Iran’s And Saudi Arabia’s Involvement in the Conflict in Syria
Name
Institution of Affiliation
Abstract
For decades since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iranian-Saudi affiliation has been tense owing to their position as superpowers in the Middle Eastern Region. The Saudi-Iran conflict, the region's theocratic nations, indicates a competition amongst conflicting doctrinal beliefs in Islam, differing political realism and systems, and reactions to the West’s intervention. The Cold War between these two nations is saturated with ethnic nationalism, political realism, and religious influence, with each country’s collective narrative emphasizing on these dissimilarities and hence perpetuating differences stemming back to Prophet Muhammad’s time. The reverberations of this conflict are currently felt in Islamic countries and throughout the Middle East.
In this tussle for religious and regional sovereignty, the most noticeable battlefield contemporarily is the Syrian Civil War, branded by external meddling, other nation’s foreign policy, sectarian divisions, and influenced by the pressures of political realism. In the forefront of the conflict in Syria is Saudi Arabia and Iran engage in a proxy war aimed at attaining regional influence, power, and the position as the ultimate representative of Islam and the advocator of its marque of theocracy. This paper outlines the history of the affiliation between Iran and Saudi before and after 2011 and analyzes the changes and driving forces behind the changes in the relationship between the two nations. The paper also discusses the foreign policy makers in Saudi Arabia and Iran followed by a discussion of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.
The paper will also entail a discussion of the Saudi Arabia and Iranian involvement in the conflict in Syria giving reasons and motivations for their intervention, political objectives, and strategies used to achieve their objectives. Finally, the paper will end with an assessment of the paper’s findings on underlying rationalities of the Saudi-Iranian involvement in Syria’s conflict. By analyzing sectarianism, impact of foreign policies, religion, and the tussle for regional supremacy, the paper enlightens about the current political realism tensions between Saudi and Iran that characterize outcomes of the conflict in Syria and regional dynamics.
Introduction
History of the Saudi Arabia-Iranian affiliation before 2011
The Saudi Arabia-Iranian relationship is traceable to 1928 following the creation of the al-Saud dynasty. Initially, there was synergy between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran that resulted from shared interests to safeguard common economic issues and goals and their respective regimes. The common economic goals between the two nations aimed at curbing radical and socialist nationalistic influences in the Middle East region that fostered a steady flow of gas and oil and raising wealth through exports in both nations till the late 1970s (Juneau and Razavi, 2013). This duration of friendly associations between the two countries was established in the existence of identical structures of governance in both nations alongside domestic complimentary objectives and foreign policy.
At this time, sectarian divisions were not significant or emphasized in bilateral debates. Despite the good bonds between Saudi Arabia and Iran, cooperation and cordial interaction concerning the two countries was not destined to endure. The Shah’s toppling in 1979 led to a major swing in Iran’s foreign policy threatening al-Saud’s validity besides threatening the status quo of Monarchical regimes in the nations of the Middle East. For over a decade after the 1979 revolution, the relationship between these two countries continuously disintegrated causing a break in their diplomatic interactions in 1988 (Okrahlik 2003, p. 39). Saudi Arabia saw Iran as a subverting power in the Middle East owing to Iran’s recurrent efforts to spread its rebellion to the rest of the Middle Eastern states. On the contrary, Iran saw Saudi Arabia as weak and unsuitable to safeguard Islam’s holy places. Whereas Iranian Khomeinist principle was fervently anti-monarchical, formal, and clerical governance that advocated and overtly populist line, these traits contradicted Saudi’s political structure and foreign policy (Wehrey 2009, p.40).
Besides the tussle for policies and ideologies, Saudi-Iranian relations were further weakened by the aftermaths of the Mecca Grand Mosque 1979 overthrow. Nonetheless, there lacked direct proof to indicate that Iran was involved (Wehrey, 2009). The major impact of Iran’s revolution on Saudi-Iranian interactions comprised of increased mistrust that led to the termination of their cooperative and diplomatic interactions, creating a bitter competitiveness for influence and power in the Middle East. After the Islamic Republic of Iran had been established, the Iran-Iraq war ensued with Saudi Arabia supporting Iraq that oversaw further deterioration of the Saudi Arabia-Iranian interactions (Juneau, 2013). The resolution to assist Iraq was founded on Saudi’s angst that Iranian propaganda against Saudi Arabia endangered Saudi Arabia’s governance and regime. Consequently, Saudi assisted Iraq economically and politically throughout their war with Iranians by lending Iraq U.S. $40 billion to reinforce its army (Juneau and Razavi, 2013). The rivalry between Saudi and Iran further escalated through the use of economic policies by either of the nation’s particularly Saudi in 1985-1986 to impose pressures on Iran.
After the culmination of the Iraq-Iran War in 1989, the rivalry and gap between Saudi’s and Iranian, diplomatic interactions continue. However, after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, the trilateral power affiliation in the Gulf Region changed again. The conflict between Saudi and Iran cooled as they united to face Iraq as the new common enemy with the Iran-Saudi diplomatic relations being restored on March 19, 1991 (Juneau, 2013). The 1990s were tainted by a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia that was facilitated by Iran’s changing foreign policy and economic goals and the lessening of Saudi Arabia’s worries of Iranian stratagem. This abrupt change in Iraqi-Saudi interactions pushed Saudi Arabia and Iran closer, permitting them to overwhelm past transgressions and differences to counter Iraq’s pursuit of power and sovereignty in the region.
After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, America intervened in the region invading both Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. invaded both nations under the notable confrontation of terror. Following Saddam Hussein’s defeat, the policies of supremacy in the Middle East changed again undesirably affecting the Iranian-Saudi interactions once more. The American invasion impacted the balance of power amongst Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in the region while igniting extremist tendencies that increased sectarian divisions between Shia and Sunni Muslims and between the Middle East and the Western Nations (Juneau, 2013). Consequently, Iraq shifted its concern for Gulf politics to its internal turmoil and revolution reducing the previously triangular system of power in the region to a bipolar one between Saudi and Iran.
Instead of striving towards a joint emphasis on restricting Iraqi’s sovereignty after the toppling of Saddam, Iran, and Saudi once more encountered an increase in tensions owing to a divergence in interests. The harmful major aspect to the interaction amid Tehran and Riyadh was the authorized Iran’s pursuit of superior power and influence in the Middle East after the toppling of Saddam. The elimination of the prolonged anti-Iranian governance in Iraq availed a chance for Iran to intensify an affiliation with the new democracy, which had a demographic population, which is 65%, Shia. Alongside the efforts to consolidate power and influence in Iraq
, Iran advanced with a smear crusade to counter the al-Saud’s dynasty. Some of Iran’s assertions involved labeling Saudi Arabia as the American’s agent in the region
Consequently, it is evident that the crucial driver of the dealings between Saudi and Iran is a tussle to maneuver and influence Middle East’s balance of power rather than sectarian divisions that realistically are exploited as a strategy to delegitimize Saudi Arabia (Wehrey, 2009). According to a recent report by RAND, the Shia-Sunni divide actually features within the calculus of the leadership that is either downplayed or encouraged as an instrument in a bigger game of political realism scheming. Nevertheless, sectarianism is not the main reason for the worsening Iranian-Saudi bonds. It is in this civil situation that the two nation’s affiliation was confronted further by the emergence of the 2011 Arab Springs.
Relationship after 2011
After the 2011 Arab Spring that saw the overthrowing of leaders in Libya, Egypt, and Libya, the steadiness of sovereignty in the region was offset similarly to the offset after U.S oversaw the toppling of Saddam Hussein (Sengupta, 2015). Nevertheless, the uprisings of 2011, contrasting the 2003 liberation of Iraq, were initiated by local inhabitants that had become weary of awaiting political reforms. The balance of power was offset by the ambiguity in Saudi’s and Iranian’s future foreign policy goals, in addition, the necessity to focus on pressing domestic issues to avert revolutions from their citizens, a belligerent approach of subversion used by the two countries beyond their borders as they searched for diversions from internal uprisings.
Saudi Arabia seemed not to fear the subversion of Iran compared to its fear of the probable ramifications of Shia freedom crusaders on Saudi’s own minority Shai population. This is proved by Saudi’s reaction to political demonstrations in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia assisted the alleged conquest of Bahrain demonstrators in supporting the conservation of the governing Al-Khalifa family that was Sunni. Nevertheless, this intervention provided more material for Iran’s propaganda tools that were enabled to stress the illegitimacy of Saudi’s involvement and the nation’s flagrant disregard for humanity. This reaction by Saudi Arabia led to elevated sectarian divisiveness since many Shia Muslims view the invasion at Bahrain as an invasion on Shia Muslims. The conflict between Saudi and Iran was further increased by Shia Cleric Nimr al-Nimr’s execution on 2nd January 2016 by Saudi Arabia.
Some people view the current competition between Saudi and Iran as one that could be viewed to be along the line of Sunni-Shia rivalry. This has further been stressed by the intervention of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria. In Syria, Saudi Arabia perceives it vital for Bashar Al-Assad to leave Syria in a condition that a political compromise will occur to the Civil War. On the other hand, Iran has been striving to support Bashar Al-Assad. Persistent structural tensions, which seem to taint much of the interaction between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with each having aspirations for regional and Islamic influence, leadership, and conflicting visions and foreign policies of regional order that have led to a competition that might possibly undermine the overall stability of the Gulf and the Middle East Region (Wehrey, 2009).
Foreign policy making in Iran and Saudi Arabia
Though the pursuit and détente of more pragmatic policies by Mohammad Khatami, a reformist, from 1997 to 2005 greatly reduced tensions between Iran and neighboring nations in the region, areas of conflict and profound mistrust, continue to taint Iran’s interactions with other states of the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. Much of this mistrust and tension is traceable to the early years of the Iranian revolution when Tehran was globally perceived to be an exporter of religious revolutionary extremism and a source of regional instability. At the beginning of the 19190s, the Iranians no longer seemed to be interested in exporting their Revolution.
However, in the early 2000s, it was Iran’s nuclear program that became a source of worry for other regional nations. For Iran, the largest threat to its security is the existence of foreign naval and military forces stationed in the region and in the waterway. Iran considers the Persian Gulf its own backyard and it gets fear whenever the region becomes unstable. Iran has continuously expressed and initiated foreign policies that facilitate the Iran’s joining any collective security arrangement that guarantees the stability of the region and recognizes Iran’s rightful power and role in the Persian Gulf.
The foreign policy of Iran at certain stages has unnecessarily responded to the hegemonic strategies of extra-regional actors in the Middle East. For instance, the aggressive policies of the U.S during the early period of the revolution led to great mistrust that was expressed through Iran’s foreign policy. However under the current situation characterized by a struggle for influence and power in the region, Iran’s foreign policy should adopt a non-rhetorical view of its geopolitical and political realism exigencies (Juneau and Razavi, 2013). Moreover, Iran’s foreign policy should consider the certainty of the existence of other players and supremacies in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia while it incorporates its own limitations and abilities into the larger section of the Middle East.
Evidently, Iran’s policy makers see their nation as of the Middle East’s most powerful nations, if not its preeminent influence and power. In this context, Iranian affiliations with other nations such as Saudi are not founded on any evident delineated foreign policy principle. Instead, they are determined more by the ebb and flow of power in regional politics and by Iran’s efforts to play the role of a regional power, than by anything else (Juneau and Razavi, 2013).
In Saudi Arabia, King Salman’s accession and judgment to lead military intrusion in Syria and Yemen indicated Saudi’s new phase of foreign policy. This does not imply that Saudi has implemented new policies, but means that the contemporary generation is taking over the lead in foreign policy making in search of new approaches to react to the highly unpredictable environment. Saudi is demonstrating its newfound preparedness to utilize military force and witness its limits. With the outcome in Yemen and Syria yet to become fully clear, the tools and direction of Saudi’s foreign policy led by King Salman continue to be under test.
For years, Saudi Arabia has been viewed as a conservative power, which seeks to retain the status quo in the region perpetuating the system of sovereign nations while welcoming the presence of America in the region. On its part, Saudi Arabia, rather than supporting counter-revolutions, the country responds to the protests and uprisings based on foreign policies that are guided by opportunities and personalities: backing regime change unswervingly in Syria (Wehrey, 2009). Globally, Saudi Arabia’s policymakers have a concern in emphasizing that its main purpose in Yemen is to restore the globally recognized president, hence safeguarding global norms. Regionally and domestically, Saudi’s policy makers emphasize on pushing the influence of Iran out of the Arabian Peninsula, hence maintaining a customary Arab sphere.
To date, it is mainly the ambition and tools that have transformed, instead of the general direction of Saudi’s foreign policy. As articulated by Saudi’s academics and diplomats, the Saudi’s government essentially wants to preserve the country’s internal stability, to have friendly countries governed by friendly regimes that will trade with Saudi and embrace a Western role in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi’s government is
said to be striving to avert the empowerment of movements having transnational agendas that would lead to destabilization of the region. Clearly, Iran and Saudi Arabia have fundamentally differing conceptions of security threats that face each of them individually and all of them collectively (Juneau and Razavi, 2013). Thus, the competition with Iran rarely concerns sectarian or ethnic issues than with conflict and opposition to influence and power by Iran in the region. Contemporary, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are at high pitch due to Saudi’s oppositions to Iran’s involvement in Syria.
Saudi-Iranian Involvement in the Syria’s conflict
In February 2016, Saudi declared its plans to release its troops to Syria. Lightly taken, it seems that Saudi is engaging in Syria to terminate the prevalence of the Muslim state. Nevertheless, the rivalry between Saudi and Iran is more ostensible that Saudi Arabia is also concerned in countering Iranian activities in the Syria. Saudi Arabia acknowledges that as days pass, Russia’s and Iran’s presence and intervention in Syria is playing a huge role in determining the direction of Syria’s Civil War. The intervention has not assisted Al-Assad to retain his power in the large sections of the West. However, it has been influential in the forces of the pro- government's recent capability to take over the city of Aleppo.
Considering that the U.S does not play a major role in Syria’s conflict, external efforts to fight Al-Assad or challenge the support from Iran and Russia has been limited. Part of this limited indirect opposition is mainly from Saudi Arabia and Israel. However, currently, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Syria is still limited and yet to reach the capacity of an intervention similar to that by Iran. Iran acknowledges that any growth of involvement on Saudi Arabia’s part will most probably not limited to fighting the Islamic nation, but have other interests, particularly search for power and influence (Melnnis 2016). Currently, Russia and Iran have a great margin in controlling the current situation in Syria.
On the part of Saudi Arabia, its coalitions with other states and other allies including the U.S (Mclnnis, 2016) complements their political realism and foreign policy through their involvement intended to result in the complication of the Iranian plans for Al-Assad to restore governance in the nation. Saudi Arabia is also striving to minimize Iran’s coalitions and allies that comprise, but not limited to Hezbollah, a terrorist movement, days after the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) initiated a similar stance (Al Jazeera, 2016). With regard to Saudi Arabia’s viewpoint, decreasing the influence of Hezbollah will damage Iran’s and Al-Assad’s geopolitical position. Hence, based on the overall reactions and politics of Iran and Saudi Arabia, conflicts between the two nations continue to escalate, either with respect to proxy works or probably more direct wars in Syria. Riyadh has been the key supporter and provider of financial and military support to various rebel groups including groups with Islamist ideologies. Often, Riyadh has pledged for a no-fly zone to be enacted to safeguard the public from attack by forces of the Syrian government (The Financial Times 2016).
In December 2012, most of the arms started reaching the rebels permitting them to gain significant technical benefits against Assad’s militias and army. This support was mainly intended to counter Iran’s shipment of weapons to Assad’s troops (Chivers, Schmitt, Eric, 2013). According to a report by The Independent (Sengupta, 2015), in May 2015, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were focusing their support to Syrian rebels by combining the Army of Conquest or Jash al-Fatah that comprises of an Al-Qaeda related Al-Nusra Front that had been declared as a terrorist group by the U.S. Earlier in 2016, Saudi Arabia declared the establishment of a military alliance comprised of Muslim nations intended to fight global terrorism in which 30 Muslim nations (all of which are Sunni majority states). These states in the newly formed alliance included Turkey and Egypt. Consequently, Iran and Russia viewed the coalition as one intended to reinforce Saudi’s leadership while countering Russia’s and Iran’s efforts in the Middle East.
Quite the opposite, Iran being the region’s Shai power is alleged to be investing billions of dollars annually to support President Assad and his government by availing subsidized weapons and military advisers alongside oil transfers and lines of credit. Through this strategy, Iran is aiming at attaining their political objectives of being the region’s supreme power. President Assad is Iran’s best ally in the region whereas Syria serves as the major point of transit for Iran’s weapons shipment to Lebanon-based Shia Islamist Movement referred to as Hezbollah (McInnis, 2016). Moreover, Iran is alleged to have influenced Hezbollah’s decision to dispatch fighters to the Western part of Syria to support Pro-Assad’s troops. Moreover, militiamen from Iraq and Iran who claim to be safeguarding Shia’s Holy Sites are often seen fighting together with Syrian militiamen. In September 2011, Iran’s Ali Khamenei was reported to favor the Syrian government and troops vocally. On 23rd November 2015, Iran is alleged to have decided to unite its stance vis-à-vis the Russia’s leadership with Syrians in a meeting that took place in Tehran between Ali Khamenei and Vladimir Putin.
Conclusion
From the discussion above, it is certain that the prolonged conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been mainly influenced by each of the countries’ foreign policy aimed at achieving full influence and power in the Middle East region. The events under the Iranian-Saudi relationship has been characterized by enduring tensions with little instances of alliance and lowered tensions, particularly when faced with a common threat such as Iraq during Saddam’s era. After the Arab Springs of 2011, regional competition has increased especially between Iran and Saudi as they struggle for power and influence guided by political realism ideologies that form the basis of their foreign policies. Fearing that the other country may become the region’s supreme power, Iran’s and Saudi’s foreign policy makers enact strategies such as direct funding and providing weapons where they have vested interests.
Though indeed there exists a religious division between these two religious groups that is traceable to the founding of the religion’s first generation in the 7th century, the truth remains that the religious conflict and division is only partly relevant to the current rivalry between the two nations and their intervention in Syria. For decades in the Middle East’s history, the Shia and Sunni had always gotten along. The religious disparity was just not so significant and influential to the region’s politics. Both Saudi and Iran attempt to exploit sectarianism for their personal gain by supporting hardline Sunni and Shia movements’ respectively that would rebel the rival’s powers while endorsing either of the countries’ political realism interests.
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