It is evident that the focus of study within the international relations discipline still largely focuses on war and peace, conflict and cooperation, the state, and the distribution of power (Sorenthau). However, it is now increasingly obvious that there is a move from a focus on positivism to a reflectivist, post-positivist study of International Relations. Instead of an international systemic focus of study post- positivists are “opening the black box” that Waltz tried so desperately hard to keep closed. There was also a move from explanatory study to normative and interpretive according to Morgenthau.
The demise of soviet communism at the beginning of the 1990s promoted the study of liberal theory. Immediately after the cold war, the focus of study was that of democracy promotion. Hyperaggressive, communist states were turned into democracies, which pursued moderate foreign policies, and so the main source of disturbance to the international order was eliminated. Fukuyama claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union proved that liberal democracy had no serious ideological competitor and it was “the end of mankinds ideological evolution”(Burchill). Scholars focused their study on the emergence of international cooperation and regimes ‘after hegemony. Economic interdependence increased, internationalorganizations and cooperation spread and democracy continued. According to Kant this should have led to ‘perpetual peace’, however, this was obviously not the case so the focus of study changed (Panke and Risse).
The post cold war liberal optimistism that had been the focus of study in internationsal realtions was tempered by a series of unexpected events which suggests the path to modernity remains a rocky one. This included: the rise of ismlamist terrorism, democratic reversals in states such as Thailand and resistance to the coercive spread of democracy in Afghanistan. This suggests liberals celebration of the ‘end of history’ was premature and the focus of study changed again. It was naïve of neoliberals to think all states would buy into democracy and post-positivist theories appreciate the ideational factors. Pre- ending of the cold war neo realistas and liberals focused primarily on the study of material structures. However, with these new developments with civil wars and democracy rejection it is evident that systems of shared ideas beliefs and values also have a structural characteristics and they exert a powerful influence on social and political study. The focus has therefore moved from an emphasis on material structure to normative structures as being equally as important.
It has been argued that “the sovereign state is the single most important macrostructure determining the lives that people live”(Sorenson). It is thought that globalisation, since the end of the cold war has led to the end of the sovereign state as the focus of study in international relations. It can be argued that the Eurocentric constructions of globalization showed the rebirth of the idea of the “hyper-sovereign” western state that has a neo imperial mandate to intervene in these ‘non democratic’ developing states arguing that the focus of study remains on the realist idea of power distribution which will be discussed later in the essay (Hobson).
However, it can be argued that in this post cold war era state sovereignty is nothing but a social construct (Hobson). The most significant change in focus since the end of the cold war has been the move from an international systemic focus of international relations to a primary focus on individuals. This shapes how scholars have changed their focus of study within other aspects, for example war and the distribution of power. This, along with new emerging focus’ in international relations such as climate change( and with that conflict over water shortages), globalization and national populism which weren’t a focus of study during the cold war have shaped how we are now looking at international relations. The end of the cold war undermined the explanatory pretensions of neo-realist and neo-liberals, neither could explain the systemic changes reshaping the global order (Reus-Smit, p. 219). There is now an increased focus on normative theory and a rejection of rationalist ideology where relativist study increases.
The end of the Cold War has started a comprehensive debate about the relative distribution of power in the international system following the decline of the Soviet Union. Neorealists characterize the present system as ‘bipolarity in an altered state’. Bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care of herself and because no other great powers have emerged. Yet with the waning of Soviet power, the United States is no longer held in check by any other country or combination of countries; the system leans towards unipolarity with the U.S. as the unipolar power. However, realists such as waltz argue that the collapse of bipolarity in the early 1990s was a cause of grave concern. Mutual nuclear deterrence maintained a stabilizing balance of power in the world, whereas unipolarity wouldn’t last. These new conflicts and wars reinforces the idea that the post cold war period remains volatile and that war hasn’t lost its efficacy in international diplomacy.
On the other hand, the changing nature of world politics has complicated the distribution of power. It is argued that since the end of the cold war, power is more diffuse, less tangible, and the non-material ‘soft power’ is of increasing importance (Sorenson). As the “game” of international relations shifts from great power competition to the management of transnational issues, success requires cooperation among multiple actors. This is key, for example, in dealing with climate change. Moreover, institutionalized multilateral cooperation—increasingly required to address issues from climate to trade—tends to level the playing field by devaluing and delegitimizing the brute exercise of power. America’s soft power, so celebrated in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, may therefore be dwindling. The excesses of the “global war on terrorism”—is partly to blame for damaging the US “brand,” as well as discrediting US global efforts to promote democracy and human rights around the world. Central components of this strategy included a return to multilateral cooperation, the collective management of transnational problems, the peaceful accommodation of rising powers, and the modernization of international institutions. Economic and political power is diffusing, particularly to fast-growing emerging nations—notably to China, but also to India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, and others. Cox speculates that we may be entering a ‘post-hegemonic’ world because the forces of globalization have led to a transformation of statehood which mitigates against a new hegemony.
The role of war in this new world order is highly problematic. On the one hand, however strong the rivalries of the major Western powers are or may become, no one seriously believes that – even in the longer term – they will lead to war. The Western community of interest in a pacified world is being reinforced by institutionalisation, economic and political as well as military. arly, the collapse of the Soviet Union is a historic failure for the successor states, so that however much they may find conflict among and within themselves, it is highly unlikely that – even with nuclear weapons – states such as Russia will pose a direct threat to Western interests. Like many other states despite civil wars, they are likely to look for an accomodation with and role within the Western-dominated world economy and state-system. For all these reasons, the era of big wars between core states in the world system seems over. The total war system of global state-society relationships, which survived in markedly attenuated form during the Cold War and the nuclearisation of military technology, is finally passing. In its place, the core states of the West, and to a considerable degree many other parts of the world, are moving into a post-military relationship of state and society.
On the other hand, however, it has rapidly become apparent that some regional and, even more, civil conflicts now have greater potential for war. The removal of Cold War bloc discipline and the undermining of Cold War ideologies, especially Communism, have thrown both the state-system and state-society relations into new flux. The nation-state has been transformed from a relatively stable nexus of state-society relationships into the focus of the manifold instabilities of both the state-system and civil society. In sum, violent conflict between post-modern states is highly unlikely. But there are large zones of conflict in the Third World where domestic conflict in weak, post- colonial states is prevalent. And in consolidated liberal states, new forms of (non- violent) threat appear to be on the rise, due to the ‘risk-society’ created by global- ization. Further exploration of these patterns of conflict and threat is an important element on the post-Cold War IR-agenda.
Overall, it is evident that war is still a primary focus in the post cold war era although the nature, and therefore, how one studies it has changed significantly. There have also been other aspects that have been of growing importance within the focus of study prior to the cold war such as globalization and the increasing importance of soft power. IT is clear that the focus of study is constantly changing as does the structure of the international system. It will be interesting to see what happens next and where the discipline of IR goes as different conflicts begin to arise such as conflicts over water shortages as is already being witnessed in states in Africa.