This paper aims to demonstrate why liberal democracy is essential in the Middle East, by ranking civil rights and governmental legitimacy above performance. Also, in this paper, I defy some erroneous views over democracy in the Arab world, such as incompatibility with Islamic precepts and a fatidic sense of resignation of local population regarding the authoritarian rule. In addition, I expose the cases of Algeria and Jordan as examples of countries that have presented a trend of increasing openness to liberalization measures, despite their profound structural differences, and how the initiation of an actual democratic process is likely to spread among other countries, similarly to the Arab Spring.
A sense of hopelessness very often comes to mind when dealing with politics in the Middle East. After years of failed uprisings, and the not-so-positive outcomes of the Arab Spring, not just the local population but also many Westerners seem to have given up on expecting political change, let alone a democratic transition in the old authoritarian regimes. Some others even question the efficiency of a liberal democracy in the region, claiming incompatibility with Islam, or “Arab predisposition” to live under authoritarian rules. This paper’s aim is to defy such unfunded beliefs, while defending why liberal democracy is not just necessary, but possible, in the region. To exemplify, I will tackle the cases of Algeria and Jordan, which despite being distinct in several aspects have presented a sign of openness towards liberalization.
To some extent, democracy has reached its peak of fragility in the global scenario. Scholars and policymakers are concerned about the possible major shifts in world politics while considering the latest events occurred in multiple democratic states, such as Brazil, and Turkey, which have experienced large popular demonstrations, and Spain, Portugal and Greece, with massive economic crises (Fukuyama 2015, 11-12; Sisk 2017, 36). Skepticism over the motives of liberal democracy has increased, as demonstrated by the Tunisian scholar Larbi Sadiki, who argues that the American attempt to promote liberal democracy in the Middle East is mostly justified by its “veiled imperialist motivation” (as cited in Markakis 2012, 24). Markakis argues that such perspective is widely shared among Islamists, who persistently have resisted the imposition or defense of liberal democracy in the Arab world, as opposed to the general Islamic society, which demonstrates a fairly high support for a democratic political system (24; Tessler et al. 2012, 90). Many scholars insist on the claim that such trend in the democratic system is not a sign of decline, but of transition and that democracy continues to be the best of political systems (Schmitter 2015, Sisk 2017). If so, it is still valid to try to assess the prospects for a liberal democracy in authoritarian countries in the Middle East, such as Algeria and Jordan.
A key-point to answering the question of why liberal democracy would be effective in Middle East countries, rather than any other political system, relies not on governments’ ability to be efficient, where some autocracies might eventually outperform democratic countries, but on the consolidation of civil rights and governmental legitimacy (Schmitter 2015, 45). As a matter of fact, some oil-rich countries in the region, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, scored above 0.840 in the 2015-Human Development Index, a fairly high position in comparison to neighboring countries and numerous other world democracies (UNDP 2016). Nonetheless, the same countries are among the least free countries in the world, according to Freedom House 2017 Report, with Qatar scoring 5 in civil liberties and 6 in political rights – 7 is the least free rating – and Saudi Arabia scoring 7 in both categories (2017a, 23). Not surprisingly, such regimes are known for using its economic capabilities as a way to either grant the population’s state of dormancy or “purchase the means to silence them by force” (Brownlee et al. 2013, 32; CSP 2017, 17).
Eventually, the questioning might shift to why changing such political systems if their performance is outstanding and people are, at a certain point, satisfied with the government, abdicating of their civil rights and granting rulers’ legitimacy, as is the case in Algeria. The answer comes in two parts, and the first relies on 2011 Arab Uprisings. Although oil wealth might work as a powerful tool to maintain “popular dormancy,” in other places where the resource is scarce or absent and living standards are precarious, autocratic regimes are hardly legitimate and, as demonstrated by the events in Tahrir Square and Bourguiba Avenue, people in the region are willing to die for political change. Moreover, the existence of a conglomerate of autocratic, neo-patrimonialist regimes only increases the barriers to political change in societies that call for it. As was seen in Manama during 2011 uprisings, Bahraini government counted on Saudi, Emirati, Qatari forces, and Kuwaiti naval support as a way to suppress popular demonstrations (Brownlee et al. 2013, 40-41). In other words, there is a toxic nature in autocratic regimes in the Middle East, where the mutual support between states generate political stagnation, not just where people are to some extent at ease, but also where political change is a major grievance.
The second part of the answer concerns the limitations of the “popular dormancy” aspect. As demonstrated by Tessler et al. with data from the Arab Barometer survey project, there is a fairly high support for democracy within Arab society, with some divergences only regarding the pace of transition (2012, 92-93). Larry Diamond confronts the views that political apathy in the Arab world would be an agent of perpetuation for the authoritarian rule in the region. The author rejects the idea that people in Arab countries might be “accustomed to…autocracy and passive obedience,” as argued by Kedourie in 1992, and claims that if it was the case, there would be no explanation to justify what happened to the rest of the world, where democracy was established in countries that formerly had experienced authoritarian regimes solely. He proceeds by stressing that such political apathy does not prevail in front of the aforementioned findings of Arab Barometer, where over 80 percent of the interviewees agreed that democracy is “the best system of government” and that it would be a beneficial implementation in their countries (2010, 95).
Such incompatibility between Islam and democracy is also refuted by Ahmed Khanani, whose work sheds light to the confusing views bred in the West regarding democracy in the Arab world by bringing the interpretation of democracy held by Moroccan islāmiyūn, politically active Muslims, nonparticipants of the elite. By focusing on the definition of democracy among ordinary people, rather than the elites that dictate its meaning both in Western and Islamic societies, the author’s findings reveal that islāmiyūn agree on the deep connection between democracy and Islam, competing only in what are the precise aspects of this connection. In Khanani’s words “to Moroccan islāmiyūn democracy is not only within the purview of Islam; rather, democracy is intimately connected to Islam such that the enactment of democracy is required of Muslims, rendering the practice of democracy worshipful” (2014, 182-235). As demonstrated by these works, the fatidic idea that Arab community is accustomed to autocracy and reject democratic ideals proves to be inconsistent, and indicate that there is a larger margin to the prospects for democracy in the Middle East – at least among the people – than that has been said.
Much of the erroneous idea of democracy existent among some Muslims derives from the problematic nature of neo-patrimonialism. A consensus among scholars defines most Arab countries in the Middle East as neo-patrimonialist regimes. One of the first to define the term, Pawelka explains that it consists in a concentric system, where the ruler at the center is surrounded by elites, which are ordered based on their personal proximity to him, demonstrating a system primarily based on loyalty, rather than merits (as cited in Dacrema 2016, 120; Fukuyama 2015, 13-14). As Dacrema argues, in neo-patrimonialism, “inequality becomes an intrinsic element of the management of the state,” and in order to minimize expected popular reactions it is necessary to resort to mechanisms of suppression through force or clientelism (118). It is understandable why the regional elites are so insistent in claiming that democracy will not fit and that it is incompatible with Islam. Such is the problematic nature of the current system in the Middle East, where despite the fairly high living standards in wealthy states, there is a critic dependence on inequality to grant its stability and perpetuation. The necessary inequality added to the lack of institutionalization give margin to large schemes of corruption, at the expense of the mass.
It would be misleading to claim that democracies are fortresses destitute of corruption and clientelism. In fact, much of the skepticism over democracies’ performance derives from massive corruption schemes in countries around the world. Fukuyama explains such deceptive trend as resulting from a “failure of institutionalization,” and clarifies that if three of the pillars of liberal democracies are not going well, then the whole system will not succeed (2012, 11-18). However, they do open a path for both governmental and societal growth, rather than the fatidic state of stagnation brought by current regimes in the Middle East.
The largest country in Africa, Algeria was for a long time a trendsetter in the Arab world. The state has a history remarked by the secular legacy left by French dominance and the success of its socialist times, where the country was a reference in the Third World. But such success was mostly backed up by oil revenues, which helped to build the façade of a fruitful product of socialism, and hide the outrageous practices of the FLN regime against the population (Gelvin 2012, 93-100; Takeyh 2003, 62). The 2016 Human Development Index ranks Algeria as 83th of 188 countries, and according to 2017 Freedom House Reports, the country is classified as not-free in all the three aspects evaluated: freedom in the world, of the press and on the Internet (UNDP 2016; 2017a, 20; 2017b; 2017c).
Algeria’s recent and traumatic experience with democracy undoubtedly plays a major role when analyzing the prospects for regime change. As it is known, after the first attempt to adopt multiparty elections in 1989, with the victory of the Islamist Salvation Front in first round, the military stepped in to prevent the advance of the opposition, initiating the 1991 Algerian civil war, that lasted over ten years, took over 150,000 lives (Diamond 2010, 97; Gelvin 2012, 94; Cavatorta 2009, 192). Had it not been for the unscrupulous actions of the military, Algeria would probably keep its role as a trendsetter, serving as a promising democratic icon in the region.
The country has a very peculiar identity, balancing secular and modern views with Islamic principles. The popular impulse towards a more democratic government should not be ignored, regardless of the outcomes. In fact, a few decades ago, Algerians marched and voted to demonstrate the dissatisfaction with a rule that, to some extent, exists until today. Despite its title of People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, and the hold of periodical presidential and parliamentary elections, the country is vastly controlled by the army, and defined by CSP Polity as an anocracy, due to its incapability of performing basic tasks, compromising the continuity of the regime (Marshall 30-31; Gelvin 2012, 96). Which raises the flag for inherent governmental instability, allowing wider discussion over the prospects for liberal democracy.
Back to a decade before the civil war, the country was hit by a massive crisis in the oil world market, which set the path for Algerian steep decline, where unemployment soared among the educated sector, the gap between the masses and the elites only increased, and a series of other tensions installed, ultimately sparking the flame of resentment against the government. According to Takeyh, “the political liberalization measures came at a time when mass discontent with the ruling elite reached a fever pitch and was awaiting an avenue for its expression” (62-64). Algeria has been walking the tightrope of oil world market for long decades, which not necessarily triggered liberalization measures. As argued by Cavatorta, these measures might imply that the decision was driven by an internal trend of finding in liberalization the only possible way to cope with the crisis (2009, 184).
Moreover, protests across the country are starting to burst, with significant movements in the Saharan region, where strikingly high inequality hits the population with almost 50 percent of unemployment rates, much higher than the ten percent claimed by the government. As pointed out by Algerian research analyst, Dalia Ghanen-Yazbeck, the south is likely to become Algeria’s Achilles heel, as its location increases the difficulty to protect and control the area. Furthermore, such idleness brought by unemployment gives margin to the spread of criminality, including terrorist activities (Khettab 2017, n.p). The counterterrorist discourse has been used by the government as a way to increase expenditures and invest in its military apparatus, however, the excuse used by Bouteflika and his comrades might shift to an undesired outcome.
Considering the international aspect, the more inequality waters the bad seeds in Algerian society, enhancing the incidence of criminal activity and leaving space for terrorism, the greater the foreign interest in combating the trend, increasing the chances of a foreign intervention. Cavatorta exposes the influential role of international actors and factors in the democratization processes of Algeria and stresses that sanctions from the international community are key elements that must be taken into consideration, and that decrease the range of possibilities of authoritarian rulers (2009, 180-181). In this sense, later events might suggest a bifurcation of international influence. China is Algeria’s main economic partner, unlikely encouraging advances to democratic transition. Nonetheless, Macron has demonstrated increased interest in recovering strong economic ties with Algeria, which could possibly have a role in the liberalization process development (Irish and Chikhi 2017, n.p.). Although Bouteflika or his successor would hardly be a nuisance to the United States or European countries like Gadaffi or Hussein, these are clear examples of how foreign intervention might dismantle the current system.
Although international intervention did not usher a democratic transition in any of these countries, it could turn out in a different way by taking into consideration the particularities of Algeria. FLN’s strength was the biggest barrier to Algeria’s democratic transition, and a foreign intervention able to destabilize it could be the necessary push to reinvent the country. Added to the previous attempt to install a legitimate regime, with high popular participation in the elections, the modernist trends and secular openness, and more important, the features of Islamic policies in Algeria which, according to Takeyh, differ from other Middle Eastern countries for its historic pacifism, Algeria could possibly be the innovative case (64).
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most promising Middle Eastern states when it comes to liberal democratic trends. King Hussein, famous for the “liberal experiment” during his reign, adopted several liberal measures such as Parliamentary elections since 1989, the lifting of martial law, the legalization of political parties, and most important, the creation of the Jordanian National Charter, an impressive step to be taken by a monarch, since it was “a blueprint for a democratic reform” (Wiktorovicz 1999, 606-607; Jordanian National Charter n.d.). His eldest son and successor, King Abdullah II maintained the moderate tone of his father, demonstrating once again inclination toward democratic ideals. In 2002 and 2005, attempts to pass on more democratic reforms were made in the country, with focus on three main areas: state infrastructure, social and economic policies and basic civil rights. However, a fear of “Palestinization,” as described by Alianak, summed to the shift of attention to terrorist threats ended up pushing reforms away (2014, 124-126).
The issue, though, comes from the fact that a democratization process only started in Jordan to maintain the regime’s stability, and was restricted to the lines delineated by the government. Due to the absence of oil reserves, the country works as a rentier state and governmental legitimacy depends more on economic stability than on democratic rights (Wiktorovicz 1999, 608). Such aspect makes Jordan particularly susceptible to economic instability, given the external factor of the subsidies. Demonstrations emerged in the country in the last years as a response to the economic decline and displayed part of popular discontent with liberalization policies adopted by Abdullah II. In the years following the Arab Spring uprisings, the King enacted numerous laws as a way to appease popular grievances (Alianak 2014, 127-133). Still, the government maintains a posture of censorship over several aspects of Jordanian society. According to the Freedom House reports, the country is classified as partly-free regarding freedom in the world and on the Internet, but not in the case of the press, which is not-free. Dunham brings attention to the arrest of the prominent writer Nahed Hattar for posting a supposedly blasphemous cartoon – who was further assassinated outside the court where he was being prosecuted – and to the repeated regulations imposed over journalists by the government (2017a, 17-26; 2017b; 2017c; Nahed Hattar shot dead 2016, n.p.).
Considering the current political sphere, a democratization process is likely to be detained. Jordan has been directly impacted by the Syrian crisis, receiving over 600,000 Syrian refugees since the beginning of the conflict. According to the International Rescue Committee, a crisis has emerged in the host country, with the scarcity of water, employment, and school vacancies, transforming the northern region in a scenario of struggle. Moreover, according to a report from the Human Rights Watch, in mid-2016 Jordan started sending numerous refugees back to Syria, regardless of the conditions in the country, possibly as a response to ISIS armed attacks in Rukban and Karak. Such measure generated repudiation from the international community over Jordan (IRC n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2017).
Despite the evident manipulation of liberalization to maintain the regime’s stability and the current distractive events, Jordan is slowly stepping toward democratization, and at a much faster pace than most of the Middle Eastern countries. The outcomes of the Arab Spring were soft but positive, with Abdullah II establishing the National Dialogue Commission in March 2011 and the Royal Committee to review the Constitution in the following month (Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan n.d.). In the aftermath of the events, Abdullah II began to explicitly defend his sympathy to democratic ideals, as he demonstrated in his 2013-discussion paper “Towards Democratic Empowerment and ‘Active Citizenship’,” reinforcing the pillars of citizenship and encouraging greater popular participation. Later in the same year, he demonstrated that a regime change is a matter of time: “I see no alternative to democracy…The date of achieving reform is linked to the accomplishment of democratic milestones and requirements I just mentioned” (as cited in Alianak 2014, 143-157).
If there is one region that can be characterized by its unpredictability it is the Middle East. Despite the current spreading skepticism over liberal democracy, some countries, as seen in Algeria and Jordan, have been demonstrating more openness towards the liberal ideology and taking steps that were otherwise unlikely. The two states with its important distinctions, being one an oil-rich semi-presidential anocracy, and the other a rentier monarchy, emit signs that liberal democracy has an opportunity in different contexts. If it is the case, regardless of which contexts welcomes it first, the consequences will not be restricted to this single sphere. The Middle East might be a Pandora box, but the Arab identity enhances the influence each country exerts over the whole group. Therefore, similarly to the Arab Spring outcomes, it is likely that liberalization might spread beyond borders and might encounter its particular barriers. Moreover, a new democratically wave is likely to be strengthened by the resentment over the, in part, the frustration of the 2011 uprisings. Being so, the masses in the region are about to experience a major step into a whole new level of fight, but also freedom.