In this chapter, I will give a precise introduction to human security. To understand the context of human security, the history of security studies will be explained based on the four phases of as postulated by Waever and Buzan.
3.1.1 Phase One of Security Studies: The Emergence of the Field in the 1940s
For long, agenda for peace and security, epidemics, menace, and action plans have been the main point of discussion for scholars. At the end of World War II, in the 1940s, security studies emerged as the paradigm in which the military and the scholars converged with the intention of deriving appropriate cross-cutting policy that would embrace different knowledge. Nevertheless, the security concepts became the focus of interest at the same time with institutional changes.
At the end of WWII, the USA anticipated not only facing the exceptional effect of nuclear but also the general ideological, economic and military challenges in which the Soviet Union posed. Although, the recognition gained from a new invention of weapons was in play, the rise of strategic studies in which the involvement of civilian helped in laying down plans on how to strategically administer and coordinate warfare that aimed balanced the military leadership during the end of Second World War and beginning of the cold war. Thus, this demand, compelled technological advancement especially the nuclear weapon and the rapid rise in preventing war, and long term broad based political mobilization (Waever and Busan 395-396).
The military was forthright, nuclear weapon thoroughly altered the security formula and various expertise was required from the classical military one. To this effect, much as the actual planning was further combined, the dilemma was that there was a need to refrain from war and instead find alternative solutions to which the existence of nuclear weapon would be used for political gain, prompting, change to occur from diplomatic and functional level to long-term strategy. (ibid, 2013: 396). Even though it appears that nuclear weapon could be used as preventive measures at frontline, it’s devastating effect would still need an alternative form of knowledge from the common military experts, hence, the emergence of the security studies at end of world war II and the beginning of cold war needed a close coordination of both military and non-military consideration. The USA realized that there was a need for an integrated form of knowledge to embrace all existing challenges especially when the USA needed more army non-existing regular army with usual practices that ought to organize for long-term mobilization, structured the emerging civil-military amalgamate as the cold war was taking shape.
The longstanding anticipated political context in America was that the establishment of permanent military institutions would jeopardize democracy since it was an exceptional and a turning point in which US army officials played a role in the formulation of foreign policies.(ibid 2013; 396)
All in all, in order to reflect the concept of security, the institutional restructuring of the military mobilization in USA settings could not be done by war or defense alone but also a more comprehensive and non-combatant terms of mobilization was needed. As Waever and Buzan quoted Lasswell 1950 and Huntington 1957 that, the cold war mobilization led to tension between the military professionalism and the American Liberalism, hence, the rise of strategic studies was a response to this tension(ibid 2013; 396).
3.1.2 Phase Two of Security Studies: The Golden Age From 1950-1965
The golden age of security refers to the developmental era after second decades of World War II from 1950 to 1965 that define the way in which security studies were anticipated. It was influenced by the nuclear weaponry, arms restrictions and war avoidance (Waever and Buzan, 2013: 397; Baldwin, 1995: 123). Security issues may be relative to other national goals, however, the use of a particular type of weapon matter in the security arena. Certainly, the most compelling issue was the logic behind the nuclear weapon as policy instrument by the states considering its destructive nature. Golden age is considered as the topmost point of theorization in which game theory and deterrence theory were developed in terms of theoretical creativity and competence relevant to policy, although in most cases it is regarded as a compromised in policy pertinence and utility versus theoretical abstraction and sophistication(ibid, 2013; 397; 1995: 123-124). Much as the nuclear weapon ushered in new challenges to understanding the speculated and contemplated situation that opened to accelerated and dynamic development, it gained principal place in political arena and concurrently, became the main development in academic platform because of it high degree of theorization and formalization in the current international relations dimensions (Ibid 2013; 397).
During the cold war, the US economy flourishes with heightening technological hopefulness that triggered huge support to social science to find the alternative solution not only to cold war struggles but also to social problems that appear to move International relations through scientific research to game theory. Therefore, game theory within the international relations context emphasizes the specific characteristics of actors, their interaction strategy, issues being negotiated and the form of interaction among the nation-states, of which economic and security issues play a central role in international relation( Correa 2001: 188). International relations holds that interactions among nation-states involved interdependency goal and directed activities, and the achievement of any nation-states’ goals is not subjected to its own actions but rather depends on the interactions with other states (Correa, 2001; 188-189). Within the field of international relations, nation-states are motivated to interaction with other nation-states only by self-interest and pursued self-satisfactions.
The game theory claims that actions between nation-states are known and players can go for the preferred choice of actions without any restrictions. Therefore, Game Theory restricts its analysis of interaction between nation-states based on security and defense issues (Correa, 2001: 189-190). During this period there was more attention was given to military aspects of the national security that other national institutions and social welfare.
Deterrence theory refers to threats of using force to prevent damage to economic policies, armed attack or destructions. This theory is only used by nation-states when each one threaten to retaliate or protecting themselves against possible attack, destruction or domination by other nation-states. Accordingly, deterrence theory as a product of the most progressive research programs came up with a new analysis and provided possible solutions to the best way to contain conflicts and avoid escalation (Weaver and Buzan 2013: 397).
It seeks to establish means in which nuclear weapon is used as a mean in war avoidance, even though, it seeks to meet the interest of the military and politicians by legitimizing ownership of nuclear weapon which influences the policy. Therefore, the theories of deterrence shape a comprehensive rationale of nuclear weapon that influences the magnitude of investment. The involvement of civilian experts in policy making and strategizing operation plans to the military operatives tamed the old military rationale of overestimating force while in possession of nuclear weapons and other destructive weapons without considering the political stability.
In other words, Golden age theory and deterrence theory play a central role in international relations theory. The policy-oriented work played a considerable role in the general theory which was not just knowledge transfer to the political world, but instead lobby for particular policy (ibid 2013; 399). During Golden age, policy-relevant work that form
ed the general theory as system analysis provided solutions to problems of military structure and resource allocation that drawn from economics theory and operations research developed by different fields of scholars. During this period, strategic studies were more about economics in that the military budget rose up because the demand for escalation dominance.
Economics of defense engulfs all aspects of the economics of war and peace as defense integrates all other relevant disciplines for its effectiveness. Security is a public good which is non-rival and non-exclusive: As such, within strategic studies economics of defense drew a lot of attention in the 1960s and 1970s because it focused on the resource availability for defense and how the military used the resources efficiently. In this way, as new threats emerge in the arena of the technological advancement, allocation of scarce resources within the military production sections ought to be available to handle the new challenges although it compromises with other social welfare spending.(Hartley 2011: 1-4; Higgs, 1994: 284-290). Military power reflects the economic power in defence budget planning, such that during wartime, the nation-states mobilizes resources to meet the required military demands to defend both national integrity and international allies either by hard power or through diplomacy; thus, the implementation of these strategy calls for tools to be developed, built capacity and ensure capability to win the plans (Ibid 2011; 1994).
3.1.3 Phase three of security Studies: The stagnation from 1965 – 1980
This period of security studies is sometimes termed as the decline period in which nation states had witnessed internal weakening during the previous period. At this time, the US interest shifted from cold war with the Soviet Union to Vietnam War which was a proxy conflict of the cold war; in which the US supported the Southern Vietnam state to suppress the National Liberation Movement which was an ally to Northern Vietnamese-backed by the communist ideology of Soviet Union. The American underestimated the potential of the nationalism and overstated influence of communist on the Southern Vietnam (Baldwin 1995: 124). In this way, American made an irrational decision and underestimate the war and believe that it would be a successful war. The security studies indulged more on nuclear weapon strategy, US-Soviet Union relations, and NATO strategy offering little attention to the Vietnamese war. As asserted by Baldwin while quoting Colin Gray that “the leading strategists knew ‘next to nothing’ about the peasants nationalism in Southeast Asia or about the mechanics of counterrevolutionary war” (Ibid 1995: 124).
However, during this period of institutionalization and stagnation, the security studies dwell of prioritizing war as a tool to establish a national policy that undermined the legal and moral aspect of war. Within this point in time, in regards to policy relevant, some scholars became policymakers as they were integrated with policymakers compromising their autonomous intellectual (ibid 1995: 124). The rise in peace studies and research in the 1960-70s reduced the interest in national security which did not amount to lack of scholarly interest in war.
Stagnation, therefore, is a period of an economic drawback in the Soviet Union in which interest in security studies took a slow pace to rejuvenate as the reduction in cold war tension brought in play gradual problems of social, economic, political, and environmental and third world poverty. The aftermath of US-Vietnam war and gross allocation of scarce resource in military services at the expense of other national needs constrained both the US and the Soviet Union economy. Consequently, the Arab Oil embargo was a threatening signal to the American livelihood stemming from both military and non-military sources. The renewal of interest in the security studies in the late 1970s and 1980s was stimulated by the growing tension of cold war between the US-Soviet Union, revitalizing scholars’ interest to carry on research as the national security studies were replaced by international relations as the basis of security studies (Baldwin 1995: 125). International relation as a mean of conventional military balance had a very thin deviation from the national security studies of 1955.