Biafran separatists in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation and largest economy, are calling for secession and a national referendum on independence from Nigeria (Abebe, 2017). In this paper, I will analyze the grievances of Biafran secessionists as articulated by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) organization and the prospects for their concerns being addressed within the current Nigerian political system.
Nigeria is an ethnically diverse country, with over 250 ethnic groups. Ethnic politics mix with regional politics as the largest ethnic and most politically influential groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the southwest, and Igbo in the southeast (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017).
The current movement for Biafran independence represents a resurgence in separatist sentiment, primarily among the Igbo, with deep historical connections to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) and its unresolved issues. Although the desire for Biafran secession is more complex than simple ethnic tensions, Biafra is a case where ethnicity is mobilized for a political agenda.
The Nigerian Civil War, one of the deadliest civil wars in history, resulted from the declaration of independence of Nigeria’s Eastern region under the Republic of Biafra in 1967. The federal military government’s brutal war and blockade against the Biafran Republic created a humanitarian crisis that caused the deaths of over one million civilians (Simpson, 2014).
Following the war’s conclusion, the federal military government reintegrated Biafra back into Nigeria with a policy of “No victors, No vanquished.” A lingering perception of marginalization, however, remained among much of the Igbo population who felt that their loss in the war left them weaker in political power and economic resources relative to the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba. (Maiangwa, 2016). The modern Biafran secessionist movement touches on many of the same concerns that triggered the secession of the old Biafran republic.
The high level of poverty in Nigeria where sixty-two percent of Nigerians live in extreme poverty has contributed to the rise in popularity of the Biafran secessionist movement, particularly among Igbo youth(Central Intelligence Agency, 2017).
Biafran separatists attack the character of Nigeria’s federal system, which they view as operating in favor of the federal government. The central government, for example, controls the country’s main sources of revenue, including disproportionate oil rents (Abebe, 2017). Moreover, the southeastern region only has five states in comparison to the other regions, which means that the southeast receives less federal allocation (Oduah, 2017).
The uncertainty of the geographical boundaries of the potential Biafran republic further complicates the Biafran question, particularly due to the issue of the Niger Delta. Some pro-Biafrans discuss the Biafran republic as including the five principal Igbo-dominated states and other times Biafra is discussed as including all the territories in the former Eastern Nigeria, thereby potentially including the major oil regions in the Niger Delta (Johnson & Olaniyan, 2016).
The oil in the Niger Delta accounts for a significant portion of government revenue and eighty percent of foreign exchange earnings. The federal government could not afford to lose these crucial states to a new Biafran republic. (Ayokhai & Peter, 2016). Although groups in the Niger Delta protest against the disproportionate oil revenues from their regions going to the federal government, minority ethnic groups in those states have also indicated that they would not be favorable to becoming another minority group in an Igbo-dominated state (Smith, 2014).
Biafran separatists also identify the political marginalization of the Igbo as a key political grievance against the Nigerian government. Their recurrent complaints include, uneven federal resource allocations, official state data collection methods being devised in such a manner that undercounts Igbos, and the federal government’s setting of rules for appointments to civil service positions that are discriminatory against Igbos (Smith, 2014).
Pro-Biafrans cite the small number of Igbo and southeastern representation in elite government positions, such as the legislature, presidency, and military leadership as illustrations of their marginalization(Johnson & Olaniyan, 2016). For example, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi has been the only Igbo leader of Nigeria since independence in 1960. There have been no Igbo presidents of Nigeria since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999 (see table 1).
The landmark election in 2015 of President Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani from the north who had fought against Biafrans in the civil war, sparked greater pro-Biafra sentiment. The election was Nigeria’s first peaceful transition to power to an opposition candidate since its establishment (Mbachu, 2017).
Buhari, however, only gained five percent of the vote in the southeast region in 2015. He heightened the Biafran separatists’ rhetoric and fears of marginalization during a speech at the United States Institute for Peace in 2015, where he suggested that he would penalize Igbos for not voting for him in the election (Adibe, 2017).
Buhari has also not appointed any Igbo or officials from the Southeast to any of the top security positions in Nigeria. His appointments have predominantly been Muslim northerners like himself, playing into the Biafran separatists’ narrative of marginalization (see table 2).
Table 1. Political leaders in Nigeria 1960-2016 (Johnson & Olaniyan)
Table 2. Security Appointments under President Buhari-2015 (Johnson & Olaniyan)
Moreover, the Buhari government’s violent suppression of security threats and separatist movements contributed to the IPOB gaining increased support among Igbos. Buhari has declared that Nigerian unity is “non-negotiable”and troublemakers will be brought back into order, even by violent means if necessary (Iyare & Essomba, 2017).
This year, the Nigerian government declared the IPOB a terrorist organization and launched a military offensive in the southeastern region to quell dissent, prompting deadly clashes between IPOB supporters and military authorities. IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu, for example, was also previously arrested for treason and is missing after a raid of his home by the Nigerian military in September (Iyare & Essomba, 2017).
The Buhari government’s responses to the Biafran secessionist movement demonstrate the government's willingness to employ violence to suppress secessionist threats and the government’s view that Nigerian unity must be maintained at all costs.
Support for separatism is also not just unique to pro-Biafrans, but widespread across Nigeria with other separatist movements, such as the demand for a Niger Delta republic and an Arewa republic in the north (Adibe, 2017) . Facing several threats to national unity, including the Boko Haram insurgency, Buhari will likely never agree to have a national referendum on the Biafran question.
The grievances of pro-Biafrans can only be met by reforming the Nigerian political system. Although Nigeria is currently a federal system, it is more centralized in practice where fiscal and political power are tilted in favor of the federal government and complicated by issues of ethnic divisions and natural resources (Abebe, 2017).
Some regional leaders support a restructuring of the Nigerian political system to “true federalism” where regions, like the southeast region, would be given greater autonomy, gain more revenue from the natural resources in its area, and allow greater political power to regional leaders(Olaniyan & Johnson, 2016). This restructuring might not only help address Biafran grievances, but grievances
of other separatist groups who also feel politically and economically marginalized.