Russia and therefore will fall into Russia’s trap of engagement.
In a recent response to Russia’s apparent aggression, NATO has increased their military presence across Europe (Schmidt). This move is an attempt to deter Russia from continued expansion or increased aggression. Deterrence is the use of threats of force to prevent another state from initiating a particular action (Art 13) and is often used to maintain the current distribution of capability across the system. In this case, NATO is showing Russia that they are not afraid to use force to protect their friend, Ukraine, and their interests in Western Europe. The deterrent strategy is based on the assumption that the threat is legitimate and that the threatening power has the actual capability to carry out the threat. The hope, however, is that the threatened state will back down and there will be no need for actual armed conflict. NATO’s deterrence is costly, requiring economic support and the deployment of troops across Europe to demonstrate their resolve. While intended to be a show of strength, the Western powers are unintentionally weakening themselves by getting involved in a drawn out conflict.
The response by Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic friends may actually be playing right into Russia’s bait and bleed strategy. Russia has clear military superiority over Ukraine and would easily be able to take over the region by force. Because this has not yet occurred, it is likely that the Ukraine crisis has been a play to get to Ukraine’s allies. The expansion of military presence in Europe is a costly process, and in combination with Russia’s control over the conflict within Ukraine, will likely be a long face-off. This is the underlying strategy of bait and bleed, to provoke conflict in a region as an attempt to weaken rivals (J. Mearsheimer 139) until the revisionist state has the advantage. While this move is not outwardly offensive– Russia has not directly threatened the current regional hegemons– it is not a defensive tactic. Russia holds clear military superiority over Ukraine and annexing Crimea to establish a buffer zone would have been a swift and effective takeover rather than a long and drawn out conflict, suggesting alterior motives. Russia may be laying the groundwork for a more openly offensive and threatening action once she has amassed the power necessary to pose a serious threat to the current balance of power in Europe.
Russia seems to be operating within an offensive-realist policy. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula increases her territory, population, and access to resources, all of which increase Russia’s latent power and contribute to the development of increased military power. It is unlikely that Russia is acting defensively because annexation of Crimea to create a buffer zone would have been easy with Russia’s current military ability. Instead, Russia has managed to engage Ukraine’s friends, the United States, Great Britain, and France, who also happen to be Russia’s global competitors. The ultimate strategy that Russia seems to be employing is bait and bleed in an attempt to weaken the global powers and thereby increase her own relative power. The realist interpretation of this conflict demonstrates the theory’s ability to explain the world and predict the intentions of states within the system. Russia’s actions in Crimea may have a parallel in the current Syrian crisis and give support to the claim that she is attempting to achieve global hegemony.