The Arab-Israeli Conflict is one of the most pressing International Security dilemmas of modernity. This dispute over the Palestinian territories is centuries old, and has left many dead. This is especially true in modern times, due to the creation of the State of Israel. This issue has also been addressed by every American president since Harry Truman, and has also ensnared other Global Powers such as Great Britain, and the Soviet Union/Russia truly making this conflict an international event. What International Relations Theory explains the modern Arab-Israeli Conflict? I argue that Realism explains some aspects of the modern Arab-Israeli Conflict, but that realist explanations fall short, namely in the rise of non-state actors, the contempt with which the two sides hold each other, and the rise of international law. I will make this argument by first providing some historical background on the conflict, then providing a summary of the relevant points of realist theory, then I will use realist theory to explain the Arab-Israeli Conflict and finally, I will look at where realism can not explain the Arab-Israeli conflict and what other theories may be able to.
The modern-day Israeli and Palestinian territory is home to many of the holy religious sites of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. There has been much conflict over this region throughout history, most notably with the crusades of the 12th and 13th centuries (Derksen 2004 44). The modern Arab-Israeli conflict, however, began roughly around the turn of the 19th into the 20th century with increased Jewish migration to the then Palestinian controlled lands following an increase in Anti-Semitism in Russia and Europe, noted by events such as the Pogroms and the Dreyfus Affair respectively (Fraser 2015 2-6). During World War I, Great Britain tried to court both the Palestinians and the Zionists for help fighting the war, making promises to both sides, guaranteeing the Palestinians lands in the western part of Syria (which they interpreted to include modern day Syria and Lebanon), and issuing the Balfour Declaration which stated that the British government would try and form a Jewish State in the region, without infringing upon the rights of the Palestinians (Fraser 2015 7-8). After World War I, Britain was given a League of Nations mandate over the region, but their conflicting promises made it difficult to enact the promises of the Balfour Declaration (Fraser 2015 8). The Holocaust during World War II led to much more support throughout the world for the creation of a Jewish state, particularly in America (Fraser 2015 19). As tensions and conflict escalated in the region, the British government sent the problem to the United Nations which came up with a plan for partition of the region into one continuous Jewish state and a Palestinian State made up of three entities in an effort to meet the nationalistic desires of each party. Also in this plan was the creation of a Palestinian Economic Community for the entire region, as well as the designation of Jerusalem as an International City due to lobbying from the Vatican (Fraser 2015 35-37). Israel declared independence as the British mandate expired on May 14, 1948, an event which is celebrated as an Independence Day in Israel but is referred to as “Al-Nakba” or “the disaster” by the Palestinians (Gainsborough 1986 43; Fraser 2015 xiv). Immediately thereafter, the surrounding Arab states attacked Israel, and Israel gained more Palestinian territory, the legality of Israel’s possession of this territory is still under dispute (Gainsborough 1968 43-44). In 1956, there was further fighting over the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal, and out of this rose the groups called Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization whose guerrilla warfare posed a threat to Israeli security (Gainsborough 1986 62-70, 141; Fraser 2015 77). In 1967, due to a false report from the Soviet Union which told the Egyptians that Israel was mobilizing, the Six Day War occurred (Fraser 2015 80). After the Six Day War, Israel expanded to include all of the Sinai, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights in the north, but the West Bank is still disputed as settlements (Gainsborough 1986 128). In 1973, Egypt and Syria attack Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, feeling that they needed to go to war or accept the Israeli presence of the Sinai (Fraser 2015 100-102). U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, helped broker a cease-fire (Fraser 2015 102-105). In 1975, raids by Fatah led Israel to pull back from potential negotiations, and Kissinger threatened a “reassessment” of American policy, but the Israel Lobby in America, specifically the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobbied to ensure that a new aid bill to Israel would pass (Fraser 2015 108-110). The late 1970s and early 1980s saw cycles of increasing and then decreasing tensions, each time only decreasing when the American president became involved, most notably with the Camp David Accords of 1979, which provided framework for Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations where Israel would leave the Sinai Peninsula (Fraser 2015 113-132). These accords also saw what President Carter and the Egyptian leader Anwar el-Sadat saw as a framework for Palestinian autonomy and ending of the settlements in the West Bank, but Israel interpreted this differently and the pace of settlement building accelerated in the mid 1980s, which angered Palestinians and led to the First Intifada or uprising of the Palestinians in the West Bank (Fraser 2015 123-138). Brutal images of the Israelis using guns against people armed only with stones caused international support for Israel to wane, but even when the Israeli government used “might, power, and beatings” people were still angered, and out of the First Intifada came Hamas, which sought an Islamic State on all of the Palestinian Lands (Fraser 2015 138-139). The 1993 Oslo Accords and future agreements in the 1990s saw Israel grant control of the Gaza Strip and some concessions in the West Bank to the PLO via the Palestinian Authority, creating a pathway to Palestinian statehood in those regions, but creating domestic problems for Israeli leaders (Fraser 2015 143-158). Tensions escalated in the early 2000s due to increased Hamas attacks and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s visit to the Jewish holy sites leading to the Second Intifada (Fraser 2015 162-163). Israel assassinated numerous leaders of Hamas, but this just led to the group consolidating power in Gaza and gaining power in the West Bank, eventually leading to Israel withdrawing from the Gaza Strip in 2005 (Fraser 2015 187-190). Palestinians elected Hamas instead of Fatah to a majority in 2006, and infighting between the two groups led to Fatah control over the Palestinian regions of the West Bank and a Hamas governed Gaza Strip (Frazer 2015 192,198). In 2009 and then again in 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu established coalitions which shifted further to the most right-wing groups in Israeli politics (Fraser 2015 203-211). As a result, Israel again started founding new settlements in the West Bank (Fraser 2015 205-210). In the Obama era, the United Nations recognized Palestine as a “non-member state” and recently President Trump has decided to officially recognize the capital of Israel as Jerusalem, a move which angers many Arab leaders (Fraser 2015 205-210; Landler and Halbfinger 2015; Liptek and Gaouette 2017).
I will now examine what Realist theory teaches about International Relations. Realist views rest upon six main assumptions. These are 1) Human Nature is Rotten, 2) We live in a world of International Anarchy, that is there is no world government, 3) States possess offensive military capability, 4) A State can never be certain of other states motives, 5) The primary goal of all states is survival, and 6) Leaders of States are rational (David, 2017). Together, these assumptions provide for a negative view of world politics, that is in a world where there is no international government to stop conflict, war is bound to occur (David, 2017). Apart from these six core tenants of realism, there are a few other important aspects of realism. As Mearsheimer states, realism accepts states as the main actor in the international system, and states seek power as a means to ensure their security (Mearsheimer 2001 17-18, 30-36). Thus, in a realist world, states will seek to maximize their power relative to other states to ensure their own survival. Mearsheimer calls this theory “Offensive Realism” (Mearsheimer 2001 22). Furthermore, Realism can be broken down into many schools of thought. Of these, the omnibalancing theory is particularly applicable to the Arab-Israel Conflict. Originally proposed to explain the decisions regarding the balance of power system in the third world, omnibalancing dictates that state leaders will not only try to balance against external threats, but also internal threats to their own power as well (David 1991 233-238). This theory can be extrapolated to include basic foreign policy concerns outside of a balance of power system.
Now I will examine what realist theory can explain about the Arab-Israeli conflict. In short, much of the motivation for many of the different wars were justified by claiming the need for security. For example, the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 can be seen through such a light. The Six-Day War started when the Soviet Union told the Egyptians that the Israelis were beginning to mobilize. In response, the Egyptians began to mobilize, prompting the Israelis to mobilize as well, leading to conflict. In this case, each side felt that they had to mobilize to defend itself. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Egyptians felt that their security was threatened by the continued Israeli presence in the Sinai, and thus went to war to protect their security. Furthermore, according to Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism theory, the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and other areas are completely justified. Israel is merely trying to expand as much as they can.
Stephen David’s omnibalancing theory provides an alternative explanation for the Israeli expansion into the West Bank. As mentioned before, since Netanyahu has come to power, his coalition government has become increasingly conservative. In order for him to stay in control of the government, Netanyahu needs to appease these right-wing groups, and he feels that the best way to do this is to expand into the West Bank. It appears as if Netanyahu learned from his disastrous elections in 1999, where he was voted out of office in part due to the concessions that Netanyahu made at the Wye conference in 1998 (Fraser 2015 156-158). The omnibalancing theory also can explain why America has supported Israeli throughout history. There is some evidence that President Harry Truman was quick to acknowledge the State of Israel not only because he thought it was the correct thing to do, but also to win over the support of American Jews (Fraser 2015 27-28). In this view, both Netanyahu and Truman crafted their foreign policy on how to win votes at home.
Then to a realist, the Arab-Israeli conflict is much the same thing as the Silesian Wars of Frederick the Great of Prussia. Both Prussia and Austria had ethnic ties to Silesia and Frederick started war first to obtain Silesia, and then two future wars because he felt that he was in danger of losing possession of Silesia. This is much the same case as Israel trying to expand in order to increase their security, their original ties to the land stemming from the Jewish holy sites. However, unlike the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Silesian Wars did not drag on into the future. Eventually, conflict over Silesia subsided. In the next phase of my paper I will examine how realism fails at explaining the Arab-Israeli conflict, and thus why it became different from a conflict such as the Silesian Wars. (CITE)
Realist theory teaches us that states are the main actors in the International System. This, however, is not the case for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Non-state actors have played an incredibly large role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Arab groups such as the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas, as well as Israeli organizations such as Gush Emunim, the Kingdom of Israel, and various underground organizations, and sometimes lone attackers on both sides have incited violence time and time again, further escalating the conflict (Fraser 2015; Rubner 2010). Furthermore, the idea that Fatah governs the Palestinian West Bank and Hamas governs the Gaza Strip is antithetical to realism. Both Fatah and Hamas are not states, therefore, according to realism, they don’t play much of a role in the International System. In the Arab-Israeli Conflict, these two groups control relatively large pieces of territory, and thus, any future peace agreement would have to include these groups. Another example of a non-state actor influencing the region is the American Jewish Diaspora/the American Israel Lobby. As previously mentioned, Harry Truman recognized Israel in part due to American Jewish lobbying efforts, and when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger threatened to change the American position on the support of Israel, AIPAC made sure that aid to Israel would still be passed (Fraser 201527-28, 108-110). Today organizations such as AIPAC and JStreet, including many American Jews still lobby for American support of Israel. In fact, Newhouse argues that AIPAC, “is the model for other lobbying groups and for lobbying firms that aim to influence U.S. foreign policy (Newhouse 2009 75).
Realism also teaches us that there is no world government. While this is true, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been heavily influenced by international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Tensions escalated when the region was under the British control due to a League of Nations mandate. Britain eventually passed the problem to the United Nations which created a partition plan that failed. Furthermore, the United Nations has stayed involved in the issue, declaring Israeli settlements/expansion illegal for the eleventh time since 1967, in December of 2016 (United Nations). This has led to the rise of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement which has been endorsed by many organizations and activists all over the world (What is BDS?). Realists would argue that these institutions possess very little power in how the world works, however, in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, their actions have had large consequences.
A third way in which the content of the Arab-Israeli conflict departs from realism is the mutual disdain and contempt that each side holds for the other. These hatreds run deep within both sides, and have fueled the fire of the conflict for many years, and as such there are numerous examples throughout the history of the conflict. This is seen in the rhetoric that is used by each people. The Palestinians refer to Israeli Independence as “Al-Nakba,” the Arab word meaning “the Disaster.” An Israeli settler in the West Bank after 40 minutes of being asked to try and consider the question from the Palestinian point of view because to do so would weaken him, as if the Palestinians were lesser than the Israelis (Grossman 1988, 139-140). Apart from rhetoric, the actions taken by each people also show this mutual hatred, most notably the use of terrorism. Further actions include the reluctance of the Palestinians and other Arab states to acknowledge Israel, as well as the recent Israeli demolition of a Palestinian school the night before classes in the school were supposed to begin (Fraser 2015, Hass 2017). Clearly, the Arab-Israeli Conflict has escalated beyond just a fight for security, it has become a war of attrition and hatred on both sides.
Realism clearly fails to explain the importance of interstate actors, world organizations, and the ideological hatred between the two groups. Two theories in particular, the institutionalist and constructivist views, are able to explain what realism can not. The institutionalist view of international relations places much more of an emphasis on the role of international institutions, such as the United Nations, in international politics (Keohane and Martin 1995, 45). In this view, the meddling of international institutions may have caused some aspects of the conflict. The constructivist view pays attention to the social ideas and norms that have been constructed by society (Wendt 1995, 73). In this view, what is important is the religious holiness of the land, as well as the mutually constructed hatred that each side has for the other.
While each theory can explain certain aspects of the Arab-Israel Conflict, no one theory can adequately explain the conflict in its entirety. Realism can explain some of the reasoning behind various wars and for Israeli expansion into the West Bank. Institutionalism can explain the importance of international organizations such as the United Nations. Constructivism can explain how, because the two sides have a socially constructed hatred for each other, the Arab-Israeli Conflict has become so brutal. By combining the virtues of each of the relevant theories, and recognizing where each falls short, it becomes easier to understand all of the aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. This needs to be taken into account when examining future events in the region as well. Israel and Palestine both have valid security concerns, which would make a peaceful solution difficult. The importance of nonstate actors and international organizations in the conflict, as well as the constructed contempt and hatred that both sides hold for each other make the Arab-Israeli conflict more complex. In essence, all of the relevant theories, not just the theory that a person subscribes to, need to be taken into account.