The war on terror that started after the attacks of 9/11 has been raging for over fifteen years. At the helm of this war on terror is the United States, who for the past administrations has been fighting the war with conventional military power. It is still raging, and the number of terrorist attacks has not abated. This then exposes a problem with the approach of the United States, because as the nation spends billions and sends thousands of troops abroad, the problem is getting worse. The situation leads to more money is spent, and more people dying in the process. The direction the United States has taken is to fight the war on terror with military tactics, which has failed. There is a need then to pursue a new direction by which foreign policy is aligned so that it not only fits within the goals of the war on terror, but also within the grand scheme of American strategy. In many ways, past administrations have forgotten or ignored the notion that the war on terror is not a war per se, but a foreign policy that seeks to oppose any state or non-state actor from indiscriminate violence against noncombatants. Terrorism is not an ideology but a tactic. The direction that the United States should pursue with regard to the war on terror is to revisit its original purpose and work with the international community to make it difficult for terrorists to work within nations, and not to force policies that can only alienate possible allies.
The war on terror was declared at the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The War on Terror was declared by George W. Bush twelve hours after the 9/11 attacks (Gordon 53). Ever since then, the United States has tried to find ways to finally win the war. Initially, the war on terror sought to go after al-Qaeda, who was the main suspect in the 9/11 attacks. However, as the years passed, it has become apparent that the fighting the war on terror was not as easy as looking for al-Qaeda and its leaders and eliminating them. Even after Osama bin Laden was neutralized during the administration of Barack Obama, the war on terror is still raging. In fact, it has intensified and cost the United States dearly. For over 15 years since the war has been raging, tangible costs for the United States “include 6,874 service members killed, 2.5 million Americans sent to fight, and an estimated $4.4 trillion dollars spent” (Goepner 107). The way it has affected the United States in terms of foreign policy has become apparent all over the world.
The war on terror is in itself a foreign policy that they United States have adopted in the past fifteen years. The reason for this is that the global war on terror is considered the most ambitious reordering of foreign policy objectives since World War II (Boyle 191). The re-evaluation was not just a move that is a reordering of foreign policy, but also a warning to the rest of the world. The war on terror was a warning, because it sought to reorder the world in terms of those who were fighting with the United States, and those who were not going to cooperate. As George W. Bush said at the joint session of Congress, “the joint session of Congress following the attacks, President Bush said that ‘every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist” (Boyle 191). This was a problem for many nations, because they many were not too keen on fighting the war on terror, especially since many were not yet affected by the terrorism at that point in time. The war on terror deepened the relations of many nations, especially those who had an interest in demise of al-Qaeda and ending the global terror threat (Ryan 338). However, it also strained relations with nations who have mixed records in fighting terrorism, such as Saudi Arabia (Boyle 191). Although the events of 9/11 did not change everything, it has altered the alliance system that served as the foundation of United States foreign policy since 1945. It may have seemed the United States was on track, but in reality it has gone adrift.
The current situation of the war on terror has cast doubt on its sustainability. Critics from both sides of the Atlantic, and across the world have voiced their doubt as to the intellectual and political sustainability of the war (Boyle 191). The problem lies in the notion that it is at all possible to wage a war on a tactic, terrorism, as opposed to an enemy per se. Indeed, the enemy in the war on terror is not just al-Qaeda, or Islamic State. It is their ideology that is the real enemy. The United States has fought the war on terror on the basis that there is a single identifiable enemy, like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, and the multitude of other minor organizations it considers as terrorists. This has resulted in what the Human Rights Watch called handing a “blank check” to any state that wanted stamp out internal dissent (Boyle 192). This is of course a problematic situation, because not every organization that dissents is a terrorist. If that were the case, then corrupt governments would stay in power longer because of the help of the United States, which is not good foreign policy at all. Instead of gaining the support of nations and coming up with new solutions, as opposed to military, the United States has been fighting a war that sees no end in the near future.
The current strategies that comprise the war on terror have not been successful. Goepner notes that over the past fifteen years, increased United States efforts are correlated to the overall worsening of the overall terror situation (111). In short, instead of alleviating the terror situation, efforts by the United States has only resulted in making the situation worse. For example, for every additional billion dollars spent, and 1,000 soldiers deployed to fight the war on terror, worldwide terror attacks increase 19 (Goepner 111). The goal of fighting terrorism and the methods that were used are not helping alleviate the situation. The result of the effort of the war on terror is wasted money, the lives of combatant and noncombatants, as well as the growing discontent around the world on how the war on terror should be handled. This is because nations who have been invaded by the United States have come out worse than they were in the past. Data shows that countries that were invaded by the United States in pursuit of terrorists had 143 more terror attacks per year, and countries where the United States conducted drone strikes were home to 395 more terror attacks per year than those where the United States did not conduct drone strikes (Goepner 111). Invasions and drone strikes have had the effect of inciting more terrorist attacks, as opposed to minimizing them. This situation calls for a new approach to fighting the war on terror, one that recognizes the realities of terrorism and how the strategies employed in the past have made it worse.
To pursue the war on terror, the United States should recognize that terrorism is a transnational problem. It is not a problem that is situated only in the Middle East, or wherever the United States perceives the treat is coming from. To put it simply, the enemy is not “a geographically bound nation state” (Prieto 6). Terrorism is borderless, dispersed, and networked movement. The notion here is that terrorists are not supposed to be fought with conventional means. Indeed, terrorism is in itself an unconventional tactic, so conventional methods will work. To be effective, the war on terror must be fought at all stages of the terrorist life cycle (Prieto 7). One way of looking at the situation is to address the problem by addressing noncriminal actions as well as actions that amount to crime and war. This also means that the United States should focus on fighting the war at in international level. However, the way it is going about it now is not ideal. Going after enemies purely by military means will not end the war on terror, because it is not what will address the problem. Military means, such as preventive wars, and going after fringe states should no longer be used as the only means to fight the war on terror.
Part of the solution to the problem of the war on terror is to revisit the goals and situate them within the grand strategy of the United States. For too long, the war has been fought as a separate policy, as opposed to being part of a bigger scheme. Even though there has concerns over the way the war on terror is being fought, it is going to be a foreign policy that will last for a long time. As Boyle pointed out, the problem of international terrorism will always remain, and once a phrase like “war on terror” has gained currency, it is going to be hard to abandon (192). However, it is going to continue, American policy makers need to think about the notion critically. Part of the solution then is to think about its purpose and how it is situated in the grand American strategy. The way to do this is to return to the core ideas behind the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States that was first published in 2002 and revised in 2006 (Boyle 192). The document provided a very simple yet powerful goal that has been forgotten in favor of military tactics.
The goal of that was encompassed in the NSS was to establish a long lasting prohibition on both states and non-state actors against engaging in or supporting terrorism (Boyle 192). Essentially, the goal is to stop actors from engaging in, or supporting terrorism. This is far from the strategy that was used by previous administrations that painted the war on terror as a primarily military endeavor. This was what happened when the Bush administration went after Saddam Hussein, as well as confusing the war on terror with other priorities, such as promoting democracy (Boyle 192). Indeed, since the start of the war, the United States has made it a priority to go after those who are believed to be terrorists. It is this muddled thinking about the nature of the enemy, for example that they are also enemies of democracy, which has caused the war on terror to drift off course. The problem then is that in veering away from a very simple and yet powerful goal, the United States has implemented a strategy where fighting terrorism involves the use of military tactics. The strategy should have should have been very simple, because the idea behind the war on terror was for the United States to be irrevocably opposed any actor who uses indiscriminate violence against noncombatants (Boyle 192). For the United States to pursue the war on terror, it should relocate within the grand American strategy.
American policymakers need to relocate the war on terror within the grand strategy by rejecting false analogies, revisiting the original purpose of the war, and to recognize that bilateral enforcement is detrimental to the United States. A problem with the direction the war on terror has taken is that it American policymakers have made a false analogy between terrorism and fascism or communism (Boyle 192). This is a result of the misreading of history that results converts fighting a tactic, terrorism, into fighting ideology. Indeed, not everyone who employs terrorism is doing it for fascism or communism, the historical enemies of democracy, which the United States is a champion. In fighting what is perceived as an ideology, the United States has chased rogue states at the expense of creating a stable international coalition of states that create a functional cooperation against terrorism (Boyle 193). This is a very big problem, because the United States is fighting a tactic, not an ideology that has an international element. This also strays far from the original purpose of the war.
The original purpose of the war was to stop the use of terror as a tactic by making states assume responsibility of the vigorous policing of terror groups within their borders. One of the ways this can be achieved is to induce the commitment of linchpin states, both great powers and endangered allies such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as opposed to forcing regime changes in states that support terrorist groups (Boyle 193). The result of this tactic is that terrorism will be delegitimized as a foreign policy choice. This can be done by lowering the costs of counterterrorism for states that are willing to cooperate. The war on terror cannot be won by going after states in the margins, because doing so will only cost more and result in unpredictable circumstances. Simply put, the United States should adopt a foreign policy that encourages states to be active players in the fight against terrorism, as opposed to going after what Bush once called the Axis of Evil.
The current tactic of enforcing bilateral antiterrorism strategies is detrimental. The reason for this is that it has costs for United States power, and puts elements of the American grand strategy at risk, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights (Boyle 193). The key to winning the war is for the United States to institutionalize cooperation on the war on terror, as opposed to bold foreign policy choices, such as a democratic revolution in the Middle East. This will ensure that states will not defect from the goal of fighting terrorism, because they will not have to worry about changes in their regime. Boyle notes that one of the ways the United States can achieve this is to renounce the policy of preventive wars (Boyle 193). In doing so, the United States is able to reduce costs, as well as maintain its power in the international arena. This will then result in going back to the idea of maintaining a global initiative against inflicting indiscriminate harm on noncombatants.
The current administration of Donald J. Trump is facing both a serious problem as well as the opportunity to forge a new direction in the war against terror. Trump needs to learn from the mistakes of the past. Even though Trump positioned himself as an isolationist, his calls for aggressive action against Islamic State are cause for concern (Barnett 24). Instead of pursuing the a unilateral action, Trump might not wait for allies before acting, which already happened when a United States warship blasted a Syrian airbase with cruise missiles, and when it dropped the “Mother of All Bombs” in ISIS caves in Afghanistan. This is again an example of using military tactics to solve the problem of terrorism. This is not the ideal, because it will just be relying on strategies that past administrations have relied on, ones that did not work. In order to make the war on terror work, the present administration should apply the concept of the aforementioned strategies such as rejecting false analogies. For example, context should be brought to individual conflicts, as opposed to taking them at face value. This is recognition of the notion that the origins of terrorist groups are rooted in unique political, economic, and social situations. Foreign policy should be based on addressing these problems. Furthermore, the current administration should refrain from equating terrorism on religion, in particular, Islam. Barnett says that this concept is not only false, but also dangerous (Barnett 24). This is against the concept of making linchpin states assume that responsibility of policing terrorism, because some of them, like the aforementioned Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are Muslim nations. This kind of thinking will only result in alienating them and making them leave any coalitions that can be created by fostering cooperation and understanding. In many ways, these tactics are more ideal than the way things are being carried about in the international stage. The threat of terrorism still exists because it has been mishandled in the past fifteen years. It is now time for the United States to pursue a new direction, one that it should have taken in the past fifteen years.